GLOBAL DEMOGRAPHY

GROUP 10
 G LO BA L

Re la t in g t o t he w h o le w o r l d ; w o r ld w id e .

D EM O G R A PH Y

D e m o g r a p h y is   th e s tu d y of h u m a n
p o p ul a ti on s – t h ei r si z e, c o m p o s it io n a n d
d is t r ib u ti o n a c r o ss s p ac e   – a n d th e
process th r o u g h w h ic h p o p u la t io n s
c h a n ge . Bi r th s, d ea t hs a nd m ig r a tio n ar e
th e 'b ig th r e e ' of d e m o g r a p h y, jo in tl y
p r o d u c in g p o p u l a tio n s ta b il ity o r c h a n g e .
 P O PU LATI O N

Population a n d e c o l o g y a r e c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o e a c h o t h e r. T h e g r o w t h o f p o p u l a t i o n c a n b e a
burden to the environment, depleting its resources and threatening human and animal lite

D EM O G R A PH Y

D EM O Me a n s pe o p le . DEMOS M e a n s p o p u la t io n .

G R A PH Y Me a n s Me a s u r em e n t . OR Me a n s p ic tu r es .
 W h y de m o gr a p h y m a tt e r s ?

• The interest of people about demography increase due to the so-called

demographic change.

• A development sometimes called "the ageing of societies. This actually gives

communities information they need to plan future investments and services.

• In this globalized world, with our knowledge of the history of population, we

may use paradigms in the past.
 T H E TO O LS O F D EM O G R A PH Y

Demographics help us understand the size, status, and behavior of populations. ... As a tool for objectively
studying populations, population ecologists rely on a series of statistical measures, known as demographic parameters,
to describe that population (Lebreton et al. 1992).

COUNT R ATI O N R AT E

P R O P O RTI O N C O N STA N T

C O H O RT M EA S U R E P ER I O D M E A S U R E
 COUNT

The absolute number of a population or any demographic event occurring in a specified area in a specified time period.

R ATE

The frequency of demographic events in population during a specified time period (usually a year)
divided by the population “at risk” of the event occurring during that time period.
R a t e s t e l l h o w c o m m o n i t i s f o r a g i v e n e v e n t t o o c c u r. R a t e s m a y b e

•C r u d e r a t e s
•S p e c i f i c r a t e s
•S t a n d a r d i z e d r a t e s

R AT I O

The relation of one population subgroup to the total population or to another subgroup; that is, one
subgroup divided by another .
 P R O P O RTIO N

The relation of a population subgroup to the entire population; that is, a population subgroup
divided by the entire population.

C O N S TA N T

An unchanging, arbitrary number (for example, 100 or 1000 or 100000) by which rates, ratios,
or proportions can be multiplied to express these measures in a more understandable fashion.
(K or constant).

C O H O RT M E A S U R E

• A s t a t i s t i c t h a t m e a s u r e s e v e n t s o c c u r r i n g t o a C O H O RT ( a g r o u p o f p e o p l e s h a r i n g a
common demographic experience) who are observed through time. Cohorts may be:

• Birth cohorts
• Marriage cohorts
• school cohorts
 P ER I O D M E A S U R E

A statistic that measures events occurring to all or part of a population during one period of
t i m e “ . I t t a k e s a s n a p s h o t ” o f a p o p u l a t i o n , i n e ff e c t .

I M P O TR N C E O F D EM O G R A PH I C D ATA

I m p o r t a nc e o f d e m o g r ap h i c d a l h e a lt h s ta t u s o f a c o m m u n i ty d e p e nd s up o n t h e
d yn am i c r e la tio n s h ip b e tw e e n nu m b e r o f p e o pl e , th e ir c o m p o s i tio n & d i s tr i b ut io n .

p la n n in g of h e a lt h se r v i ce s c a n b e g ui d e d b y d e m o g r ap h i c v a r i a bl e s , f o r e x a m p le : h o w
m a n y h e a lth u n i ts d o w e ne e d ? H o w t o d is t r ib u te th e m i n t h e c o m m u ni ty in o r d er to b e
a c c es s ib le to th e t arg e t p o p ul a ti on ? W h a t ty p e o f m a n p o w e r is n e e d ed ?
 G LO BA L D EM O G R A P H Y

Fo r m u ch o f h um a n h i s to r y, d e m o gr a p h ic p a tte r n s w e r e r e a s o n a b ly
s ta b le ; h u m a n p o p u la tio n s g r e w s lo w l y, an d th e a g e s t r u c tu r e s , b i r th
r a te s , a n d d e a th r at e s o f p o p u la t io n s c h a n g e d o n ly g r a d u a ll y. Ep i d em ic s
an d p a n de m ic s h a d h u g e e ff e c ts o n p op u l at io n s , b u t th e s e e ff e c ts w e r e
s h or t- l iv e d a n d h a d li ttl e b e a r in g o n l o ng - te r m tr e n ds .

