Trust is fundamental to our social lives. Our most important relationships involve rich and deep ... more Trust is fundamental to our social lives. Our most important relationships involve rich and deep trust, and without trust, our relationships lose all meaning. Trust also seems to be a moral relation; trust obligations are included within the subset of obligations that we would properly characterise as moral, in some sense. More specifically, trust relations seem to be morally normative; they give us moral reasons for action. We have moral reasons not to betray the trust of a devoted friend or lover; when we do betray them, we are committing a (quite severe) moral transgression. This paper gives an explanation of the unique moral normative profile of trusting. It does so, specifically, in terms of the moral demands derivative of specific social relationships. That is, I claim that trust is constitutive of interpersonal relationships, and the moral demands of trust are themselves constitutive of the demands of these relationships. In this way, it moves away from reliance accounts of moral normativity, and towards an account that properly grounds the moral reasons of trust as interpersonal social reasons. Trusting is a social phenomenon; and its normativity is grounded quite clearly in the moral importance of social relations.
Why must we keep our promises? Promising is one of our most familiar practices, and yet, this que... more Why must we keep our promises? Promising is one of our most familiar practices, and yet, this question still remains to be philosophically perplexing. The problem is that promising just seems to be so mysterious; we utter some words, or shake hands, and therein we undertake an entirely new set of normative obligations.
The task of this essay is to explain exactly how these promissory obligations come to exist. A classic starting-point for such an explanation has been some form of promissory instrumentalism. That is, philosophers (following Hume) have attempted to explain promissory obligation in terms of the instrumental utility of such a practice. Promissory obligations, according to such an account, exist just because it is instrumentally useful to us that they exist.
Promissory instrumentalism, however, has been subjected to serious criticism. David Owens (2011) has purported to show that instrumentalism about promising just fails to reflect our intuitions on specific cases. Obligations, according to Owens, can exist even without instrumental practices. More recently, Stephen Darwall (2011) and Margaret Gilbert (2011) have argued that promising consists in bipolar obligations, and that instrumentalism cannot account for this particular feature. The result of these criticisms is that promissory instrumentalism does not seem to provide a viable answer to our original question.
The task of this essay, then, is twofold: first, to outline exactly why instrumentalism provides such an appealing explanation of promissory obligation; and, second, to give a satisfactory answer to the problems outlined above. In brief, this essay aims to provide a new defence for an old explanation of promissory obligation.
With respect to the first task, I argue that instrumentalism best fits the normative profile of promissory obligation for two reasons: (i) promising shares many prima facie similarities with other instrumentalist institutions; and (ii) instrumentalism offers the most plausible explanation of the normative powers involved in promising.
With respect to the second task, I show how Owens' objection can be avoided by formulating promissory instrumentalism in terms of Rawlsian Fair-Play instrumentalism. I then consider the problem posed by Darwall and Gilbert, which the Rawlsian account does not obviously answer. I show, however, that the problem can be explained away according to the practice-internal rules of the Rawlsian account.
My final formulation of the Rawlsian Fair-Play instrumentalism, therefore, satisfies both of the above tasks; it possesses the normative strength of promissory instrumentalism, and offers new responses to serious objections.
Trust is fundamental to our social lives. Our most important relationships involve rich and deep ... more Trust is fundamental to our social lives. Our most important relationships involve rich and deep trust, and without trust, our relationships lose all meaning. Trust also seems to be a moral relation; trust obligations are included within the subset of obligations that we would properly characterise as moral, in some sense. More specifically, trust relations seem to be morally normative; they give us moral reasons for action. We have moral reasons not to betray the trust of a devoted friend or lover; when we do betray them, we are committing a (quite severe) moral transgression. This paper gives an explanation of the unique moral normative profile of trusting. It does so, specifically, in terms of the moral demands derivative of specific social relationships. That is, I claim that trust is constitutive of interpersonal relationships, and the moral demands of trust are themselves constitutive of the demands of these relationships. In this way, it moves away from reliance accounts of moral normativity, and towards an account that properly grounds the moral reasons of trust as interpersonal social reasons. Trusting is a social phenomenon; and its normativity is grounded quite clearly in the moral importance of social relations.
Why must we keep our promises? Promising is one of our most familiar practices, and yet, this que... more Why must we keep our promises? Promising is one of our most familiar practices, and yet, this question still remains to be philosophically perplexing. The problem is that promising just seems to be so mysterious; we utter some words, or shake hands, and therein we undertake an entirely new set of normative obligations.
The task of this essay is to explain exactly how these promissory obligations come to exist. A classic starting-point for such an explanation has been some form of promissory instrumentalism. That is, philosophers (following Hume) have attempted to explain promissory obligation in terms of the instrumental utility of such a practice. Promissory obligations, according to such an account, exist just because it is instrumentally useful to us that they exist.
