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Charles Lindholm
  • Boston, MA, USA
  • 239-579-0698

Charles Lindholm

Based on extensive fieldwork, this ethnographic account of life in Pukhtun village outlines characteristic patterns of exchange, marriage, politics, family life, socialization, as well as exploring notions of honor, hospitality, feud,... more
Based on extensive fieldwork, this ethnographic account of life in  Pukhtun village outlines characteristic patterns of exchange, marriage, politics, family life, socialization, as well as exploring notions of honor, hospitality, feud, warfare,  It argues that there is direct correlation between the cultural elaboration of masculine rivalry and the ideal of generosity, and friendship
The paper is a description of the village in Swat, Pakistan, where the author did his fieldwork in 1977, and a comparison with the present situation, where social ties have been eroded and taliban-like religious parties have gained... more
The paper is a description of the village in Swat, Pakistan, where the author did his fieldwork in 1977, and a comparison with the present situation, where social ties have been eroded and taliban-like religious parties have gained authority, both through moral appeals and through force.  Sources of  this transformation are outlined, including the influx of impoverished migrants from Afghanistan, matched by increased encroachment by the Pakistani.  The complexities of this situation are illustrated in a narrative about the relationship between a suicide bomber and a Pukhtun doctor.
An interview conducted with me by Dr. Sher M. Khan about recent upheavals in the Pukhtun areas of Pakistan
The Pukhtun of Swat Valley assume that persons are essentially independent actors, each separately responsible for his or her own fate and endowed with a God-given potential for free choice and agency. Each separate individual is... more
The Pukhtun of Swat Valley assume that persons are  essentially independent actors, each separately responsible for his or her own fate and endowed with a God-given potential for free choice and agency.  Each separate individual is believed to be motivated by a natural desire for self-aggrandizement and the accumulation of desired goods.  Furthermore, all men (though not women) are regarded as equal before God and the law, and have an absolute right to assert their value as human beings deserving of respect. Given this ideology, a major problem is how authority is legitimized.
    One route to power is to rule by 'natural' force.  Strong men have the right to dominate.  But they can rightfully be displaced by a stronger figure at any time. A second  road to power is by the acquisition of spiritual gifts (baraka) through submission to a teacher. 
    Authority that is secular and deemed  'natural' must be fleeting and weakly legitimized, while power that is potentially permanent is held by ambivalent characters whose very essence is a refutation of Pukhtunness.  We see efforts by the Pukhtun to overcome this quandary through myths of spiritual blessing and by devaluation of the saints as lecherous, mendacious, and avaricious.  Yet the impasse of secular authority remains unresolved, meaning that holy leadership lies just below the surface, ready to redeem the tribesmen from their eternal battles and rescue them from external invasion by a revelation of mystical authority. 
    This model implies that religious figures, whether Sufis or scholars, will continue to call for purification of the faith and the ascendance of the righteous – that is, themselves; in times of stress their efforts may succeed in the short run, but will eventually be met by accusations of hypocrisy from Pukhtuns who find their deepest values threatened by content of saintly claims for secular authority. This paradigm can be profitably be extended to apply to societies in the Middle East and elsewhere which have similar beliefs in egalitarian individualism, and which share a similarly disenchanted view of the secular state. 
    The article concludes by illustrating this pattern  in the rise of Taliban (TNSM) in Swat.
The Pukhtun of Swat in Northern Pakistan refer to Islam to justify their practice of polygamy and female subordination. However, Islamic law is far more egalitarian than Pukhtun practice. Using case studies and statistical evidence, this... more
The Pukhtun of Swat in Northern Pakistan refer to Islam to justify their practice of polygamy and female subordination. However, Islamic law is far more egalitarian than Pukhtun practice. Using case studies and statistical evidence, this article argues that husbands in Swat take second wives mainly in a spirit of revenge, reflecting the endemic hostility between spouses that exists within this strongly patriarchal segmentary lineage organization in which romantic love is ideally reserved for chaste extramarital relationships. An ideology of the primacy of paternal blood underlies the misogynistic attitudes characteristic of Swat, and prevalent elsewhere in the Middle East and the
Circum-Mediterranean region.
Fasting in Islam during Ramadan and at other times is not imagined as atonement for sins, nor as suffering. Rather, as befits the Islamic ethos, the fast is pragmatic, egalitarian, and oriented toward the unity of the community as well... more
Fasting in Islam during Ramadan and at other times is not imagined as atonement for sins, nor as suffering.  Rather, as befits the Islamic ethos, the fast is pragmatic, egalitarian, and oriented toward the unity of the community as well as the salvation of the individual.  The personal restraint and virtue of the faithful during the day is rewarded both by a communal celebration at night, and by redemption in the afterlife.  High and low are leveled through the giving of alms, while sharing in hunger gives the wealthy a sense of the contingency of their plenty and their brotherhood with the impoverished, who, like all other Muslims, share in both the fast and the feast. Muslim identity and the fast are thus deeply intertwined, and can only be disentangled at the price of apostasy.
