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Building Routines: Learning, Cooperation, and the Dynamics of Incomplete Relational Contracts. (2010). Chassang, Sylvain.
In: American Economic Review.
RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:100:y:2010:i:1:p:448-65.

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  4. Predicting internet commercial connectivity wars: The impact of trust and operators’ asymmetry. (2015). Giovannetti, Emanuele ; Dignazio, Alessio .
    In: International Journal of Forecasting.
    RePEc:eee:intfor:v:31:y:2015:i:4:p:1127-1137.

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  5. Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting. (2012). Zhao, Rui.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:964-983.

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  6. Learning from private information in noisy repeated games. (2011). Fudenberg, Drew ; Yamamoto, Yuichi.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:5:p:1733-1769.

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  7. The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring. (2011). Fudenberg, Drew ; Yamamoto, Yuichi.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:4:p:1664-1683.

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  8. Termination of dynamic contracts in an equilibrium labor market model. (2011). wang, cheng.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:1:p:74-110.

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  9. The dynamics of efficient asset trading with heterogeneous beliefs. (2011). Espino, Emilio ; Beker, Pablo.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:1:p:189-229.

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  10. Monetary policy with a touch of Basel. (2010). Cosimano, Thomas ; Chami, Ralph.
    In: Journal of Economics and Business.
    RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:62:y::i:3:p:161-175.

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  11. Rational investor sentiment in a repeated stochastic game with imperfect monitoring. (2010). Gerber, Anke ; Hens, Thorsten ; Vogt, Bodo.
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:76:y:2010:i:3:p:669-704.

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  12. Individual and cultural learning in stag hunt games with multiple actions. (2010). Golman, Russell ; Page, Scott E..
    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
    RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:73:y:2010:i:3:p:359-376.

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  13. Tariff wars in the Ricardian Model with a continuum of goods. (2010). Opp, Marcus.
    In: Journal of International Economics.
    RePEc:eee:inecon:v:80:y:2010:i:2:p:212-225.

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  14. Optimal collusion with internal contracting. (2010). Lee, Gea M..
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:68:y:2010:i:2:p:646-669.

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  15. A multilateral telephone bargaining game. (2010). Li, Duozhe .
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:108:y:2010:i:1:p:43-45.

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  16. Markov-perfect capital and labor taxes. (2010). Martin, Fernando.
    In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
    RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:34:y:2010:i:3:p:503-521.

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  17. An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance. (2010). Hagedorn, Marcus ; Kaul, Ashok ; Mennel, Tim .
    In: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
    RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:34:y:2010:i:3:p:490-502.

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  18. Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence. (2009). Frechette, Guillaume ; Aoyagi, Masaki.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:3:p:1135-1165.

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  19. Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. (2009). Tomala, Tristan.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:67:y:2009:i:2:p:682-694.

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  20. Productive low morale. (2009). Zhao, Rui.
    In: Economics Letters.
    RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:103:y:2009:i:1:p:18-22.

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  21. Optimal sustainable monetary policy. (2008). Kurozumi, Takushi.
    In: Journal of Monetary Economics.
    RePEc:eee:moneco:v:55:y:2008:i:7:p:1277-1289.

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  22. Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals. (2008). Scarsini, Marco ; Renault, Jérôme ; Scarlatti, Sergio .
    In: Mathematical Social Sciences.
    RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:56:y:2008:i:1:p:44-74.

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  23. A theory of the transition to secondary market trading of IPOs. (2008). Wilhelm, William J. ; Chen, Zhaohui.
    In: Journal of Financial Economics.
    RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:90:y:2008:i:3:p:219-236.

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  24. The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs. (2008). Miyagawa, Eiichi ; Miyahara, Yasuyuki ; Sekiguchi, Tadashi .
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:139:y:2008:i:1:p:192-221.

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  25. Repeated games with present-biased preferences. (2008). Smith, Lones ; Prokopovych, Pavlo ; Chade, Hector.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:139:y:2008:i:1:p:157-175.

