While inequality between children and adults characterizes practically every aspect of contempora... more While inequality between children and adults characterizes practically every aspect of contemporary society, school is considered a paradigmatic site of adult domination. Childist critiques tend to point to school as a place where adultism is not only conspicuous but also (re)produced. In this article, however, it is argued that the public school, obviously founded by adults for adult purposes, has an important childist dimension. Although it is based on a clear distinction between adult teachers and child students, school can problematize key adultist norms and promote a more age-equal society. This does not imply that exiting schools are necessarily childist, but rather that a certain understanding of the school, which emphasizes its social-democratic significance, can uncover its childist aspects and build on them when reimagining public education. The conception of the school in which the article focuses is presented in Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons' 2013 book In Defence of the School: A Public Issue. Although the authors do not refer directly to childism (or child equality), and are clearly writing from an adultist perspective, I argue that the public school they describe does have a childist dimension: it challenges one of the root causes of adultism: considering children the property of their parents. Nevertheless, Masschelein and Simons' conception of the school raises a problem of its own, which also has a childist aspect: the concern that uniform schooling supervised by the state will be detrimental to minority and indigenous groups, imposing a culture and identity determined by adults. The second part of this article addresses this concern, arguing that genuine school education can be key not only to preserving but also to revitalizing minority cultures and identities by allowing the students to bring their "newness" into the encounter with the cultures and identities of their families.
In this paper, I discuss the teacher’s role in Laclaudian democratic education in light of the no... more In this paper, I discuss the teacher’s role in Laclaudian democratic education in light of the notion of the organic intellectual as proposed by Antonio Gramsci. Unlike common readings of the figure of the organic intellectual, where it is understood as developing organically from within the ranks of the oppressed, I argue that the term “organic” also refers to organization, and that the role of the organic intellectual is to be a political organizer. In contrast to the figure of the charismatic leader to which Laclau and Mouffe often appeal, a political organizer works dialogically, without altogether renouncing the position of active leadership. I argue, accordingly, that the democratic teacher should be an organizer who creates for the students the conditions for articulating their demands and identities and strives to stir the emerging political subjects in a democratic direction, namely against oppressive elites and mechanisms rather than other oppressed groups.
In his ‘Towards the Critique of Violence’, Walter Benjamin introduces the concept of ‘educative v... more In his ‘Towards the Critique of Violence’, Walter Benjamin introduces the concept of ‘educative violence’ as a contemporary manifestation of ‘divine violence’. In this paper, we aim to interpret ‘educative violence’ by examining other instances where the young Benjamin addresses pedagogical issues. By connecting the concept of divine violence to Benjamin’s ideas of education in tradition and of the schooling of Geist, our goal is twofold: firstly, to comprehend the productive role that violence may play in the pedagogical context, and secondly, to apply it to the conception of schooling presented by Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons to highlight its relevance to school education. By linking scholastic violence to divine violence, we argue that schools must be defended not despite but because of the violence they inhere. In doing so, we contribute another layer to the defense of the school and offer fresh insights into Benjamin’s notion of divine violence.
Critical Horizons: A Journal of Philosophy and Social Theory, 2023
Children have always been an essential part of politics. However, the political struggles in whic... more Children have always been an essential part of politics. However, the political struggles in which children are involved are rarely, if at all, for the equality of children as such. Struggles for the benefit of children are nearly always led by adults, focusing on children’s rights in an adult-dominated world. In this paper, I develop the possibility of Children’s political struggle for equality, informed by the political philosophy of Jacque Rancière. I present the educational backdrop for Rancière’s claim that all intelligences are equal, and argue that it implies that children are by nature equal to adults, hence also equally capable of political action. By demonstrating that children are a “part of those who have no part” in the existing sociopolitical order, I examine the possibility of a collective political subject of children, and articulate the implications child politics may have.
Our discussion addresses Benjamin’s antifascist education through the lens of aesthetic education... more Our discussion addresses Benjamin’s antifascist education through the lens of aesthetic education and Herbert Marcuse’s aesthetic theory. While this theme is not explicitly discussed in Lewis’ book, we argue that it is essential for understanding the full political and educational potential of what he calls “the art of straying in the city”. Such straying is aesthetic in a twofold way: it allows for the city to be experienced as a massive work of art, and at the same time it makes the one who strays an artist who creates herself as a work of art. This unique relation to the urban world is an antifascist and anticapitalist educational experience, as it becomes a politically creative catalyst for imagining another way of relating to self, others, and environment – a relation liberated from the imperatives of utility and profit.
אני מבקש להגדיר ילדים כמי שסובלים מדיכוי ומופלים לרעה בדרכים שונות מחמת גילם הצעיר. תווית הילדוּת ... more אני מבקש להגדיר ילדים כמי שסובלים מדיכוי ומופלים לרעה בדרכים שונות מחמת גילם הצעיר. תווית הילדוּת משמשת גם בשיח היומיומי וגם בתיאוריה הפוליטית להצדקה ונרמול של הפרדת הצעירים מהמבוגרים והשליטה בהם. אבל ההיגיון שנותן לגיטימציה ליחסי כוח בהווה על בסיס טענה לחסר שיושלם רק בעתיד מיושם גם על קבוצות אחרות: ילידים, עניים ונשים, אם למנות רק כמה דוגמאות מובהקות. חרף ההבדל הברור בלוחות הזמנים – שנים אחדות במקרה של הילדים, לעומת דורות רבים בדוגמאות האחרות – אפשר לזהות כאן את אותה שפה ואותו משטר של הצדקה. אך בעוד במקרים אחרים כבר למדנו לראות את הדיכוי גם אם הוא מכוסה במילים יפות ואפילו בכוונות טובות, זה אינו המצב ביחס לילדים. השליטה בהם שקופה ונראית טבעית גם לתיאורטיקנים ולפעילות ביקורתיות.
In this article, we examine the installation of surveillance cameras in the
Bedouin town of Hura ... more In this article, we examine the installation of surveillance cameras in the Bedouin town of Hura in the Negev desert in Israel, analysing the complex interactions between the state and the local inhabitants, for whom the cameras were an opportunity to exercise agency. Considering the long history of Jewish colonialism in the Negev, one could have assumed that the new surveillance technology was imposed on the Bedouins against their will. However, in-depth interviews with Hura inhabitants demonstrated that the municipality and tribal authorities were active players in deciding on the installation and location of the surveillance cameras. In light of the conflictual relations of the Bedouin population to Israeli state authorities, we argue that while the cameras placed the Bedouins of Hura under a new layer of surveillance, their installation could also be understood as a reaction to the ongoing neglect of Bedouin lives and possessions by the state.
Post-critical pedagogy, which offers a significant alternative to the dominant trends in contempo... more Post-critical pedagogy, which offers a significant alternative to the dominant trends in contemporary philosophy of education, objects to seeing education as instrumental to other ends: it attempts to conceive of education as autotelic, namely as having intrinsic value. While there are good reasons for accepting the post-critical reservations with the instru-mentalization of education, I argue that its autonomy is equally problematic, as it risks turning the philosophy of education-perhaps education itself-into a privileged activity, out of touch with the most important issues in the contemporary world. In this paper I offer post-critical pedagogy a way out of this dilemma, by drawing on Walter Benjamin's essay "The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility". After presenting the thesis concerning the autonomy of art held by Benjamin's Frankfurt School friends, and pointing to the similarity between their view and that of post-critical pedagogy, I articulate six Benjaminian theses on post-critical pedagogy. Following Benjamin's claim that the technological reproducibility of art changes the way it is perceived as well as its political function, I argue that school is an educational technology that reproduces the world to the masses without an "aura", in a way that allows for political critique that does not reduce education to politics. Next, I highlight the importance of the school to post-critical pedagogy, and contribute to developing the critical-political aspect that remains essential to post-critical pedagogy. Finally, the Benjaminian perspective also makes it possible to reflect on the relation of digital technologies of reproduction to post-critical pedagogy.
