Philosophy

Philosophers have grappled with clarifying both the nature and ethical status of acts of forgiveness.  Much discussion has been devoted to whether, say, acts of forgiveness can be performed by outside parties or whether such acts should be thought of as supererogatory rather than as moral requirements.  In what follows, I will explore questions pertaining to ‘radical’ acts of forgiveness as they relate to considerations of duties and justice.  Acts of forgiveness that tend to move us the most are often justified by appeals to self-duty.  I will survey recent examples and show a possible philosophical basis for understanding them in terms of self-duty.  This kind of basis has been virtually ignored by the vast philosophical literature on forgiveness.  I attempt to show both that considerations of self-duty can provide a secular basis for justifying radical acts of forgiveness and that problems associated with this kind of forgiveness and justice are not as serious as they are often taken to be.

Key aspects of Mahatma Gandhi’s ethical theory can be understood by way of the framework provided by David Hume’s ethics.  While respecting contextual differences as well as those in overall outlook between a Sanatani Hindu reformer and a Western empiricist, I show that Gandhi and Hume mutually illuminate each other’s thought on significant ethical matters.  These matters are: (1) The inability of reason to produce action (2) The relationship of reason to the emotions (3) The importance of the commonality of moral sentiments among humans, and (4) Identification (a kind of sympathy) as the proper starting place for morality.  I hope to show a greater viability in each thinker’s views can be noticed by those schooled in traditions different from what each respectively represent. 
(Paper originally published in The Acorn: Journal of the Gandhi-King Society winter 2010).

In “Globalization, Gandhism, and Free Trade” I offer a Gandhian critique of present day globalization from a respective religious, ethical, and economic perspective.  It is in regard to the economic perspective that that paper is most relevant to the theme of this conference.  Today I will give a brief overview of Gandhi’s concept of economic freedom (khadi) and the implications that concept has for dealing with climate change and the uplifting of marginalized communities (who bear the greatest burdens brought about by that change).  The application of such ideas has been underway even in war torn places like Sri Lanka via the Gram Swaraj (Village Self-Governance) movement which has been elaborated  on by A.T. Ariyaratne and claims success in 5000 local villages.  Primarily using Gandhi’s words, I will discuss the viability for pursuing such efforts in our current world given institutional realities.  My aim will be to illuminate ways, according to Gandhian philosophy, in which economic freedom can be pursued and attained by the less well off in spite of the lack of institutional support evident.  Ultimately, I will try to show why, for Gandhi, it is not necessary to wait for great changes to occur among the top of the structural hierarchy for us to bring about a world of economic and thus climate justice.

Though it is clear that in Gandhi’s mind nonviolence and love are equivalent to one another, it is not so difficult to think of situations indicative of a real tension between these two concepts.  This is the case given common understandings we have of love.  I argue that for Gandhi these apparent tensions are resolved when we consider the degree to which certain necessary conditions are present in any given acts of love.  Thus I show that Gandhi’s view regarding the equivalence of nonviolence and love is capable of withstanding problems that arise from supposing there are different types of love.

It is well known that notions of individual sovereignty, universal rights, and the duty to follow one's own conscience are central to the philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi. The importance Gandhi places on community, tradition, and fulfilling duties particular to one's place in life is no less noticeable in his writings. That such is the case may indicate an uneasy tension among different elements in Gandhian thought (especially from the perspective of the Western political philosophical tradition). In the first section of this paper, I argue that an underlying harmony in Gandhi's philosophy can be noticed among such seemingly contradictory liberal and communitarian values given his overall views on self-realization. Crucial to my arguments in this section will be an exposition of Gandhi's views on religious conversion and caste identity. I will then show the value Gandhi's understanding has for contemporary philosophical debates between liberals and communitarians. Before concluding, I will consider a problem that arises for my interpretation of Gandhi's thought given perceived universal duties we have toward others.

