MATHEMATICS

IN THE
MODERN
WORLD

CHAPTER 4. APPORTIONMENT AND VOTIN

 CHAPTER 4

Apportionment and Voting

 
In this chapter, we present different methods of apportionment and the two of
the most important components of democracy: the right to vote and the weight
of that vote. In Section 4.1. Introduction to Apportionment, we describe the
properties and the steps involved in the implementation of each apportionment
method. Section 4.2. The Mathematics of Voting covers different voting
methods, the fairness criteria in voting and the Arrow’s theorem. Section 4.3
The Weighted Voting System will discuss various types of weighted voting and
the Banzhaf power index.
 
CHAPTER 4

Chapter Objectives:
To introduce the different methods
of apportionment, voting and
weighted voting. The chapter also
introduces the fairness criteria in
apportionment and voting systems.
CHAPTER 4

Lesson 4.1.
Introduction to Apportionment

This section introduces you to the basic idea of apportionment. This

will focus on the different methods of apportionment, paradoxical
outcomes and the behavior of each apportionment method
according to the fairness criteria.
CHAPTER 4

Intended Learning Outcomes

At the end of this lesson, students are expected to demonstrate the following:

1. Use each
2. Identify 3. identify
method of
which among if an
apportionmen the
t to distribute apportion
apportionment
items fairly to ment
methods will
several satisfy the problem
groups of a fairness will result
population criteria. to some
paradoxes.
 Introduction to Apportionment

Apportionment is a method of distributing a number of items proportionally into several

groups on the basis of the group population sizes.

For example, we can use an apportionment method to determine the number of

representatives a city should have based on its present population.

Hamilton Rules

• To get the lower quota of a group, round down the standard quota to a whole number.
• The standard quota of a group with the highest decimal part is only rounded up to a
whole number if the sum of the lower quotas is less than the value of A.
• The process is repeated until the value of A is reached.
 
Example 1
Consider a country with 6 states and 40 seats in the House
of Representatives with populations distributed as follows.
  Population

STATE A 58,805

STATE B 32,780

STATE C 109111

STATE D 78,900

STATE E 67,430

STATE F 44,862

TOTAL 391888

Determine the apportionment of 40 seats to the 6 states using

Hamilton method.
  

Hamilton              

  STATE A STATE B STATE C STATE D STATE E STATE F TOTAL

P 58805 32780 109111 78900 67430 44862 391888

SQ=P/SD 6.00 3.35 11.14 8.05 6.88 4.58  

Lower Quota 6 3 11 8 6 4 38

Final Apportionment 6 3 11 8 7 5 40

A 40            

SD 9797.2            

The sum of the lower quota does not meet A=40. Thus, the top 2
states with the highest decimal part will be rounded up to whole
number just to complete the requirement. In this case, we add
one representative to state E and another one to state F.
Jefferson Method
 
• This method uses a trial and error value for a modified
standard divisor.
• This value is chosen so that the sum of the standard
quotas is equal to the required number of allocations
(A).
Example 2
Using Jefferson method, solve Example 1.
  Solution
 Jefferson STATE A STATE B STATE C STATE D STATE E STATE F TOTAL

P 58805 32780 109111 78900 67430 44862 391888

SQ=P/MSD 6.53 3.64 12.12 8.76 7.49 4.98  
Lower Quota 6 3 12 8 7 4 40

Final Apportionment 6 3 12 8 7 4 40
A 40            

Modified Std. Divisor (MSD) 9000            

Note that you can choose any one from 8973 to 9092 for
your modified standard divisor in Jefferson method. This
can be done by trial and error. Solution using excel
application is much easier as shown below.
First, input an arbitrary value for MSD. Use dollar signs to fix the cell for MSD (C17), when
computing for SQ (D13). Apply the same formula for the other cells in that row.

Apply rounddown function in D14 to H14 cells as shown above to round

down the SQ cells. You can now change the value of MSD to satisfy the
requirement of 40.
The Webster Method
 
• This method is very similar to the Jefferson Method
• Instead of rounding down the lower quota as in the previous
method, it is rounded up to a whole number.
 
Example 3
Solve Example 1 using Webster method.
 
