Technocracy

This thesis analyses the idea of central bank independence, how it shaped the creation of the European Central Bank (ECB) and its management of the Euro Crisis. Based on a genealogical analysis, the thesis identifies the central normative commitments undergirding the insulation of monetary policy from ordinary democratic politics. It argues that central bank independence is an institutional response to the ‘problem of politics’ in relation to money: the problem that money is simultaneously founded on political authority and fundamentally threatened by the ordinary exercise of this authority. Central bank independence, then, constitutes a way of grounding the value of money politically while at the same time depoliticising its government. The form that central bank independence takes in practice, however, differs substantially, reflecting different ways of wedding the idea to broader constitutional imaginaries. Drawing comparisons to other major central banks, the thesis details the ECB’s form of independence and argues that the creation of the ECB not as a government agency (as the Fed) or a societal power on a par with the government (as the Bundesbank), but as a sovereign representative on a par with the Member States altered the constitutional make-up of the Eurozone. As the existential crisis of the euro shows, general tensions within central bank independence become irresolvable contradictions in this constitutional construct. Without institutional mechanisms for resolving them through ordinary politics, the emergency politics of the Euro Crisis placed the ECB centre-stage, engaged in the ‘higher lawmaking’ of changing the Eurozone’s constitution in order to save it. In doing so, however, the ECB redefined the meaning of its independence and reignited ‘the problem of politics’ by undermining its underlying social contract.

This is the final version of Harry Boyte's Distinguished Humanities Lecture at Arizona State University, March 20, 2019. The lecture argues that the immense cultural organizing of the New Deal helped to create a new (and renewed) story of democracy as the work of the people. This history is relevant again.

Suffering from high rates of inflation since the 1940s and having experienced two hyperinflations at the end of the 1980s, in 2019 Argentina faced an increase of prices of more than 50%. But in the 1990s Argentina achieved price stability and growth at once. What were the sources of such an immediate change? What lessons can be drawn from this experience? As in the 1990s Argentina adopted profound market reforms, stability could be considered an achievement of neoliberal diffusion. Not only international forces were propelling change; the International Monetary Found (IMF) celebrated the success and invited other emerging nations to imitate it. Nevertheless, this perspective underestimates the importance of the local context in the history of neoliberal reforms and overestimates the coherence of external forces. Through the analysis of testimonies of Argentine and foreign officials and the study of declassified documents from the IMF, this paper argues that stability was only achieved after the adoption of a currency board, which was against the recommendation of most foreign officials. Instead of a simple top-down transposition of ideas, the Argentinian case reveals the importance of the agency of technocrats. Their local innovation not only made the diffusion of neoliberalism possible, but it also turned the currency board into one of the global anti-inflationist recipes recommended to other countries, despite its heavy consequences.

Η οικονομική κρίση της δεκαετίας του 2010 έστρεψε την προσοχή της κοινής γνώμης, των δημοσιογράφων και των πολιτικών στους οικονομολόγους, οι οποίοι κλήθηκαν να εντοπίσουν τα αίτια και τους τρόπους υπέρβασης της κρίσης, απέκτησαν μεγαλύτερη δημοσιότητα και κύρος και βρέθηκαν στην κορυφή της πολιτικής εξουσίας (όπως οι πρωθυπουργοί Παπαδήμος στην Ελλάδα και Μόντι στην Ιταλία). Ωστόσο, η σχέση των οικονομολόγων με την πολιτική έχει ευρύτερο κοινωνικό και ιστορικό βάθος.

Διατρέχοντας την πολιτική ιστορία τεσσάρων δεκαετιών, ο συγγραφέας διερευνά, πίσω από τις στερεότυπες εντυπώσεις, ερωτήματα όπως τα παρακάτω: Πώς σχετίζεται η τεχνοκρατικοποίηση της πολιτικής με την οικονομική παγκοσμιοποίηση; Είναι κατ’ ανάγκην οι τεχνοκράτες εκφραστές του νεοφιλελευθερισμού; Έχει σχέση η συμμετοχή τους στη διαμόρφωση της οικονομικής πολιτικής με την υποχώρηση της πολιτικής και της δημοκρατίας;

Στις σελίδες του βιβλίου ο αναγνώστης θα βρει μια πρωτότυπη κοινωνιολογική μελέτη των τεχνοκρατών/τεχνοπολιτικών της ελληνικής οικονομικής πολιτικής. Από τον Γ. Αρσένη μέχρι τον Γ. Αλογοσκούφη, τον Γ. Στουρνάρα, τον Γ. Βαρουφάκη και πολλούς άλλους, αναλύονται οι σταδιοδρομίες, τα δίκτυα και οι στρατηγικές όσων συνέβαλαν καθοριστικά σε αυτή την πολιτική ως υπουργοί, σύμβουλοι, ειδήμονες και διοικητές τραπεζών και σκιαγραφούνται οι ετερόδοξοι τεχνοκράτες, οι φιλοευρωπαίοι τεχνοπολιτικοί, τα στελέχη νεοφιλελεύθερων δεξαμενών σκέψης και οι αριστεροί πανεπιστημιακοί που συνθέτουν το ανταγωνιστικό πεδίο μιας κοσμοπολίτικης πολιτικο-επαγγελματικής ελίτ.

