Economics of Strategy

Sixth Edition
Besanko, Dranove, Shanley and Schaefer

Chapter 4
Integration and Its Alternatives

Copyright  2013 John Wiley  Sons, Inc.

 Vertical Boundaries

For each step in the vertical chain the firm

has to decide between market exchange and
vertical integration
The degree of vertical integration differs
 Across industries
 Across firms within an industry

 Across transactions with in firm

 The Tradeoff in Vertical Integration

Using the market improves technical

efficiency (least cost production)
Vertical integration improves agency
efficiency (coordination, transactions costs)
Firms should “economize” - choose the best
possible combination of technical and
agency efficiencies.
 Path Dependence
A firm may not possess the skills to sell to
multiple buyers.
When a supplier is acquired, the firm will
have the skills to sell to others besides itself
Competitive considerations may limit the
use of this resource.
 Technical Efficiency

Using the market leads to higher technical

efficiency compared to vertical integration
(power of market discipline)
The difference in technical efficiency of
market over vertical integration (T)
depends on the nature of the assets involved
in production
 Technical Efficiency

As the assets become more specialized the

market firm’s advantage becomes weaker
The difference in technical efficiency of
market over vertical integration (T)
declines with greater asset specificity
 Agency Efficiency

At high levels of asset specificity, differential

agency efficiency (A) of market over
vertical integration is negative
When specialized assets are involved,
potential for a holdup is high and the
transactions costs are higher
 Agency Efficiency

At low levels of asset specificity, differential

agency efficiency of market over vertical
integration (A) is likely to be positive
Without the holdup problem, market
exchange could be more “agency efficient”
than in-house production
Technical and Agency Efficiency

Tradeoff between Agency Efficiency and Technical Efficiency

 Efficiency Tradeoff
The combined (market over vertical
integration) differential efficiency (C) will
be negatively related to asset specificity
At high levels of assets specificity vertical
integration is more efficient
At low levels of assets specificity market
firms have an edge.
 Efficiency Tradeoff and Scale
When the scale of production increases, the
vertically integrated firm enjoys better
economies of scale
With increased scale, the differential
technical efficiency decreases for every level
of asset specificity
 Efficiency Tradeoff and Scale
With an increase in scale, the
differential agency efficiency becomes
more sensitive to asset specificity
Differential agency efficiency will
 increase with scale for low asset specificity
and
 decrease with scale with high asset
specificity.
 Efficiency Tradeoff and Scale

The Effect of Increased Scale on Tradeoff between Agency and Technical Efficiency
 Efficiency Tradeoff and Scale

The combined differential efficiency (C)

sharply declines for low asset specificity
The degree of asset specificity at which
market is just competitive with vertical
integration declines
Vertical integration is preferred to market
exchange over a larger range of asset
specificity
 The Efficiency Tradeoff Model: Conclusions

Supplier’s economies of scale will make

routine products and services to be procured
in the market.
Firms with large shares in the products are
likely to be vertically integrated.
Relationship-specific assets will tilt the
advantage in favor of vertical integration.
 Real-World Evidence
As manufacturing firms increased in size
they forward integrated into marketing and
distribution.
Forward integration was more likely when
specialized investments were needed.
Statistical evidence supports scale and asset
specificity effects.
 Real-World Evidence

GM is more vertically integrated than Ford

is, for the same asset specificity (scale)
In aerospace, greater design specificity
increases the likelihood of vertical
integration of production
Among utilities, mine-mouth plants are
more likely to be integrated compared with
other plants
 Real-World Evidence

In the electronics components industry

firms rely on own sales force:
 when there is greater asset specificity
 when they are larger manufacturers

 when performance measurement is more

difficult
 Vertical Integration and Asset
Ownership

Make-or-buy decision is essentially a

decision regarding ownership and control
rights about assets. (Grossman, Hart and
Moore)
Ownership brings with it the residual control
rights (rights not specified in contracts).
Vertical integration transfers the residual
rights of control to the firm.
 Vertical Integration and Asset
Ownership

With complete contracts it does not matter

who owned the assets in the vertical chain.
With incomplete contracts, ownership
determines the willingness of each party to
make relationship-specific investments.
 Vertical Integration and Asset
Ownership

Three ways to organize the vertical

chain
 The two units are independent (non
integration)
 Upstream unit owns the assets of the
downstream unit (forward integration)
 Downstream unit owns the assets of the
upstream unit (backward integration)
 Asset Ownership and Integration

The form of integration affects the

incentives to invest in relationship-
specific assets
Whether vertical integration is optimal
or not depends on the relative
contribution to value added by each
party’s investment
 Asset Ownership and Integration

