Why Anger?

WHY ANGER? Especially within the current political climate, the alleged legitimacy of the place of anger merits serious philosophical reflection. Though many regard anger as a justified emotion that is indispensable for motivating social change, I will altogether question its value for social activism and discourse. My arguments will focus on two supposedly essential aspects of anger that are not often considered in the philosophical literature on the topic: 1. It is a reaction to feelings of powerlessness and lack of control. 2. It results from the perceived downgrading of one’s status. I maintain that the presence of either or both of these aspects in one’s dealings with the world underscore problematic philosophical understandings that can be thought of as more serious than any event which is thought to give rise to a person’s anger. Additionally, I will argue that the functional value of anger is (at best) questionable given the role other, less damaging, human emotions are capable of playing in producing good outcomes. Though this is a conclusion others have affirmed, I will argue that one need not deny the functional value of anger altogether to reject its overall importance for motivating moral action. Wherever one may find herself in the contemporary world there is, it seems, never a shortage of situations and occurrences to feel angry about. The obviousness of this point is brought home from the supposedly more banal examples of everyday life, like navigating traffic in populated and congested metro areas and seeking customer service assistance from disinterested sales clerks, to the outrages evident in so many of the present day events (e.g. killings of unarmed blacks by law enforcement, political occurrences once thought unimaginable) which will be the focus of much future historical study. For many of us anger is not just an understandable but also a justified reaction to the outside world. Indeed, the statement “Whoever does not get angry has no idea what the hell is going on!” could easily be accepted as a truism in present times. It would be accurate, in fact, to conclude that many would not even think of what they so frequently experience so much as anger but some variation of what is often called “righteous indignation”. Anger, furthermore, is also typically thought of as useful and thus valuable given its perceived role clarifying wrongs and motivating reform. In what follows, I question such understandings. I will argue that the functional value of anger is (at best) questionable given the role other, less damaging emotions, can play in producing good outcomes. Before turning to the supposed functional value of anger however, I will make use of Stoic insight to argue that two features clearly characteristic of anger (that it is a reaction to feelings of powerlessness as well as the perceived downgrading of one’s status) are indicative of mental attitudes which are more problematic than any events that are thought to give rise to anger itself. For my purposes, Aristotle’s well known characterization of anger as “a desire accompanied by pain for an imagined retribution on account of an imagined slighting inflicted by people who have no legitimate reason to slight oneself or one’s own”1 is (for the most part) both adequate and sufficient. I’m not denying however that anger can be conceived as directed toward nonhuman entities and even inanimate objects. Thus, I’m comfortable with broadening Aristotle’s definition in a way that does not commit that definition to anger being tied necessarily to imagined slighting inflicted by people. I do not see this qualification though to seriously impact Aristotle’s basic insight regarding anger since it is not problematic to me to think of anger to arise on account of imagined slighting inflicted by someone or something (human or otherwise) who is not regarded as having a legitimate reason to inflict the slighting. Though many have explored the contrast between Aristotle’s understanding of the place of anger and those of Stoic thinkers (particularly Seneca), core aspects of Stoic philosophy, relevant to Aristotle’s definition of anger, are often overlooked in such discussions. Specifically, commentators have ignored both the Stoic emphasis on powerlessness over external events as well as the inability of others to ever truly impact one’s own worth and dignity. I want to emphasize both aspects of Stoicism to bolster my conclusions. In keeping with Seneca, I will also treat anger not so much as an unavoidable reflexive reaction but as a judgment (with cognitive content) that can be seen to follow from such reactions. ANGER AS A RESPONSE TO FEELINGS OF POWERLESSNESS Martha Nussbaum links the emphasis Aristotle’s definition places on feelings of vulnerability and personal insecurity to a more general sense of powerlessness.2 In discussing the Aristotlean conception of anger she states: (We) are prone to anger to the extent that we feel insecure or lacking in control with respect to the aspect of our goals that has been assailed—and to the extent that we expect or desire control. Anger aims at restoring lost control and often achieves at least an illusion of control. As Nussbaum indicates, incidents of perceived slighting serve (however subtly) to ultimately remind us of our powerlessness to ever successfully determine the regard with which others will hold us in. Thus, we can see the unmistakable relevance here of the core Stoic insight that external events are beyond our control and we should therefore align our inner attitudes to the outside world instead of seeking to align that world to our wishes. Such considerations lead the great Stoic thinker, Epictetus to conclude, “What disturbs men is not events but their judgments on event.”3 Accordingly Epictetus advises one to, “Make it your study…to confront every harsh impression with the words ‘You are but an impression, and not at all what you seem to be.’ “4 Regarding certain situations in which anger clearly seems to be a justifiable reaction, Epictetus states: Remember that not he who gives ill language or a blow insults, but the principle which represents these things as insulting. When, therefore, any one provokes you, be assured that it is your own opinion which provokes. Try, therefore, in the first place not to be hurried away with the appearance. For if you gain time and respite, you will more easily command yourself.5 Epictetus’ thoughts seem to clearly conflict with those of Jeffrey Blustein (among many others) who see anger to be a kind of moral protest that serves the significant purpose of promoting one’s self-worth6. There is much to be said however for Epictetus’ insistence that we should not think of our self-worth as ever being contingent on what others may or may not do (something which the Stoics maintain is ultimately beyond our control). Later, I will discuss the notion that anger has value as a motivator of desired behavior. Considering that if one were to imagine an alternative world in which all abided at all times by his own wishes he would not, it seems, ever see any reason for getting angry in that world, Epictetus clearly seem to be unto something related to anger. It seems that there is always a general unhappiness about not being able to live in this kind of alternative world; an unhappiness that underlies an individual’s feelings of anger. In his book Nonviolent Communication: A Language of Life, Marshall Rosenberg puts forth an example that nicely illustrates the plausibility of Stoic thinking as it relates to anger: (If) someone arrives late for an appointment and we need reassurance that she cares about us, we may feel hurt. If, instead, our need is to spend time purposefully and constructively, we may feel frustrated. If, on the other hand, our need is for thirty minutes of quiet solitude, we may be grateful for her tardiness and feel pleased. Thus, it is not the behavior of the other person, but our own need that causes our feeling.7 Rosenberg’s words here nicely dovetail with those of Epictetus’ in The Enchiridion: If you want to improve, reject such reasonings as these: "If I neglect my affairs, I'll have no income; if I don't correct my servant, he will be bad." For it is better to die with hunger, exempt from grief and fear, than to live in affluence with perturbation; and it is better your servant should be bad, than you unhappy. Begin therefore from little things. Is a little oil spilt? A little wine stolen? Say to yourself, "This is the price paid for equanimity, for tranquillity, and nothing is to be had for nothing." When you call your servant, it is possible that he may not come; or, if he does, he may not do what you want. But he is by no means of such importance that it should be in his power to give you any disturbance. 8 Stoicism reminds us that we are ultimately free, whatever our situation and regardless of external events and what others do, to determine what need we will pursue in a given moment. Furthermore, the Stoic holds that not only is this something we have complete control over but this is all that we need or should ever really want complete control over. Though we cannot control the level of punctuality another may demonstrate at any given instant, lacking such control should hardly matter when we consider that it is completely within our power whether another’s lack of punctuality will impact what need we give priority to. This point is echoed by Amod Lele in discussing his interpretation of the Buddhist understanding of anger. Lele, states, “Mind and world interact to cause our suffering, but according to the classical texts, fixing the world does not fix the suffering. Only fixing the mind does that”9. For Epictetus, the power to fix our minds makes us like the gods themselves: But what says Zeus? "Epictetus, if it were possible, I would have made both your little body and your little property free and not exposed to hindrance. But now be not ignorant of this: this body is not yours, but it is clay finely tempered. And since I was not able to do for you what I have mentioned, I have given you a small portion of us, this faculty of pursuing an object and avoiding it, and the faculty of desire and aversion, and, in a word, the faculty of using the appearances of things; and if you will take care of this faculty and consider it your only possession, you will