Class analysis is back. Skyrocketing inequalities, the stagnation and marginalisation of the traditional working class, and the right-wing nationalist revolt have pushed issues of class into the limelight. The 2010s saw the publication of numerous books on the working class, causing quite a stir both in academia and public discourse (see the review by Bergfeld 2019). These phenomena challenged the view of 'classless' societies, dominant from the 1980s to the 2000s, that suggested individual success was determined solely by individual abilities or ethnic/gender hierarchies. Fitting into this class renaissance is Michael Lind's provocative, incisive, yet structurally flawed book on class war. Lind is both an academic and a journalist, whose writings always draw public attention across the political spectrum in the US. He is an excellent writer. His sentences are short and punchy, his argument is clear, and his message is dear to the heart of a reader who is sensitive to the problems of our times: 'Demagogic populism is a symptom. Technocratic neoliberalism is the disease. Democratic pluralism is the cure' (p. xv).

Il contributo intende analizzare l’impatto che l’introduzione di procedure tecniche e di standard di verifica (ex ante, in itinere ed ex post) possono aver avuto sulla tutela di quello che a pieno titolo va considerato un diritto sociale: vale a dire il diritto a vivere in un ambiente salubre, concetto generale (e generico) che insiste su numerosi diritti costituzionalmente garantiti.
In tutti i numerosi campi regolativi che coinvolgono tale diritto, dall’urbanistica alla pianificazione economica territoriale, alla localizzazione di infrastrutture e industrie socialmente impattanti, sono infatti all’opera diversi strumenti tecnici di valutazione. Il riferimento è in particolare, da un lato, alle forme di pianificazione strategica più direttamente tecnocratiche e che si basano sull’analisi SWOT, e, dall’altro, ai variegati strumenti pubblici (VIA/VAS; Autorizzazione Integrata Ambientale) e privati (valutazione della Corporate Social Responsibility) all’opera nell’ambito della localizzazione o controllo di infrastrutture ed impianti industriali.
In particolare, riferendosi a casi concreti quali quelli della linea ad alta velocità Torino-Lione e dell’ILVA di Taranto, e richiamando i modelli di Lascoumes e Le Galès (2009), Borraz (2009) e Innes e Booher (2003), si intende mostrare come in realtà l’applicazione di norme tecniche, più che configurarsi quale strumento neutrale ed oggettivo che fa venire meno ogni forma di discrezionalità, si traduca più spesso in una nuova e maggiore fonte di discrezionalità per il decisore pubblico a fronte di una sua minore responsabilità. Discrezionalità da intendersi non in senso classico quale luogo dell’autonomia decisionale concreta, ma quale possibilità di negoziazione fra interessi pubblici e privati sulla definizione degli standard, la scelta dello standard da utilizzare, la dipendenza da chi raccoglie e fornisce i dati. In questo senso il riferimento a norme tecniche certe, più che una tutela su materie socialmente sensibili quali quelle ambientali e sanitarie, pare rappresentare un mezzo per porre la discrezionalità al riparo del controllo pubblico, dietro standard apparentemente oggettivi. Nel caso degli interventi infrastrutturali, viceversa, si riscontra ad esempio, sovente, un uso ambiguo delle procedure e un certo grado di opportunistica incertezza sulla norma tecnica di riferimento (nello specifico gli strumenti previsti dalla normativa ordinaria, o da quella straordinaria della Legge Obiettivo), con impatti dubbi sulla tutela dei diritti sociali relativi alla salute pubblica locale.

A relatively brief overview of Erving Goffman's notion of "framing analysis" is given, developed through several examples, and, then, that perspective is placed in dynamic juxtaposition to various issues concerning technocracy, especially in conjunction with the idea of "infrastructure".

2021 ausgezeichnet mit dem Hedwig Hintze Preis des Verbandes der Historiker und Historikerinnen Deutschlands (VHD)

Legitimation über wirtschaftlichen Erfolg: Das Francoregime als technokratische Verwaltungs- und Entwicklungsdiktatur.

