G20 - G8 - G7

Palestra para o II Congresso Internacional das Américas, I Simpósio do GRULAC e Fórum Argentina Brasil de Direito - Aduaneiro e Tecnologia. Organizado pela Comissão de Direito e Relações Internacionais da Subseção de Santos da Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil. Dia 10 de junho de 2022.

Among the deficiencies demonstrated by the world financial crisis of 2008–9, one was the limited capacity of G-8 to provide for global economic governance. The developed economies quickly realised that they should seek joint solutions and coordinated policies in cooperation with the leading emerging-market economies. As a result, the G-20 turned into the main forum for managing the crisis. This in fact pointed to an early institutional acknowledgement that important changes were underway in the global distribution of power. These changes derive from the substantially higher growth rates of the emerging-market economies in comparison with those of the developed economies, a trend named ‘the rise of the rest’ (Zakaria, 2008, pp. 2–3).

In developed and emerging economies, capital markets play a major role in tranforming savings into investment. The high profit expectation of the investors in the capital markets of the emerging economies increase the curiosity about predicting future prices. The aim of this study is to test weak-form efficiency of 20 stock markets in G-20 members countries. For this purpose, with the help of random walk model, daily index values of the stock markets of G-20 members countries for the period of 01.01.2001-12.31.2018 are applied by analysis of variance and unit root tests including ADF, PP and KPSS tests. As a result of study according to variance ratio test, it is concluded that NASDAQ (USA), SESN (India), TASI (Saudi Arabia) and SSEN (China) do not show a random walk and are not effective at the weak-form in the degrees of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Other stock markets in the study are found in weak-form efficient. In addition, according to the unit root test results, 18 stock markets are found in weak-form efficient during the analysis period.
ÖZ Gelişmiş ve gelişmekte olan ekonomilerde sermaye piyasaları tasarrufların yatırıma dönüşmesinde büyük rol oynamaktadır. Yatırımcıların gelişmekte olan ekonomilerin sermaye piyasalarındaki yüksek kar beklentisi, gelecekteki fiyatları öngörebilmesine ilişkin merakı artırmıştır. Bu çalışmanın amacı G-20 ülkelerindeki 20 borsanın zayıf formda etkinliğini test etmektir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda rassal yürüyüş modeli yardımıyla G-20 ülkeleri borsalarının 01.01.2002-31.12.2018 dönemine ait günlük endeks değerlerine varyans analizi ve ADF, PP, KPSS testleri ile kırılmalı birim kök testleri uygulanmıştır. Çalışmanın sonucunda varyans oran testine göre NASDAQ (ABD) ve SESN (Hindistan) %1, TASI (Suudi Arabistan) %5 ve SSEC (Çin) %10 düzeyinde rassal yürüyüş sergilemedikleri ve zayıf formda etkin olmadıkları sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Çalışma kapsamındaki diğer borsalar zayıf formda etkin bulunmuştur. Ayrıca gerçekleştirilen birim kök testi sonuçlarına göre analiz döneminde 18 borsa zayıf formda etkin bulunmuştur.

Suffering from high rates of inflation since the 1940s and having experienced two hyperinflations at the end of the 1980s, in 2019 Argentina faced an increase of prices of more than 50%. But in the 1990s Argentina achieved price stability and growth at once. What were the sources of such an immediate change? What lessons can be drawn from this experience? As in the 1990s Argentina adopted profound market reforms, stability could be considered an achievement of neoliberal diffusion. Not only international forces were propelling change; the International Monetary Found (IMF) celebrated the success and invited other emerging nations to imitate it. Nevertheless, this perspective underestimates the importance of the local context in the history of neoliberal reforms and overestimates the coherence of external forces. Through the analysis of testimonies of Argentine and foreign officials and the study of declassified documents from the IMF, this paper argues that stability was only achieved after the adoption of a currency board, which was against the recommendation of most foreign officials. Instead of a simple top-down transposition of ideas, the Argentinian case reveals the importance of the agency of technocrats. Their local innovation not only made the diffusion of neoliberalism possible, but it also turned the currency board into one of the global anti-inflationist recipes recommended to other countries, despite its heavy consequences.