Dr. Sher M. Khan conducts an interview with me about the present situation in Swat and Pakistan
What are the reasons behind the inferior status of women in Middle Eastern society? Why are they veiled, secluded, mistreated and degraded? For many Western commentators the answer is obvious and singular: Islam. In this paper I will... more
What are the reasons behind the inferior status of women in Middle Eastern society?    Why are they veiled, secluded, mistreated and degraded?  For many Western commentators the answer is obvious and singular: Islam.  In this paper I will demonstrate that this easy answer is mistaken, and that the cultural denigration of women is best understood as the result of what Deniz Kandiyoti has called the "patriarchal bargain."  I will then trace the historical and cultural roots of this invidious bargain, which has been generally understood as an inevitable consequence of the evolution of patrilineality in situations of cultural complexity.  However, the case of the Egyptian Middle Kingdom, which was patrilineal, culturally complex, but yet very friendly to women’s rights, shows that this common understanding is insufficient.  Alongside complexity and patrilineality, a belief in female inferiority requires a fateful linkage between blood and belonging.  This linkage, I suggest, is correlated with an unstable environment and a competitive social formation where power is ephemeral and hard to maintain.
Provides a short overview of sex roles among the Pukhtun of Swat, Northern Pakistan
Dr. Sher M. Khan conducts an interview with me covering various aspects pertaining to Pakistan and Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11.
This paper briefly discusses the history of and prospects for an anthropology of Islam. The essay is focused on the Middle East, the Islamic heartland, and only cites works that I believe are especially groundbreaking or representative... more
This paper briefly discusses the history of and prospects for an anthropology of Islam.  The essay is focused on the Middle East, the Islamic heartland, and only cites works that I believe are especially groundbreaking or representative of a type.  My intent is simply to inform the reader about the trajectory, contradictions, and vicissitudes of a particular scholarly tradition.
What is the connection between civil society, Islamic law, and the state? To provide some provisional answers to these questions, I supply a capsule historical background of the complex relations between these three elements, which are... more
What is the connection between civil society, Islamic law, and the state? To provide some provisional answers to these questions, I supply a capsule historical background of the complex relations between these three elements, which are analytically separable but empirically entangled, and will conclude with a short case study of their intersection in a political uprising in Northern Pakistan.
in the Middle East adoption from outside the immediate patriline is extremely unusual. In Islamic law, such children, if they are taken in, have no automatic rights of inheritance, in contrast to the children of slave women, who have a... more
in the Middle East adoption from outside the immediate patriline is extremely unusual.  In Islamic law, such children, if they are taken in, have no automatic rights of inheritance, in contrast to the children of slave women, who have a full legal share in the patrimony.  This paper argues that the antipathy toward adopted children is a consequence of the powerful patrilineal blood ideology of Middle Eastern peoples, which was challenged but never superseded by the communal message of Islam.  This ideology insists that those descended from a common forefather have a shared substance, an equivalence made explicit in feuds, wherein the blood of any member can serve as payment for injuries done by any other.  The ideology of shared paternal blood also has great impact in terms of personal and familial relationships. When purity of paternal blood is a central cultural value, then veiling, female seclusion, and enforced chastity follow.  The data lead to the hypothesis of a causal correlation between status instability, a cultural ethic of competitive egalitarianism, a cultural idiom of natural difference located in blood inheritance, rejection of adoption, and the evolution of patrilineality and patriarchy.
Using historical data, I argue that tensions implicit in the Muhammad's charismatic enunciation of an emissary religion of unparalleled purity inevitably led to the rise of charismatic saints who could serve as embodied moral exemplars... more
Using historical data, I argue that tensions implicit in the Muhammad's charismatic enunciation of an emissary religion of unparalleled purity inevitably led to the rise of charismatic saints who could serve as embodied moral exemplars for ordinary people.  In the Middle East, these figures had their heyday as alternative power sources in periods of cultural and political disruption, but were gradually pressed to make greater and greater claims for their own powers and more extreme demands on the devotion and self-sacrifice of their disciples.  This tendency was in contradiction to the general cultural ethos of equality and autonomy, and eventually led to the delegitimization of the Sufi movement. 
