Pilapil VS Ibay Somera

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA,
HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, and
ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen married private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national on September 7,
1979 at Federal Republic of Germany. They lived together in Malate, Manila
and had a child named Isabella Pilapil Geiling.
Unfortunately, after about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial
disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating divorce proceeding against
Imelda before the Schoneberg Local Court in Germany. He claimed that
there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since
April 1982.
Imelda, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and
separation of property before the RTC of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January
23, 1983.
FACTS:
On January 15, 1986, the Schoneberg Local Court in Germany, promulgated

a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The
custody of the child was granted to petitioner.
The records show that under German law said court was locally and
internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution
of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law
of that foreign jurisdiction
FACTS:
June 27, 1986, Geiling filed two (2) complaints for Adultery against Imelda
before the City Fiscal of Manila. Geiling alleged that Imelda had an affair with
William Chia in 1982 and Jesus Chua in 1983 in the duration of their
marriage.
Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding
investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence.
However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution,
dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery
against the petitioner.
FACTS:
"People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia”

Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the
respondent judge Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera;
"People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua“

Criminal Case No. 87-52434 was assigned to Branch XXV presided by Judge
Leonardo Cruz.
FACTS:
Petitioner then filed a petition asking to set aside the aforementioned

resolution (January 8, 1986) and dismiss the cases against her before the
Secretary of Justice.
A similar petition was also filed by James Chua - petitioner’s co-accused in
Criminal case no. 87-52434.
The Secretary of Justice granted such petition.
The respondent city fiscal was directed to inform the Department of Justice
"if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to
move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of
both cases to his office for review.
FACTS:
Petitioner then filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment
and to suspend further proceedings.
Consequently, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended the proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 87-52434.
However, respondent Judge Ibay-Somera reset the date of the arraignment
of Criminal case no. 87-52435, to which petitioner moved for the cancellation
of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings until after the
resolution was reviewed by the Secretary of Justice.
Petitioner also filed for motion to quash the said case due to lack of
jurisdiction which was denied by respondent judge in an order dated
September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both
accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia
FACTS:
Petitioner filed for special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order
of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without
jurisdiction
"to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense
that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported
complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse
having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to
his filing the criminal complaint."
FACTS:
On October 21, 1987, the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining

order enjoining the respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of
September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-
52435.
Subsequently, on March 23, 1988, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez
acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's
ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to
move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent
Geiling can prosecute petitioner
Pilapil on the ground of adultery
after the issuance of a final divorce
decree.
HELD:
No, private respondent Geiling can no longer prosecute petitioner Pilapil on
the ground of adultery after the issuance of a final divorce decree.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery can only
be filed by the offended spouse and nobody else.
Criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State,
through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the
complaining witness therein.
However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such
genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right
to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within
his power and option.
HELD:
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute

the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status,
capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the
criminal action.
It is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to
commence the action be definitely established and, as already
demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time
he initiates the action
HELD:
There does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the
specific issue as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an
offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced
only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which
are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been
decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings
against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse
shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery.
Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce
subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the
criminal proceedings to a conclusion
HELD:
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the

complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus
was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have been
committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was
begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to entitle
him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is
against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the
reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that
the unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is
commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
HELD:
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case
and in our jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the
matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the
complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the
complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be
an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the
accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce
in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce
and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on
the matter of status of persons.
HELD:
Hence, Geiling no longer has marital relations with the

Imelda and has lost his legal capacity as an offended
spouse to file for the crime of adultery against the latter.

Pilapil VS Ibay Somera

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Pilapil VS Ibay Somera

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Pilapil VS Ibay Somera

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL,

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

On January 15, 1986, the Schoneberg Local Court in Germany, promulgated

"People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia”

"People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua“

Petitioner then filed a petition asking to set aside the aforementioned

On October 21, 1987, the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute

'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the

Hence, Geiling no longer has marital relations with the

You might also like