On Education: Journal for Research and Debate, 2020
While post-critical pedagogy urges us to educate out of and toward love for the world, in this ar... more While post-critical pedagogy urges us to educate out of and toward love for the world, in this article I argue against the privileged status of love in educational discourse. I hold that renewing the world is impossible without critique, indeed without a pinch of hatred. I suggest, therefore, moving from post to neo-critique, to renewing the world by renewing critique. I start with discussing some good reasons for hating the world, and then turn to the concept of critique, which post-critical pedagogy is by no means the first to attack. A look at the thorough analysis of the modern concept of critique offered by German historian Reinhart Koselleck uncovers the deep contradictions inherent to its totalizing, rationalistic presuppositions that see nothing but absolute good and absolute evil. Koselleck's comments on premodern critique point the way to a more complex concept of critique, which transcends such binary divisions. In the last section of this article, I take some steps in this direction, fleshing out the concept of neo-critical pedagogy by thinking of art criticism.
The answer I propose to the question posed by the editors of ducational Philosophy and Theory—Wh... more The answer I propose to the question posed by the editors of ducational Philosophy and Theory—What Comes after ostmodernism?—is already in the question. All we have to do is move the question mark a bit: What? Comes after postmodernism. After postmodernism, it is time to ask: What? Answering the question ‘What now?’ with the question ‘What?’ now is to ask again, but differently, the most basic question of philosophy: What is it? What is x? This is the question Socrates asked the citizens of Athens: a question that is looking for a definition, an essence, the final meaning of a word or a concept (e.g. Plato, 2002). The ‘What?’, according to Socrates, reveals the contradictions and misconceptions in the ordinary ways of thinking and speaking, thereby leading to knowledge, be it even the knowledge of not knowing. This What? has led philosophy into modernity, attempting to enlighten the world and educate mankind by revealing true essences, understanding what things truly are. Postmodernism challenged the What?, attempting to go beyond philosophy and reject the search for essences. Thinkers from Wittgenstein (1953) to Derrida (1977) declared war on What?, attacking the very supposition that concepts can be defined and that words represent things in physical or mental reality. No more What?: We no longer ask ‘What does it mean?’ but ‘How does it work?’. This, I believe, is what lies behind what Michael Peters (2008) called the ‘naming anxiety’, which allows only ‘negative definitions’, shunning away from positive knowledge, from commitment to the truth. The role of the Socratic educator, who leads the student out of the cave of prejudices into the light of possible knowledge, has likewise declined. The end of all narratives of progress undermined pedagogic authority and with it all traditional concepts of education. But for this very reason, from within the logic of postmodernism, we must ask again: What is education? What is a teacher? Every such question forces us to stop and think, to distance ourselves for a moment from the postmodern flux of images and representations with no referents, and commit ourselves to looking for answers. Indeed, we cannot ask these questions in (pre)modern naiveté—perhaps, we have never been modern (Latour, 1993), but we will always be postmodern, unable to determine simple definitions and eternal essences. We can only give partial, contingent answers, being aware of the ways each answer is conditioned by history and politics but can never be reduced to them. We can answer, for instance, that education after postmodernism is one which keeps asking ‘What is it?’; and that a teacher after postmodernism is one who summons the question ‘What is it?’. Such a teacher will not assume the answer in advance. But perhaps more importantly, after postmodernism, every answer could only be accepted temporarily, in a way that does not put an end to thought but rather keeps it open, alert, committed. This will allow a return (always partial, temporary) of education from the chaotic carnival of postmodernism back to philosophical thinking. A return to education as philosophical thinking and to philosophy as a form of education.
In this paper I discuss two attempts to challenge mainstream liberal education, by Hannah Arendt ... more In this paper I discuss two attempts to challenge mainstream liberal education, by Hannah Arendt and by contemporary Israeli philosopher Hanan Alexander. Arendt and Alexander both identify problems in liberal-secular modern politics and present alternatives based on reconnecting politics and education to tradition. I analyze their positions and bring them into a dialogue that suggests a complex conception of education that avoids many of the pitfalls of modern liberal thought. First, I outline Arendt and Alexander's educational views and discuss their similarities, arguing that both may be understood as opposed to the modern attempt to adopt a «view from nowhere» at the world. Next, I suggest that Alexander's view may benefit from adopting Arendt's conceptions of tradition and authority. In the consecutive section, I argue that Alexander sheds light on significant problems in Arendt's approach to education, problems his understanding of critical dialogue can help solve. The succeeding section joins the two views together to form an approach I call «critical traditionalism», and examines it against prevailing approaches to political education. I conclude by pointing to an important point overlooked by both Arendt and Alexander, namely the need for internal political struggle within each tradition.
This paper outlines a theory of radical democratic education by addressing a key concept in Lacla... more This paper outlines a theory of radical democratic education by addressing a key concept in Laclau and Mouffe's Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: articulation. Through their concept of articulation, Laclau and Mouffe attempt to liberate Gramsci's theory of hegemony from Marxist economism, and adapt it to a political sphere inhabited by a plurality of struggles and agents none of which is predominant. However, while for Gramsci the political process of hegemony formation has an explicit educational dimension, Laclau and Mouffe ignore this dimension altogether. My discussion starts with elaborating the concept of articulation and analysing it in terms of three dimensions: performance, connection and transformation. I then address the role of education in Gramsci's politics, in which the figure of the intellectual is central, and argue that radical democratic education requires renouncing that figure. In the final section, I offer a theory of such education, in which both teacher and students articulate their political differences and identities.
According to a widespread view, one of the most important roles of
education is the nurturing of ... more According to a widespread view, one of the most important roles of education is the nurturing of common sense. In this article I turn to Gilles Deleuze’s concept of sense to develop a contrary view of education—one that views education as a radical challenge to common sense. The discussion will centre on the relation of sense and common sense to thinking. Although adherents of common sense refer to it as the basis of all thought and appeal to critical thinking as instrumental in eliminating its occasional errors, I shall argue, following Deleuze, that common sense education in fact thwarts thinking, while only education which revolves around making sense may provoke thinking that goes beyond the self-evident. I demonstrate how making sense can become an educational encounter that breaks hierarchies and generates thinking independently of the thinker’s knowledge and place in the sociopolitical order. The present article attempts, therefore, to put some sense into Deleuzian education for thinking, and thereby shed new light on its radical-political, counter-commonsensical power.
This article attempts to think of thinking as the essence of critical education. While contempora... more This article attempts to think of thinking as the essence of critical education. While contemporary education tends to stress the conveying of knowledge and skills needed to succeed in the present-day information society, the present article turns to the work of Theodor W. Adorno to develop alternative thinking about education, thinking and the political significance of education for thinking. Adorno touched upon educational questions throughout his writings, with growing interest in the last ten years of his life. Education, he argues following Kant, must enable students to think for themselves and to break free of the authority of teachers, parents and other adults. Nevertheless, in his discussions of education Adorno says little about the nature of thinking, and the secondary literature on his educational theory addresses this question only cursorily. Important claims on the nature of thinking do appear elsewhere in Adorno's work. From his early writings up to Negative Dialectics, Adorno is preoccupied with thinking, sketching the outlines of critical-dialectical thought. Still, these reflections rarely touch upon educational questions, and the Adorno scholarship has yet to establish this link. Unlike studies which read Adorno's educational thought against the backdrop of the history of education and the German Bildung tradition, or in relation to art and aesthetics, the present article brings together Adorno's ideas on education and thinking in an attempt to contribute both to the Adorno scholarship and to the growing field of education for thinking.