Considerations of justice and rights are assumed to present problems for the idea that we should do, that which we take to be, supererogatory.  I argue that careful consideration of how we think of justice and rights lead to the conclusion that “supererogatory” actions are actually better grouped within the class of acts we identify as moral requirements.  My argument is based on our common understanding of justice as being incompatible with free-riding.  Additionally, I focus attention on our implicit assumption that we possess the right to benefit by that which, we agree, is made possible from the willingness of others to go beyond perceived moral requirements.  Thus, I conclude we should re-think where we draw the line demarcating the required from the saintly. 
Keywords:  Justice, Rights, Supererogation, Heroism, Saintliness, Moral requirements, Free-riding

Though it can be said that having freedom from the fear of death is a quality needed not just by peace activists, it is in particular need of affirmation by those espousing a philosophy of nonviolence.  This follows from the commonly offered assertion that violence (be it personal, institutional, or cultural) is required for protecting our lives.  While there is a rich philosophical literature exploring the supposed harmfulness of death, the topic is scarcely discussed by peace theorists.  In this paper, I will show the significance the topic has for more broadly showing the attractiveness of nonviolent philosophy given certain non-religious understandings of death that are well suited for advancing non-violence.

In “Globalization, Gandhism, and Free Trade” I offer a Gandhian critique of present day globalization from a respective religious, ethical, and economic perspective.  It is in regard to the economic perspective that that paper is most relevant to the theme of this conference.  Today I will give a brief overview of Gandhi’s concept of economic freedom (khadi) and the implications that concept has for dealing with climate change and the uplifting of marginalized communities (who bear the greatest burdens brought about by that change).  The application of such ideas has been underway even in war torn places like Sri Lanka via the Gram Swaraj (Village Self-Governance) movement which has been elaborated  on by A.T. Ariyaratne and claims success in 5000 local villages.  Primarily using Gandhi’s words, I will discuss the viability for pursuing such efforts in our current world given institutional realities.  My aim will be to illuminate ways, according to Gandhian philosophy, in which economic freedom can be pursued and attained by the less well off in spite of the lack of institutional support evident.  Ultimately, I will try to show why, for Gandhi, it is not necessary to wait for great changes to occur among the top of the structural hierarchy for us to bring about a world of economic and thus climate justice.

While there has been no shortage of philosophical writings dealing with humanity’s great struggles (be they on issues of justice, war, the proper structure of the state, et al) there is a notable absence within academic philosophy in asserting a broad, overriding, and natural place for philosophical analysis regarding such issues—a role which can be crucial in making us better people (and thus capable of realizing a better world).  In the first part of this paper, I will discuss the notable absence of certain character traits on the part of activists fighting for a better world that are essential for attaining the lofty goals protest movements aim for.  I will then show that philosophy is uniquely suited for helping develop such traits (specifically when philosophy is seen as a practice).  In the last part of this paper, I will discuss possible areas of philosophical exploration that would be particularly fruitful for making us better people.  My intention is to ultimately help establish a unique and irreplaceable role academic philosophy can have in activist movements.

It is not implausible to think that when followed to its logical conclusion both stoicism and nonviolent philosophy inevitably give rise to an attitude of resignation (an impression that prevents many from seeing the viability of these ethical systems). That stoicism and nonviolence lead to resignation is implied by the way the most devoted proponents of these schools have regarded harm. In what follows, I will seek to show that a Stoic conception of harm is central to a philosophy of nonviolence. However, I will argue that instead of implying resignation proper consideration of harm from a Stoic (and thus nonviolent) perspective helps to clarify what our rightful targets of resistance should be given the never ending myriad of causes demanding our attention. I maintain that such clarity, in turn, will serve to better illuminate ways in which Stoic thought can offer needed solace to the politically concerned while showing just what kind of resignation is implied by nonviolent philosophy.

In this paper, which is part of a larger book project I’ve taken on, I will consider issues that relate to the viability and justification of the liberal project from the standpoint of Gandhi’s philosophy.  I will aim to go beyond simply showing Gandhi’s disagreements with modern day liberalism and seek to explicate specific remedies he offers regarding serious ailments that currently plague liberal society.