However, this same trajectory did not occur in South Asia, where Sufism has maintained its hold on the public.  This is partly because Sufi saints retained more autonomy and wealth in South Asia, which allowed them to offer disciples concrete rewards and also to present themselves plausibly as moral alternatives to corrupt politicians.  Furthermore, the oppositional character of South Asian Islam inevitably heightened the anxiety of the faithful, and pressed them to seek personalized charismatic leaders.  Finally, the  hierarchical and devotional traditions of South Asian culture favor saint worship, despite the egalitarian messages of orthodox Islam.  Hence, while Sufism has almost died in the Middle East, it has retained and even improved its position in South Asia.
I argue that the prevalence of despotism in the premodern Middle East was not, as is often asserted, a consequence of the lack of a notion of legitimate government, or the absence of an independent civil society. I will contend that, to... more
I argue that the prevalence of despotism in the premodern Middle East was not, as is often asserted, a consequence of the lack of a notion of legitimate government, or the absence of an independent civil society.  I will contend that, to the contrary, tyranny coincided with, and was partly a consequence of, an elaborated ideal of the state and a proliferation of independent non-governmental groups characterized by the same sorts of values that are usually considered diagnostic of modern democratic citizenry: individual autonomy, social mobility, equality, competitiveness. 
Although I generally accept Ernest Gellner's Khaldunian model of the oscillation between center and periphery in Middle Eastern culture, here I focus more on the central importance of the historical advent of Mohammad and on the values urbanites, particularly tradesmen, share with their rural cousins.  And, where Gellner employs Hume to extend Khaldun's analysis, I make use of Tocqueville.
Far from being a refuge from the rest of society, Pukhtun marriage is rather a reflection of it, since Pukhtun life, whether public or private, is primarily concerned with politics in the very broadest sense—that is, in the pursuit of... more
Far from being a refuge from the rest of society,  Pukhtun marriage is rather a reflection of it, since Pukhtun life, whether public or private, is primarily concerned with politics in the very broadest sense—that is, in the pursuit of power.  This paper explores the socializing effects of this social formation where, verbal and physical violence is so much a part of domestic life that it loses much of its emotional impact and becomes more of a divertisement than a subject for serious concern.  Differential treatment of boys and girls prepares them for their different roles in life, but within these limits both sexes develop the identical character traits necessary for survival.  All children learn to be tough and fearless, to accept violence as normal, and to be essentially aggressive and self-seeking in their dealings with others.  There is a pervasive logic to this harsh form of child raising, as it prepares the child for his or her adult life.
Moral and theoretical challenges to traditional modes of study and to the notion of culture itself have led to a deep crisis in Middle Eastern ethnography. The six books under review are taken to be exemplary of recent responses to this... more
Moral and theoretical challenges to traditional modes of study and to the notion of culture itself have led to a deep crisis in Middle Eastern ethnography. The six books under review are taken to be exemplary of recent responses to this crisis.  Recourse to personal narrative and biography humanizes the Middle Eastern Other, but at the expense of any possibility of theory building or comparative work.  More promising avenues of approach aim at reconceptualizing the manner in which power relations are instated, maintained and challenged in a cultural milieu that is ideologically committed to egalitarian individualism.
The classic Western image of the traditional Middle East as the home of unfreedom is apt in one sense, insofar as it refers to the state, but quite wrong when it refers to local political action. This misunderstanding is due to a... more
The classic Western image of the traditional Middle East as the home of unfreedom is apt in one sense, insofar as it refers to the state, but quite wrong when it refers to local political action.  This misunderstanding is due to a blurring of the logically distinct notions of the state and the public realm, a blurring which may fit the general case in the West, but is not applicable in the context of the Middle East, where the public life of local level political participation only occurred outside the confines of the state.
The characteristic dichotomy between state and civic life in Islam was related in the first instance to an historical process: the loss of faith in the legitimacy of the state after the charismatic reign of the Prophet and the 'rightly guided' Caliphs.  After this millennial moment, central authority in the Middle East did indeed become despotic and the possibility of public participation in the kingdom was deeply eroded, as pious Muslims withdrew from service to a state that had been desacralized and rationalized, accepting rule by any ostensible Muslim as preferable to social anarchy (fitna).
The despotism of the government had a structural base, as the state struggled to hold off the encroachments of armed, independent,ideologically egalitarian and dangerously quarrelsome peripheral tribes, and also to fend off resistance from within by similarly structured urban guilds, brotherhoods and neighborhoods. And, most importantly, the ruler needed to subordinate his own close kinsmen and allies, who saw him simply as one of themselves, without any special powers whatsoever. 
