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    H2S Workshop ' Silent Killer'': Abdul Munim Saif Al Kindy General Manager, ADCO

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    Majeed Rumani
    This document summarizes an H2S workshop presentation about a tragic incident that occurred on February 3, 2009 at the Shah Field. Five workers died after entering a corrosion coupon pit without proper permits or protective equipment to drain a transfer line. The immediate causes were violations of procedure by not obtaining a work permit or using breathing apparatus, and exposure to hazardous H2S and hydrocarbons. The root causes included inadequate hazard identification, lack of procedure enforcement, complacency, and inadequate management oversight. Recommendations included ensuring risk assessments and safety approvals for permits, empowering workers to stop unsafe work, training improvements, enhanced PPE requirements, and focus on high risk activities like confined space entry.

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    H2S Workshop ' Silent Killer'': Abdul Munim Saif Al Kindy General Manager, ADCO

    Uploaded by

    Majeed Rumani
    60 views10 pages
    This document summarizes an H2S workshop presentation about a tragic incident that occurred on February 3, 2009 at the Shah Field. Five workers died after entering a corrosion coupon pit without proper permits or protective equipment to drain a transfer line. The immediate causes were violations of procedure by not obtaining a work permit or using breathing apparatus, and exposure to hazardous H2S and hydrocarbons. The root causes included inadequate hazard identification, lack of procedure enforcement, complacency, and inadequate management oversight. Recommendations included ensuring risk assessments and safety approvals for permits, empowering workers to stop unsafe work, training improvements, enhanced PPE requirements, and focus on high risk activities like confined space entry.

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    This document summarizes an H2S workshop presentation about a tragic incident that occurred on February 3, 2009 at the Shah Field. Five workers died after entering a corrosion coupon pit without proper permits or protective equipment to drain a transfer line. The immediate causes were violations of procedure by not obtaining a work permit or using breathing apparatus, and exposure to hazardous H2S and hydrocarbons. The root causes included inadequate hazard identification, lack of procedure enforcement, complacency, and inadequate management oversight. Recommendations included ensuring risk assessments and safety approvals for permits, empowering workers to stop unsafe work, training improvements, enhanced PPE requirements, and focus on high risk activities like confined space entry.

    Copyright:

    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Download as PPT, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as ppt, pdf, or txt
    60 views10 pages

    H2S Workshop ' Silent Killer'': Abdul Munim Saif Al Kindy General Manager, ADCO

    Uploaded by

    Majeed Rumani
    This document summarizes an H2S workshop presentation about a tragic incident that occurred on February 3, 2009 at the Shah Field. Five workers died after entering a corrosion coupon pit without proper permits or protective equipment to drain a transfer line. The immediate causes were violations of procedure by not obtaining a work permit or using breathing apparatus, and exposure to hazardous H2S and hydrocarbons. The root causes included inadequate hazard identification, lack of procedure enforcement, complacency, and inadequate management oversight. Recommendations included ensuring risk assessments and safety approvals for permits, empowering workers to stop unsafe work, training improvements, enhanced PPE requirements, and focus on high risk activities like confined space entry.

    Copyright:

    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Download as PPT, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as ppt, pdf, or txt
    of 10

    H2S Workshop Silent Killer

    24th May 2009

    Abdul Munim Saif Al Kindy General Manager, ADCO

    The Tragic Incident on 3rd Feb. 2009 Shah Field

    Corrosion Coupon Pit

    12 ft

    Background
    Asab GASCO plant shutdown was planned from 25th Jan. to 11th Feb. 2009. This resulted in a complete ADCO production shutdown. Shutdown provided window of opportunities to carry out key maintenance activities across Asab, Sahil & Shah Fields. In Shah, the planned key maintenance activities included partial replacement of transfer line and removal of two stuck corrosion coupons retrieval tools at KM-58 and KM-68 pits. At KM-68, removal of stuck corrosion coupon retrieval tool was successfully carried out with drainage of approx. 200 barrels crude from the transfer line. At KM-58, removal of stuck corrosion coupon retrieval tool necessitated drainage of approx. 1600 barrels of crude from the transfer line.
    4

    Events of the tragic Day


    A Foreman and five laborers proceeded to work involving draining of a transfer line inside a corrosion coupon pit (confined space) (without obtaining work permit)
    One laborer entered the pit to reattach the rope to the drain valve. While trying to exit the pit he fell back, hanging upside down and his leg trapped inside the ladder. Foreman entered the pit to rescue the laborer and asked a second laborer to close the valve and help him with the rescue. The second laborer entered and started helping, but foreman collapsed and soon after the second laborer collapsed and sustained a head injury by hitting an object (he survived). The third laborer entered the pit to rescue his colleagues and collapsed The two laborers standing outside the pit sought help from Shah control room.

    Immediate Causes
    Violation of Procedure (PTW & Confined Space Entry) Procedure for draining the Transfer Line not available & method of statement less than adequate.

    Personal Protective Equipment (BAs) not used Exposure to Hazardous Conditions (H2S, hydrocarbons)

    Root Causes
    Inadequate hazards identification /perception Inadequate reinforcement of procedures Inadequate reinforcement of safe behavior, not implementing stop policy. Complacency and overconfidence Inadequate consequence management Not acceptable and Inadequate MANAGEMENT
    7

    Recommendations
    Ensure PTW is issued based on task risk assessment (TRA) and the TRA has been endorsed by a safety professional (Safety & Loss Prevention Engineer (SLPE) as minimum).
    Confined space entries cannot be made unless a SLPE is present and he has reviewed the emergency plan

    Empower laborers/workers to STOP unsafe activities and initiate contractual arrangements to protect/encourage individuals exercising ADCO STOP Policy.
    Provide personal H2S detectors to all personnel including laborers working in H2S exposed areas. Ensure all helper/laborers members are fully trained for performing their assigned tasks.

    Include practical element (step test) and confined space entry in H2S/BA training course and for all operation/ production and HSE staff.

    Establish Access Control on all confined spaces with effective markings, signs & tagging; and locking, where applicable.
    8

    Post Shah Incident


    Comprehensive Respiratory Protection Programme H2S area classifications and zoning Facial Hair policy implementation PPE (escape set and H2S monitor/per employee( ADCO& contractors) in restricted areas. Identification of requirements forH2S warning signs and sign boards Enhanced &simplify H2S training (multi lingual) for contractor labours Focused High profile tours theme on the high risk activities( H2S , PTW) Task Risk Assessment - TRA
    Developed TRA for high risk activities, raised the approval level and linked to PTW Clearly defined requirements for formal TRA Initiated training on TRA

    Initiated enhancement in HSE communications


    9

    Thank You

    10

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