never be hindered, never meet with impediments; you will not lament, you will not blame, you will not flatter any person." "Well, do these seem to you small matters?" I hope not.10 Insofar as anger perpetuates desire for something that cannot be attained (control of what—by its very nature—is out of our hands) and also insofar as it hampers our ability to see and thus deal with the real causes of our disturbance, anger can be said to go against our nature as rational creatures. Anger therefore is irrational. Somewhat ironically, in giving a qualified defense of anger Jennifer Kling echoes these very points. Kling writes, “It is inapt to direct one’s anger toward something, or someone, who is unable to or cannot respond—either well or poorly—to that anger.”11 Since it is clear that others cannot really satisfy the desire for external control that anger is ultimately an expression of nor can they implement within us the ability to see and deal with the actual causes of our disturbances when we are angry it would seem to follow that it is inapt for us to ever indulge in the emotion of anger. ANGER AS A RESPONSE TO PERCEIVED DOWNGRADING Just as we can think that a reaction to feelings of powerfulness is essential to the emotion of anger, it is also plausible to think—as Aristotle does—that anger necessarily results from a perceived downgrading of one’s status. While there is nothing unusual about a person who can think of examples of feeling angry because of what has happened to another (and not herself per se), this point does not undermine Aristotle’s insight here. After all, it is plausible to think that when the perceived mistreatment of another has evoked an individual’s anger the one who is angry regards the supposed mistreatment to be directed toward someone or something that is extension of herself. While Nussbaum does not find the judgment that anger is a proper response to the perceived downgrading of one’s status to be all that irrational she is nonetheless critical of it. Specifically, she concludes: (The) tendency to see everything that happens as about oneself and one’s own rank seems very narcissistic, and ill-suited to a society in which many aspects of human welfare have intrinsic value. This way of seeing things loses the sense that actions have intrinsic moral worth: that rape is bad because of the suffering it inflicts, and not because of the way it humiliates the friends of the victim.12 In keeping with core Stoic insight, and somewhat in contrast to Nussbaum, I want to suggest that the judgment that anger is a justified reaction to one’s perceived downgrading is indeed inherently irrational. This is the case even though I take no issue with the qualm Nussbaum expresses regarding the way angry people view situations that are thought to be status downgrading. Ultimately, it seems irrational to think one’s status is ever really dependent on what others may or may not do. Consider that a status judgment is a kind of value judgment and value judgments (in the sense in which they are relevant to discussions of anger) always concern one’s own moral worth. It is seriously problematic to think such worth ever hinges on the acknowledgement of others. This point is indicated by psychologist and neuroscientist Martin Daley’s finding that over half the murders committed in America which can be attributed to a precipitating cause are the result of someone’s perception that they are being insulted or disgraced.13 Notably, Nussbaum even seems sympathetic to this point. Regarding the fear (which can be said to underlie anger) that another’s offense has revealed “a real lowness or lack of value in oneself” she states that this emotion is more plausible “if the value people care about is status, which is easily damaged, than if it is human dignity, which is not.”14 I want to argue however that it is not rational for someone to separate her understanding of her status from her sense of personal dignity (which, as Nussbaum notes, cannot be easily damaged). Indeed, for the Stoic whether one’s dignity as a human is damaged is always completely within her power. Furthermore, to the Stoic one’s own dignity (i.e. moral standing) is the only thing that should matter to him when he formulates his self-understanding. To such an individual, as Richard Sorabji puts it, “there is nothing you could do against a person with the right values that he would see as a harm to himself rather than an indifferent, unless you could make him go against his values and commit injustice.”15 Even though it is likely that such a description does not apply to the vast majority of us it nonetheless can be maintained that, given certain realities about what each of us actually have control over, it is not rational for anyone to do that which perpetuates the desire for controlling the status given to him by others. When considered from the perspective, declared by Epictetus, that reputation is among the things not in our power16 anger can indeed be seen as not unlike the irrational self-indulgence of one tragically warped in his own world of unrealistic fantasy. Clearly, it seems to be more in keeping with the demands of rationality to seek to develop