If the investments by the upstream player

and the downstream player are of
comparable importance, market exchange is
preferred
If the investment by one player is more
important in value creation, vertical
integration is preferred
 Asset Ownership and Integration

Asset ownership is an important dimension

of vertical integration
There could be degrees of integration
depending on the extent of control over
specialized assets
 Example: Auto manufacturers can use
independent suppliers for body parts but own the
dies and stamping machines
Governance and Vertical Integration
Use of market firms entail contracting
inefficiencies
Vertical integration replaces contracting
with governance
Delegation of decision rights and control of
assets occur within the firm instead of
between firms.
Poor governance may nullify the benefits of
vertical integration
Governance and Vertical Integration

When physical assets are involved,

upstream (or downstream) asset ownership
can be used along with market exchange
When human assets are important,
acquiring control of these assets can be done
only through a full fledged vertical
integration
 Process Issues in Vertical Mergers

The process by which governance develops

excludes certain governance arrangements.
Post-merger conflicts may not allow
cooperation between managers of the
acquiring and the acquired firm.
 Alternatives to Vertical Integration

Tapered integration (making some and

buying the rest)
Joint ventures and strategic alliances
Semi formal collaborative relationships
based on long term implicit contracts
between firms
 Tapered Integration
Tapered integration is a mixture of vertical
integration and market exchange.
A firm may produce part of its input on its
own and purchase the rest.
A firm may sell part of its output through
in-house sales efforts and sell the rest
through independent distributors.
 Tapered Integration: Advantages
Additional input/output channels without
massive capital investments
Information about costs and profitability
from internal operations can help in
negotiating with market firms
Threat of self manufacture can impose
discipline on external suppliers.
 Tapered Integration: Advantages

Internal channels will be motivated by

potential expansion of the use of outside
sources.
Internal supply capabilities will protect
against potential holdups
Tapered Integration: Disadvantages

Possible loss of economies of scale

Coordination may become more difficult
since the two production units must agree
on product specifications and delivery times
Managers may be self-serving in continuing
with internal production well after it has
become inefficient to do so
 Strategic Alliances and Joint Ventures

Strategic alliances involve cooperation,

coordination and information sharing for a
joint project by the participating firms.
A joint venture is an alliance where a new
independent organization is created and
jointly owned by the promoting firms.
 Strategic Alliances

Strategic alliances and joint ventures fall

between pure market exchange and full
vertical integration.
Alliances rely on trust and reciprocity
instead of contracts.
Disputes are rarely litigated but resolves
through negotiation.
 Strategic Alliance - Scenarios

Uncertainty surrounding future activities

prevents the parties from writing detailed
contracts.
Transactions are complex and one cannot
count on contract law to “fill the gaps.”
Relationship-specific assets give rise to
potential holdup problems
 Strategic Alliance - Scenarios

It is costly for any one party to develop the

necessary expertise.
Market opportunity for the transaction is
not expected to last very long making a long
term contract or merger unattractive.
Regulatory environment necessitates
acquiring a local partner for the venture
 Collaborative Relationships

Traditionally Japanese and Korean

industrial firms have been less vertically
integrated compared to their western
counterparts.
Recent trend in the West is vertical
disintegration and a focus on core
competencies.
 Collaborative Relationships

Japanese and Korean firms have organized

the vertical chain using long term
relationships rather than arm’s length
transactions
Two major types of collaborative
relationships are found in Japan
 Subcontractor networks
 Keiretsu (Chaebol in Korea)
 Subcontractor Networks

Japanese manufacturers maintain close,

informal, long term relationship with their
network of subcontractors
The typical relationship between a
manufacturer and a subcontractor involves
far more asset specificity in Japan than in
the West.
 Keiretsu
Members have strong institutional linkages.
Links are further strengthened by social
affiliation and personal relationship among
executives.
Easy coordination and no holdups when
vertical chain activities are performed by
keiretsu members
 Evidence on Keiretsu

Recent research indicates that keiretsu

are not what they were thought to be.
Members have extensive business
dealings outside their keiretsu. They
borrow from the keiretsu banks as well as
from outside banks.
 Keiretsu
Debt, Equity, and Trade
Linkages in Japanese
Keiretsu
 Implicit Contracts
Implicit contracts are unstated
understanding between firms in a business
relationship.
Members of a keiretsu work with each other
through implicit contracts.
Longstanding relationship between firms
can make them behave cooperatively
towards each other without any formal
contracts.
 Implicit Contracts

The threat of losing future business (and the

future stream of profits) is enough to deter
opportunistic behavior in any one period.
The desire to protect one’s reputation in the
market place can be another mechanism
that makes implicit contracts viable.
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