Die Francodiktatur (1936/39-1975) war sowohl eine der am längsten währenden als auch eine der stabilsten Diktaturen in der europäischen Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Anna Catharina Hofmann zeigt, dass sich diese Besonderheit aus der »Neuerfindung« des Regimes als Entwicklungsdiktatur ab den 1950er Jahren erklärt: Am französischen Modell der planification orientiert, sollte das Land in kürzester Zeit ins Industriezeitalter katapultiert werden. Mit dem - wenig bekannten - franquistischen Planungskommissar Laureano López Rodó (1920-2000) rückt die Autorin den Architekten dieser neuen
Legitimationsstrategie in den Mittelpunkt. Er prägte wesentlich den Versuch, das Regime über administrative Effizienz, wirtschaftlichen Erfolg und die Einbindung in den Westen zu stabilisieren. Paradoxerweise legte seine Politik damit zugleich die Grundlagen für die Erosion der Diktatur. Denn sie verschärfte die Machtkämpfe in der franquistischen Herrschaftselite und wurde zum Einfallstor für Regimekritik. Auf diese Weise entwickelt die Autorin eine neue Interpretation der spanischen Diktaturgeschichte.

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Galardonado con el premio "Hedwig Hintze" de la Asociación de Historiadores e Historiadoras Alemanes (VHD) en 2021

Legitimación tecnocrática: El régimen de Franco como dictadura administrativa y desarrollista

El régimen de Franco (1936/39-1975) no sólo fue una de las dictaduras más longevas en la historia europea del siglo XX sino también una de las más estables. Anna Catharina Hofmann demuestra que esta singularidad se explica por la «reinvención» del régimen como dictadura desarrollista a partir de los años 50 con el objetivo de catapultar al país lo antes posible a la era industrial imitando el modelo de la planification francesa. La autora se centra en el principal arquitecto de esta estrategia de legitimación, Laureano López Rodó (1920-2000), quien fuera Comisario del Plan de Desarrollo entre 1962 y 1973. Suyo fue el impulso para intentar estabilizar el régimen a través de  la eficacia administrativa, del éxito económico y de la integración en Occidente. Paradójicamente, su política acabó sentando las bases para la erosión de la dictadura porque contribuyó a agudizar las luchas de poder en la élite franquista y expuso el régimen a la crítica. De esta manera, la autora logra desarrollar una nueva interpretación del segundo franquismo.

Neoliberal Transformations of the Italian State is an exploration, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, into the nature and transformations of the state in the neoliberal era. Nowadays, a widespread crisis of legitimation affects the institutions and authority of the state; similarly, and especially after the Great Crisis of 2008 to the present, the European project is increasingly questioned by populist and neo-nationalist forces, which politically advance in the state and society, and promote further coercive-oriented reconfiguration of state powers and apparatus. The 'nationalist international', the 'new populists' and/or the 'rise of new international fascism' are questions on the verge of international scholarship and political debate. However, many of these studies often miss the specificity and critical importance of the study of the state and of state (institutional and ideological) powers; even more importantly, the phenomenon of populism/neo-authoritarianism is interpreted by the mainstream as a clear break with traditional centrist parties, with the result of neglecting the past authoritarian tendencies that accompany the entire history of neoliberalism.

This book is a guide for political activists and policy-makers; specifically, by showing how the state is of critical importance to the making of neoliberalism in institutional and cultural terms, it also aims to rethink the state as the arena of politics and, accordingly, as the key site to promote alternatives to neoliberalism.

The Climate Change Commission (CCC) has a mandate to provide independent, expert advice to the New Zealand Government to enhance the clarity and stability of climate change policies. This institutional innovation has occasionally been rationalised as a form of expert rule, especially by analogy with central banks. In reality, however, the CCC only has advisory powers, so lacks the practical authority to enforce rules or operate policy instruments. How then might the CCC exert greater influence on the low-emissions transition? One option is to double-down on the model of expert rulethat is, to create exceptions to parliamentary sovereignty and to empower the CCC as a technocratic (or epistocratic) institution that has independence over the means (and ends) of climate change policy. Subsequently, the CCC would have a right not only to be believed, but obeyed. But this is politically improbable and also increases the CCC's susceptibility to trends in political culture and mass media that erode the epistemic privilege of experts. Accordingly, this paper offers reasons for the CCC to deepen its entanglement with democracy, such that its epistemic authority might achieve greater practical authority by informing the ends of popular sovereignty.

Ilya Somin effectively exposes the extent of public ignorance and the ways in which such ignorance may damage democratic outcomes. This underpins his case for a more streamlined state, leaving more to individual “foot voting”—where citizens are better incentivized to choose knowledgeably and rationally. One cannot dispute the fact of deep public ignorance. However, one can question the widespread assumption that ignorance is necessarily ethically significant, always productive of undesirable outcomes, or otherwise implicitly dangerous for democracy. The sheer lack of individual efficacy in mass democracies not only incentivizes ignorance, but also creates conditions wherein such ignorance is individually harmless, and unlikely in the aggregate to greatly contribute to one or another outcome. Beyond this, there may be no way to attain meaningful knowledge in the areas where democratic decision making is most fraught. Indeed, ignorance may at times lead to better outcomes than would knowledge. The seemingly unassailable status of democracy itself, and the valuable institutional stability that this status ensures, seem to be founded upon a bedrock of public ignorance as to the real nature of democracy.