I n t h e pa s t 5 0 y e a r s, h o w e v e r, th is t r e n d o f lo n g - te r m s ta b il ity h a s g iv e n
w a y to t h e b ig g e st d e m o gr a p h ic u p h e a v a l i n h is t or y, a n u p h e a v a l th a t is
s til l r u n n in g its c o u r s e. I n th e d ev e l op e d w o r ld , a s h a r p p o s t- w a r r is e in
f e r ti lit y w a s f o ll o w e d b y an e qu a l ly s h a r p f a ll . T he s e c h a n ge s in f e r til ity
tr a n s f o r m e d a g e str u c tu r e s t h r o u g h th e c r e a tio n o f a ‘ b a by b o o m ’
g en e r at io n . Th e a g ei n g o f t h is g e n e r a tio n a n d c o n ti n ue d d e c lin e s in
f e r ti lit y a n d o ld - a g e m o r ta li ty a r e s h i f ti n g th e p op u l a tio n b a la n c e in
d ev e lo p e d c ou n t r ie s f r o m y ou n g to o ld . I n th e m e a n t im e , th e d e v e lo p in g
w o r l d h as e x pe r ie n c e d a p o p u la ti o n ex p lo s io n , th e r e s u lt o f im p r o v e d
n ut r it io n , p u b lic h e al th in f r as tr u c t ur e a n d m ed i c a l ca r e .
G L O B A L D E M O G R A P H I C T R E N D S A N D PAT T E R N S

The global population, which stood at just over 2 billion in 1950, is 6.5 billion today.
The world is currently gaining new inhabitants at a rate of 76 million people a year
(representing the difference, in 2005, between 134 million births and 58 million
deaths). Although this growth is slowing, middle-ground projections suggest the world
will have 9.1 billion inhabitants by 2050, when growth will be approximately 34 million
a year.

(See figure 1). The population of the world's 50 least-developed countries is expected

to more than double by the middle of this century, with several poor countries tripling
their population over the period. By contrast, the population of the developed world is
expected to remain steady at around 1.2 billion, with population declines in some
wealthy countries.
G L O B A L D E M O G R A P H I C T R E N D S A N D PAT T E R N S
C R U D E B I R T H A N D D E AT H R AT E S

O n e o f th e si m p le st w ay s t o c o n s i de r po p u l at io n g r o w th is t hr o ug h c r u d e b ir t h a n d
d ea t h r a te s. Th e se a r e th e n u m b e r o f b ir th s a n d d ea t h s pe r 1 ,0 0 0 p eo pl e . O n a
w o r l dw id e b a sis , t h e di ff e r e n c e b e tw ee n th e s e r a t e s is th e r a t e o f p o p u la ti o n g r o w t h.
Wit hi n r eg i o ns o r c o u n tr ie s , p o p u l at io n g r o w th is a ls o a ff e c te d b y e m ig r a tio n a n d
im m ig r a tio n . Fi g u r e 2 s h o w s th a t i n b o th d e v e lo p e d a n d d e v el o p in g r e g io n s th e c r u d e
b ir th r a te h a s d ec r e a s e d b y a b o u t h a lf o v e r th e p a s t 5 0 y e a r s . T h is im p li e s a m u c h
g r e a te r a b so lu t e r e d uc t io n in d e v e lo p in g r e g io n s . Th e n e t r e s u lt o f th e s e r e d u c tio n s is
a c u r r e n t c r u d e b ir th r a t e in de ve lo p in g r e gi o n s t ha t i s s i m il ar t o th a t o f th e d ev e lo p e d
r e g io n s 50 y e a r s ag o.
C R U D E B I R T H A N D D E AT H R AT E S
C R U D E B I R T H A N D D E AT H R AT E S
 FERTILITY

The UN uses several differing assumptions about future fertility in making its projections. For the data and figures
in this paper, we have used the UN's ‘medium-fertility variant’ in all instances in which more than one variant is
available: total fertility rate, crude birth rate, crude death rate, population (for all age groups), population growth
rate, migration rate and number of migrants.