It is not implausible to think that when followed to its logical conclusion both stoicism and nonviolent philosophy inevitably give rise to an attitude of resignation (an impression that prevents many from seeing the viability of these ethical systems).  That stoicism and nonviolence lead to resignation is implied by the way the most devoted proponents of these schools have regarded harm.  In what follows, I will seek to show that a Stoic conception of harm is central to a philosophy of nonviolence.  However, I will argue that instead of implying resignation (in the sense of passivity) proper consideration of harm from a Stoic (and thus nonviolent) perspective helps to clarify what our rightful targets of resistance should be given the never ending myriad of causes demanding our attention.  I maintain that such clarity, in turn, will serve to better illuminate ways in which Stoic thought can offer needed solace to the politically concerned while showing just what kind of resignation is implied by nonviolent philosophy.

Among those who have worked for uplifting the poor, Mahatma Gandhi occupies a unique place. Although his reform efforts received ample financial support from well-off benefactors, Gandhi's personal life exemplified ideals of voluntary poverty and renouncement. On Martha Nussbaum's account of stoicism, Gandhi's voluntary renouncement may imply morally unacceptable reasoning regarding nonviolence and the plight of the poor. Nussbaum argues that the stoic disparagement of external things of fortune implies that they cannot coherently oppose external harms such as torture or rape as unjust. Furthermore, on Nussbaum's account, stoic flexibility regarding the duty to render material aid provides insufficient ethical grounds for relieving the injustice of poverty. Applying Nussbaum's critique of stoicism to Gandhi, I ask if Gandhi's personal-life renouncement of external things exposes his philosophy to vulnerabilities that Nussbaum finds in the stoics. I then respond to the critique. With the stoics, Gandhi does deny that states of simple living are genuinely bad; therefore, pursuing ethical life means seeking some states of poverty. Nevertheless, based on Gandhian values of freedom, equality, sustainability, service, and character, there are coherent ethical grounds in Gandhian thought for pursuing nonviolence (with its proscription of external harms) while fighting global poverty (with attention to material needs). I explicate a Gandhian view of social uplift that vitally connects individual character to social well-being. I also illuminate a Gandhian model of poverty eradication that reveals deficiencies in a model of poverty eradication that depends solely on the value of external things of fortune. Given his conspicuous lack of personal material possessions and the austere simplicity of his personal life, Gandhi's mindset as it relates to poverty is summarized in the declaration that "he

Mode of access: World Wide Web.. Title from title page screen (viewed on Sept. 13, 2006).. Thesis advisor: John Nolt.. Thesis (Ph. D.) -- University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 2006.. Vita.. Includes bibliographical references.. Mahatma Gandhi intended for the concepts of universal love ...

Especially within the current political climate, the alleged legitimacy of the place of anger merits serious philosophical reflection.  Though many regard anger as a justified emotion that is indispensable for motivating social change, I will altogether question its value for social activism and discourse.  My arguments will focus on two supposedly essential aspects of anger that are not often considered in the philosophical literature on the topic: 1. It is a reaction to feelings of powerlessness and lack of control. 2. It results from the perceived downgrading of one’s status.  I maintain that the presence of either or both of these aspects in one’s dealings with the world underscore problematic philosophical understandings that can be thought of as more serious than any event which is thought to give rise to a person’s anger.  Additionally, I will argue that the functional value of anger is (at best) questionable given the role other, less damaging, human emotions are capable of playing in producing good outcomes. Though this is a conclusion others have affirmed, I will argue that one need not deny the functional value of anger altogether to reject its overall importance for motivating moral action.

Violence, among some theorists, is conceived in terms of actions that impede the ability of others to thrive.  While I do not dispute the viability of this conception I will seek to draw attention to complications brought about for it by Stoic thought.  Specifically, I will discuss the above conception in regard to the standard Stoic notion that what others do can never really impact one’s own well-being and thus her ability to thrive.    I take the development of the traditional Stoic quality of equanimity as central to creating a peaceful social order.  For me this kind of order is one which is conducive to developing  hopefulness—a quality of obvious value especially during the so-called dark times—within its members.  However, I also wish to preserve the aforementioned understanding of violence (an understanding which clearly implies that events beyond the inner control of the individual are capable of impacting her well-being).  In my synthesis below I will incorporate insights provided by certain bio-centric environmental philosophers that relate to different categories of welfare.  Ultimately, I hope to show that applying a kind of bio-centric framework to understanding harm holds great promise for attempts to bolster arguments of peace philosophers.