The republican political tradition, which originated in Ancient Rome and picked up by several ear... more The republican political tradition, which originated in Ancient Rome and picked up by several early-modern thinkers, has been revived in the last couple of decades following the seminal works of historian Quentin Skinner and political theorist Philip Pettit. Although educational questions do not normally occupy the center stage in republican theory, various theorists working within this framework have already highlighted the significance of education for any functioning republic. Looking at educational questions through the lens of freedom as non-domination has already yielded important insights to discussions of political education. However, consideration of the existing republican educational discourse in light of the wide range of issues discussed in Pettit's recent works reveals that it suffers from two major lacunae. First, it does not take into consideration the distinction (and deep connection) between democracy and social justice that has become central to Pettit's republicanism. Thus, the current discussion focuses almost exclusively on education for democratic citizenship and hardly touches upon social justice. Second, the current literature thinks mainly in terms of educating future citizens, rather than conceiving of students also as political agents in the present, and of school itself as a site of non-domination. This paper aims at filling these voids, and it will therefore be oriented along two intersecting axes: the one between democracy and justice, and the other between future citizenship in the state and present citizenship at school. The resulting four categories will organize the discussion: future citizens and democracy; future citizens and social justice; present citizens and democracy; present citizens and social justice. This will not only enable us to draw a clearer line between the civic republican and liberal educational
The neo-republican political philosophy (sometimes referred to as civic republicanism) advances t... more The neo-republican political philosophy (sometimes referred to as civic republicanism) advances the idea of freedom as non-domination, in an attempt to provide democracy with a solid normative foundation upon which concrete principles and institutions can be erected so as to make freedom a reality. However, attempts to develop a republican educational theory are still hesitant, and fail to take the republican radical conception of freedom to its full conclusions. This article suggests that dialogue between neo-republicanism and critical pedagogy can be mutually productive. In the first part of the article we present the neo-republican theory, and contrast it with traditional liberalism. In the second we focus on existing neo-republican theories of education, and claim that they do not take the republican presuppositions to their necessary conclusion, namely to an educational theory fully committed to the idea of freedom as non-domination. A republican educational theory, we argue, must take into consideration not only the freedom students will have in the future, but also their freedom in the present: it should think of school as a small-scale republic, which prepares its inhabitants to be future citizens of the state while at the same time treating them as free citizens in their own right. In the third part we use insights taken from critical pedagogy to chart the direction republican education must take by applying three key republican notions—democratic control, civic contestation, and trust. In the fourth and last part we outline four aspects in which neo-republicanism can shed new light on contemporary debates in critical pedagogy: the connection between democracy and justice, the multiplicity of forms of domination, critical education within schools, and work with students from relatively privileged backgrounds.
This paper addresses the question "what is school?", and argues that the answer to this question ... more This paper addresses the question "what is school?", and argues that the answer to this question has an essential political dimension. I focus on two very different attempts to characterize school – Ivan Illich's Deschooling Society and Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons's In Defence of the School – and demonstrate that both texts miss the political potential which is inherent in school. The two texts are analyzed along two relational axes: relations between school and society, and relations between children and political subjects. Illich rejects children’s de-politicization while accepting the assumption that school operates according to a similar logic as society in general. Masschelein and Simons, on the other hand, advocate a separation between school and society, but also accept the separation of children from politics. I aim to integrate Illich's analytical categories into Masschelein and Simons' discussion, in order to mark important directions for political struggles both over and within school.
This article focuses on the concept of common sense in order to shed new light on the radical and... more This article focuses on the concept of common sense in order to shed new light on the radical and pluralist democracy developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. It is argued that their move via Antonio Gramsci away from both Marxism and traditional liberal democracy cannot be fully understood without reference to the role common sense plays in it. Focusing on common sense reveals crucial aspects of the relations between intellectuals and ordinary people in Laclau and Mouffe's political theory, and how they deal with problems of embedded hierarchy, characteristic of modern political thought. First I reconstruct Gramsci's concept of common sense, trace its origins and analyze its egalitarian aspect. Next I present the concept's novelty with regard to other modern political theories and their presuppositions, and discuss Gramsci's eventual commitment to the latter. I then turn to discussing both the reasons why Laclau and Mouffe cannot accept the traditional concept of common sense and why they assert that constructing some sort of common sense is necessary for the formation of democratic hegemony. Finally, I argue that Laclau and Mouffe can be seen as having dealt with the problems that result from the need for common sense and the inability to accept it only if we interpret their concept of common sense as a development of Gramsci's, namely as a heterogeneous matrix of various incompatible "common senses".
Arendt’s concept of common sense has generally been misunderstood. It
is almost exclusively inter... more Arendt’s concept of common sense has generally been misunderstood. It is almost exclusively interpreted in light of Kant’s common sense, either as an espousal of the latter or as a distortion of it. This narrow reading of Arendtian common sense has led to a problem, as her uses of the concept do not always fit its Kantian understanding. This has led to accusing her of being inconsistent, or as holding on to several, incompatible concepts of common sense. This article argues that Arendt has one complex concept of common sense, used more or less consistently throughout her writings. Rather than understanding Arendt’s common sense in light of Kant’s, as most readers do, I demonstrate its links to Aristotle and to the eighteenth-century Scottish school of common sense. By doing so I turn attention to a difficulty that has thus far not been adequately treated, namely the fact that Arendt presents two, allegedly contradictory pictures of the relation between common sense on the one hand and science and philosophy on the other: a picture in which science and philosophy depend upon common sense, versus one in which they find themselves in a conflict that eventually leads to the loss or demise of common sense. The last part of the article suggests a way to settle the tension between these two pictures, by understanding the political significance Arendt ascribes to them as two distinct yet complementary ways of approaching the modern phenomenon of totalitarianism.
While inequality between children and adults characterizes practically every aspect of contempora... more While inequality between children and adults characterizes practically every aspect of contemporary society, school is considered a paradigmatic site of adult domination. Childist critiques tend to point to school as a place where adultism is not only conspicuous but also (re)produced. In this article, however, it is argued that the public school, obviously founded by adults for adult purposes, has an important childist dimension. Although it is based on a clear distinction between adult teachers and child students, school can problematize key adultist norms and promote a more age-equal society. This does not imply that exiting schools are necessarily childist, but rather that a certain understanding of the school, which emphasizes its social-democratic significance, can uncover its childist aspects and build on them when reimagining public education. The conception of the school in which the article focuses is presented in Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons' 2013 book In Defence of the School: A Public Issue. Although the authors do not refer directly to childism (or child equality), and are clearly writing from an adultist perspective, I argue that the public school they describe does have a childist dimension: it challenges one of the root causes of adultism: considering children the property of their parents. Nevertheless, Masschelein and Simons' conception of the school raises a problem of its own, which also has a childist aspect: the concern that uniform schooling supervised by the state will be detrimental to minority and indigenous groups, imposing a culture and identity determined by adults. The second part of this article addresses this concern, arguing that genuine school education can be key not only to preserving but also to revitalizing minority cultures and identities by allowing the students to bring their "newness" into the encounter with the cultures and identities of their families.
In this paper, I discuss the teacher’s role in Laclaudian democratic education in light of the no... more In this paper, I discuss the teacher’s role in Laclaudian democratic education in light of the notion of the organic intellectual as proposed by Antonio Gramsci. Unlike common readings of the figure of the organic intellectual, where it is understood as developing organically from within the ranks of the oppressed, I argue that the term “organic” also refers to organization, and that the role of the organic intellectual is to be a political organizer. In contrast to the figure of the charismatic leader to which Laclau and Mouffe often appeal, a political organizer works dialogically, without altogether renouncing the position of active leadership. I argue, accordingly, that the democratic teacher should be an organizer who creates for the students the conditions for articulating their demands and identities and strives to stir the emerging political subjects in a democratic direction, namely against oppressive elites and mechanisms rather than other oppressed groups.
In his ‘Towards the Critique of Violence’, Walter Benjamin introduces the concept of ‘educative v... more In his ‘Towards the Critique of Violence’, Walter Benjamin introduces the concept of ‘educative violence’ as a contemporary manifestation of ‘divine violence’. In this paper, we aim to interpret ‘educative violence’ by examining other instances where the young Benjamin addresses pedagogical issues. By connecting the concept of divine violence to Benjamin’s ideas of education in tradition and of the schooling of Geist, our goal is twofold: firstly, to comprehend the productive role that violence may play in the pedagogical context, and secondly, to apply it to the conception of schooling presented by Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons to highlight its relevance to school education. By linking scholastic violence to divine violence, we argue that schools must be defended not despite but because of the violence they inhere. In doing so, we contribute another layer to the defense of the school and offer fresh insights into Benjamin’s notion of divine violence.
Critical Horizons: A Journal of Philosophy and Social Theory, 2023
Children have always been an essential part of politics. However, the political struggles in whic... more Children have always been an essential part of politics. However, the political struggles in which children are involved are rarely, if at all, for the equality of children as such. Struggles for the benefit of children are nearly always led by adults, focusing on children’s rights in an adult-dominated world. In this paper, I develop the possibility of Children’s political struggle for equality, informed by the political philosophy of Jacque Rancière. I present the educational backdrop for Rancière’s claim that all intelligences are equal, and argue that it implies that children are by nature equal to adults, hence also equally capable of political action. By demonstrating that children are a “part of those who have no part” in the existing sociopolitical order, I examine the possibility of a collective political subject of children, and articulate the implications child politics may have.