It was at the fractious level of personal rivalries and alliances - Ibn Khaldun's asibiya - that the public realm of participation and citizenship, as we understand it in the West, was to be found. But due to the historical delegitimizing of government itself and the consequent lack of any ideal of community beyond asibiya these local public worlds were conceived as an arena not for service to a wider ideal, but rather for individual displays of power and the maximization of pride; in this sense, state and local politics are equivalent in their pragmatism and desacralized quality.
In this situation, traditions of democracy, equality, and participation in the rivalries of the local polity trained men to value their freedom from domination, but did not necessarily lead to any wider sense of citizenship beyond the basic community of mutual defense and group loyalty.  Rather, individual free agents acting within the mythical charter of equality and independence, and lacking the notion of public service and moral government, hoped to become a tyrants themselves, and felt no great moral horror at another man's enactment of the cultural ideal.
This paper is essentially built upon the Weberian hypotheses that belief systems motivate actors, and that there is an elective affinity between moral codes and certain social roles. I begin by outlining the taken-for-granted norms,... more
This paper is essentially built upon the Weberian hypotheses that belief systems motivate actors, and that there is an elective affinity between moral codes and certain social roles.  I begin by outlining the taken-for-granted norms, habits and values - Bourdieu's 'habitus', Geertz's 'system of meaning', or what old-fashioned anthropologists simply called 'ethos' - that provide a pattern for the moral life among the people of Swat District in Northern Pakistan. I then use this model, and its underlying ambiguities, to help explicate some real-life problems over the representation and implementation of authority, making comparisons with tribal Morocco, which has a similar value structure and social system and thus similar quandaries in the conceptualization and enactment of hierarchy  .  The emphasis is thus not on specifics and exceptions, nor on historical contingencies, but on discovering the logic and contradictions of the fundamental processes at work beneath variation.
After outlining and critiquing the various competing models for conceptualizing the presence (or absence) of caste among Muslims in South Asia, this paper suggests that a better approach is to focus on relationships first, especially... more
After outlining and critiquing the various competing models for conceptualizing the presence (or absence) of caste among Muslims in South Asia, this paper suggests that a better approach is to focus on relationships first, especially relationships of antagonism and contradiction, and finds order and belief growing from these oppositional relations.  This mode of analysis assumes that cultures and values are chosen and defined in relation to what is ignored, denied or negated. What people believe and what people do grows from experience and antagonism both within and without the community.  With this perspective in mind, the importance of the study of subcultures, is crucial, both for the definition of the larger culture and the smaller.  The most salient questions to ask are not only how and why Indian Muslims have been assimilated, but also how and why they have resisted assimilation; not only how religion  is discussed and interpreted, but by whom, and for what purpose.
Comparing the Middle East and Inner Asia, I argue that conceptions of kinship have important ramifications for the ways in which the peoples of these two areas conceive of political authority and accept political domination. The larger... more
Comparing the Middle East and Inner Asia, I argue that conceptions of kinship have important ramifications for the ways in which the peoples of these two areas conceive of political authority and accept political domination.  The larger claim is that, along with more conventional elements of trade, warfare, ecological constraint, and the proximity of complex state systems, factors of belief also limit and structure potentials for action in these frontier societies.

The basic argument is that the primordial Middle Eastern segmentary kinship system did not manufacture distinctions of rank, the ancient Central Asian system of generalized does.  As a consequence, steppe peoples were more willing to recognize the superiority of senior lineages, while Middle Easterners maintain belief in the essential equality of all and do not accept  inequality based on birth.
Following the four-stage model offered by Brett (1980), of learned (Mufti), warrior (Murabit), arbitrator (Marabout), and inspirational leader (Mahdi), this paper compares and contrasts the political evolution of the kingdoms of Swat and... more
Following the four-stage model offered by Brett (1980), of learned (Mufti), warrior (Murabit), arbitrator (Marabout), and inspirational leader (Mahdi), this paper compares and contrasts the political evolution of the kingdoms of Swat and Dir on Pakistan's northwestern frontier.  Mutations and transformation of these roles are placed within the context of British colonial authority and  the encroachment of the Pakistani state,
This paper is structural/symbolic analysis of narratives surrounding two contrasting figures in Swati society- the leatherworker and the barber. Both serve as mediating figures, and play mutually oppositional roles that reflect local... more
This paper is structural/symbolic analysis of narratives surrounding two contrasting figures in Swati society- the leatherworker and the barber.  Both serve as mediating figures, and play mutually oppositional roles that reflect local anxieties about sexuality and female power.
