Location via proxy:   [ UP ]  
[Report a bug]   [Manage cookies]                
Skip to main content
Francesc Amat
  • University of Barcelona

    John M.Keynes, 1-11

    08034 Barcelona
The main contribution of the article is to highlight the fact that preferences for inter-regional redistribution in Spain are crucially shaped by the dynamics of party competition. First, I show that it is not regional income but the... more
The main contribution of the article is to highlight the fact that preferences for inter-regional redistribution in Spain are crucially shaped by the dynamics of party competition. First, I show that it is not regional income but the saliency of the second dimension of party politics that drives preferences for regional redistribution. Second, I analyse whether the relationship between partisan attitudes and redistributive preferences is conditional on the saliency of the second dimension across various regions. Third, I also investigate whether the ...
This paper examines the link between Catalan identity and preferences for interregional redistribution and decentralization in Spain. We exploit two plausibly exogenous causes for identity, the presence of a third person in the household... more
This paper examines the link between Catalan identity and preferences for interregional redistribution and decentralization in Spain. We exploit two plausibly exogenous causes for identity, the presence of a third person in the household when the interview was conducted to identify and the place of birth of the respondent's mother. Both an instrumental variables approach and a causal mediation analysis (Imai et al 2011) are used to estimate (local) average causal effects. If we assume that there is no direct effect of the third person on redistributive preferences, we can ...
Research Interests:
La pandemia provocada per la COVID-19 planteja un seguit de dilemes per als sistemes democratics. En primer lloc, la governan ca d’un problema complex com aquest requereix molta coordinacio entre diferents nivells i arees de govern.... more
La pandemia provocada per la COVID-19 planteja un seguit de dilemes per als sistemes democratics. En primer lloc, la governan ca d’un problema complex com aquest requereix molta coordinacio entre diferents nivells i arees de govern. Aquesta coordinacio pot derivar en processos de concentracio del poder en els executius estatals, i, per tant, en un afebliment de la separacio de poders horitzontal i vertical. Aixi mateix, el control de la pandemia exigeix mesures que poden representar limitacions importants de drets i llibertats fonamentals. En aquest article, analitzem aquests dilemes i estudiem com hi responen els ciutadans. Mitjancant l’analisi d’una enquesta panel duta a terme durant els mesos de gener, marc i juny de 2020, observem una tendencia molt marcada, en primera instancia, a demanar lideratges forts, tecnocratics i centralitzats, aixi com a acceptar restriccions de llibertats. Passada la primera onada de contagis, aquesta tendencia es va matisar significativament, amb l’e...
Parties make policy in government and in parliament, but we do not know what institution matters the most for policy-making. We use an extensive dataset with information on party manifestoes, parties' bargaining power, and... more
Parties make policy in government and in parliament, but we do not know what institution matters the most for policy-making. We use an extensive dataset with information on party manifestoes, parties' bargaining power, and redistribution policies for 20 OECD countries to show empirically that parliamentary composition is a better predictor of redistribution policies than cabinet composition when we take parties' bargaining power into account. On the one hand, we use voting power indices in order to calculate parties' bargaining power in parliaments and cabinets. On the other hand, we also use information on parties' preferences using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP). We estimate dynamic TSCS models based on legislature and cabinet datasets. The empirical results show that parliaments impact policy through the legislative bargaining power that parties obtain after elections. Opposition parties, therefore, also affect policy because they can have or ha...
In this paper, we build on recent work by Glaeser (2005), Scheve and Stasavage (2006) and Huber and Stanig (2007) to theorize the conditions under which politicians have electoral incentives to provoke group identities and how this have a... more
In this paper, we build on recent work by Glaeser (2005), Scheve and Stasavage (2006) and Huber and Stanig (2007) to theorize the conditions under which politicians have electoral incentives to provoke group identities and how this have a subsequent impact on individual preferences for redistribution. We argue that those strategic incentives respond to between group inequality, the relative size of groups and electoral institutions. Thus, individual-level preferences for redistribution respond to both individual level ...