Este trabajo se centra en el fenómeno de los i-memes (internet memes) y comprende un estudio de caso a partir de un acontecimiento local que tuvo repercusiones y trascendencia globales: la cumbre del G20 celebrada en Buenos Aires (diciembre 2018). Entre las distintas piezas meméticas que circularon en relación al evento tuvo cierto predominio la imagen del entonces presidente Mauricio Macri lagrimeando tras el espectáculo Argentum, realizado en el teatro Colón como agasajo para los líderes concurrentes a la cumbre. Esta imagen tuvo múltiples reapropiaciones en las redes, mayormente con finalidades humorísticas. En los casos analizados en el trabajo, las apropiaciones meméticas sirvieron a fines satíricos, tendientes a desvalorizar la gestión y el liderazgo del ex-presidente, en el marco de crecientes conflictos poíticos, económicos y sociales alrededor de su Gobierno. Esto devino en la consolidación de un nuevo meme, que aquí llamamos "Macri Llorón" y cuya longevidad superó el contexto cronológico de la cumbre del G20, registrando reapariciones significativas en momentos posteriores del Gobierno de la alianza Cambiemos; fundamentalmente, su derrota electoral del 2019 a manos del Frente de Todos.

In 2012, public opinion focussed on what has been called 'aggressive tax planning of multinational enterprises'. Since then, the G20 and OECD developed the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan – a phenomenon that has received enormous attention. Despite this attention, the efforts, methodology and outcomes, and the instruments used to implement them, pose very little innovation. This article analyses the issues raised by the BEPS Action Plan from a historical perspective, showing that they remain grounded on the same basis of discussions that took place decades ago. This is probably because the project was triggered by a decrease in tax revenue, and not by an actual study of the failures of the system. The only real innovation of the BEPS Project is the change in the public state of mind and attitude towards tax planning, as well as a totally new way of developing international tax rules through consensus with the participation of a broad number of countries. Future steps should take advantage of this actual innovation, get rid of previous analysis and, taking into account of the current economic situation, study (1) the structure of the tax system and tax burden; (2) the jurisdiction to tax rules and the source and residence principles; and (3) the relationship between private law and tax law, i.e. legal personality and recognition of foreign persons and contracts. Without such in-depth analysis, any changes would be changes that only deepen already existent failing principles forming the base of the current system.

This article engages with the activities of the alternative international media centre FC/MC which was established and operated during the 2017 G20-Summit in Hamburg. Rather than following established narratives on alternative media or mobilising discourses on aesthetics of resistance in the arts, the specific operational logics of affective and preemptive politics of perception define the main scope of developing what is termed “activist sense” and the emergence of potential “aesthetic counterpowers” as part and parcel of an affective politics of perception. Drawing on the conception of affect in social media studies and on the notions of field and information in the works of gilbert Simondon, the FC/MC will be analysed as a building block in the overall infrastructure of affective resistance against dominant and platform-based narratives of violence and threat amplified by mainstream media. Through a field-based conception of affect and perception, the question of “making-sense” takes on a pervasive yet potentially more inclusive and activating dimension of future forms of media-infused modes of resistance.

Bu çalışmada 1997 Asya Finans Krizi sonrası kurumsallaşan G20'nin küresel yönetişim sistemindeki gelişimi ve yeri analiz edilmektedir. Günümüzde G20'nin bürokratik bir yapıdan küresel zirveler düzenleyen bir karaktere evrilmesinin mantığı küresel yönetişim bağlamında irdelenecektir. Bu bağlamda G20'yi içeriden statükoya meydan okuyacak bir platform olarak gören önemli yükselen güçler ile gelişmiş ülkelerin tepkileri de ele alınacaktır. Yöntem olarak, uluslararası sistemde küresel yönetişim tartışmalarına dair bir teorik çerçeve ortaya konacak, bu teorik çerçeve bağlamında küresel yönetişimin yüklerini paylaşmak ve katılımcı bir platform oluşturmak amacıyla G20'nin kurumsal faaliyet alanı ve politika gündemini genişletme çabaları masaya yatırılacaktır. Ardından, finansal istikrardan farklı alanlara yayılan G20 faaliyetlerinin kalıcı bir sekreterya ve kurumsal altyapı eksikliğinde yol açtığı performans ve meşruiyet tartışmalarına dikkat çekilecektir. 2008 Küresel Ekonomik Kriz sonrasında ABD, küresel yönetişim yapısını daha kalıcı bir şekilde değiştirmek istemiştir ve bu istek G20 grubunun kurumsal bir yapı olarak ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur tartışması bu çalışmaya temel oluşturmuştur.