For the medium-fertility variant, the UN assumes for all countries that fertility will gradually converge to 1.85
children per woman. It does not assume that countries will necessarily reach that level by 2050. For high- and
medium-fertility countries (that is, those with total fertility at or below 2.1 children per woman in 2000–2005),
projections are built on the experience of all countries that experienced fertility declines during the past half-
century. If a country's fertility rate is projected to fall to 1.85 before 2050, the UN model assumes it will then
remain at that level. Projections are not done mechanistically; they are always checked against recent trends in a
specific country. In some instances, these recent trends require an adjustment in projections for the coming five
or ten years, after which time projections revert to the basic fertility projection model. For low-fertility countries
whose fertility rate is currently below 1.85, the model used by the UN assumes that fertility in the coming five to
ten years will follow recent trends and will then increase at a rate of 0.07 children every five years.
FERTILIT
Y

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE

FERTILIT
Y

INFANT AND CHILD MORTALITY DECLINE

The developing world has seen significant reductions in infant and child mortality over
the past 50 years (see Figure 6). Infant mortality (death prior to age 1) in developing
countries has dropped from 180 to about 57 deaths per 1,000 live births. It is projected
to decline further to fewer than 30 deaths per 1,000 live births by 2050. The past half-
century's gains resulted primarily from improved nutrition, public health interventions
related to water and sanitation, and medical advances such as the use of vaccines and
antibiotics. Infant mortality rates in the developed world have been, and will continue to
be, significantly lower than those in the developing world. Developed countries have
seen infant mortality decline from 59 to 7 deaths per 1,000 live births since 1950, and
this is projected to decline further still, to 4 by 2050. Child mortality (death prior to age
5) has also fallen, in both developed and developing countries.
FERTILIT
Y

INFANT AND CHILD MORTALITY DECLINE

FERTILIT
Y

LIFE EXPECTANCY AND LONGEVITY

For the world as a whole, life expectancy increased from 47 years in 1950–1955 to 65 years in 2000–2005.
It is projected to rise to 75 years by the middle of this century, with considerable disparities between the
wealthy developed countries, at 82 years, and the less-developed countries, at 74 years (see Figure 8). As
a result of the global decline in fertility, and because people are living longer, median age is rising (see
Figure 9). The proportion of the elderly in the total population is rising sharply. The number of people over
the age of 60, currently around half the number of those aged 15–24, is expected to reach 1 billion
(overtaking the 15–24 age group) by 2020. It is projected to reach almost 2 billion by 2050. The proportion
of individuals aged 80 or over is projected to rise from 1 per cent to 4 per cent of the global population by
2050. (Figure 10 shows the history and projections for the actual number of individuals aged 80 or above.)
Population ageing is occurring in both developed and developing countries, although more rapidly in the
former. In the developed world, the proportion of people aged 60 or over will increase from 20 to 32 per
cent by 2050. In the developing world, it will rise from 8 to 20 per cent. There are gender differences in life
expectancy. Figure 11 shows that life expectancy for women tends to be around 4 to 6 years longer than
for men, although there is considerable variation across countries.
FERTILIT
Y

LIFE EXPECTANCY AND LONGEVITY

FERTILIT
Y

LIFE EXPECTANCY AND LONGEVITY

 FERTILIT
Y
AGE DISTRIBUTION: WORKING-AGE POPULATION

Baby booms have altered the demographic landscape in

many countries. As the experiences of several regions
during the past century show, an initial fall in mortality
rates creates a boom generation because high survival
rates lead to more people at young ages than in earlier
generations. Fertility rates fall subsequently, as parents
realize they do not need to produce as many children to
reach their desired family size, or as desired family size
diminishes for other reasons. When fertility falls and the
baby boom stops, the age structure of the population
then shows a ‘bulge’ – the baby-boom-age cohort –
created by the nonsynchronous falls in mortality and
fertility. As this cohort works its way through the age
structure of the population, it represents a share of the
population larger than the share represented by the
cohorts that precede or follow it (see Figure 12).
MIGRATION
For migration numbers and rates, the UN assumes for most countries that migration patterns will change very
slowly after the period 2010–2015, compared with the speed at which such patterns changed in the past.
Projections are based on past trends and take into account countries' current policies regarding international
migration
MORTALITY