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  26. Cooperation in the commons with unobservable actions. (2008). Tarui, Nori ; Polasky, Stephen ; Mason, Charles ; Ellis, Greg.
    In: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.
    RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:55:y:2008:i:1:p:37-51.

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  27. An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy. (2007). Tambalotti, Andrea ; Schaumburg, Ernst.
    In: Journal of Monetary Economics.
    RePEc:eee:moneco:v:54:y:2007:i:2:p:302-324.

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  28. Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard. (2007). Zhao, Rui.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:136:y:2007:i:1:p:601-640.

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  29. Efficient collusion in repeated auctions with communication. (2007). Aoyagi, Masaki.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:134:y:2007:i:1:p:61-92.

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  30. Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient. (2007). Takahashi, Satoru ; Levine, David ; Fudenberg, Drew.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:61:y:2007:i:1:p:27-49.

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  31. Competitive equilibria of economies with a continuum of consumers and aggregate shocks. (2006). Miao, Jianjun.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:128:y:2006:i:1:p:274-298.

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  32. Dynamic mechanism design with hidden income and hidden actions. (2006). Townsend, Robert ; Doepke, Matthias.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:126:y:2006:i:1:p:235-285.

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  33. The risk of contagion from multimarket contact. (2006). Thomas, Charles ; Willig, Robert D..
    In: International Journal of Industrial Organization.
    RePEc:eee:indorg:v:24:y:2006:i:6:p:1157-1184.

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  34. Dynamic contracting, persistent shocks and optimal taxation. (2005). Zhang, Yuzhe.
    In: Working Papers.
    RePEc:fip:fedmwp:640.

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  35. Finite memory and imperfect monitoring. (2005). Kocherlakota, Narayana ; Cole, Harold.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:53:y:2005:i:1:p:59-72.

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  36. Investment and liquidation in renegotiation-proof contracts with moral hazard. (2004). Quadrini, Vincenzo.
    In: Journal of Monetary Economics.
    RePEc:eee:moneco:v:51:y:2004:i:4:p:713-751.

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  37. Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring. (2003). Ben-Porath, Elchanan ; Kahneman, Michael.
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:44:y:2003:i:2:p:227-250.

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  38. Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Communication. (2002). Aoyagi, Masaki.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:102:y:2002:i:1:p:229-248.

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  39. On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private. (2002). Compte, Olivier.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:102:y:2002:i:1:p:151-188.

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  40. On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations. (2002). Compte, Olivier.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:102:y:2002:i:1:p:106-150.

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  41. Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring. (2002). Kandori, Michihiro.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:102:y:2002:i:1:p:1-15.

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  42. Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. (2002). Sekiguchi, Tadashi .
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:40:y:2002:i:2:p:299-321.

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  43. A Recursive Formulation for Repeated Agency with History Dependence. (2000). Fernandes, Ana ; Phelan, Christopher.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:91:y:2000:i:2:p:223-247.

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  44. Recursive contracts. (1998). Marimon, Ramon ; Marcet, Albert.
    In: Economics Working Papers.
    RePEc:upf:upfgen:337.

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  45. Optimal Retention in Agency Problems. (1998). Banks, Jeffrey ; Sundaram, Rangarajan K..
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:82:y:1998:i:2:p:293-323.

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  46. Credible Monetary Policy in an Infinite Horizon Model: Recursive Approaches. (1998). Chang, Roberto.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:81:y:1998:i:2:p:431-461.

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  47. Money Is Memory,. (1998). Kocherlakota, Narayana.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:81:y:1998:i:2:p:232-251.

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  48. The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency. (1998). Pearce, David G. ; Stacchetti, Ennio .
    In: Games and Economic Behavior.
    RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:23:y:1998:i:1:p:75-96.

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  49. Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model,. (1997). wang, cheng.
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:76:y:1997:i:1:p:72-105.

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  50. Time Consistent Taxation by a Government with Redistributive Goals,. (1997). Pearce, David ; Stacchetti, Ennio .
    In: Journal of Economic Theory.
    RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:72:y:1997:i:2:p:282-305.

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