Violence in Swat is highly structured along several lines; the stress on revenge, the utilization of types of mediating bodies and leaders, and the scale of genealogical distance and corresponding physical propinquity of the rival... more
Violence in Swat is highly structured along several lines; the stress on revenge, the utilization of types of mediating bodies and leaders, and the scale of genealogical distance and corresponding physical propinquity of the rival elements.  Far from every genealogical level being a replica of every other, each more inclusive patrilineal segment has its own specific rules of violence for hostilities with segments of equal scale.  Moreover, relations involving  revenge take precedence over other forms of violence and opposition, so that a death in a village party dispute dissolves the parties and leads to a personal vendetta between two nuclear families.  In intervillage wars, as well, murders by tarbur are avenged, while those by more distant enemies are not.  The formal patterning of revenge thus acts to restrict the range of feud and violence.
Stimulated by Michael Meeker's critical article about injustice and violence in Swat, I wrote a rebuttal, arguing that Meeker had misunderstood the rewards offered by the Swati ideology of honor, and a social structure based on mutual... more
Stimulated by Michael Meeker's critical article about injustice and violence in Swat, I wrote a rebuttal, arguing that Meeker had misunderstood the rewards offered by the Swati ideology of honor, and a social structure based on mutual dependency between patrons and clients.  In particular, Meeker misjudged the mobility  - both spatial and political - of the client population
Can colonial accounts tell us anything useful about the people the colonialists ruled? Or are they useful primarily as indicators of shifting attitudes and politics among the colonialists themselves? While the latter is certainly the... more
Can colonial accounts tell us anything useful about the people the colonialists ruled?  Or are they useful primarily as indicators of shifting attitudes and politics among the colonialists themselves?  While the latter is certainly the case, this paper argues that colonial ethnography need not be discarded, or seen only as a commentary on itself.  When informed by an adequate notion of social structure, and by an historical consideration of the position of the colonial ethnographer, the work of these early writers can offer indispensable information for anthropologists.  This argument is illustrated by an exploration of colonial accounts of the Pukhtun/Pashtun of Northern Pakistan.
The subject of this paper is the persistence and patterned transformation of primordial political structures through history.  The case is based on material gathered in Swat, Northern Pakistan
Pakistan's border tribes associate together in what anthropologists call a "segmentary lineage system." Such a system has within it characteristic patterns of interaction of leadership strategies and of relationships of group hostility... more
Pakistan's border tribes associate together in what anthropologists call a "segmentary lineage system."  Such a system has within it characteristic patterns of interaction of leadership strategies and of relationships of group hostility and cooperation.  Typically, mutual suspicion is high, with patron-client groups regarding each other jealously and insisting on being dealt with as equals.  In general a leader must balance these contending groups and cannot provide lasting shape and direction for all the groups' activities. 
    In this paper, the segmentary lineage system is first presented as an abstract model and then a few observations are made concerning this model's applicability and relevance to specific Pakistani political forms.  Special attention is paid to the influence of modes of production and to the development of hierarchical authority.
    Case studies of the Pukhtun of Pakistan's frontier and the Mughal state reveal the shaping power and the variation of segmentary systems.  The model also has applicability to the Pakistani state, as illustrated in the political trajectories of Ayub Khan and Zulfiqar Bhutto. Despite the appearances of despotism, both of these leaders succeeded only when they fulfilled mediatory roles, balancing various powerful factions.  The tenacity of the system is challenged only by the emancipatory promise of the vote.
A shared ethic of 'niceness,' distaste for elitism, a stance of friendliness, a generally high sense of generalized trust and moral minimalism, an ability to withdraw from conflict, all coincide to produce a relatively stable and peaceful... more
A shared ethic of 'niceness,' distaste for elitism, a stance of friendliness, a generally high sense of generalized trust and moral minimalism, an ability to withdraw from conflict, all coincide to produce a relatively stable and peaceful community.  At the same time, Americans agree that society is a moral corporation knitted together by voluntary agreements between independent and co-equal agents each bearing personal responsibility for their acts. The individual in this cultural framework is not empty, but is an actor pursuing his or her own ends, whether spiritual or monetary (or both).  The community is required to serve those ends, but it is not believed to pre-exist them, and it can be deconstructed when it no longer fulfills its purpose. The sense that community has no existence beyond the choices of the individuals who make it up is the main source of American anxiety about the stability of their society.  But since most Americans also believe most other Americans are basically the same as they are, fear of disintegration is balanced by faith in the good nature of one's fellow citizens.