This piece, the lead article in a special issue of Public Administration Review on "Civic Engagement in the 21st Century," makes the case for a new understanding of democracy, as a way of life or a society, not simply a state system. This also entails a different role for government -- neither center of the political universe providing solutions nor enemy of the people, but empowering partners.

I argue that civil servants, elected officials, and government agencies have vital roles as catalysts, conveners and "citizen professionals" who work with other citizens in  empowering fashion, if they reclaim their deep civic identities.

Bruce Robinson's 1989 film "How To Get Ahead In Advertising", whilst being viciously satirical, is not an easy film to watch, let alone analyse. Richard E Grant's portrayal of advertising executive Dennis Dimbelby Bagley's descent into madness is a compelling tale that has long been on my list of films to dig deeper into.  The two had worked together before on Robinson's cult classic of 1987 "Withnail and I", where Grant had excelled in his performance of a washed up alcoholic actor.

This follow up project to "Withnail and I" appealed to me not just because of the quirky subject matter, where a stress induced boil becomes another head, and a subsequent overwhelming new personality. 

I feel that the film's psychoanalytic farce has a broader ranging commentary than experience of the film's protagonist, and the critique at play here is a broader one of society and the overwhelming rise of a technocratic elite, bursting forth to corrupt and control us all. ...

http://www.whenthenewsstops.org/2016/12/how-to-get-ahead-in-advertising.html

Aim of this thesis is to describe and analyze the EU discourse, as a discoursive practice expressed in the political texts regarding the LLL, in order to examine which factors have affected and acted towards the transformation of the Community ‘discourse’ that resulted into promoting LLL as a fundamental element of the EU policies.  In the mid 90’s, under the pressure of external factors such as globalization, knowledge and information society, as well as internal factors such as the Maastricht Treaty (1992), a discontinuity can be observed in the Community ‘discourse’ on education / training.  While in the preceding thirty years it was the political and economic targets that manifested the Community actions in regard to education and training, in the 90’s it is the educational / training systems that are put in the focus of EU policies, so that to benefit and support the economic and political EU targets.  In this framework, LLL becomes a fundamental political and economic stake of the Community ‘discourse’, a ‘discourse’ that as much as ‘knowledge – power’ or, and most importantly, as ‘truth’, aims to widen the decision-making functions of the EU inter-national political establishment.

This essay in the journal of engaged political theory, The Good Society, argues that Dewey was a "prophetic populist" who anticipated important power relations of knowledge societies. He argued that knowledge power is not a zero-sum resource but is enhanced through sharing transactions; that, nonetheless, cultures of research and academia tended to produce a detached, outsider stance that had to be overcome; that education needed to be engaged with the problems of society; and that all professions have educative democratic potential.

His mistake, common to the conceptual framework of the progressive movement but not universal in that movement, was to separate "politics" from "citizenship," with a resulting weakening of any strategies for deepening the work of democracy as a way of life.

This article questions the perceived or assumed dichotomy between populism and expertise. Using the United Kingdom Government's response to the Covid-19 crisis in 2020 as a case study, it argues that there is in fact an alignment or synergy between populism and expertise, one that has important implications for public law, particularly for the principle of accountability. More specifically, it argues that technocratic means-and reliance on scientific expertise in particular-can indeed be useful to populists to the extent that they can be utilised as a way to depoliticise issues and at least partially shield them from direct political accountability. This, in turn, allows populists to escape responsibility for their policy choices in a way that, perhaps ironically, resembles the populist critique of the "undemocratic" nature or "technocratic" tendencies of present-day liberal democracy.

The first half of the 20th century witnessed the rise of modernist architects. BROKERS OF MODERNITY reveals how East Central Europe turned into one of the pre-eminent testing grounds of the new belief-system of modernism. By combining the internationalism of the CIAM organi za tion and the modernizing aspirations of the new states built after 1918, the reach of modernist architects extended far beyond their established fields. Yet, these architects paid a price when Europe's age of extremes intensified. Using mainly Polish, but also wider Central and Eastern European, examples this book delivers a pioneering study of the dynamics of modernist architects as a group, including how they became qualified, how they organized, how they communicated and their own attempts to live the modernist lifestyle themselves. In so doing BROKERS OF MODERNITY raises questions concerning collective work and the social role of architects today.

Cet article commence par examiner trois justifications épistémiques de la démocratie, proposées par José Luis Martí, David Estlund et Hélène Landemore. Tous trois cherchent à montrer en quoi la (ou certaines formes de) démocratie(s) possède(nt) une tendance à engendrer des décisions correctes, mais font face au risque de légitimer une organisation technocratique du politique, en contradiction avec le principe d’égalité politique. Ils estiment donc que l’argument épistémique ne peut pas suffire à justifier des institutions démocratiques. Cependant, si l’on comprend la valeur « épistémique » d’une décision politique à la fois d’un point de vue factuel et normatif, c’est-à-dire qu’on considère à la fois sa rationalité et son impartialité, une justification épistémique de la démocratie beaucoup plus robuste émerge. C’est cette dernière qui est explorée et défendue dans la seconde partie de cet article.