Solution 
Choose 9500 or any closer value for the modified standard
divisor. The sum of the lower quotas will be equal to 40 which is
the value for A.
  Webster              

  STATE A STATE B STATE C STATE D STATE E STATE F TOTAL

P 58805 32780 109111 78900 67430 44862 391888

S=P/MSD 6.19 3.45 11.49 8.31 7.10 4.72  

Lower Quota 6 3 11 8 7 5 40

Final Apportionment 6 3 11 8 7 5 40

A 40            

Modified Std. Divisor (MSD) 9500            

Comparison Between Hamilton and Jefferson

Using these two methods may give different final apportionment as
shown below.

STATE STATE STATE STATE STATE STATE

Apportionment Method A B C D E F TOTAL

Final Hamilton
Apportionment 6 3 11 8 7 5 40

Final Jefferson
Apportionment 6 3 12 8 7 4 40
 
Example 4
The following table shows the number of computers that are assigned to five
departments of a university in Manila and the number of students enrolled in
these departments. To which department a new computer should be assigned
using Huntington-Hill method?
  Department Number of Students Number of Computers
 
1 Chemical Engineering 289 40

2 Mechanical Engineering 785 74

3 Computer Engineering 590 59

4 Civil Engineering 892 85

5 Architecture 345 45
 
 

Fairness in Apportionment
 
Quota Criterion – The number of allocations to a subset of a population is the
standard quota or one more than the standard quota.
 
• The Hamilton method always satisfies the quota criterion.
 
• The way the modified standard divisor is chosen, it is possible that both
Jefferson and Webster may violate this criterion.
 

Paradoxes in Hamilton Method

• Paradoxical outcomes may exist using Hamilton Method.
• When there is a change in the sizes of the groups, the number of items
to be allocated (Alabama paradox), and also the number of groups, a
new apportionment will occur to one of the groups which is lower than its
original apportionment.
• Paradoxes cannot occur in Jefferson, Webster & Huntington-Hill
methods.
The Balinski-Young Impossibility Theorem
It is mathematically impossible to develop an apportionment method that can
avoid all types of paradoxes and at the same time can satisfy the quota criterion.
Lesson 4.2

The Voting Systems

This section deals with the different voting methods

and procedures which aim to consolidate individual
preferences of members from a group into one unified
preference.
CHAPTER 4

Intended Learning Outcomes

At the end of this lesson, students should be able

to:

1. use different voting methods to determine the

winner among candidates or options.

2. identify which among the voting methods satisfy

some fairness criteria.
 
Lesson 4.2

The Voting Systems

What is voting?
Voting is a tool used by groups of people
in making a collective decision. It can be
presented conveniently in terms of an
election system where one can select
one particular candidate out of a set of
candidates on the basis of ballots cast by
a group of voters.
Lesson 4.2

Majority System

Majority means that more than 50% of

the total voters favor a certain
candidate. Majority system is the most
common voting system applied on an
election with only two candidates.
 
Lesson 4.2

Plurality of Voting

In the plurality system with a

preference list, the candidate
having the most number of first-
place votes is declared the winner.
The winning candidate may not
have the majority of the votes and
alternative choices are not
considered.
 
Lesson 4.2

Example 1
The results of an election with 4
candidates and 50 voters are shown in
the preference list below. Using the
Plurality of voting which candidate wins
this election?
CANDIDATE RANKING

A 1 4 2 4 2

B 3 3 1 3 4

C 2 1 4 1 3

D 4 2 3 2 1

No. of Votes 12 8 16 10 4
 Lesson 4.2

Solution
CANDIDATE RANKING Total First Place
Votes

A 1 4 2 4 2 12

B 2 3 1 3 3 16

C 3 1 4 1 4 18

D 4 2 3 2 1 4

No. of Votes 12 8 16 10 4  

 
We can see that candidate C has the most number of
first place votes. Thus, he wins in this election
according to the plurality method. However, candidate
C did not get the majority of the votes (26 votes or
higher).
 