The United States has long demonstrated a strong homogenizing value system capable of drawing its citizens away from any divisive ethnic, class, regional, racial, or religious identities. Alternative visions have been marginalized in... more
The United States has long demonstrated a strong homogenizing value system capable of drawing its citizens away from any divisive ethnic, class, regional, racial, or religious identities.  Alternative visions have been marginalized in favor of a standard notion of America as "the land of opportunity" where old settlers and new migrants, rich and poor, Protestant and Catholic, black and white, Hispanics and Anglos, can participate as equals in pursuit of the shared American dream of being "all they can be." Within this shared frame of reference, Americans imagine their social universe to be, in its ideal form, based on the voluntary co-operation of autonomous co-equals.    Americans have great faith in their taken-for-granted ideals, and, like other true believers, firmly believe that everyone else would share their faith, if only they had the opportunity. That this might not be the case is felt by many Americans to be akin to blasphemy.
In his 'depression trilogy' the director Frank Capra portrayed the struggle of the honest 'little guy' against the unscrupulous rich and powerful. In what was supposed to be the culmination of the trilogy, Meet John Doe, the internal... more
In his 'depression trilogy' the director Frank Capra portrayed the struggle of the honest 'little guy' against the unscrupulous rich and powerful.  In what was supposed to be the culmination of the trilogy, Meet John Doe, the internal problems of the plot led to a famously unsatisfactory conclusion. In this paper, John Hall and I show how and why this film failed, and how that failure reflects larger contradictions in American political thought, i.e.,  the difficulty of reconciling heroic individualism with the practice of collective action.
This paper refutes a standard claim that America is falling apart. On the one hand, the institutional structure of the United States has the capacity to diffuse potentially divisive conflicts between classes, religious sects and ethnic... more
This paper refutes a standard claim that America is falling apart. On the one hand, the institutional structure of the United States has the capacity to diffuse potentially divisive conflicts between classes, religious sects and ethnic communities throughout society--rather than concentrating them against the state. On the other hand, as long as the economy is healthy, putative new identities and groups do not offer any real challenge to the basic premises of American culture, nor is the highly flexible social fabric of America likely to be torn asunder by their demands.  Whether black or white, gay or straight, female or male, the vast majority of Americans continue to believe in the possibilities of economic success and to act as if the world was made up of nice nonjudgmental individuals who build familial communities through mutual and voluntary cooperation.  Despite the inevitable, and wrenching, tensions and paradoxes implicit in this idealized belief system, it shows no signs of losing its hold.
This paper views romantic love through a comparative cultural historical lens, and argues that the ideal and experience of romantic love is neither universal nor uniquely Western. Rather it is best understood as an embodied form of the... more
This paper views romantic love through a comparative cultural historical lens, and argues that the ideal and experience of romantic love is neither universal nor uniquely Western. Rather it is best understood as an embodied form of the sacred, which appears in various forms under certain specific social conditions. It can blossom or fade, but the impulse behind is not likely to vanish.  The paper presents a short history of romantic love in Western thought and then presents a structural analysis of romance in several cultures and epochs
How culturally and historically specific is the experience of romantic love. Western expectations and beliefs about romantic love clearly develop out of our unique historical trajectory and cultural background. But this obvious truth... more
How culturally and historically specific is the experience of romantic love.  Western expectations and beliefs about romantic love clearly develop out of our unique historical trajectory and cultural background. But this obvious truth should not blind us to deeper correspondences between our emotional lives and the emotional lives of people in cultures different from our own, who, like lovers in our society, report an intense idealization of a loved person, feelings of exaltation in their presence, and suicidal despair when they are absent. The cross-cultural and historical instances presented in this article shows that romantic love is not necessarily the prerogative of a leisured class or a complex society; it is not solely heterosexual, nor does it always lead to marriage; it is not intrinsically linked to capitalism, small families, sexual oppression, a cult of motherhood, or a quest for identity, and is not simply a disguise for lust or evidence of the unseen hand of evolution at work.  The extraordinary phenomenon of romantic attraction ought to be understood as a peculiarly human response to characteristic social contradictions and tensions that people seek to escape through the love of another individual.
The repudiation of intense and idealized personal romantic relationships in favor of pragmatic ties of mutual sexual satisfaction may have unforeseen consequences. A lack of commitment in love, within the modern context in which... more
The repudiation of intense and idealized personal romantic relationships in favor of pragmatic ties of mutual sexual satisfaction may have unforeseen consequences.  A lack of commitment in love, within the modern context in which alternative forms of idealized attachment are weak or absent, may lead not to self-actualization (whatever that amorphous term may mean), but to a pervasive feeling of isolation, depression and insignificance.  This state of mind in turn is conducive to the loss of the self in the anonymity of the group; a loss which may be rationalized by any number of intellectual superstructures, but which really gains its appeal because it offers the sensation of transcendence that is absent in the world at large, and no longer to be found in romantic idealization.