Our discussion addresses Benjamin’s antifascist education through the lens of aesthetic education... more Our discussion addresses Benjamin’s antifascist education through the lens of aesthetic education and Herbert Marcuse’s aesthetic theory. While this theme is not explicitly discussed in Lewis’ book, we argue that it is essential for understanding the full political and educational potential of what he calls “the art of straying in the city”. Such straying is aesthetic in a twofold way: it allows for the city to be experienced as a massive work of art, and at the same time it makes the one who strays an artist who creates herself as a work of art. This unique relation to the urban world is an antifascist and anticapitalist educational experience, as it becomes a politically creative catalyst for imagining another way of relating to self, others, and environment – a relation liberated from the imperatives of utility and profit.
אני מבקש להגדיר ילדים כמי שסובלים מדיכוי ומופלים לרעה בדרכים שונות מחמת גילם הצעיר. תווית הילדוּת ... more אני מבקש להגדיר ילדים כמי שסובלים מדיכוי ומופלים לרעה בדרכים שונות מחמת גילם הצעיר. תווית הילדוּת משמשת גם בשיח היומיומי וגם בתיאוריה הפוליטית להצדקה ונרמול של הפרדת הצעירים מהמבוגרים והשליטה בהם. אבל ההיגיון שנותן לגיטימציה ליחסי כוח בהווה על בסיס טענה לחסר שיושלם רק בעתיד מיושם גם על קבוצות אחרות: ילידים, עניים ונשים, אם למנות רק כמה דוגמאות מובהקות. חרף ההבדל הברור בלוחות הזמנים – שנים אחדות במקרה של הילדים, לעומת דורות רבים בדוגמאות האחרות – אפשר לזהות כאן את אותה שפה ואותו משטר של הצדקה. אך בעוד במקרים אחרים כבר למדנו לראות את הדיכוי גם אם הוא מכוסה במילים יפות ואפילו בכוונות טובות, זה אינו המצב ביחס לילדים. השליטה בהם שקופה ונראית טבעית גם לתיאורטיקנים ולפעילות ביקורתיות.
In this article, we examine the installation of surveillance cameras in the
Bedouin town of Hura ... more In this article, we examine the installation of surveillance cameras in the Bedouin town of Hura in the Negev desert in Israel, analysing the complex interactions between the state and the local inhabitants, for whom the cameras were an opportunity to exercise agency. Considering the long history of Jewish colonialism in the Negev, one could have assumed that the new surveillance technology was imposed on the Bedouins against their will. However, in-depth interviews with Hura inhabitants demonstrated that the municipality and tribal authorities were active players in deciding on the installation and location of the surveillance cameras. In light of the conflictual relations of the Bedouin population to Israeli state authorities, we argue that while the cameras placed the Bedouins of Hura under a new layer of surveillance, their installation could also be understood as a reaction to the ongoing neglect of Bedouin lives and possessions by the state.
Post-critical pedagogy, which offers a significant alternative to the dominant trends in contempo... more Post-critical pedagogy, which offers a significant alternative to the dominant trends in contemporary philosophy of education, objects to seeing education as instrumental to other ends: it attempts to conceive of education as autotelic, namely as having intrinsic value. While there are good reasons for accepting the post-critical reservations with the instru-mentalization of education, I argue that its autonomy is equally problematic, as it risks turning the philosophy of education-perhaps education itself-into a privileged activity, out of touch with the most important issues in the contemporary world. In this paper I offer post-critical pedagogy a way out of this dilemma, by drawing on Walter Benjamin's essay "The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility". After presenting the thesis concerning the autonomy of art held by Benjamin's Frankfurt School friends, and pointing to the similarity between their view and that of post-critical pedagogy, I articulate six Benjaminian theses on post-critical pedagogy. Following Benjamin's claim that the technological reproducibility of art changes the way it is perceived as well as its political function, I argue that school is an educational technology that reproduces the world to the masses without an "aura", in a way that allows for political critique that does not reduce education to politics. Next, I highlight the importance of the school to post-critical pedagogy, and contribute to developing the critical-political aspect that remains essential to post-critical pedagogy. Finally, the Benjaminian perspective also makes it possible to reflect on the relation of digital technologies of reproduction to post-critical pedagogy.
On Education: Journal for Research and Debate, 2020
While post-critical pedagogy urges us to educate out of and toward love for the world, in this ar... more While post-critical pedagogy urges us to educate out of and toward love for the world, in this article I argue against the privileged status of love in educational discourse. I hold that renewing the world is impossible without critique, indeed without a pinch of hatred. I suggest, therefore, moving from post to neo-critique, to renewing the world by renewing critique. I start with discussing some good reasons for hating the world, and then turn to the concept of critique, which post-critical pedagogy is by no means the first to attack. A look at the thorough analysis of the modern concept of critique offered by German historian Reinhart Koselleck uncovers the deep contradictions inherent to its totalizing, rationalistic presuppositions that see nothing but absolute good and absolute evil. Koselleck's comments on premodern critique point the way to a more complex concept of critique, which transcends such binary divisions. In the last section of this article, I take some steps in this direction, fleshing out the concept of neo-critical pedagogy by thinking of art criticism.
The answer I propose to the question posed by the editors of ducational Philosophy and Theory—Wh... more The answer I propose to the question posed by the editors of ducational Philosophy and Theory—What Comes after ostmodernism?—is already in the question. All we have to do is move the question mark a bit: What? Comes after postmodernism. After postmodernism, it is time to ask: What? Answering the question ‘What now?’ with the question ‘What?’ now is to ask again, but differently, the most basic question of philosophy: What is it? What is x? This is the question Socrates asked the citizens of Athens: a question that is looking for a definition, an essence, the final meaning of a word or a concept (e.g. Plato, 2002). The ‘What?’, according to Socrates, reveals the contradictions and misconceptions in the ordinary ways of thinking and speaking, thereby leading to knowledge, be it even the knowledge of not knowing. This What? has led philosophy into modernity, attempting to enlighten the world and educate mankind by revealing true essences, understanding what things truly are. Postmodernism challenged the What?, attempting to go beyond philosophy and reject the search for essences. Thinkers from Wittgenstein (1953) to Derrida (1977) declared war on What?, attacking the very supposition that concepts can be defined and that words represent things in physical or mental reality. No more What?: We no longer ask ‘What does it mean?’ but ‘How does it work?’. This, I believe, is what lies behind what Michael Peters (2008) called the ‘naming anxiety’, which allows only ‘negative definitions’, shunning away from positive knowledge, from commitment to the truth. The role of the Socratic educator, who leads the student out of the cave of prejudices into the light of possible knowledge, has likewise declined. The end of all narratives of progress undermined pedagogic authority and with it all traditional concepts of education. But for this very reason, from within the logic of postmodernism, we must ask again: What is education? What is a teacher? Every such question forces us to stop and think, to distance ourselves for a moment from the postmodern flux of images and representations with no referents, and commit ourselves to looking for answers. Indeed, we cannot ask these questions in (pre)modern naiveté—perhaps, we have never been modern (Latour, 1993), but we will always be postmodern, unable to determine simple definitions and eternal essences. We can only give partial, contingent answers, being aware of the ways each answer is conditioned by history and politics but can never be reduced to them. We can answer, for instance, that education after postmodernism is one which keeps asking ‘What is it?’; and that a teacher after postmodernism is one who summons the question ‘What is it?’. Such a teacher will not assume the answer in advance. But perhaps more importantly, after postmodernism, every answer could only be accepted temporarily, in a way that does not put an end to thought but rather keeps it open, alert, committed. This will allow a return (always partial, temporary) of education from the chaotic carnival of postmodernism back to philosophical thinking. A return to education as philosophical thinking and to philosophy as a form of education.