Published in "Interaction" (Book Fair, 2021). ISSN 2277 4335.
Where do the philosophers stand at the age of neoliberal globalization, at the time of the reign of digital monopolies carrying on with the free flow of data in the context of technocracy? Are the data-based market and the "love for wisdom" compatible or commensurable in any possible manner? Is Philosophy a relevant discipline at all? The author seeks to find an answer to these very philosophical queries.
ডেটা — সওদাগর — রাষ্ট্র — প্রযুক্তিতন্ত্রের আধিপত্যের যুগে কোথায় দাঁড়িয়ে দার্শনিক-মন, দার্শনিক জিজ্ঞাসা, দার্শনিক অনুসন্ধান? কেন প্রয়োজন দর্শনের? দর্শন কি আদৌ প্রাসঙ্গিক?

This introductory essay outlines some of the issues that surround contemporary engagements with the ‘‘popular’’ as a site of political struggle and change. This piece notes that in the
30 years since Stuart Hall published his seminal essay, ‘‘Notes on Deconstructing the Popular,’’ the power relations that define the term as well as the way in which scholars study the popular have shifted in profound ways. The authors argue that, rather than simply
equating the popular with popular culture, it is necessary to recognize that the popular is a contingent term that marks the possibility of constituting forms of collective agency and the
potential for bringing about social and political change.

This paper discusses the relationship between science and the socio-political structures in history. I discuss how science can be corrupted and transformed into Scientism by what Eric Voegelin calls modern gnosticism. Identifying the radical shift in thinking that occurs in modernity, I argue that the cosmos is no longer seen as a divine order, but a man-made system created by a will to power and exploitation of nature. This gnostic recreation of the order of being inevitably leads to our current technocratic totalitarianism and corrupted science.

تُعنى هذه المراجعة بعَرض كتابين، من أبرز الكتب النقدية المنشورة أخيرًا، ومناقشتهما، وقد بحثَا صعود التكنوقراط في الولايات المتحدة منذ مطلع القرن العشرين إلى يومنا هذا، وهما
Technocracy Rising: The Trojan Horse of Global Transformation and Technocracy: The Hard: Road to World Order.
الكتابان لباتريك وود، وهو باحث وخبير
قتصادي تنموي دولي، وأحد أشد الخبراء النقديين لسياسات التنمية المستدامة، يركز على سياسات حكومات التكنوقراط، والكيفية التي ساهمت بها في تحويل السياسة والاقتصاد في العالم. وتنطوي المراجعة على استخلاص أهم ما ورد في الكتابين، مع التركيز على خلفية صعود التكنوقراط، والتحولات التي فرضها على الاقتصاد والحكم والإنسان والقانون والتنمية المستدامة والنظام العالمي. ثم تناقش أبرز أفكار الكاتب، وأخيرًا تقدم خلاصة استنتاجية عن قدرة التكنوقراطية في إنقاذ العالم من التحديات التي تواجهه.

Technocracy is a contested concept, but it is typically associated with the exercise of political power justified by claims to expertise, and is often contrasted with populist forms of politics. In Power Without Knowledge, Jeffrey Friedman reframes the concept of technocracy as a form of politics oriented to solving social and economic problems, and thereby extends it to cover not only epistemic elites but ordinary people. This move usefully challenges the simplistic framing of populism and technocracy as opposites, but at the expense of effacing other dimensions of democratic politics. Friedman also suggests that maximizing individuals’ exit opportunities will allow them to take advantage of their relatively reliable personal knowledge. The architecture of “exitocracy” would itself, however, be designed by experts who, as such, might be tempted to insulate the institutional architecture they design against democratic interference.

Current debates on austerity often forget that these policies are almost 100 years old. This paper explores how the combination of austerity and technocracy acted as a powerful tool to secure the compliance of European countries to socio-economic stabilization after WWI. Austerity emerged as an economic, moral and technocratic message as economic experts sought to educate the restless post-war civil society. This paper analyses primary austerity documents from the international economic conferences of Brussels (1920) and Genoa (1922). In addition I use a case study of Italy (1922-1925) to show how austerity succeeded under the first years of Fascism, when the government authorized prominent economics professors to implement the international financial codes devised at Brussels and Genoa. This essay considers the scientific writings of De Stefani, Ricci and Pantaleoni to examine the theoretical roots of the technocratic nature of austerity.