We investigate how particular configurations of national parliaments affect the dynamics of political decentralization in parliamentary democracies. Recent research has emphasized the impact of structural determinants on levels of... more
We investigate how particular configurations of national parliaments affect the dynamics of political decentralization in parliamentary democracies. Recent research has emphasized the impact of structural determinants on levels of decentralization across countries. However, we argue that decentralization processes are endogenous to legislative bargaining by political parties. Our main hypothesis is that, ceteris paribus, the greater the legislative bargaining power of parties with decentralization demands, the more likely decentralization reforms are to occur. For that purpose, we calculate an index of the parliamentary salience of decentralization that reflects the distribution of parties’ preferences for decentralization weighted by their bargaining power. We test our hypotheses with dynamic models for 19 parliamentary democracies using Comparative Manifesto Project data and the Regional Authority Index. We demonstrate that the dynamics of decentralization are crucially shaped by ...
Precinct-level analysis
ZIP file containing original data, stata do-files, R scripts and output (log, tables and figures) to reproduce the analyses of the article and appendix.
This article examines the process of electoral mobilization that follows the extension of voting rights to low-income citizens. We take advantage of a historically unique panel data set of official registers that include individual voting... more
This article examines the process of electoral mobilization that follows the extension of voting rights to low-income citizens. We take advantage of a historically unique panel data set of official registers that include individual voting roll-calls as well as individual demographics of almost 25,000 electors in Barcelona in the 1930s, matched with relevant precinct-level socio-economic, political and geographical data. We show that voting was driven by the direct mobilization strategies developed by political parties and by those social organizations, such as trade unions, that encompassed an important part of society. This was the case especially among unskilled workers and in areas with a high density of working class voters. We also show that turnout was shaped by indirect channels, such as the social networks in which partisan ideas and organizations were embedded. To identify the mobilizational effects of organizations we rely on a variety of strategies, including a sharp, sho...
Why do political parties set an extreme or a more moderate position on the territorial dimension? Despite previous works have paid recent interest on the dynamics of the political competition on the territorial dimension, we know much... more
Why do political parties set an extreme or a more moderate position on the territorial dimension? Despite previous works have paid recent interest on the dynamics of the political competition on the territorial dimension, we know much less about the factors that lead to a centrifugal or a centripetal party competition on the same dimension. In this article, we offer a new way of understanding it: we argue that parties’ policy position on the decentralization continuum not only depends on the level of territorial decentralization, but also on the credibility of the institutional agreement established through the country’s constitutional rigidity. If the original territorial pact does not guarantee that the majority group will have its “hands tied” so that it does not reverse the territorial agreement, political parties will have incentives to adopt more extreme positions on the territorial dimension. We test this argument with a dataset covering around 460 political parties clustered...
We investigate how particular configurations of national parliaments affect the dynamics of political decentralization in parliamentary democracies. Recent research has emphasized the impact of structural determinants on levels of... more
We investigate how particular configurations of national parliaments affect the dynamics of political decentralization in parliamentary democracies. Recent research has emphasized the impact of structural determinants on levels of decentralization across countries. However, we argue that decentralization processes are endogenous to legislative bargaining by political parties. Our main hypothesis is that, ceteris paribus, the greater the legislative bargaining power of parties with decentralization demands, the more likely decentralization reforms are to occur. For that purpose, we calculate an index of the parliamentary salience of decentralization that reflects the distribution of parties’ preferences for decentralization weighted by their bargaining power. We test our hypotheses with dynamic models for 19 parliamentary democracies using Comparative Manifesto Project data and the Regional Authority Index. We demonstrate that the dynamics of decentralization are crucially shaped by ...