Using comparative material from 248 cases culled from the Human Relations Area File, three types of social configuration are shown to be conducive to different patterns of romantic idealization. The present Western notion that romantic... more
Using comparative material from 248 cases culled from the Human Relations Area File, three types of social configuration are shown to be conducive to different patterns of romantic idealization.  The present Western notion that romantic love leads to marriage is found mainly in simple dispersed hunting and gathering societies under conditions of considerable ecological stress.  Like the modern West, these small scale societies also feature extremely fluid social relations marked by mobility and competition, operating according to individualistic worldviews within harsh or otherwise insecure environments may find meaning and emotional warmth in the mutuality of romantic relationships. Romance in these societies is associated with marriage, since the couple is idealized as the ultimate refuge against the hostile world, and functions as the necessary nucleus of the atomized social organization.

I conclude that romantic attraction is an attempt to escape from certain types of social contradictions and structural tensions through the transcendental love of another person.  As such, it is experientially akin to the experience of religious ecstasy.
This book provides a thorough synthesis of classic theories on charisma and group psychology. The usefulness of this theoretical synthesis is then tested against detailed case studies of the cults surrounding Jim Jones and Charles... more
This book provides a thorough synthesis of classic theories on charisma and group psychology.  The usefulness of this theoretical synthesis  is then tested against detailed case studies of the cults surrounding Jim Jones and Charles Manson, as well the cult of Hitler.  Shamanic religion is also considered.  The conclusion is that charisma is a quintessentially human experience which has no substantive content beyond providing an immediate  a visceral and ecstatic moment that is outside of and opposed to the alienation and isolation of the mundane world - a memory upon which ordinary life can be constructed.  The paradigm established by Weber and Durkheim, and restated by psychological theory, claims, in fact, that society is based upon a deeply evocative communion of self and other, a communion that offers not reason, but lived vitality.  Without this electrifying blurring of boundaries, life no longer has its savor, action is no longer potent, the world becomes colorless and drab. 
The question then is not whether such moments of selflessness and communion will continue to exist.  They are a part of our existential condition.  The question is what form these moments will take.
This introduction to a volume on the anthropology of religious charisma provides some personal history of my interest in the topic as well as a survey of the major theories of charisma, starting with Rousseau and encompassing Goethe,... more
This introduction to a volume on the anthropology of religious charisma provides some personal history of my interest in the topic as well as a survey of the major theories of charisma, starting with Rousseau and encompassing Goethe, Mill, Nietzsche, Sohm, Freud and Durkheim and, most importantly, Weber.  More recent contributors include the Weberians Geertz and Shils, and, from a different direction, Asad.
   
      I argue that Shils and Geertz utilized the meaning-centered Weberian paradigm to explore the cultural specificity of institutionalized charisma, but at the cost of ignoring the emotional force that is the heart of primary charisma.  Although starting from a different direction—that of tradition---Asad’s embodied model had the same failing.  These one-sided theories that stressed either meaning or routine offered little to advance the anthropological understanding of the raw emotional power or the trajectory of charismatic relationships.  In consequence, the study of charismatic movements remained to a great extent outside the range of ethnography.  Reasons for this absence are explored, and new approaches - as exemplified in the edited volume - are outlined.
This essay contrasts Kharijite and early Alid efforts at recreating the original community of the faithful united under the authority of a charismatic leader. It is argued that, despite operating from completely opposed first premises... more
This essay contrasts Kharijite and early Alid efforts at recreating the original community of the faithful united under the authority of a charismatic leader.  It is argued that, despite operating from completely opposed first premises (popular acclamation in the Kharijite case and selection by ascription in the case of the Alids), both routes end in factionalism and zealotry.
Charismatic shamans who enter into ecstatic trance and commune with spirits attain their power because of their emergent public capacity to enter the ecstatic dissolution of trance, commune with spirits, and thereby express and conquer... more
Charismatic shamans who enter into ecstatic trance and commune with spirits attain their power because of their emergent public capacity to enter the ecstatic dissolution of trance, commune with spirits, and thereby express and conquer the most fearsome human reality: the disintegration of the self in insanity and death.  Where society is small, closely knit, personalistic, and egalitarian, these shamanic figures are revered as healers and spiritual leaders.  But even under these circumstances, they are also always viewed with a degree of fear, since those who can cure can also kill.
The balance shifts from positive to negative when charismatic figures and movements occur within highly rationalized social configurations that are structurally hostile to immersion in immediate communal transcendent experience. It is not charisma itself, but the cultural, institutional, and ideological context in which it occurs, that determines the way it will be experienced, expressed, and evaluated.  In more complex societies, the shaman is a demon to those in the mainstream, but beloved by the alienated disciples who wish to obliterate the old order.  It is no surprise that today, in our complex society, the popular notion of charisma, as introduced by Weber, is used to explain the allure of monsters.