7/31 small additions: p 8 Weber, and p 98, both ref. academic freedom.  p 176 Fried and photography. and minor fixes
1/28/23 minor fixes.  1/12/2023 pages 110-121 are new.
2/3/22  small mistakes. a couple of missed photos.  3/31 On Saint-Simon. and the history of the phrase "avant-garde"  p 12.. (short but obviously needed) 3/24 On Frears' The Queen p163
1.../24...1/10...
1/05: I can't quit. More on Weber as "private reason", p.8. Arendt contra Chomsky, p. 34.
12/28 Again: this has has turned into a series of essays, posted here as a last resort. I'm taking a break. I've been working on it for a long time.


"We need, finally, to separate Modernism from modernity. They are not synonyms. Modernism is an ideology and modernity merely a situation: it’s where we’re at. The dream and lie of Modernism was the fantasy and the nightmare of disenchantment, of the fiction of the scientific or revolutionary vanguard, free from history, the instrument of reason alone. Modernism celebrated the range of fantasies that modernity inspired: Marx was a Modern, engaging contradictions, including his own; Marxists were Modernists, dreaming of the end of contradiction. These fantasies have aged badly, devolving from idealism to reaction and now farce. Modernism is dead; its defenders aren’t."

La thèse proposée est que le pouvoir de nos jours n’est plus théologico-politique, mais scientifico-politique, une preuve historique de sa mise en place infléchit l'ordre de causation entre le capitalisme et le pouvoir scientifico-politique: ce n'est pas le capitalisme qui génère un monde technologique dont il faudrait réaliser la critique, c'est le pouvoir-savoir scientifico-politique qui génère une production dont le capitalisme est un mode articulé aux autres dont celui de la forme-Etat. Une preuve historique est proposée dans la thèse. Si nous avons vu juste, c'est donc la normalisation scientificisée qui discrimine les tenants du pouvoir-savoir contemporain du reste de la population: tout a du se scientificiser pour survivre, tout a du être ou se diviser, être normalisé. Le risque dénoncé est une hégémonie de l'autorité de ce pouvoir scientifico-politique parmi d'autres. Le moyen de le contrer n'est pas d'accepter les inégalités et les considérer comme justes comme pour Hayek, Nozick ou Rawls: le moyen de contrer tout pouvoir est d'en réaliser la critique, accompagnant les actions des groupes politiques minoritaires et de formuler des propositions et mesures concrètes et des diagnostics critiques transcatégoriels.

Héritière de la tradition critique française, soucieuse d'une lecture rigoureuse de Hobbes, la production s'est voulue proposer un effort de pensée politique totalisant mais pour déployer un geste philosophique de philosophie politique : le geste auto-critique. Certains points sont développés avec une importance capitale, la relecture de l'accumulation primitive l'errance migratoire comme anomalie face au droit, la question des relations internationales contemporaines et les stratégies politiques possiblement mises en œuvre.

La thèse soutenue propose donc en résumé une méthode d’identification du pouvoir central contemporain et une vérification de la validité de cette identification, une création d’outils conceptuels pour analyser les effets de ce pouvoir central contemporain, ainsi qu’une proposition de mesures concrètes pour en réduire les effets mutilants dans le cadre d’une philosophie politique matérialiste d’inspiration deleuzo-guattarienne. Cette production philosophique propose une réponse aux sommes existantes contemporaines notamment les oeuvres de Hayek, de Nozick et de Rawls.  Il s'agit d'une réponse d'une philosophie continentale française politique à ces théorisations américaines.

How and why has it come to pass that children as young as 12 in the UK are being injected with a novel form of mRNA technology that is unlicensed, has no long-term safety data, and remains in clinical trials until May 2023? This article traces the path by which the unthinkable became an alarming reality between October 2020 and September 2021 and also follows developments since then. Working chronologically, the actions and claims of the manufacturers, the regulators, politicians, and in particular the establishment media in promoting “COVID-19 vaccination” for children are examined. The actions taken by policy makers are juxtaposed to scientific evidence available showing that there has never been any rational justification for the mass rollout of “COVID-19 vaccines” to children. The rollout has been predicated on shifting narratives, obfuscations, faux justifications, outright lies, regulatory capture of supposed guardians of the public interest, and mass propaganda. Evidence of actual and potential injuries to children has accumulated from before the beginning of the rollout, in spite of repeated attempts to cover it up, and yet, the under-12s are now also in the crosshairs and children are being targeted for “booster shots.” A clear picture emerges of collusion and corruption at the highest levels in forcing through an agenda that runs contrary to public health, democracy, and freedom. It is becoming clear that the rollout to children has nothing to do with “SARS-CoV-2” and everything to do with ongoing efforts to refashion the international monetary system in the image of central bank digital currencies and biometric IDs. In pursuit of that agenda, the transnational ruling class has revealed that it is willing to maim and kill children knowingly, creating enormous potential for a backlash as the public becomes aware of what is being done.