The literature on decentralization has traditionally focused on the study of its origins and consequences, leaving the analysis of its dynamics much further behind. We aim to fill this gap by creating a new theoretical framework in which... more
The literature on decentralization has traditionally focused on the study of its origins and consequences, leaving the analysis of its dynamics much further behind. We aim to fill this gap by creating a new theoretical framework in which the evolution of decentralization is contingent upon national incumbent’s strategies of political survival. Our argument conceives decentralization as a national incumbent’s choice that results from the interaction between national and subnational politicians’ relative powers and goals. Two dimensions define it: the degree of vertical integration of statewide parties (intraparty competition) and the blackmail role played by regional parties (interparty competition). We claim that, apart from structural factors, decentralization happens when it helps the national politician to survive in office. In our framework, the decision to implement further decentralization depends on, first, the degree of vertical integration of statewide parties - defined by ...
El darrer llibre1 editat per An-thony Giddens és una aportació remarcable al debat teòric de la socialdemocràcia europea. El lli-bre consisteix en un recull de breus articles acadèmics de desta-cats sociòlegs i economistes; en-tre ells,... more
El darrer llibre1 editat per An-thony Giddens és una aportació remarcable al debat teòric de la socialdemocràcia europea. El lli-bre consisteix en un recull de breus articles acadèmics de desta-cats sociòlegs i economistes; en-tre ells, per exemple, Ulrich Beck, Gösta Esping-...
According to most of the available evidence, women were less likely to turn out than men when they got the right to vote. However, often these figures are based on simple comparisons of turnout rates between the pre and post female... more
According to most of the available evidence, women were less likely to turn out than men when they got the right to vote. However, often these figures are based on simple comparisons of turnout rates between the pre and post female enfranchisement elections. Much less is known, however, about the root causes of female political participation upon formal electoral enfranchisement. We argue that ideological activation before female enfranchisement is key to understand the variation in the gender turnout gap. In places where women were exposed to ideologically-charged events they were as likely to turn out to vote as men. This pattern is analyzed by exploiting the post-WWI collapse of the heavily-feminized textile sector in Catalonia, that lead, in turn, to a wave of labour unrest prior the introduction of female su rage. We exploit a unique individual level data of o cial registers with individual voting roll-calls as well as other personal characteristics, such as age, address, gende...
In this paper we investigate how particular configurations of the legislative affect the likelihood of a decentralization reform in Parliamentary democracies. We contend that the distribution of political power between central and... more
In this paper we investigate how particular configurations of the legislative affect the likelihood of a decentralization reform in Parliamentary democracies. We contend that the distribution of political power between central and regional authorities is an endogenous institution subject to political bargaining among the disciplined political parties that seat in the legislative. For that purpose we construct an index of the saliency of the decentralization dimension that reflects the distribution of parties’ preferences for decentralization weighted by legislative bargaining power. Our first hypothesis is that, holding constant structural determinants like inter‐regional inequality or ethno‐linguistic diversity greatly emphasized by previous research, the greater the legislative bargaining power of parties with decentralization demands the more likely decentralization reforms will occur. We also postulate a second hypothesis according to which the degree of polarization in Parliame...
Contrary to the view that inequality reduces turnout, political participation among low income voters is higher in democracies with very high levels of inequality and intermediate levels of state capacity. We address this puzzle by... more
Contrary to the view that inequality reduces turnout, political participation among low income voters is higher in democracies with very high levels of inequality and intermediate levels of state capacity. We address this puzzle by analyzing the link between political mobilization and budget allocations at di↵erent levels of inequality and state capacity. Under high inequality and low levels of capacity, parties find it optimal to mobilize low income voters via targeted goods. But as inequality decreases and capacity increases, clientelism becomes less e↵ective a tool for voters’ mobilization. To evaluate the implications of this argument we exploit a quasi-experiment, namely the anti-corruption audits by the Brazilian federal government on its municipalities. We show that an exogenous increase in monitoring e↵ort by the state breaks the clintelistic equilibrium, leading to a joint reduction in the likelihood of re-election by incumbents, the turnout rates, and the provision of targ...