In this paper I discuss two attempts to challenge mainstream liberal education, by Hannah Arendt ... more In this paper I discuss two attempts to challenge mainstream liberal education, by Hannah Arendt and by contemporary Israeli philosopher Hanan Alexander. Arendt and Alexander both identify problems in liberal-secular modern politics and present alternatives based on reconnecting politics and education to tradition. I analyze their positions and bring them into a dialogue that suggests a complex conception of education that avoids many of the pitfalls of modern liberal thought. First, I outline Arendt and Alexander's educational views and discuss their similarities, arguing that both may be understood as opposed to the modern attempt to adopt a «view from nowhere» at the world. Next, I suggest that Alexander's view may benefit from adopting Arendt's conceptions of tradition and authority. In the consecutive section, I argue that Alexander sheds light on significant problems in Arendt's approach to education, problems his understanding of critical dialogue can help solve. The succeeding section joins the two views together to form an approach I call «critical traditionalism», and examines it against prevailing approaches to political education. I conclude by pointing to an important point overlooked by both Arendt and Alexander, namely the need for internal political struggle within each tradition.
This paper outlines a theory of radical democratic education by addressing a key concept in Lacla... more This paper outlines a theory of radical democratic education by addressing a key concept in Laclau and Mouffe's Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: articulation. Through their concept of articulation, Laclau and Mouffe attempt to liberate Gramsci's theory of hegemony from Marxist economism, and adapt it to a political sphere inhabited by a plurality of struggles and agents none of which is predominant. However, while for Gramsci the political process of hegemony formation has an explicit educational dimension, Laclau and Mouffe ignore this dimension altogether. My discussion starts with elaborating the concept of articulation and analysing it in terms of three dimensions: performance, connection and transformation. I then address the role of education in Gramsci's politics, in which the figure of the intellectual is central, and argue that radical democratic education requires renouncing that figure. In the final section, I offer a theory of such education, in which both teacher and students articulate their political differences and identities.
According to a widespread view, one of the most important roles of
education is the nurturing of ... more According to a widespread view, one of the most important roles of education is the nurturing of common sense. In this article I turn to Gilles Deleuze’s concept of sense to develop a contrary view of education—one that views education as a radical challenge to common sense. The discussion will centre on the relation of sense and common sense to thinking. Although adherents of common sense refer to it as the basis of all thought and appeal to critical thinking as instrumental in eliminating its occasional errors, I shall argue, following Deleuze, that common sense education in fact thwarts thinking, while only education which revolves around making sense may provoke thinking that goes beyond the self-evident. I demonstrate how making sense can become an educational encounter that breaks hierarchies and generates thinking independently of the thinker’s knowledge and place in the sociopolitical order. The present article attempts, therefore, to put some sense into Deleuzian education for thinking, and thereby shed new light on its radical-political, counter-commonsensical power.
This article attempts to think of thinking as the essence of critical education. While contempora... more This article attempts to think of thinking as the essence of critical education. While contemporary education tends to stress the conveying of knowledge and skills needed to succeed in the present-day information society, the present article turns to the work of Theodor W. Adorno to develop alternative thinking about education, thinking and the political significance of education for thinking. Adorno touched upon educational questions throughout his writings, with growing interest in the last ten years of his life. Education, he argues following Kant, must enable students to think for themselves and to break free of the authority of teachers, parents and other adults. Nevertheless, in his discussions of education Adorno says little about the nature of thinking, and the secondary literature on his educational theory addresses this question only cursorily. Important claims on the nature of thinking do appear elsewhere in Adorno's work. From his early writings up to Negative Dialectics, Adorno is preoccupied with thinking, sketching the outlines of critical-dialectical thought. Still, these reflections rarely touch upon educational questions, and the Adorno scholarship has yet to establish this link. Unlike studies which read Adorno's educational thought against the backdrop of the history of education and the German Bildung tradition, or in relation to art and aesthetics, the present article brings together Adorno's ideas on education and thinking in an attempt to contribute both to the Adorno scholarship and to the growing field of education for thinking.
The republican political tradition, which originated in Ancient Rome and picked up by several ear... more The republican political tradition, which originated in Ancient Rome and picked up by several early-modern thinkers, has been revived in the last couple of decades following the seminal works of historian Quentin Skinner and political theorist Philip Pettit. Although educational questions do not normally occupy the center stage in republican theory, various theorists working within this framework have already highlighted the significance of education for any functioning republic. Looking at educational questions through the lens of freedom as non-domination has already yielded important insights to discussions of political education. However, consideration of the existing republican educational discourse in light of the wide range of issues discussed in Pettit's recent works reveals that it suffers from two major lacunae. First, it does not take into consideration the distinction (and deep connection) between democracy and social justice that has become central to Pettit's republicanism. Thus, the current discussion focuses almost exclusively on education for democratic citizenship and hardly touches upon social justice. Second, the current literature thinks mainly in terms of educating future citizens, rather than conceiving of students also as political agents in the present, and of school itself as a site of non-domination. This paper aims at filling these voids, and it will therefore be oriented along two intersecting axes: the one between democracy and justice, and the other between future citizenship in the state and present citizenship at school. The resulting four categories will organize the discussion: future citizens and democracy; future citizens and social justice; present citizens and democracy; present citizens and social justice. This will not only enable us to draw a clearer line between the civic republican and liberal educational
The neo-republican political philosophy (sometimes referred to as civic republicanism) advances t... more The neo-republican political philosophy (sometimes referred to as civic republicanism) advances the idea of freedom as non-domination, in an attempt to provide democracy with a solid normative foundation upon which concrete principles and institutions can be erected so as to make freedom a reality. However, attempts to develop a republican educational theory are still hesitant, and fail to take the republican radical conception of freedom to its full conclusions. This article suggests that dialogue between neo-republicanism and critical pedagogy can be mutually productive. In the first part of the article we present the neo-republican theory, and contrast it with traditional liberalism. In the second we focus on existing neo-republican theories of education, and claim that they do not take the republican presuppositions to their necessary conclusion, namely to an educational theory fully committed to the idea of freedom as non-domination. A republican educational theory, we argue, must take into consideration not only the freedom students will have in the future, but also their freedom in the present: it should think of school as a small-scale republic, which prepares its inhabitants to be future citizens of the state while at the same time treating them as free citizens in their own right. In the third part we use insights taken from critical pedagogy to chart the direction republican education must take by applying three key republican notions—democratic control, civic contestation, and trust. In the fourth and last part we outline four aspects in which neo-republicanism can shed new light on contemporary debates in critical pedagogy: the connection between democracy and justice, the multiplicity of forms of domination, critical education within schools, and work with students from relatively privileged backgrounds.
This paper addresses the question "what is school?", and argues that the answer to this question ... more This paper addresses the question "what is school?", and argues that the answer to this question has an essential political dimension. I focus on two very different attempts to characterize school – Ivan Illich's Deschooling Society and Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons's In Defence of the School – and demonstrate that both texts miss the political potential which is inherent in school. The two texts are analyzed along two relational axes: relations between school and society, and relations between children and political subjects. Illich rejects children’s de-politicization while accepting the assumption that school operates according to a similar logic as society in general. Masschelein and Simons, on the other hand, advocate a separation between school and society, but also accept the separation of children from politics. I aim to integrate Illich's analytical categories into Masschelein and Simons' discussion, in order to mark important directions for political struggles both over and within school.
This article focuses on the concept of common sense in order to shed new light on the radical and... more This article focuses on the concept of common sense in order to shed new light on the radical and pluralist democracy developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. It is argued that their move via Antonio Gramsci away from both Marxism and traditional liberal democracy cannot be fully understood without reference to the role common sense plays in it. Focusing on common sense reveals crucial aspects of the relations between intellectuals and ordinary people in Laclau and Mouffe's political theory, and how they deal with problems of embedded hierarchy, characteristic of modern political thought. First I reconstruct Gramsci's concept of common sense, trace its origins and analyze its egalitarian aspect. Next I present the concept's novelty with regard to other modern political theories and their presuppositions, and discuss Gramsci's eventual commitment to the latter. I then turn to discussing both the reasons why Laclau and Mouffe cannot accept the traditional concept of common sense and why they assert that constructing some sort of common sense is necessary for the formation of democratic hegemony. Finally, I argue that Laclau and Mouffe can be seen as having dealt with the problems that result from the need for common sense and the inability to accept it only if we interpret their concept of common sense as a development of Gramsci's, namely as a heterogeneous matrix of various incompatible "common senses".