a mindset which regards one’s status as ultimately equivalent to one’s moral standing (given not only that the latter is always within one’s control but that it undeniably has greater objective worth than common understandings of status). Such a mindset, it may be argued, is susceptible to P.F. Strawson’s criticism that arguments against resentment are problematic since they undermine our common practices of holding others responsible when they fail to meet the legitimate moral expectations we have.17 I maintain however that insofar as our common practices of holding people responsible perpetuate the notion that we can have control over how others use whatever agency they may possess (a notion that is clearly at odds with our lived experience) it would be better to ignore such practices in determining how we should view anger. We can see that insofar as anger hampers a person’s ability to grasp (and thus address) the actual cause of his disturbance and perpetuates unrealistic desires for control as well as the acceptance of notions of status that are ultimately suspect it is (at the very least) questionable that anger is a rational response to external events. Indeed, the problematic understandings underscored by our angry responses can be plausibly deemed as more serious than (at least the vast majority of) external events (e.g. traffic delays) that give rise to anger in the first place. ANGER AS FUNCTIONALLY VALUABLE So far I have sought to show the irrationality of anger by focusing on what I take to be problematic and apparent cognitions which underlie and get perpetuated by the emotion. Many, however, take anger to have value not so much on account of the beliefs that can be said to be below its surface but because of the role it is seen to play in motivating desired behavior. Similarly, it has been said that anger plays an important role in opening our eyes to wrongs which should be addressed and may otherwise go unnoticed. It can be argued, after all, that erroneous beliefs about control and inaccurate understandings of status do not change the fact that anger can be looked upon as an indispensable signal by which ultimately greater levels of justice can actually be achieved. In discussing her notion of “transitional anger” Nussbaum, while echoing many of the sentiments put forth here, expresses some sympathy for the notion that anger is functionally valuable. She writes: Anger can be a source of motivation. The Greek Stoics were often charged with robbing society of motives to pursue justice by their insistence that anger is always mistaken. The charge is even more pertinent to my own view, since…anger is often appropriate in its underlying values: the loss or damage can be major, and something really ought to be done about it…The intensity of the emotion, and perhaps, too, its magical fantasy of retribution are part of what get people going when otherwise least some people might simply fail to act (or, without anger’s signal, even fail to notice wrongdoing).18 More explicitly, Krista Thomason declares “Anger is…a morally necessary response to wrongdoing.”19 As stated above, I regard anger not as an unavoidable reflexive reaction but as a judgment (with cognitive content) that follows such reactions. This distinction implies that somethings can be true of the reflexive reactions which are antecedent to anger without being true of anger itself. These reflexive reactions seem both sufficient and necessary for motivating proper action as well as giving us valuable sources of information by which wrongs can be noticed. I see no reason, however, to think that the erroneous judgments and problematic cognitions discussed above (that I take to be essential to anger) are needed for these important purposes to be served. In other words, we should not suppose that the visceral, inevitable reaction humans experience as a prelude to anger needs to be interspersed with other, lamentable mental states that are no less essential to the emotion. Moreover, it is my contention even if we regard certain informative and motivational aspects that are conjointly present with anger to be essential to that emotion these aspects are still not sufficient for redeeming it within our system of values. Ultimately, it is plausible to think that our involuntary and visceral reactions can serve to inform and motivate us (and thus preserve functional value) without, at the same time, being misleading or deceiving. In keeping with certain defenders of anger (e.g. Thomason), I affirm the value of a person being liable to anger but deny that anger proper has any real value. Additionally, if as psychologist Everett Worthington maintains, the emotion of anger is associated with the “action tendency” to remove blocks to one’s pleasure20 there is no reason to suppose that one who can take pleasure in noticing morally proper treatment must also be disposed to anger. Like the Stoics, I maintain that after experiencing the involuntary and visceral reactions that are conjoined with anger (though not necessarily on my view) we can employ our cognitive faculties in ways that not only prevent the occurrence of anger but also motivate behavior that is often