I graduated in Philosophy from the Autonomous University of Querétaro, Mexico. I obtained an MB in Philosophy from the UNAM in Mexico City and a PhD from the University of Granada, Spain.
Frege’s assertion that a third realm must be admitted between the external world of things and ou... more Frege’s assertion that a third realm must be admitted between the external world of things and our subjective imaginations is frequently taken as an explicit confirmation that thoughts and logical objects in general are ideal things outside space and time and that this view makes Frege a platonistic realist. In this brief paper I offer some arguments as to why such a view might reveal a basic misunderstanding of Frege’s view.
Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin, Dec 31, 2015
espanolLos trabajos recientes de Stephen Schiffer en el desarrollo de una explicacion pleonastica... more espanolLos trabajos recientes de Stephen Schiffer en el desarrollo de una explicacion pleonastica de proposiciones (y de otras entidades) producen resultados importantes que cambian el significado tanto de la ontologia de primer orden como de la meta-ontologia. El objetivo del presente trabajo es dejar en claro cuales son estas consecuencias y por que son tan importantes. Segun mi punto de vista, la mayor amenaza para los partidarios de la metafisica proviene de un punto de vista que yo he llamado en otro trabajo el acercamiento «facil» a la ontologia: los argumentos de Schiffer a favor de proposiciones «pleonasticas», propiedades, estados, eventos y personajes ficticios; los argumentos neo-fregeanos a favor de la existencia de numeros; y mis propios argumentos a favor de objetos sociales, culturales, y personajes ficticios, y objetos ordinarios como mesas y sillas. El trabajo expande estas tres diferentes formas de ontologia facil, mostrando sus interrelaciones y argumenta que estos acercamientos nos dan un realismo ciento por ciento directo, sobre las entidades en cuestion. A un nivel meta-ontologico, sin embargo, el trabajo sugiere que el debate ontologico serio es confundido porque sus preguntas ontologicas tienen respuestas tan directas. Este acercamiento podria ser la amenaza mas importante para la metafisica seria, pero tambien es extremadamente prometedor como una manera de disolver misterios y clarificar la epistemologia de la metafisica EnglishStephen Schiffer’s recent work in developing a pleonastic account of propositions (and other entities) leads to major, game-changing results in both first-order ontology and meta-ontology. This paper aims to clarify what these consequences are and why they are so important. In my view, the biggest threat to the metaphysical party comes from a view I have elsewhere called the «easy» approach to ontology: Schiffer’s arguments for «pleonastic» propositions, properties, fictional characters, states and events; the neo-Fregean’s arguments for the existence of numbers; and my own arguments for fictional characters, social and cultural objects, and ordinary objects such as tables and chairs. The paper draws out these three different forms of easy ontology, showing their interrelations, and argues that these approaches really give us a straightforward, out and out realism about the entities in question. On the meta-ontological level however, it suggests that serious ontological debate in metaphysics is confused because its ontological questions have so straightforward answers. This approach may be the most important threat to serious metaphysics but it is also extremely promising as a way of dissolving mysteries and clarifying the epistemology of metaphysics.
Frege’s assertion that a third realm must be admitted between the external world of things and ou... more Frege’s assertion that a third realm must be admitted between the external world of things and our subjective imaginations is frequently taken as an explicit confirmation that thoughts and logical objects in general are ideal things outside space and time and that this view makes Frege a platonistic realist. In this brief paper I offer some arguments as to why such a view might reveal a basic misunderstanding of Frege’s view.
Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin, Dec 31, 2015
espanolLos trabajos recientes de Stephen Schiffer en el desarrollo de una explicacion pleonastica... more espanolLos trabajos recientes de Stephen Schiffer en el desarrollo de una explicacion pleonastica de proposiciones (y de otras entidades) producen resultados importantes que cambian el significado tanto de la ontologia de primer orden como de la meta-ontologia. El objetivo del presente trabajo es dejar en claro cuales son estas consecuencias y por que son tan importantes. Segun mi punto de vista, la mayor amenaza para los partidarios de la metafisica proviene de un punto de vista que yo he llamado en otro trabajo el acercamiento «facil» a la ontologia: los argumentos de Schiffer a favor de proposiciones «pleonasticas», propiedades, estados, eventos y personajes ficticios; los argumentos neo-fregeanos a favor de la existencia de numeros; y mis propios argumentos a favor de objetos sociales, culturales, y personajes ficticios, y objetos ordinarios como mesas y sillas. El trabajo expande estas tres diferentes formas de ontologia facil, mostrando sus interrelaciones y argumenta que estos acercamientos nos dan un realismo ciento por ciento directo, sobre las entidades en cuestion. A un nivel meta-ontologico, sin embargo, el trabajo sugiere que el debate ontologico serio es confundido porque sus preguntas ontologicas tienen respuestas tan directas. Este acercamiento podria ser la amenaza mas importante para la metafisica seria, pero tambien es extremadamente prometedor como una manera de disolver misterios y clarificar la epistemologia de la metafisica EnglishStephen Schiffer’s recent work in developing a pleonastic account of propositions (and other entities) leads to major, game-changing results in both first-order ontology and meta-ontology. This paper aims to clarify what these consequences are and why they are so important. In my view, the biggest threat to the metaphysical party comes from a view I have elsewhere called the «easy» approach to ontology: Schiffer’s arguments for «pleonastic» propositions, properties, fictional characters, states and events; the neo-Fregean’s arguments for the existence of numbers; and my own arguments for fictional characters, social and cultural objects, and ordinary objects such as tables and chairs. The paper draws out these three different forms of easy ontology, showing their interrelations, and argues that these approaches really give us a straightforward, out and out realism about the entities in question. On the meta-ontological level however, it suggests that serious ontological debate in metaphysics is confused because its ontological questions have so straightforward answers. This approach may be the most important threat to serious metaphysics but it is also extremely promising as a way of dissolving mysteries and clarifying the epistemology of metaphysics.
Because of the expansion of our activities, we are currently calling for the presentation of cand... more Because of the expansion of our activities, we are currently calling for the presentation of candidates to becoming Associate Editors of Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin (Madrid, ISSN: 2254-0601). / Mediante la presente convocatoria pública solicitamos la presentación de candidaturas para ser Editor Asociado de Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin (Madrid, ISSN: 2254-0601).
Uploads
Papers by kurt wischin