The UN also makes assumptions about future mortality rates, which affect most of the data
in the figures in this paper. UN projections take into account recent sex-specific trends and
are based on the expectation that life expectancy will rise more slowly in countries that
have already reached a fairly high level. For those indicators for which the UN provides
data specific to various possible courses of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, we have used only the
‘normal mortality assumption’ (which uses a model that takes HIV/AIDS into consideration
and, for countries with high levels of the disease, projects a ‘slowdown in the reduction of
general mortality risks not related to HIV/AIDS’).
THE EFFECT ON ECONOMIES – HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND

Demographic change is consequential with respect to economic and social development.

The economic consequences of population growth, in particular, have long been the
subject of debate.

It was first believed that population growth would lead to the exhaustion of resources. In
1798, Thomas Malthus, perhaps the first of the ‘population pessimists’, argued that the
world's resources would be unable to keep pace with population growth. Food production
would expand more slowly than population, and many would lose out in the competition for
food. Such thinking held sway well into the 20th century. In 1968, Paul Ehrlich predicted:
‘The battle … is over. In the 1970s … hundreds of millions of people are going to starve to
death’ (Ehrlich 1968, p xi). In the early 1970s, studies by the US National Academy of
Sciences and the United Nations also predicted negative effects of population growth.
THE EFFECT ON ECONOMIES – HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND

Population neutralism became the predominant school of thought in the 1980s and 1990s.
Advocates of this position (Bloom and Freeman 1986; Kelley 1988) took the optimists' observation
that the consequences of population growth depended largely on the policy environment a step
further. Population neutralism was based on empirical research showing little correlation between
the growth rate of income per capita and the rate of population growth. In other words,
population growth by itself has no effect on economic performance. Other factors such as
openness to trade, educational attainment and the quality of institutions determine whether
economic progress can keep pace with population expansion. Although fast-growing populations
tend to experience slower economic growth, when these other factors are taken into account, the
negative impact of population expansion disappears.

Recently, population neutralism is giving way to a more fine-grained view of the effects of
population dynamics in which demographic change does affect economic development. Economists
and demographers now point to both the accounting effects and the behavioural effects of
changes in population size and structure.
THE EFFECT ON ECONOMIES – SOME NEW
THINKING

ACCOUNTING EFFECTS

Some of the effects of population change on economic growth result from ‘accounting’ effects.
Accounting effects assume constant behaviour – in marriage, labour participation or other
decisions – within age and other demographic groups, but allow for changes in the relative size of
those groups to influence overall outcomes. For example, holding age- and sex-specific labour
force participation rates constant, we can see how a change in the age structure affects total labour
supply.

B E H AV I O U R A L E F F E C T S

Declining rates of adult mortality and the movement of large cohorts through the global population pyramid
will lead to a massive expansion in the proportion of elderly in the world population. Some simple economic
projections show catastrophic effects of this ageing. These projections tend to be based on an ‘accounting’
approach, which assumes that age-specific behaviour remains unchanged and ignores the potentially
significant effects of behavioural change.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Rapid and significant demographic change places new demands on national and international
policy-making. Transitions from high mortality and fertility to low mortality and fertility can be
beneficial to economies as large baby-boom cohorts enter the workforce and save for retirement.
Rising longevity also affects the incentives to save for old age, which can affect investment,
international capital flows and interest rates.

The ability of countries to realise the potential benefits of the demographic transition and to
mitigate the negative effects of ageing depends crucially on the policy and institutional
environment. Attention to the following areas is likely to be key in developing effective policy to
deal with the effects of demographic change.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Health

Recent evidence indicates that good health may be an important factor in economic development (see
Bloom, Canning and Sevilla 2004). Health improvements – especially among infants and children –
often lead to declines in fertility. Focusing on the diseases of childhood can therefore increase the
likelihood of creating a boom generation and the positive economic effects a boom can generate (see
Bloom, Canning and Weston 2005). Countries wishing to accelerate fertility declines may benefit from
improving access to family planning services and education about fertility decisions.