Can the power of the G20 be legitimate? This book examines the politics surrounding the G20's efforts to act effectively and legitimately and the problems and challenges involved in this activity. Developing a critical constructivist conceptualisation of the G20, the book considers holistically and practically the ways that the G20 develops various forms of power and influence and acts as an apex form of global governance that seeks to be an overall coordinating forum to address global problems. Assessing how debates about the legitimacy of the G20 shaped its operation, Slaughter argues that the G20's power can be legitimate despite a range of considerable challenges and limits. The book also explores what measures the G20 could take to be more legitimate in the future. Offering a direct and accessible consideration of the politics of legitimacy with respect to the G20, this book will be of interest to those attempting to understand and analyse the G20 as well as to scholars of IR theory, global political economy, global policy, diplomacy and globalisation.

The objective of the study is to contribute to the discourse about media by investigating frames and journalistic techniques used by the corporate mass media to establish boundaries for understanding police and protesters at the 2010 G20 Summit, any temporal changes, and the applicability of the hierarchy of credibility at this international protest event. Using data from 2009 to 2011in two national and one local newspaper, a frame analysis seeks to uncover how the media frame behaviour and events, what are the primary and second definers of reality, and how the police and protesters are depicted as social problems. The findings suggest that media portrayals of the social actors are framed within an inferential structure that shifts from protester violence before the summits to police violence afterward. Episodic coverage and the decontextualization of people and events create the boundaries for discussion,
through the use of the attribution-of-responsibility, conflict, economic-consequences, and human-interest generic frames in the areas of security, social problems, and controversy. We conclude that the results depart from previous research by suggesting a reconceptualization of the hierarchy of credibility. Within conflict and human interest frames, this crisis event destabilized the police as primary definers of crime in favour of citizens and protesters.

The UK, US, EU response to the catastrophic economic impact of COVID on Africa, Asia & Latin America is A KICK IN THE TEETH—and this is to put it mildly! The poorest countries, who account <3% of private and public debt owed by so-called developing countries, can request postponement (!!!) of interest payments on debt owed to G7 governments until June 2021 - the so-called 'Debt Service Suspension Initiative'. And that’s it!!! Private lenders, i.e. the super-rich loan-sharks, are refusing to participate, demanding every penny be paid on time, whatever the cost to public health.
The biggest scandal of all is that there’s no scandal!

This is a mid-2020 Update of my 2016 BEPS Primer article. This 2020 Update is in two parts. Part 1 focused on the initial two-year BEPS project and developments concerning it since the release of the October 5, 2015 Final Reports. This Part 2 focuses on Pillars One and Two of the currently ongoing BEPS 2.0 OECD-led process.

Governments throughout the world have been losing many billions of dollars of tax revenues over the past two decades from tax avoidance conducted by many multinational groups (MNEs). These MNEs have aggressively structured their operations and transactions in manners that often lack economic reality so as to divorce their profits from the activities that earn those profits, thereby recording excessive profits in group members that are subjected to zero or low-taxation. The success of this tax avoidance motivated the G-20 and the OECD to begin the initial two-year Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) OECD-led project, which took place from 2013 to 2015.

Following the initial two-year project were several years of continued developments with an acceleration of activity beginning in 2019, which has been termed BEPS 2.0. This BEPS 2.0 project is described in this Part 2 in some detail with editorial thoughts on its potential effects and how it may proceed. BEPS 2.0 includes two “Pillars”, the first of which would provide for limited taxation by market countries and the second of which would create a minimum tax to discourage profit shifting.

This discussion of the BEPS project is intended to give the reader an understanding of the project’s origin, its objectives, and how it may proceed in the future. It does not provide details of the specific results of the work on the initial project’s 15 Action Plan items. Rather, only some brief comments are made on them to give the reader a flavor of the BEPS work undertaken by the OECD and the others who participated in this project. It is more detailed regarding the currently on-going BEPS 2.0 Pillars One and Two.