 
Example 2

Using Borda count method, determine the winner in the preference list in Example 1.
Solution
Totaling the weights over 50 ballots, we arrive at the Borda counts for the following
candidates.
n=4 CANDIDATE A n=4 CANDIDATE B
RANK Rank Point No. of Votes Total RANK Rank Point No. of Votes Total
1 4 12 48 2 3 12 36
4 1 8 8 3 2 8 16
2 3 16 48 1 4 16 64
4 1 10 10 3 2 10 20
2 3 4 12 3 2 4 8
    Borda Count = 126     Borda Count =  144
n=4 CANDIDATE C n=4 CANDIDATE D
RANK Rank Point No. of Votes Total RANK Rank Point No. of Votes Total
3 2 12 24 4 1 12 12
1 4 8 32
2 3 8 24
4 1 16 16
3 2 16 32
1 4 10 40
2 3 10 30
4 1 4 4
1 4 4 16
     Borda Count =  116
       Borda Count =  114

The candidate with the largest Borda count is candidate B. Thus, candidate B wins the election.
 Plurality With Elimination
Plurality with elimination is a variation of the
plurality method in which the alternative choices
of the voters are taken into consideration.
The candidate with the fewest number of first-
place votes is first eliminated. In case there are
two alternatives that have the same lowest votes
then both are to be eliminated. The remaining
candidates are re-ranked with the assumption that
voters’ preferences do not change from round to
round.
 

Example 3

Answer Example 1 using the method of

plurality with elimination.

CANDIDATE RANKING

A 1 4 2 4 2

B 3 3 1 3 4

C 2 1 4 1 3

D 4 2 3 2 1

No. of Votes 12 8 16 10 4
Solution
Round 1, candidate D should be eliminated.
For Round 1 For Round 2 Total
CANDIDATE Total First Place Votes CANDIDAT RANKING CANDIDATE Total First Place
E Votes

A 12 A 1 3 2 3 1

A 12 + 4 = 16
B 16 B 3 2 1 2 3

C 18 C 2 1 3 1 2 B 16

C 8 + 10 = 18
D 4 No. of 12 8 16 10 4
Votes

Candidates A and B have the same lowest first-place votes then both
should be eliminated. Thus, the winner for this method is candidate C.
 The Fairness Criteria
Which voting method is fair? What do we mean by fair? The following are four
different ways to define fairness in voting options.
 
1. Majority Fairness Criterion
A voting method is said to satisfy the majority fairness criterion if the winning
candidate receives a majority of the first-place votes.
2. Monotonicity Criterion Basically, it requires that the winning candidate must
not lose by being ranked higher by a voter or the losing candidate must not win by
being ranked lower.
Suppose A is the winner of the original election. If one or more voters who voted
for other candidates were to change their choice to A, then A should still be the
winner of the new election.
3. Condorcet Criterion If a candidate wins over other
candidates in all head-to-head matchups using the majority
rule then this candidate must also be the winner when all
candidates appear on the ballot.

4. Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) A winning

candidate in an election remains the winner in any recount
even if the losing candidates withdraw from the election.
 Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem

In all cases, it is impossible to develop a voting

system that satisfies all of the four fairness criteria.
Hence, none of the voting methods discussed in
this section can be considered fair if we talk about
Arrow’s theorem.
 
Lesson 4.3
The Weighted Voting Systems

This section introduces you to the basic idea of weighted

voting systems. A weighted voting system occurs when
voters have unequal weights on the outcome of an
election.
Intended Learning Outcomes:

At the end of this lesson, students should be able to:

1. determine the winning coalitions in a weighted voting

system.
2. determine the critical voters.
3. compute the Banzhaf power index and use this value to
determine the voter’s power.
 
Types of Weighted Voting Systems
1.One Person – One Vote System
Each person has only one vote. Thus, a majority of the votes is required
to pass a resolution.
Example 1: W = {Q:1,1,1,1,1,1,1}
Since the total number of votes is 7 then Q = 4 is the required number of
votes to pass a resolution.
2.Dictatorship
One particular person has a weight that is greater than the quota and
sum of all the weights of other voters.
 
 
 Coalition
A coalition in a voting system is an alliance formed by a group of voters
with a common goal which is either to favor a resolution or vote against
it. We define the following terms related to coalition.
1.A winning coalition is a group of voters whose sum of all votes is
greater than or equal to the quota.
2.A losing coalition is a group of voters whose sum of all votes is less
than the quota.
3.A critical voter is a voter who turns a winning coalition into a losing
coalition if he leaves for another group.
4.A dummy is a voter whose weight does not affect any voting outcome.
Note that when a system has a dictator, all other players are
considered dummies.
 
  

Owners Shares
A 425
B 250
C 175
D 350
Quota = 601  
 
 
Solution
The total number of critical voters
in all 7 winning coalitions is 12.
Owner   B
 
A 5/12 0.42

B 3/12 0.25

C 1/12 0.08

D 3/12 0.25

Owner A has the most power and owner C has the least power.