Promissory instrumentalism, however, has been subjected to serious criticism. David Owens (2011) has purported to show that instrumentalism about promising just fails to reflect our intuitions on specific cases. Obligations, according to Owens, can exist even without instrumental practices. More recently, Stephen Darwall (2011) and Margaret Gilbert (2011) have argued that promising consists in bipolar obligations, and that instrumentalism cannot account for this particular feature. The result of these criticisms is that promissory instrumentalism does not seem to provide a viable answer to our original question.
The task of this essay, then, is twofold: first, to outline exactly why instrumentalism provides such an appealing explanation of promissory obligation; and, second, to give a satisfactory answer to the problems outlined above. In brief, this essay aims to provide a new defence for an old explanation of promissory obligation.
With respect to the first task, I argue that instrumentalism best fits the normative profile of promissory obligation for two reasons: (i) promising shares many prima facie similarities with other instrumentalist institutions; and (ii) instrumentalism offers the most plausible explanation of the normative powers involved in promising.
With respect to the second task, I show how Owens' objection can be avoided by formulating promissory instrumentalism in terms of Rawlsian Fair-Play instrumentalism. I then consider the problem posed by Darwall and Gilbert, which the Rawlsian account does not obviously answer. I show, however, that the problem can be explained away according to the practice-internal rules of the Rawlsian account.
My final formulation of the Rawlsian Fair-Play instrumentalism, therefore, satisfies both of the above tasks; it possesses the normative strength of promissory instrumentalism, and offers new responses to serious objections.
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The task of this essay is to explain exactly how these promissory obligations come to exist. A classic starting-point for such an explanation has been some form of promissory instrumentalism. That is, philosophers (following Hume) have attempted to explain promissory obligation in terms of the instrumental utility of such a practice. Promissory obligations, according to such an account, exist just because it is instrumentally useful to us that they exist.
Promissory instrumentalism, however, has been subjected to serious criticism. David Owens (2011) has purported to show that instrumentalism about promising just fails to reflect our intuitions on specific cases. Obligations, according to Owens, can exist even without instrumental practices. More recently, Stephen Darwall (2011) and Margaret Gilbert (2011) have argued that promising consists in bipolar obligations, and that instrumentalism cannot account for this particular feature. The result of these criticisms is that promissory instrumentalism does not seem to provide a viable answer to our original question.
The task of this essay, then, is twofold: first, to outline exactly why instrumentalism provides such an appealing explanation of promissory obligation; and, second, to give a satisfactory answer to the problems outlined above. In brief, this essay aims to provide a new defence for an old explanation of promissory obligation.
With respect to the first task, I argue that instrumentalism best fits the normative profile of promissory obligation for two reasons: (i) promising shares many prima facie similarities with other instrumentalist institutions; and (ii) instrumentalism offers the most plausible explanation of the normative powers involved in promising.
With respect to the second task, I show how Owens' objection can be avoided by formulating promissory instrumentalism in terms of Rawlsian Fair-Play instrumentalism. I then consider the problem posed by Darwall and Gilbert, which the Rawlsian account does not obviously answer. I show, however, that the problem can be explained away according to the practice-internal rules of the Rawlsian account.
My final formulation of the Rawlsian Fair-Play instrumentalism, therefore, satisfies both of the above tasks; it possesses the normative strength of promissory instrumentalism, and offers new responses to serious objections.
The task of this essay is to explain exactly how these promissory obligations come to exist. A classic starting-point for such an explanation has been some form of promissory instrumentalism. That is, philosophers (following Hume) have attempted to explain promissory obligation in terms of the instrumental utility of such a practice. Promissory obligations, according to such an account, exist just because it is instrumentally useful to us that they exist.
Promissory instrumentalism, however, has been subjected to serious criticism. David Owens (2011) has purported to show that instrumentalism about promising just fails to reflect our intuitions on specific cases. Obligations, according to Owens, can exist even without instrumental practices. More recently, Stephen Darwall (2011) and Margaret Gilbert (2011) have argued that promising consists in bipolar obligations, and that instrumentalism cannot account for this particular feature. The result of these criticisms is that promissory instrumentalism does not seem to provide a viable answer to our original question.
The task of this essay, then, is twofold: first, to outline exactly why instrumentalism provides such an appealing explanation of promissory obligation; and, second, to give a satisfactory answer to the problems outlined above. In brief, this essay aims to provide a new defence for an old explanation of promissory obligation.
With respect to the first task, I argue that instrumentalism best fits the normative profile of promissory obligation for two reasons: (i) promising shares many prima facie similarities with other instrumentalist institutions; and (ii) instrumentalism offers the most plausible explanation of the normative powers involved in promising.
With respect to the second task, I show how Owens' objection can be avoided by formulating promissory instrumentalism in terms of Rawlsian Fair-Play instrumentalism. I then consider the problem posed by Darwall and Gilbert, which the Rawlsian account does not obviously answer. I show, however, that the problem can be explained away according to the practice-internal rules of the Rawlsian account.
My final formulation of the Rawlsian Fair-Play instrumentalism, therefore, satisfies both of the above tasks; it possesses the normative strength of promissory instrumentalism, and offers new responses to serious objections.