More specifically, the Primer includes:

— Examples of MNE BEPS activities,

— Description of how the environment strongly motivates BEPS behavior including both systemic issues and developments occurring over past decades,

— Participants in the BEPS process,

— Brief comments on the initial BEPS Project 15 Action Plan Items,

— Results of the initial BEPS Project and possible future developments, and

— Description, comments, and editorial reflections on both Pillars One and Two of BEPS 2.0.

In recent years, numerous so-called soft law regimes have been established, often in combination with effective international oversight and rigorous review procedures. This contribution considers the specific impact such regimes may have on small and very small States. Relying primarily on the experiences of Switzerland and Liechtenstein with GRECO and the OECD respectively, it is argued that international standardisation might not always sufficiently take into consideration the sometimes peculiar historical, political and institutional characteristics of small States; also, there is some risk that small States are exposed to particular scrutiny. Sentiments of unfair treatment may in turn lead to an increasingly negative attitude towards soft law in general, as illustrated by the unexpected parliamentary opposition to the U.N. Migration Compact both in Liechtenstein and Switzerland.

After providing a brief overview of the global justice movement
history, this article analyzes the main argument raised by its activists to oppose the neoliberal ideology, as notably asserted by the shifts in the discourses of some G20 leaders. Activists however call attention to the gap between the speeches of the G20 leaders and the measures actually implemented.
Accordingly, global justice activists have decided to focus on seeking concrete outcomes through the following: specialized advocacy networks, empowerment at the local level and alliances with progressive regimes.

This volume assesses the European Union (EU) as a 'Diplomatic Actor' in key foreign policy fields in the post-Lisbon era. It brings together leading scholars and practitioners in order to examine the main players, processes and outcomes of the EU's collective diplomatic engagement in the fields of security, human rights, trade and finance and environmental politics. In addition, the collection also analyses institutional developments and the EU's responses to major internal and external challenges in the context of international politics and global diplomacy. It provides the first comprehensive overview of the scope, nature and impact of the EU's growing role as a diplomatic actor and offers a comparative analysis of EU diplomacy in bilateral, multilateral and international fora. By taking stock of the successes and failures of EU diplomacy, this volume identifies the main internal and external conditions that shape the EU's influence in global affairs.

2001-2021 Finita la guerra fredda, in un contesto di crescita globale, il vertice di Genova autorizzava per il XXI secolo speranze andate in fumo. L’11 settembre arrivò subito dopo, poi la crisi del 2008 gettò l’Occidente nell’incertezza, mentre l’avanzata cinese si fa impetuosa.
E siamo anche tornati al G7, appena celebrato, dopo l’esclusione di Mosca per il caso ucraino

Apresentação do livro de Paulo Roberto de Almeida:
A grande ilusão do Brics e o universo paralelo da diplomacia brasileira
(Brasília: Diplomatizzando, 2022; ISBN: 978-65-00-46587-7; Edição Kindle; ASIN: B0B3WC59F4; disponível na Amazon.com.br)

Resumo:
Coletânea de ensaios e artigos se estendendo desde a concepção do conceito do Bric, na planilha de um economista profissional de um banco de investimentos, no início dos 2000, até a situação em 2022, depois da invasão da Ucrânia por um dos membros do Brics, a Rússia. A maior parte da análise é de natureza histórica, cobrindo aspectos econômicos e diplomáticos do empreendimento, e focando particularmente nos interesses do Brasil, suas motivações e capacidades, como um dos propositores originais do grupo, e a letra inicial no acrônimo apelativo. Pelo seu título, A grande ilusão do Brics, há uma clara visão crítica em torno das razões e motivações para a criação desse grupo, como se os quatro membros originais estavam tentando confrontar o G7 e buscando uma ordem mundial alternativa. Como revelado pelo subtítulo, o universo paralelo da diplomacia brasileira, existe também uma discussão sobre o tipo de novo direcionamento da política externa brasileira, fugindo de seus padrões tradicionais que visam a criação de uma postura autônoma nas relações internacionais, vinculando sua diplomacia essencialmente aos interesses nacionais de desenvolvimento econômico e social.