This paper outlines the basics of a theory of charisma drawn from a synthesis of the classic texts of Weber, Marx and Freud. This abstract theoretical perspective is then applied to an analysis of the charismatic religious cult led by... more
This paper outlines the basics of a theory of charisma drawn from a synthesis of the classic texts of Weber, Marx and Freud.  This abstract theoretical perspective is then applied to an analysis of the charismatic religious cult led by Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh.  Emphasis is placed on the methods used to inculcate loyalty in followers and on the personal history and psychic capacities of the leader.
in this essay I have argued that 'meaning-centered' interpretive analysis assumes as its basic premise the rationality of maximizing individual actors. This perspective is not adequate for understanding forms of social action that are... more
in this essay I have argued that 'meaning-centered' interpretive analysis assumes as its basic premise the rationality of maximizing individual actors.  This perspective is not adequate for understanding forms of social action that are outside the realm of rationality .
In this paper I have sketched some alternative views on irrationality, using the works of Weber, Durkheim, Le Bon and Tarde to argue that processes of charismatic involvement, collective effervescence, and crowd psychology may help us grasp the basic pattern of apparently irrational action and to place it a framework of theoretical knowledge.  I've applied this framework to the actual trajectories of two new religions (est and  Scientology) showing how their evolution and their mode of recruitment fit within it.
The final question is whether this mode of approach is  applicable only for understanding cultic groups at the periphery of social life, or whether it might have some relevance for more mainstream medical practitioners and psychiatrists.  I contend the latter is the case.  For example, if we believe, with Durkheim, that human society is built upon an emotional experience of selflessness within the transcendent group, what then happens when the increasing dominance of the competitive economy and the worship of the individual make such experiences less and less likely to occur, or even to be imagined?  One result might be the escalating excesses of charismatic groups.  But the more prevalent result may be the appalling number of complaints about depression, deadness and detachment among psychiatric patients in the US, coupled with fevered efforts to stimulate some sense of vitality through various forms of addiction and thrill seeking. These may be the prices paid for the absence of any felt sense of connection to the social world.
This paper begins with the premise that there are two modes of authenticity. The first is based on genealogy or history (origin); the second is based on identity and immediacy (expressive content). For persons, the latter is... more
This paper begins with the premise that there are two modes of authenticity.  The first is based on genealogy or history (origin); the second is based on identity and immediacy (expressive content).  For persons, the latter is conceptualized as ‘being oneself.’  Expressive authenticity arose in the 18th and 19th century as a reaction to the collapse of traditional forms of social life and the comingled rise of capitalism, Protestantism, empiricism, nationalism and possessive individualism. 

The evolution of expressive authenticity is traced through two related dimensions: the first is literary.  The early satirical treatment of authenticity in Moliere’s Misanthrope is compared to the later sympathetic and corrosive portraits of authenticity in Diderot’s Rameau’s Nephew and Goethe’s Young Werther.  The central figure is Rousseau, whose Confessions serves as the template for later high evaluations of expressivity evinced by European philosophers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre.  In the United States, a parallel movement was championed by Emerson and understood by William James as a new therapeutic religion of the “once born”.

In the 1960s the quest for personal expressive authenticity became a primary route to political and personal growth, leading to a backlash by conservative critics, and then to the moral resuscitation of the concept by the Canadian theorist Charles Taylor.

I conclude by noting that theories of authenticity have thus far tended to focus on the expressive individual, ignoring historical and collective forms of this powerful modern quest for the sacred.
As a social movement that relies on an ethic of pleasure as the source of commitment, Slow Food is, in many senses, a realisation of what Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) termed the dominant morality of modernity: emotivism – that is, the... more
As a social movement that relies on an ethic of pleasure as the source of commitment, Slow Food is, in many senses, a realisation of what Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) termed the dominant morality of modernity: emotivism – that is, the utilitarian assumption that only personal preferences can determine virtue. As he argues, this value orientation eliminates the possibility of developing a substantive morality, while also fostering conformity (since preference is rarely unambiguous, and so leads to anxious perusal of the preferences of others for reassurance). To its credit, Slow Food has attempted to offset these possibilities by proclaiming that authenticity and tradition provide objective sources of virtuous enjoyment. Believers then must search the world for gustatory pleasures that are proven to be authentic. But who decides the reliability of such proofs is left in the air. This move escapes the trap of solipsism but falls into another: reification.

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