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Subjectivism in Ethics

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GE 5:

Ethics
Prepared by your friendly
instructor:
Andre John C. Apilado
Subjectivism in Ethics
Ethical subjectivism is the idea that
moral opinions are based on our
feelings and nothing more. On this
view, there is no such thing as
“objective” right and wrong.
Subjectivism in Ethics
Ethical subjectivism is a meta-ethical
theory

Does not tell us how we ought to live

Does not tell us what specific actions


are right or wrong
Subjectivism in Ethics

“x is morally acceptable”
“x is right”
“x is good”
All these statements = “I (the
speaker) approve of x”
Problems with simple Subjectivism

No one is infallible


There cannot be moral
disagreement (though in fact
there is disagreement about
moral issues).
Subjectivism in Ethics

 It is a fact that the Nazis exterminated


millions of innocent people; but
according to Ethical Subjectivism, .it is
not a fact that what they did was evil.
When we say their actions were evil we
are only saying that we have only
negative feelings towards them. The
same applies to any moral judgment
whatever.
Subjectivism in Ethics
 People have different opinions, but
where morality is concerned there is no
“facts”
 And no one is “right”, people just feel
differently, and that’s the end of it.
 But this contradicts the plain fact that no
one is infallible. We are some times
wrong. Therefore, simple subjectivism
cannot be correct.
The denial of moral truth:
Emotivism

Or, the "hurrah/boo!"


theory
Emotivism
 Emotivism does not view moral
assertions as either true or false.
 Reporting – “I (the speaker) approve of x”
 Expressing – “Hurrah for x” (does not
express my feelings about x)
 Moral statements are essentially
commands, and not at all fact stating.
Where it fits in
 A non-cognitivist theory: morality is non-
propositional, and so can’t be known to be
true or false.
 If moral judgments are not true or false, we
can’t reason about basic moral principles.
 “X is good” simply means “Hurrah for X!”
 so goodness and immorality are limited to our
(societal?) preferences.
 For example, the death penalty makes me feel
nasty.
 So it’s wrong
Ayer’s arguments for Emotivism:
 To be meaningful, a proposition must be empirically
verifiable or analytically true.
 ‘My favourite trousers are Lycra’ (verifiable)
 “Married people are partnered” (analytic)
 A C20 restatement of ‘Hume’s Fork’ – if not ‘matter of
fact’ or ‘relation of idea’, then meaningless.
 Moral opinions
 neither factually verifiable
 Or reducible to tautologies
 So are meaningless (as are religious, aesthetic,
metaphysical claims)
 E.g “There is a God”, “Terrorism is wrong”, ‘There
are objects that exist without being perceived’.
Ayer’s conclusions
 Moral arguments are just expressions of
feeling.
 Ethical statements and moral judgements are
emotive responses: they seek to arouse
feelings or express pain.
 So moral judgements are persuasive, but they
are not factual.
 They might look like they assert truth-claims
(moral statements resemble declarative,
testable statements)…but…
 They assert an emotion, that’s all.
Emotivism isn’t subjectivism

 Mind! Emotivism isn’t subjectivism:


 Emotivism: “X is good” means “Hurrah for X!”
 Subjectivism: “X is good”
 This means “I like X”

 A verifiable proposition

 hence T/F

 hence meaningful as a psychological not


ethical claim (according to Ayer)
 We could test if you liked X…
Virtues of Emotivism

 Problem with fallibility is avoided since


moral utterances are not true or false.
 Different senses of disagreement
 Factual disagreement
 Disagreements about what we think ought to
happen
 Disagreements about attitudes
 Disagreements in attitude

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