Summary:
A collection of essays and articles spanning from the inception of the Bric concept, at the table of a professional economist from an investments bank, in early 2000s, up to the situation in 2022, after the invasion of Ukraine by one of Brics members, Russia. Most of the analysis is of a historical nature, dealing with economic and diplomatic aspects of the endeavor, and focusing especially on Brazil’s interests, inducements, and capabilities, as one of the first proponents of the group, and the initial letter of the appealing acronym. By its title, The Great Illusion of the Brics, there is a clear critical standpoint about the reasons and motivations for the creation of this group, as if the four original members seek to be countering the G7 and looking to offer an alternative world order. As revealed by the subtitle, a parallel universe of the Brazilian diplomacy, there is also a discussion about a kind of a new driving line in Brazilian foreign policy, deviating from its traditional patterns towards the building up of an autonomous stance in regional and international relations, connecting its diplomacy essentially with its national interests of social and economic development.

La crisis económico-financiera de 2008/2009 ha venido a espolear los ánimos de algunos Estados-nación por avanzar en las reformas en la gobernanza economía global. De cara a este proceso, algunas organizaciones intergubernamentales informales han adquirido especial relevancia, siendo el G7/G8, el G20 y el Foro BRICS los principales protagonistas en los últimos años. No obstante, las agendas de cada uno de estos bloques distan de ser compatibles: mientras que el G7 se orienta por un mantenimiento del status quo, el BRICS apuesta por un mundo multipolar y más democrático, mientras que el G20 se orienta a conciliar posturas entre las viejas potencias y las llamadas potencias emergentes que para nosotros, la terminología que mejor las describe, es la de potencias regionales. ¿Qué posibilidades de prosperar tiene cada bloque y cuáles son las opciones para las potencias regionales latinoamericanas (Argentina, Brasil y México) frente a ellos? El objetivo del artículo es presentar el estado de la cooperación al interior del G7/G8, G20 y BRICS hasta 2013 y trazar posibles escenarios en los que pudieran desenvolverse las potencias regionales de América Latina (Argentina, Brasil y México).

There is little research into the use of Twitter by diplomats. This study analysed the extent to which Twitter is being used by ambassadors and embassies exchanged between G8 states. This was done by researching which of the 56 ambassadors and 56 embassies had accounts. Then differences between the ways different nationalities used Twitter, and where it was being used the most. Finally, the way Twitter was being used to communicate, and whether ambassadors and embassies were maximising their effectiveness of Twitter as a tool for broadcasting was analysed.
It was discovered that the majority of ambassadors and embassies were on Twitter, but with significantly more embassies. The UK and USA both had the most ambassadors and embassies using Twitter and were the countries where Twitter was used the most. Twitter is primarily being used as a one-way communication tool within a traditional public diplomacy model of broadcasting at foreign publics, and those ambassadors and embassies that include URL’s and hashtags within their tweets are the most effective at doing this.
It was concluded that Twitter has become a powerful broadcast channel for ambassadors and embassies that use it well.

Resumen: El presente artículo evalúa y plantea una crítica al Proyecto BEPS de la OCDE. En las primeras tres secciones del artículo se expone la lógica conductual de las empresas multinacionales, el contexto económico en el que se plantea la iniciativa BEPS y el desarrollo de las prácticas fiscales nocivas. En las secciones posteriores se aborda tanto los objetivos y principios del plan BEPS, como una evaluación crítica de su desarrollo. Finalmente, se concluye que el plan BEPS tiene defectos estructurales y funcionales que, aunque lo hacen el mejor esfuerzo contemporáneo para contrarrestar BEPS, es insuficiente para contener las prácticas de planeamiento fiscal agresivo por parte de las multinacionales.
Abstract: This article evaluates and proposes a critique on the OECD’s BEPS Project. In the first three sections of the article behavioral logic of multinational companies are exposed, as well as the economic context in which the BEPS initiative arises and harmful tax practices develop. In subsequent sections we approach the objectives and principles of the BEPS plan and also addressed a critique of its development. Finally, we conclude that the BEPS plan has both structural and functional defects, although they are the best contemporary effort to counter BEPS, it is insufficient to curb multinationals aggressive tax planning practices.
Palabras clave: Traslado de beneficios – Erosión de la base imponible – BEPS – Planificación fiscal agresiva – OCDE
Keywords: Profit shifting – Base erosion – BEPS – Aggressive tax planning – OECD