Education

Workers are better able to contribute to economic growth if they have received an effective education.
East Asia capitalised on its baby boom generation by providing high-quality education, including both
general schooling and technical skills, which equipped them as workers to meet the demands of an
ever-changing labour market. Ireland also gained from its baby boom by introducing free secondary
schooling and expanding tertiary education.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Labour market institutions

Restrictive labour laws can limit a country's ability to benefit from demographic change, particularly
where these laws make it difficult to hire and fire workers or to work part-time. [4] Restrictions on
immigration are also of concern, as they hold down the labour supply. Immigration is a political hot
potato in many countries, but economic incentives to lower barriers to immigration are likely to grow
stronger as populations in developed countries age. International outsourcing, another controversial
subject, may also be an increasingly important means of meeting the demand for labor.

Trade

One means by which east-Asian countries provided productive opportunities to their baby boom
cohorts was by carefully opening up to international trade. The opportunity to export provides an
outlet for the product of a large cohort. Bloom and Canning (2004) found that open economies benefit
much more from demographic change than the average, and that closed economies do not derive any
statistically significant benefit from changes in the age structure.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS

 Retirement

Population ageing requires increased savings to finance longer retirements (especially if

governments maintain current policies that discourage the conversion of greater longevity into
longer working lives). This will affect financial markets, rates of return and investment. As more
people move into old age, health care costs are likely to spiral upward, with the expansion of
health care systems and growth in long-term care for the elderly. 
THINKING FAR AHEAD: WHITHER THE HUMAN
LIFE SPAN?

A discussion that pertains centrally to increases in life expectancy and that touches on retirement
naturally leads to the question of the human life span. How long are people likely to live in the
coming decades, and are the anticipated changes likely to bring new issues to the fore?

In most of the world, life expectancy has risen sharply during the past two centuries. Children born
today can expect to live for many decades longer than their ancestors born in the 19th or early
20th centuries. In Japan, life expectancy at birth is now 82 years, and other regions have also
made great progress as medical and public health advances, improved nutrition and behavioral
changes encouraged by improved education have combined to reduce the risk of death at all ages.
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

What can we expect in the next half-century? Based on the indicators that are available, we can
make a few points.

• All signs suggest that there will be continued but slowing population growth. This continued
growth will result in the addition of roughly 3 billion people to the world population, before it
stabilizes around 2050 at about 9 billion. Managing this increase will be an enormous challenge,
and the economic consequences of failing to do so could be severe.

• The world's population is ageing, and the growth in the sheer number of elderly people will be
huge. The United Nations predicts that 31 per cent of China's population in 2050 – 432 million
people – will be aged 60 or over. The corresponding figures for India are 21 per cent and 330
million (see Figure 15). No longer can ageing be thought of as a developed-world phenomenon.
(Further comparison of China and India's demographic development as it has affected their
economic development can be found in Bloom, Canning, Hu et al 2006.)
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

• International migration will continue, but the extent is unclear. The pressures that encourage people to
migrate – above all the lure of greater economic well-being in the developed countries – will undoubtedly
persist, but the strength of countervailing policy restrictions that could substantially staunch the flow of
migrants is impossible to predict.

• Urbanization will continue, but here, too, the pace is impossible to predict. Greater economic opportunities
in the cities will surely continue to attract migrants from rural areas, but environmental and social problems
may stymie growth.

Although demographic changes are, for the most part, easier to predict than economic changes, the big-
picture outlook is nonetheless unclear. The uncertainties are similar to those we cited regarding possible
changes in the human life span. Will an outbreak of avian flu or another disease become pandemic, killing
many millions and decimating economies? What happens if these diseases are, or become, resistant to existing
drugs? Conversely, scientific advances in areas such as genomics, contraceptive methods, or vaccines for
diseases such as AIDS or malaria could save and improve millions of lives. Global warming and other
environmental changes, or large-scale war, could completely alter the context of demographic and economic
predictions. Millions of refugees, from any cause, could lead demographic predictions to be far off the mark,
and could, of course, lead to upheavals that would dwarf the importance of the analysis offered here.
THANK YOU!

GROUP 10 = GLOBAL DEMOGRAPHY

OCZON, Aron Jin P.
OLADIVE, Kyril Jake R.
PABELLO, Gerald A.
PADECIO, Kristine Cicely Q.
PANALIGAN, Jherlyn May D.