This paper analyzes the relationship between economic and political inequality. Beyond the view that inequality reduces turnout we document a non-linear relationship between them. To explain these patterns we argue that parties'... more
This paper analyzes the relationship between economic and political inequality. Beyond the view that inequality reduces turnout we document a non-linear relationship between them. To explain these patterns we argue that parties' strategies to target and mobilize low income voters re ect the level of economic inequality and development. Under high inequality and low development, clientelism becomes the dominant form of political competition and turnout in- equality declines. As societies grow and inequality recedes, clientelism becomes suboptimal and parties turn to mobilize voters around programmatic o erings. As a result, turnout inequality increases. Empirically, we produce two analyses. First, we identify the relationship between political mobilization strategies, inequality and turnout by exploiting the randomized allocation of anti-fraud measures across Brazilian municipalities in the early 2000s. Second, we address the generalizability of our ndings by carrying out a cross...
In this paper we explore how increasing immigration levels affect party strategies. Specifically, we analyse the effect of immigration on parties’ positions over the economic and authoritarian dimensions. We content that the relationship... more
In this paper we explore how increasing immigration levels affect party strategies. Specifically, we analyse the effect of immigration on parties’ positions over the economic and authoritarian dimensions. We content that the relationship between immigration and party positions crucially depends on the structure of inequality. We present a new theoretical argument according to which, based on a median voter logic, the structure of inequality can explain the conditional relationship between immigration and party strategies. We investigate the mechanism empirically by exploiting a panel dataset at the party-level for OECD democracies over the period 1962-2015. Overall, the paper presents robust empirical evidence that shows that immigration is an important determinant of party strategies but highly conditional to the type of inequality. The results are robust to alternative explanations such as trade exposure and labor market segmentation. Importantly, the results also show that redist...
In this paper, I study the economic and social network determinants of anti-establishment voting patterns in advanced democracies. More specifically, I investigate how economic shocks and social capital jointly affect voting for... more
In this paper, I study the economic and social network determinants of anti-establishment voting patterns in advanced democracies. More specifically, I investigate how economic shocks and social capital jointly affect voting for non-mainstream parties. I expect that economic downturns should favor the electoral success of anti-establishment parties. In order to test the effect of economic shocks I employ a novel dataset on layoffs at the regional level (the European Restructuring Dataset). On the other hand, I also expect that social capital should reduce the vote for anti-establishment parties. Especially so when a higher density of local social networks is associated with greater provision of local public goods. In addition, I expect an interaction between these two factors by which regional social capital should moderate the effect of economic shocks on anti-establishment parties. I exploit individual-survey data aggregated at the European-region level matched with the layoffs re...
This article examines what constitutional arrangements are more likely to facilitate the transfer of effective decision-making power to the regional level. We show that certain constitutional arrangements can result in institutional... more
This article examines what constitutional arrangements are more likely to facilitate the transfer of effective decision-making power to the regional level. We show that certain constitutional arrangements can result in institutional commitment problems between regional minority and national majority groups, which in turn influence levels of regional autonomy across regions. Specifically, we examine how the depth and scope of decentralization depend on the presence of federal agreements and the availability of institutional guarantees that make the federal contracts credible. Analyzing regional-level data, we show that regions where identity minority groups are majoritarian enjoy more regional autonomy when the commitment problem has resulted in a satisfactory national accommodation. Our findings highlight two important scenarios. The first occurs when the institutional commitment problem is solved, and regional minority groups are granted substantial levels of regional autonomy. The...