The issue of internationalization of capital and its effects on the changing internal structure of the
state has been broadly debated in recent years. This paper aims to indicate the changing orientation
of the state by proposing an alternative explanation based on Marxist political economy approach.
For this aim, first neoliberal, institutionalist, and transnational class/state approaches are critically
examined and the process of transformation of the state is analyzed as intertwined and dynamic relationships
between the state, social classes, and capital accumulation by employing N. Poulantzas’s
analytical framework. Second, the paper suggests that the concept of “interior bourgeoisie” might
be useful for explaining transformation of the state, especially for emphasizing the internal dynamics
which are argued among of the crucial elements of the transformation. Finally, it proposes that the
concept of “technocratic authoritarianism” might be an explanatory tool for comprehending the
processes of the technicalization of the decision-making, the tendencies of depoliticization, and of
authoritarianism as significant components of the recent transformation of the state.

Sermayenin uluslararasılaşması ve bunun devletin içsel yapısının değişimine etkisi konusu son dönemde geniş bir şekilde tartışılmıştır. Bu çalışma, Marksist ekonomi politik yaklaşımına dayanan alternatif bir açıklama ile devletin dönüşümünün yönelimine işaret etmeyi hedeflemiştir. Bu çerçevede ilk olarak devletin dönüşümünün anlamlandırılması amacıyla geliştirilen neoliberal, kurumsalcı ve ulus-ötesi sınıf analizlerinin eleştirel bir değerlendirilmesini yapılmış, ardından da N. Poulantzas’ın analitik çerçevesi kullanılarak süreç, devlet, sınıflar ve sermaye birikimi arasındaki iç içe geçmiş ve dinamik ilişkiler ağı analiz edilerek açıklanmıştır. İkinci olarak, sermayenin uluslararasılaşması ve devletin dönüşümü sürecinin aktif bir öznesi olarak “içsel burjuvazi” kavramının kullanılabileceği önerilmiş ve dönüşümün anlamlandırılması açısından içsel dinamiklerin önemi vurgulanmıştır. Son olarak, yaşanan dönüşüm sürecinin önemli parçaları olarak, karar alma süreçlerinin teknikleştirilmesi ve bununla beraber gelen apolitizasyon eğilimi ile siyaset alanının daralması ve otoriterizm eğilimlerini beraber ele alarak, dönüşümün muhtemel doğrultusunun “teknokratik otoriterizm” kavramının kullanılmasıyla analiz edilmesi önerilmiştir.

At the beginning of the XXI century, human societies are entering a period of "late modernity" characterized by new forms of trust and risk, untransparent social situations and economic, political and cultural globalization. These processes are associated with the presence of abstract systems that surround people and which require support of people with expertise in the fields which include transport, telecommunications, finance, security, media, energy. At the same time, it is noted that the expertise cult is born and specialists not only meet the identified needs, but also produce new, thus contributing to the development of a culture of narcissism. Article aims to explain the characteristics of expert systems and cultural narcissism, experts role as a participant in social change, model types and kinds of experts with their arcane in to ontological and epistemological structures of the social world. I also highlight the problems associated with the suppression of restrictions in to the access of expertise knowledge.
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Wraz z początkiem XXI wieku społeczeństwa ludzkie wchodzą w okres „późnej nowoczesności” cechujący się nowymi formami zaufania i ryzyka, nieprzejrzystością sytuacji społecznych oraz postępującą globalizacją ekonomiczną, polityczną i kulturową. Procesy te wiążą się z obecnością systemów abstrakcyjnych, które otaczają ludzi i do funkcjonowania wymagają wsparcia osób z wiedzą specjalistyczną z zakresu m.in. transportu, telekomunikacji, finansów, bezpieczeństwa, mediów, energetyki. Jednocześnie zauważa się, iż rodzi się kult ekspertyzy a specjaliści nie tylko zaspokajają rozpoznane potrzeby, ale też wytwarzają nowe, przyczyniając się tym samym do rozwoju kultury narcyzmu. Artykuł ma na celu przybliżenie specyfiki systemów eksperckich i narcyzmu kulturowego, roli eksperta jako uczestnika przemian społecznych, modelowych typów ekspertów i rodzajów ich wtajemniczeń w struktury ontologiczne i epistemologiczne świata społecznego oraz zwrócenie uwagi na problemy związane ze znoszeniem ograniczeń dostępu do wiedzy specjalistycznej.