Since the global financial crisis of 2008/09, international cooperation has failed to curb volatile financial markets. Changes in the global rules of finance discussed in the G20 during the last decade remain limited, and it is uncertain whether they are suitable to help mitigate and manage future crises to come. This book offers an alternative to the popular notion that this failure is the result of the ‘nature’ of the international system, the clash of national egoisms, or lack of leadership. It instead investigates problems of international cooperation by looking at their deeper structural origins in the competition of different models of capitalism.
US finance-led, EU integration-led, and East Asian state-led capitalism complement each other globally but have conflicting preferences on how to regulate international finance. This interdependence of capitalist models is relatively stable but also prone to crises caused by volatile financial flows, global economic imbalances, and ‘currency wars’. By bringing together approaches from International Political Economy and Comparative Capitalism, this book shows that regulating international finance is not a technocratic exercise of fine-tuning the machinery of international institutions, but rather a political process. International cooperation can only be successful, if it goes hand in hand with deep domestic changes in each of these capitalist models.

The main objective of this article is to analyse the new global governance mechanism developed at the G20 forum by nineteen individual countries, along with the European Union (represented by the European Commission and the European Council), cooperating with international organizations (IOs) and government officials (GOs). In the subsequent sections, I argue that the new mechanistic and praxis-oriented mechanism of global governance is built on the nexus between (1) the G20 acting as a hub of multi-level cooperation and as an apex systemic risk manager; (2) IOs offering expertise on specific issue areas; and (3) GOs as sherpas, or ministers responsible for specific subjects, who are able to meet before and after commitments, and are endorsed by and influence the iteration leaders use at subsequent summits to soften difficult issues. The mechanism represents a departure from the Schumpeterian " creative destruction " process, understood in broader terms as not restricted solely to the role of entrepreneurs and innovations, but extended also towards global politics and institutions (norms, systems, and organizations). As shown in G20 communiqués and declarations, the elite global governance institutions are providing valuable input to the G20 process. A good example of the G20 and IOs' effective synergy is the relationship between the G20 and the OECD, which can be described as a " partnership of convenience. " The activity of sherpas, finance ministers, central bank governors, expert groups and similar sub-summit entities are also an essential component of the global governance mechanism. They are all responsible for major preparatory work before G20 summits. In conclusion, I argue that the successful spreading of this mechanism makes it possible to achieve ambitious objectives, such as (1) crisis response and closing global governance gaps, (2) enhancing international cooperation, and (3) building a capacity for international innovation.

Citation: Rewizorski M. (2017) G20 and the Development of a New Global Governance Mechanism. International Organisations Research Journal, vol. 12, no 3, pp. 32–52 (in Russian and English). DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2017-03-32

Keywords: G20; global governance; international organizations; government officials

Los días 18 y 19 de junio de 2012 se realizará en Los Cabos/Baja California Sur la próxima Cumbre del G20 bajo la presidencia de México. Este magno evento reunirá a los líderes del mundo en México bajo signos de crisis económica y financiera internacionales y un escenario electoral que
culminará el 1 de julio con la elección presidencial. Estos dos contextos ubicarán esta Cumbre en el ámbito internacional y nacional con lecturas divergentes, condición típica de eventos de este alcance que siempre encuentran ecos mediáticos y públicos con muy variados mensajes.