In this dissertation I explore the redistributive effects of second-dimensional identity politics in parliamentary democracies. Specifically, I focus on parties’ electoral incentives to manipulate the salience of the territorial-identity... more
In this dissertation I explore the redistributive effects of second-dimensional identity politics in parliamentary democracies. Specifically, I focus on parties’ electoral incentives to manipulate the salience of the territorial-identity cleavage. My main argument is that a greater electoral salience of the second dimension distorts the nature of redistributive outcomes. Although the redistributive effects of second dimensions of political competition have been explored in majoritarian democracies, much less is known about their effects in democracies with proportional representation (PR). The dissertation brings “bad news” in that regard: when the territorial second dimension is salient, it is no longer true that parliamentary democracies with proportional electoral systems redistribute more –which is the prevalent view in the existing literature. In fact, the so called “left-bias” of PR systems vanishes when the territorial-identity cleavage is politically activated. This key insi...
The COVID-19 outbreak poses an unprecedented challenge for contemporary democracies. Despite the global scale of the problem, the response has been mainly national, and global coordination has been so far extremely weak. All over the... more
The COVID-19 outbreak poses an unprecedented challenge for contemporary democracies. Despite the global scale of the problem, the response has been mainly national, and global coordination has been so far extremely weak. All over the world governments are making use of exceptional powers to enforce lockdowns, often sacrificing civil liberties and profoundly altering the pre-existing power balance, which nurtures fears of an authoritarian turn. Relief packages to mitigate the economic consequences of the lockdowns are being discussed, and there is little doubt that the forthcoming recession will have important distributive consequences. In this paper we study citizens' responses to these democratic dilemmas. We present results from a set of survey experiments run in Spain from March 20 to March 28, together with longitudinal evidence from a panel survey fielded right before and after the virus outbreak. Our findings reveal a strong preference for a national as opposed to a Europe...
In this paper I analyse the interplay between second dimension politics and redistribution in parliamentary democracies. I do so by exploring the redistributive effects of the parliamentary saliency of the regional-identity dimension of... more
In this paper I analyse the interplay between second dimension politics and redistribution in parliamentary democracies. I do so by exploring the redistributive effects of the parliamentary saliency of the regional-identity dimension of party competition. The main hypothesis is that the existence of a politically salient second dimension creates new opportunities for legislative coalitions in which political parties trade-off inter-personal redistribution against the provision of economic self-rule at the regional level. Thus, I study the way in which the parliamentary saliency of each dimension affects the nature of fiscal choices. I test two main empirical implications: (i) the greater the parliamentary saliency of the second dimension, the lower the expected inter-personal redistribution; and (ii) the greater the parliamentary saliency of the second dimension, the greater the expected economic self-rule at the regional level. Both hypotheses are tested with dynamics TSCS models f...
Parties make policy in government and in parliament, but we do not know what institution matters the most for policy-making. We use an extensive dataset with information on party manifestoes, parties' bargaining power, and... more
Parties make policy in government and in parliament, but we do not know what institution matters the most for policy-making. We use an extensive dataset with information on party manifestoes, parties' bargaining power, and redistribution policies for 20 OECD countries to show empirically that parliamentary composition is a better predictor of redistribution policies than cabinet composition when we take parties' bargaining power into account. On the one hand, we use voting power indices in order to calculate parties' bargaining power in parliaments and cabinets. On the other hand, we also use information on parties' preferences using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP). We estimate dynamic TSCS models based on legislature and cabinet datasets. The empirical results show that parliaments impact policy through the legislative bargaining power that parties obtain after elections. Opposition parties, therefore, also affect policy because they can have or ha...
La crisis económica ha puesto de manifiesto, una vez más, la importancia de la estructura institucional del Estado Autonómico y de sus implicaciones económicas. Parece claro que para afrontar la crisis será necesario hacer una revisión... more
La crisis económica ha puesto de manifiesto, una vez más, la importancia de la estructura institucional del Estado Autonómico y de sus implicaciones económicas. Parece claro que para afrontar la crisis será necesario hacer una revisión del modelo actual. La teoría económica ofrece dos razones básicas a favor de la descentralización. En primer lugar, un argumento de eficiencia según el cual con mayores niveles de descentralización será posible satisfacer mejor las preferencias heterogéneas de los ciudadanos en países con ...

And 3 more