Arendt’s concept of common sense has generally been misunderstood. It
is almost exclusively inter... more Arendt’s concept of common sense has generally been misunderstood. It is almost exclusively interpreted in light of Kant’s common sense, either as an espousal of the latter or as a distortion of it. This narrow reading of Arendtian common sense has led to a problem, as her uses of the concept do not always fit its Kantian understanding. This has led to accusing her of being inconsistent, or as holding on to several, incompatible concepts of common sense. This article argues that Arendt has one complex concept of common sense, used more or less consistently throughout her writings. Rather than understanding Arendt’s common sense in light of Kant’s, as most readers do, I demonstrate its links to Aristotle and to the eighteenth-century Scottish school of common sense. By doing so I turn attention to a difficulty that has thus far not been adequately treated, namely the fact that Arendt presents two, allegedly contradictory pictures of the relation between common sense on the one hand and science and philosophy on the other: a picture in which science and philosophy depend upon common sense, versus one in which they find themselves in a conflict that eventually leads to the loss or demise of common sense. The last part of the article suggests a way to settle the tension between these two pictures, by understanding the political significance Arendt ascribes to them as two distinct yet complementary ways of approaching the modern phenomenon of totalitarianism.
Education and Thinking in Continental Philosophy: Thinking against the Current in Adorno, Arendt, Deleuze, Derrida and Rancière, 2020
In this introductory chapter, I examine the philosophical and educational background within and a... more In this introductory chapter, I examine the philosophical and educational background within and against which I posit the encounters between the conceptions of thinking offered by the continental philosophers discussed in the book – Adorno, Arendt, Deleuze, Derrida and Rancière – and the educational field. I begin with discussing the constitutive role of thinking in modern philosophy, and analyze the Cartesian conception of thinking that has become paradigmatic. Next, I present the existing field of education for thinking and trace the trends, controversies and assumptions shared by all who work in it, almost all of whom belong to the analytic tradition. Without committing to any clear difference between the two traditions, I then turn to continental philosophy, to examine how three of its founding fathers – Marx (who is examined also through the psychological work of Lev Vygotsky), Nietzsche and Heidegger – have challenged the Cartesian conception of thinking. Finally, I present the aims of the book and outline its chapters.
Education and Thinking in Continental Philosophy: Thinking against the Current in Adorno, Arendt, Deleuze, Derrida and Rancière, 2020
This chapter brings together Adorno's ideas on education and thinking in an attempt to develop an... more This chapter brings together Adorno's ideas on education and thinking in an attempt to develop an original approach to education, thinking, and the political significance of education for thinking. I start with discussing Adorno’s radio talks and lectures on education, to outline his reasons for conceiving of education for autonomous thinking as a task of the outmost importance. Next, I turn to other texts in which Adorno engages with thinking, and argue that the key for genuine thinking is experience, namely openness on the part of the subject to the object's particularity. To better understand the connections between education, thinking and experience in Adorno, I examine how they are linked together in the thought of John Dewey. I highlight the differences between Adorno and Dewey, arguing that while for the latter thinking of an object amounts in the last instance to discovering the laws applying to it, for the former thinking requires experiencing the object as “non-identical”, transcending all general categories. Finally, I show that the proper form of genuine thinking is not public discussion but rather the writing of essays. I conclude by terming this type of education that is focused on thinking as action minima pedagogica.
Education and Thinking in Continental Philosophy: Thinking against the Current in Adorno, Arendt, Deleuze, Derrida and Rancière, 2020
In this chapter, I analyze Arendt's conception of thinking and examine ways education can facilit... more In this chapter, I analyze Arendt's conception of thinking and examine ways education can facilitate thinking activities. I argue that education for thinking in Arendt's approach is indeed possible and of great importance, but may also be hazardous to the thinker as well as her political community. Confronting this danger does not require less thinking (or education encouraging it), but rather engaging in two different but complementary kinds of thinking. That is to say, taking up the educational potential of Arendt's conception of thinking requires acknowledging the difference between two distinct kinds of thinking she discusses – a distinction which often escapes existing scholarship – and using the second as an antidote to the dangers of the first. The first kind of thinking is a mental activity demanding withdrawal from the world and from the company of other people in order to think about meanings, while the second follows Kant's notion of "enlarged mentality", attempting to view the world from the points of view of these very others.
Education and Thinking in Continental Philosophy: Thinking against the Current in Adorno, Arendt, Deleuze, Derrida and Rancière, 2020
In this chapter, I turn to Deleuze to demonstrate how making sense can become an educational enco... more In this chapter, I turn to Deleuze to demonstrate how making sense can become an educational encounter that breaks hierarchies and generates thinking independently of the thinker's knowledge and place in the sociopolitical order. I start with an analysis of the Deleuzian concepts of common sense and good sense, which form the basis of what he calls “the dogmatic image of thought”. I then discuss his concept of sense, and demonstrate that Deleuzian sense can never be common, for it resides not in ordinary, communicable linguistic propositions but rather in the surface between language and world, arising from a problematic encounter with the latter. Next, I address the commonsensical relation between the human faculties to develop Deleuze's notion of thinking as an involuntary, unregulated exercise of the faculties and present his example of learning to swim as a case of education for thinking. Finally, I turn to Deleuze's discussion of Marcel Proust's In Search of Lost Time to elaborate on how thinking is generated by involuntary encounters with signs and analyze the Proustian search as another example of education for thinking, in which the narrator both learns and makes others think.
Education and Thinking in Continental Philosophy: Thinking against the Current in Adorno, Arendt, Deleuze, Derrida and Rancière, 2020
This chapter aims at reconstructing Derrida's concept of thinking and analyzing its relations to ... more This chapter aims at reconstructing Derrida's concept of thinking and analyzing its relations to education. The starting point is "Cogito and the History of Madness", where Derrida argues against Foucault's reading of Descartes’ reference to madness in the first chapter of his Meditations. While Foucault claims that Descartes constitutes a dichotomous opposition between thought and madness, Derrida shows that madness finds its way into the Cartesian cogito and into thought itself. This debate, I argue, has interesting educational implications: Derrida presents both Foucault and Descartes as teachers who not only provide their students with knowledge, but also leave them with the madness required to break discursive boundaries and think for themselves. Next, I broaden the perspective and show that Derrida understands thinking, like every system of signification, as a kind of writing – the thinking subject is in fact a writing subject who does not fully master the meanings of her thoughts. Finally, I turn to Derrida's writings on education: I discuss his call to make room in schools for thinking against the predominant "philosophy of the state", and analyze his claim that the university should "blink", namely think of the conditions making thinking possible within its walls.
Education and Thinking in Continental Philosophy: Thinking against the Current in Adorno, Arendt, Deleuze, Derrida and Rancière, 2020
In this chapter, I argue that the notion of thinking can shed new light on Rancière’s conception ... more In this chapter, I argue that the notion of thinking can shed new light on Rancière’s conception of emancipatory education, as well as on the relation between education and politics in his thought. I show that thinking opens the dimensions of plurality and singularity in Rancière’s politics, thereby playing a crucial role in the formation of political subjects. By thinking about thinking in Rancière, I demonstrate that universal teaching – understood as a unique kind of education for thinking – may indeed be political, and politics contains a necessary aspect of education for thinking. I start by analyzing the importance of thinking for universal teaching. I argue that while stultifying education aims at confining thought to a single model, universal teaching emancipates thought and acknowledges a plurality of ways of thinking. Next, I argue that thinking plays an important role in Rancière’s democratic politics, especially in the formation of collective political subjects out of a plurality of individuals. Finally, I show that the formation of such political subjects involves educational activities that can also be seen as education for thinking, and that this educational aspect makes it possible to understand how political subjects can reproduce and generate each other.
Education and Thinking in Continental Philosophy: Thinking against the Current in Adorno, Arendt, Deleuze, Derrida and Rancière, 2020
In this concluding chapter, I try to shed light on the differences and similarities between the f... more In this concluding chapter, I try to shed light on the differences and similarities between the five approaches discussed in the book, so as to allow them to appear more clearly. To that end, I examine the views of Adorno, Arendt, Deleuze, Derrida, and Rancière along the three main axes around which the book revolves: the conception of thinking, the relations between thinking and politics, and the possibility of education for thinking. The first is approached through examining the relations to the Cartesian cogito and to language, the second through focusing on the question what politics is, and the third through asking whether education for thinking can find place at school. In each case, the comparison reveals agreements and overlaps between some philosophers, but also indicates the lack of common ground on which to build a comprehensive theory of education for thinking based on all. Finally, I use the meta-analysis to draw some general conclusions and attempt to think about the relations between the continental conceptions of thinking and concrete educational practice.