Etkin Piyasalar Hipotezi'nin Geçerliliğinin Yapısal Kırılmalı Birim Kök Testleri ile Sınanması: G7 Ülkeleri, Rusya ve Türkiye Üzerine Bir Örnek Seca TOKER1 Özet Zayıf etkin piyasalar hipotezi (EPH) finansal varlıkların gelecek fiyatlarının, geçmiş dönem fiyatları ile öngörülemediği durumlarda geçerlidir ve bu piyasalarda aşırı kar elde edilemez. Bu çalışmanın amacı G7 ülkeleri, Rusya ve Türkiye finansal piyasaları için zayıf EPH'nin geçerliliğini sınamaktır. Veri setleri 2005-2017 yılları arasındaki günlük fiyat endekslerinden oluşmaktadır. Finansal piyasaları temsil eden fiyat endekslerinin logaritmaları alınmıştır. Çalışmada geleneksel birim kök testlerinden Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), Philips Perron (PP), yapısal kırılmalı birim kök testlerinden Zivot Andrews (ZA) ve Lee-Strazicich (LM) kullanılarak zayıf EPH test edilmiştir. Elde edilen sonuçlara göre ADF ve PP testinde bütün ülkelere ait fiyat endeksleri için zayıf EPH'nin geçerliliği kabul edilmiştir. ZA testi sonuçlarına göre ABD dışındaki bütün ülkelerde bir yapısal kırılma ile zayıf EPH geçerli iken, ABD için zayıf EPH'nin geçerli olmadığı bulgularına rastlanılmıştır. İki yapısal kırılmalı LM testinde bütün ülkeler iki yapısal kırılma ile birim köklüdür ve zayıf EPH geçerli olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Elde edilen sonuçlara dayanarak öne sürülebilir ki piyasalar rassal yürüyüş sürecini desteklemektedir. Anahtar Kelimeler: Birim Kök Testi, Etkin Piyasalar Hipotezi, Yapısal Kırılmalı Birim Kök Testi Testing the Validity of the Efficient Market Hypothesis with Structural Breakdown Unit Root Tests: An Empirical Study on the G7 Countries, Russia and Turkey Abstract Weak form of efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is valid for the situations that future prices of financial assets cannot be estimated via their previous prices in the market and for such markets gaining abnormal profit is not possible. In this study, we aim to examine the validity of weak form of EMH for the group of seven (G7) countries, Russia and Turkey. Dataset consists of daily data of price indices from the years 2005-2017. We take the logarithm of price indices that represent financial markets. Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Philips Perron (PP) unit root tests and Zivot Andrews (ZA) Lee-Strazicich (LM) unit root tests with two structural breaks are used to test weak form of EMH. According to the results, it is observed that weak form of EMH is valid for all countries' price indices on ADF and PP tests. According to ZA test results, all countries except US weak EMH is valid with one structural break but for the US it is not. For LM test with two structural breaks, all countries can be modeled via unit root with two structural breaks and validity of weak EMH is shown. Depending on these results, it can be asserted that markets support random walking process.

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Kepresidenan Indonesia di Kelompok Negara 20 menjadi “titik kritis” strategis setelah lebih dari dua tahun dunia mengalami masa pandemi pertama kali dalam abad ini dengan referensi yang relatif minim terhadap pengalaman terhadap beragam skenario pilihan kebijakan atas kejadian pandemi yang berskala global.  Keputusan–keputusan yang diambil dalam kepemimpinan Presiden Jokowi akan sangat menentukan respons solusi yang efektif terhadap masa depan dunia guna pulih serta berdaya bangkit lebih kuat secara bersama–sama mencapai Agenda Tujuan Pembangunan Berkelanjutan 2030.  Sebagai negara menengah, Indonesia menjadi jembatan negara–negara maju sekaligus penyambung lidah negara miskin–berkembang.  Indonesia kini tak lagi menaruh tangan di bawah (meminta) akan tetapi juga telah mulai turut serta memberi contoh dengan tangan di atas (memberi).  Presidensi Indonesia dalam Kelompok Negara 20 harus membuktikan kepemimpinan Indonesia yang bekerja untuk kepentingan semua (inklusif).

Implications for Rio +20

This month, the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (“Rio +20) on June 20-22 in Brazil immediately follows a Summit of the Group of 20 (G20) on June 18-19 in Mexico.  These events invite a comparison of their respective agendas and approaches to securing future economic development.  The “Rio+20” Conference occurs in the “big tent” of all UN member states in order to reflect on progress made over the last twenty years (since the 1992 Earth Summit) in achieving sustainable development  and (more controversially) to repackage these ideas into the market-friendly concept of building a ‘Green Economy.’

In contrast, the G20 Summit is a closed gathering of the world’s nineteen largest economies, plus the European Union—which will focus on managing the eurozone crisis, governance and financial reform, unemployment, and international development, including a  massive infrastructure initiative.

This paper explores the ways in which G20 Summit affect the outcomes of “Rio+20” and whether these two global events might be mutually reinforcing or work at cross-purposes. 

It begins by providing a brief history of the G20 and its two growth frameworks and, then, describes how, on the one hand, nation states are moving away from binding commitments (e.g., environment, climate, human rights, biodiversity) and, on the other, private actors (i.e., ‘public-private partnerships’) are shaping the future. The brave new world dominated by transnational corporations is deepening and expanding ‘market mechanisms,’ which commodify and ‘financialize’ natural resources. The conclusions describe government and civil society responses to the new challenges to global governance and sustainable development in a multi-polar world where the power of the financial sector remains ascendant.