In today’s world, open science and open government matter. When combined, many agree, they strengthen science and democracy. Yet opening up – whether in the name of open science, open data, open source or open government – is rarely straightforward. This essay explores the curious alliances, novel tensions and surprising paradoxes that contemporary practices of openness entail. It dwells on two controversies in particular: Climategate and The Honest and Open New EPA Science Treatment Act of 2017. These examples show that the grounds on which expertise and science for government work are shifting; and how difficult it can be to defend established scientific practices, which are increasingly cast as secretive, suspect and morally untenable. While pundits routinely take both examples as evidence of a populist, right-wing assault on science, the essay suggests that the recent push for openness and transparency itself contributes substantially to the challenges science for government faces. Familiar stories about a post-truth, anti-science Right that operates in the shadows, and a truthful, pro-science Left that does not, have limited explanatory value. Ultimately the essay aims to expand our thinking on the knotty entanglements of science and liberal democratic governance in the twenty-first century.

This thesis analyses the relationship between the ideal of democracy and its practical implementation. More in detail, its main purpose is to discuss whether, in the context of a continuous increase of democratic political systems, citizens can meaningfully take part in decisions over things which affect their lives, or whether, as we argue, popular sovereignty has turned into a "simulacrum" that hides the existence of decision makers which are not subordinated to any kind of democratic control. The thesis can be divided into two main parts. First, the main theories on democracy are discussed and compared with those ones on technocracy. Afterwards, three different levels of analysis - word, continent and nation - are taken into account to illustrate the deficiencies of representative democracy and the challenges facing it in the current societies. Here, particular attention is devoted to the European Union institutional structure (and to its lacking of democratic control and participation instruments) and to the three cases of technical government established in Italy in the last two decades.

This is a "big picture," a synthesis of material from several critical fields, including climate change, economics, digital technology, world governance, the global economy, economic benefits of a circular economy, the dangers of increasing electrification, and further strategies of improving societal resilience and sustainability. The even bigger picture, the spiritual perspective, is also discussed. The effects of catastrophic climate change have by now become so apparent and alarming that the topic has taken global center stage. COP26, in Glasgow, unsurprisingly, did not accomplish much, however. Once again, agreements were compromises, promises for doing too little, too late. But the conference did bring pressure upon nations to act with a greater sense of urgency. As has been reported, between 2015 and today, the "tribe" of COP attendees had been transformed from one of "environment ministers, scientists and activists" to one of "business leaders, financiers and monetary officials." Climate modeling remains flawed. The growth imperative still rules the day. Growth causes global ecological damage, including climate change and resultant biodiversity losses, altogether driving us faster toward the extinction of our own and other species. Add to that, a pandemic which has, to a large degree, crippled the circulatory system of a globalized society. A transnational capitalist class is emerging, uniting to create central control at the global level. Globalization is now in the next phase of consolidation and centralization of the world economy. Through the electrification and interconnection of all parts of the global economy, through Wi-Fi and the "Internet of Things," the increasingly wealthy global elite, are working to ensure their ongoing control over the resources and distribution of global goods and services, whether they be natural, raw, technological, or financial resources. The global economy has changed since the beginning of industrialization, and is now in the next phase of consolidation by global elites. This comes as the end of a long arc of national imperial powers, which, individually, have been imperiled by growing global unrest and challenges to their authority, and more severe shortages of natural resources, not to mention the global recession brought about by the pandemic. In 2020 the ultra-rich got richer. Now they're bracing for the backlash. They are coming together as a global organization as a means of preserving themselves, largely ignoring how they are destroying our biosphere. The belief that environmental costs of digital technology can be offset by the gains they could render is still to be confirmed. The rush to electrify the world and establish a technological digital economy has a considerable downside, not to mention the embedded opportunities for authoritarianism. This author wrote in "How Has it Come to This: Climate Change and the Future of Planet Earth", about a few of the strategies for ensuring optimal resilience and survivability. They include re-localization, cooperative communities, and regenerative agriculture. Additional strategies are presented here. There is an overarching even bigger picture too...the spiritual dimension. Broadly speaking, this means not only how one responds to apparent threats, but also how one may fortify one's equanimity. We can best see our way forward if we are in a state of inner equanimity, not reacting out of fear. Further, we may remember that this is a time of profound learning. If we hold the view that what are we here for is to learn and grow in our understanding, wisdom, and skillfulness, then we may embrace the present and the many opportunities it offers for our learning.

In this paper, we offer a contribution to the ideational approach to populism. Considering populism as a ‘thin’ ideology in whose conceptual core lie the notions of the good ‘people’, the evil ‘elite’ and popular sovereignty, we propose a theoretical articulation of populism that, in our view, encompasses two hitherto inadequately articulated dimensions of the populist phenomenon – reactivity and elitism. To this end, we draw from Friedrich Nietzsche’s genealogical account of Slave morality, Vilfredo Pareto’s theory of elite cycles, as well as from John Higley and Michael Burton’s notion of ‘elite configuration’ to construct a descriptive elite- theoretical model which we then apply in our interpretation of the populist phenomenon. According to our proposed model, populism can be understood as the ideological expression of an ‘outsider-elite’ whose aim is to renegotiate the ‘thickened’ ideological consensus of a consensually united political elite.