התרוממות הרוח האקסטטית שחשים רבים בישראל לנוכח האסון המתגלגל שאנו נמצאים בו מאז 7 באוקטובר, שמלוו... more התרוממות הרוח האקסטטית שחשים רבים בישראל לנוכח האסון המתגלגל שאנו נמצאים בו מאז 7 באוקטובר, שמלווה אפילו בהתייחסויות אל התקופה כאל "נס", מפורשת לעתים קרובות כביטוי למשיחיות. המלחמה וקורבנותיה, בראייה זו, הם חבלי משיח — שלב כואב אך הכרחי ורצוי בדרך להגשמת מטרה מיוחלת שהיא בה־בעת פוליטית (גירוש, התנחלות) ודתית (גאולה). אבל פרשנות זו מחמיצה חלק גדול מהלך הרוח שמאפיין ציבורים גדולים יותר ויותר במדינה: תפיסת המלחמה לא רק כאמצעי לתכלית חיצונית, שתבוא אחרי הניצחון המוחלט, אלא כטוב עצמו, בעל ערך פנימי. לתפיסה זו יש ממד תיאולוגי ברור, אבל לא משיחי. היא מתפעמת מההווה ומייחסת לו אופי גאולי, יותר משהיא נושאת פניה לעתיד.
התמודדות מעמיקה עם האתגרים הניצבים בפני מערכת החינוך עוברת בהכרח דרך מחשבה על בית הספר. מה שהופך ... more התמודדות מעמיקה עם האתגרים הניצבים בפני מערכת החינוך עוברת בהכרח דרך מחשבה על בית הספר. מה שהופך את החינוך המודרני ל"מערכת" ומבדיל אותו מהוראה בחיק המשפחה, מרכישת מקצוע בסדנת אומן ואף ממסגרות לימוד פרטיות או דתיות, הוא מערך בתי הספר הנמצאים בזיקה ברורה (אם כי משתנה) למדינה. לא ניתן אפוא לענות על שאלות הנוגעות למצוינות חינוכית וחתירה לשוויון במערכת החינוך מבלי לחשוב ברצינות על בית הספר ולהבין את הבעיות והמגבלות הטמונות בו כמו גם את האפשרויות וההבטחות שהוא מגלם.
על מנת לחשוב מחדש על בית הספר ולחלץ את האפשרות להפוך אותו ממוסד שמרני לגורם חתרני, חשוב אפוא לבחו... more על מנת לחשוב מחדש על בית הספר ולחלץ את האפשרות להפוך אותו ממוסד שמרני לגורם חתרני, חשוב אפוא לבחון את תרומתו הסגולית והייחודית של בית הספר, שאינה מתמצה בסיוע למשפחה העובדת בטיפול בילדים, ואף לא בהנחלת משמעת או בהקניית ידע, שגם אותם ניתן לבצע בחיק המשפחה, בדרכים מסורתיות או בעזרת אמצעים טכנולוגיים. כדי להבין מה בית הספר יכול להציע מעבר למה שמסוגלת המשפחה להעניק, יש טעם לחשוב עליו לא כהמשכה של המשפחה ואף לא כגורם שמסייע לה, אלא בדיוק להיפך: כמוסד ציבורי שיכול לשחרר את הילד והילדה מהמשפחה למשך פרקי זמן קצובים, ולאפשר להם לבלות חלקים מחייהם בלי להיות כבולים לסד המשפחתי. דרך השחרור מהמשפחה יכול בית הספר להפוך למרחב חופשי במובן מיוחד, לא באמצעות בחירה אישית של נושאי וזמני הלימוד – בחירה שמתאפשרת במידה רבה גם בחיק המשפחה ולעיתים קרובות מוכוונת על ידה – אלא על ידי הענקת שוויון וחירות שאין בידי המשפחה להעניק. כך נוכל להבין את בית הספר לא כמוסד של שעתוק חברתי, אלא כאתר פוליטי רדיקלי הפורע את סדרי החברה ומאפשר לה להתחדש.
Itay Snir's book Education and Thinking in Continental Philosophy (Springer, 2020) draws on five ... more Itay Snir's book Education and Thinking in Continental Philosophy (Springer, 2020) draws on five philosophers from the continental tradition – Theodor Adorno, Hannah Arendt, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, and Jacques Rancière – in order to “think about thinking” and offer new and surprising answers to the question: How can we educate students to think creatively and critically? Despite their differences, all of these philosophers challenge the modern understanding of thinking, and offer original, radical perspectives on it. In very different ways, each rejects the modern approach to thinking, as well as the reduction of proper thought to rationality, situating thinking in sociohistorical reality and relating it to political action. Thinking, they argue, is not a natural, automatic activity, and the need to think has become all the more important as political reality seems to exhibit less thinking, or to even celebrate thoughtlessness. Bringing these continental conceptions of thinking to bear on the urgent need to educate young people to think against the current, this book makes a significant contribution to educational theory and political philosophy, one that is particularly relevant in today’s anti-intellectual climate. (The podcast focuses especially on Adorno's thoughts about thinking.)
Uploads
Academic papers by Itay Snir
Bedouin town of Hura in the Negev desert in Israel, analysing the complex interactions between the state and the local inhabitants, for whom the cameras were an opportunity to exercise agency. Considering the long history of Jewish colonialism in the Negev, one could have assumed that the new surveillance technology was imposed on the Bedouins
against their will. However, in-depth interviews with Hura inhabitants demonstrated that the municipality and tribal authorities were active players in deciding on the installation and location of the surveillance cameras. In light of the conflictual relations of the Bedouin population to Israeli state authorities, we argue that while the cameras placed the
Bedouins of Hura under a new layer of surveillance, their installation could also be understood as a reaction to the ongoing neglect of Bedouin lives and possessions by the state.
Answering the question ‘What now?’ with the question ‘What?’ now is to ask again, but differently, the most basic question of philosophy: What is it? What is x? This is the question Socrates asked the citizens of Athens: a question that is looking for a definition, an essence, the final meaning of a word or a concept (e.g. Plato, 2002). The ‘What?’, according to Socrates, reveals the contradictions and misconceptions in the ordinary ways of thinking and speaking, thereby leading to knowledge, be it even the knowledge of not knowing. This What? has led philosophy into
modernity, attempting to enlighten the world and educate mankind by revealing true essences, understanding what things truly are.
Postmodernism challenged the What?, attempting to go beyond
philosophy and reject the search for essences. Thinkers from Wittgenstein (1953) to Derrida (1977) declared war on What?, attacking the very supposition that concepts can be defined and that words
represent things in physical or mental reality. No more What?: We no longer ask ‘What does it mean?’ but ‘How does it work?’. This, I believe,
is what lies behind what Michael Peters (2008) called the ‘naming anxiety’, which allows only ‘negative definitions’, shunning away from positive knowledge, from commitment to the truth. The role of the
Socratic educator, who leads the student out of the cave of prejudices into the light of possible knowledge, has likewise declined. The end of all narratives of progress undermined pedagogic authority and with it all traditional concepts of education.
But for this very reason, from within the logic of postmodernism, we must ask again: What is education? What is a teacher? Every such question forces us to stop and think, to distance ourselves for a moment from the postmodern flux of images and representations with no
referents, and commit ourselves to looking for answers. Indeed, we cannot ask these questions in (pre)modern naiveté—perhaps, we have never been modern (Latour, 1993), but we will always be postmodern, unable to determine simple definitions and eternal essences. We can only give partial, contingent answers, being aware of the ways each answer is conditioned by history and politics but can never be reduced to them.