The uploaded text appeared, with slight modifications, in the collectaneous volume 'Bürokratiepolitiken. Schriften zur Verkehrswissenschaft 44', edited by Frank Jödicke, Reinhold Knoll, Christopher Schlembach, Walter Seitter, Sonderzahl Verlagsgesellschaft, Vienna 2021.

A partir de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, las potencias vencedoras comenzaron un proceso de construcción de un nuevo orden internacional, que posteriormente fue configurando la unipolaridad estadounidense como centro de gravedad global. Este nuevo orden se tradujo en el peso que obtuvieron los países centrales en los organismos internacionales de carácter político y económico. La crisis financiera global, desatada en 2008, significó un quiebre en las relaciones de fuerza internacionales, generó una parálisis en las economías centrales y, paralelamente, un proceso de crecimiento económico y articulación política de las economías emergentes agrupadas en los “BRICS”. Este trabajo pretende ser un aporte a los estudios sobre el estado del mundo en el Siglo XXI, a partir de la recopilación y análisis de los estudios teóricos precedentes y, a su vez, plantear algunas consideraciones propias organizadas en dos ejes fundamentales: por un lado, el proceso de transnacionalización de la economía global y de consolidación de la unipolaridad estadounidense y, por el otro, la crisis financiera de 2008 y el análisis de las condiciones particulares de los países emergentes desde la perspectiva multipolar. Los resultados pretenden convertirse en objeto de debate a efectos de realizar nuevas miradas de las perspectivas sociológicas sobre los aspectos socio-territoriales globales.

Following the 2008 global economic downturn, the Group of 20 (G20) countries committed to
holding their protectionist impulses at bay in order to avoid undermining the fragile global
recovery. Unfortunately, this pledge to refrain from adopting new trade-restrictive measures –
and to roll-back those in place – has not been honoured. For the sixth year, the global
institutions monitoring protectionism in the G20 have confirmed the accumulation of new
trade-restrictions and few efforts to liberalise trade. Protectionism has changed form and
geography. On the one hand, the predominant form of trade-restrictions – border measures, typically tariffs and quotas – isincreasingly being replaced by behind-the-border measures,such
as technical, taxation and localisation measures. What is more, trade restriction has shifted
eastwards, with Russia, China, India and Indonesia among the main offenders. The BRICS
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) have also gained prominence within the
G20 group, as those introducing the highest number of new trade-restrictionsin the last year.
Such a protectionist drift derives from the deteriorating economic performance of
emerging economies and their increasingly assertive role in global economic
governance.

The digitalization of the global economy since the onset of the Great Recession in 2008 has had, and continues to have, profound implications for markets, global policy, and our everyday lives. Since the onset of the global coronavirus pandemic since ca. January 2020 in the world's advanced economies, which ushered in a second phase of contemporary digitalization, the combination of international government-initiated lockdowns and the suppression of demand has served to accelerate secular trends already underway in many sectors such as retail, culminating in uneven gains and losses occasioned by public policy restrictions on the global economy. The public policy challenges raised by the new digital economy are far reaching, transcend disciplinary fault lines, and occur at the international, national, and sub-national levels of governance simultaneously. Yet the tax implications of digitalization have received relatively little empirical and interdisciplinary scrutiny compared to their relative importance in global economic governance. Given the rapid evolution of international tax governance since 2008, interdisciplinary empirical insight on G20 performance is of utmost importance as global policymakers chart the path forward. The central question driving this paper is as follows: how and why is the digitalization of the global economy impacting the global summit governance of international taxation, and what are the potential lessons for legal enforcement from cognate spheres of international economic law and political economy? Analyzing global tax governance reform under the auspices of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Inclusive Framework in its 1.0 and 2.0 iterations through the perspectives of political science and law, this paper argues that policymakers ought to redouble their efforts to reform global tax dispute resolution by drawing on the comparative experience in Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). With the goal of providing global taxpayers and investors with greater legal certainty and substantive legal standing, the architects global policy ought to institutionalize dispute resolution through international arbitral tribunals to give BEPS more BITe.