We can answer, for instance, that education after postmodernism is one which keeps asking ‘What is it?’; and that a teacher after postmodernism is one who summons the question ‘What is it?’. Such a teacher will not assume the answer in advance. But perhaps more importantly, after postmodernism, every answer could only be accepted temporarily, in a way that does not put an end to thought but rather keeps it open, alert, committed. This will allow a return (always partial, temporary) of education from the chaotic carnival of postmodernism back to
philosophical thinking. A return to education as philosophical thinking and to philosophy as a form of education.
education is the nurturing of common sense. In this article I turn to Gilles Deleuze’s concept of sense to develop a contrary view of education—one that views education as a radical challenge to common sense. The discussion will centre on the relation of sense and common sense to thinking. Although adherents of common sense refer to it as the basis of all thought and appeal to critical thinking as instrumental in eliminating its occasional errors, I shall argue, following Deleuze, that common sense education in fact thwarts thinking, while only education which revolves around making sense may provoke thinking that goes beyond the self-evident. I demonstrate how making sense can become an educational encounter that breaks hierarchies and generates thinking independently of the thinker’s knowledge and place in the sociopolitical order. The present article attempts, therefore, to put some sense into Deleuzian education for thinking, and thereby shed new light on its radical-political, counter-commonsensical power.
First I reconstruct Gramsci's concept of common sense, trace its origins and analyze its egalitarian aspect. Next I present the concept's novelty with regard to other modern political theories and their presuppositions, and discuss Gramsci's eventual commitment to the latter. I then turn to discussing both the reasons why Laclau and Mouffe cannot accept the traditional concept of common sense and why they assert that constructing some sort of common sense is necessary for the formation of democratic hegemony. Finally, I argue that Laclau and Mouffe can be seen as having dealt with the problems that result from the need for common sense and the inability to accept it only if we interpret their concept of common sense as a development of Gramsci's, namely as a heterogeneous matrix of various incompatible "common senses".
is almost exclusively interpreted in light of Kant’s common sense, either as an
espousal of the latter or as a distortion of it. This narrow reading of Arendtian
common sense has led to a problem, as her uses of the concept do not always fit
its Kantian understanding. This has led to accusing her of being inconsistent, or as
holding on to several, incompatible concepts of common sense.
This article argues that Arendt has one complex concept of common sense, used
more or less consistently throughout her writings. Rather than understanding
Arendt’s common sense in light of Kant’s, as most readers do, I demonstrate its
links to Aristotle and to the eighteenth-century Scottish school of common sense.
By doing so I turn attention to a difficulty that has thus far not been adequately
treated, namely the fact that Arendt presents two, allegedly contradictory pictures
of the relation between common sense on the one hand and science and philosophy
on the other: a picture in which science and philosophy depend upon common
sense, versus one in which they find themselves in a conflict that eventually
leads to the loss or demise of common sense. The last part of the article suggests a
way to settle the tension between these two pictures, by understanding the political
significance Arendt ascribes to them as two distinct yet complementary ways of
approaching the modern phenomenon of totalitarianism.
Bedouin town of Hura in the Negev desert in Israel, analysing the complex interactions between the state and the local inhabitants, for whom the cameras were an opportunity to exercise agency. Considering the long history of Jewish colonialism in the Negev, one could have assumed that the new surveillance technology was imposed on the Bedouins
against their will. However, in-depth interviews with Hura inhabitants demonstrated that the municipality and tribal authorities were active players in deciding on the installation and location of the surveillance cameras. In light of the conflictual relations of the Bedouin population to Israeli state authorities, we argue that while the cameras placed the
Bedouins of Hura under a new layer of surveillance, their installation could also be understood as a reaction to the ongoing neglect of Bedouin lives and possessions by the state.
Answering the question ‘What now?’ with the question ‘What?’ now is to ask again, but differently, the most basic question of philosophy: What is it? What is x? This is the question Socrates asked the citizens of Athens: a question that is looking for a definition, an essence, the final meaning of a word or a concept (e.g. Plato, 2002). The ‘What?’, according to Socrates, reveals the contradictions and misconceptions in the ordinary ways of thinking and speaking, thereby leading to knowledge, be it even the knowledge of not knowing. This What? has led philosophy into
modernity, attempting to enlighten the world and educate mankind by revealing true essences, understanding what things truly are.
Postmodernism challenged the What?, attempting to go beyond
philosophy and reject the search for essences. Thinkers from Wittgenstein (1953) to Derrida (1977) declared war on What?, attacking the very supposition that concepts can be defined and that words
represent things in physical or mental reality. No more What?: We no longer ask ‘What does it mean?’ but ‘How does it work?’. This, I believe,
is what lies behind what Michael Peters (2008) called the ‘naming anxiety’, which allows only ‘negative definitions’, shunning away from positive knowledge, from commitment to the truth. The role of the
Socratic educator, who leads the student out of the cave of prejudices into the light of possible knowledge, has likewise declined. The end of all narratives of progress undermined pedagogic authority and with it all traditional concepts of education.
But for this very reason, from within the logic of postmodernism, we must ask again: What is education? What is a teacher? Every such question forces us to stop and think, to distance ourselves for a moment from the postmodern flux of images and representations with no
referents, and commit ourselves to looking for answers. Indeed, we cannot ask these questions in (pre)modern naiveté—perhaps, we have never been modern (Latour, 1993), but we will always be postmodern, unable to determine simple definitions and eternal essences. We can only give partial, contingent answers, being aware of the ways each answer is conditioned by history and politics but can never be reduced to them.
We can answer, for instance, that education after postmodernism is one which keeps asking ‘What is it?’; and that a teacher after postmodernism is one who summons the question ‘What is it?’. Such a teacher will not assume the answer in advance. But perhaps more importantly, after postmodernism, every answer could only be accepted temporarily, in a way that does not put an end to thought but rather keeps it open, alert, committed. This will allow a return (always partial, temporary) of education from the chaotic carnival of postmodernism back to
philosophical thinking. A return to education as philosophical thinking and to philosophy as a form of education.
education is the nurturing of common sense. In this article I turn to Gilles Deleuze’s concept of sense to develop a contrary view of education—one that views education as a radical challenge to common sense. The discussion will centre on the relation of sense and common sense to thinking. Although adherents of common sense refer to it as the basis of all thought and appeal to critical thinking as instrumental in eliminating its occasional errors, I shall argue, following Deleuze, that common sense education in fact thwarts thinking, while only education which revolves around making sense may provoke thinking that goes beyond the self-evident. I demonstrate how making sense can become an educational encounter that breaks hierarchies and generates thinking independently of the thinker’s knowledge and place in the sociopolitical order. The present article attempts, therefore, to put some sense into Deleuzian education for thinking, and thereby shed new light on its radical-political, counter-commonsensical power.
First I reconstruct Gramsci's concept of common sense, trace its origins and analyze its egalitarian aspect. Next I present the concept's novelty with regard to other modern political theories and their presuppositions, and discuss Gramsci's eventual commitment to the latter. I then turn to discussing both the reasons why Laclau and Mouffe cannot accept the traditional concept of common sense and why they assert that constructing some sort of common sense is necessary for the formation of democratic hegemony. Finally, I argue that Laclau and Mouffe can be seen as having dealt with the problems that result from the need for common sense and the inability to accept it only if we interpret their concept of common sense as a development of Gramsci's, namely as a heterogeneous matrix of various incompatible "common senses".
is almost exclusively interpreted in light of Kant’s common sense, either as an
espousal of the latter or as a distortion of it. This narrow reading of Arendtian
common sense has led to a problem, as her uses of the concept do not always fit
its Kantian understanding. This has led to accusing her of being inconsistent, or as
holding on to several, incompatible concepts of common sense.
This article argues that Arendt has one complex concept of common sense, used
more or less consistently throughout her writings. Rather than understanding
Arendt’s common sense in light of Kant’s, as most readers do, I demonstrate its
links to Aristotle and to the eighteenth-century Scottish school of common sense.
By doing so I turn attention to a difficulty that has thus far not been adequately
treated, namely the fact that Arendt presents two, allegedly contradictory pictures
of the relation between common sense on the one hand and science and philosophy
on the other: a picture in which science and philosophy depend upon common
sense, versus one in which they find themselves in a conflict that eventually
leads to the loss or demise of common sense. The last part of the article suggests a
way to settle the tension between these two pictures, by understanding the political
significance Arendt ascribes to them as two distinct yet complementary ways of
approaching the modern phenomenon of totalitarianism.