said to confirm that emotion’s functional value. Overall, such a process would involve not getting “swept away” by anger’s currents once we have perceived a wrong and feel motivated to remedy it. Here we should remember also that there is no reason to think that full-blown anger is all that reliable of a guide for either revealing genuine wrongs or motivating proper responses. The always ever-present instances like those involving someone breaking bones by striking inanimate objects after being overcome by anger adequately substantiate this point. I see no reason to keep from thinking that the embryonic stages of full-blown anger (which are seemingly inevitable aspects of human experience and separate from the actual emotion itself) can ultimately be regarded as psychological cues that are indicating the presence of some wrong as well as calling on us to intelligently assess a situation in which we find ourselves disturbed (to whatever degree). If after such an assessment, it is clear that some wrong has really occurred (even though it is always quite possible, if not likely, we are actually receiving a false indication of a wrong) there remains nothing that should lead us suppose there is value in the actual psychological state of anger. Consideration of the reality of any given situation in which we have accurately perceived a wrong should make it clear that our only rational options are to act to correct the wrong or to accept our powerlessness over what is happening and to adjust ourselves accordingly. Anger does not seem helpful or valuable even if the first option is the one that aligns closest with one’s reality. After all, as many have noted, love (such as of humanity) seems no less capable of moving us to correct wrongs that we notice and can do so in a way that is free from the aforementioned downside and others not discussed here (e.g. elevated levels of stress) that anger entails. Furthermore, it is clear from so much everyday experience that once anger has been allowed to manifest it is very difficult (if not ultimately impossible) to control where and the degree to which that anger is directed. There is indeed always a strong likelihood that an angry person will be swept up by the currents of his anger and act in ways that even those who defend this emotion will find problematic. Whenever anger is present this is in fact more likely than it is that the angry person will be motivated to do great things because of that anger. Hence, the psychological value of anger is all the more questionable. This understanding is echoed by Worthington in his discussion of so called “righteous anger”: Righteous anger can motivate a fight against injustice. A good example is the Civil War, which ended up leading to the abolishment of slavery in the United States. Another is Brown versus Board of Education…The danger is that anger provokes much self-justification and rationalization, so often, when we think we are experiencing righteous anger, we are in fact justifying our own biased pursuit of personal motives.21 Interestingly, in seeking to affirm the value of anger social activist and Nobel Peace Prize co-recipient, Kailash Satyarthi, implies this very point during his 2015 TED Talk provocatively titled “How to Make Peace? Get Angry”22 After enunciating the schema of anger, idea, and action while discussing his successful campaigns against modern-day slavery Satyarthi states: 15:56 Anger is a power, anger is an energy, and the law of nature is that energy can never be created and never be vanished, can never be destroyed. So why can’t the energy of anger be translated and harnessed to create a better and beautiful world, a more just and equitable world? Anger is within each one of you, and I will share a secret for a few seconds: that if we are confined in the narrow shells of ego, and the circles of selfishness, then the anger will turn out to be hatred, violence, revenge, destruction. But if we are able to break the circles, then the same anger could turn into a great power. We can break the circles by using our inherent compassion and connect with the world through compassion to make this world better. That same anger could be transformed into it. These insights were echoed by the great peace activist and Buddhist monk, Thich Nhat Hanh, who wrote “Our anger is a field of energy, and thanks to our mindful observation and insight into its roots we can change this energy into the energy of love and compassion—a constructive and healing energy.”23 By emphasizing the “energy of anger” and focusing on the breaking of narrow circles, Satyarthi’s points align with the idea that we can value what are clearly the embryonic stages of anger while, at the same time, eschew full-blown (proper) anger. Breaking the circles Satyarthi refers to entails becoming loving in ways that are non-exclusionary and, indeed, universal. Satyarthi’s points can be seen as not so much affirming the value of anger in and of itself but as underscoring the significance of the above-mentioned reflexive reactions that precede occurrences of anger. As I’ve argued, anger always must involve some judgment yet judgments that are transformative in the ways Satyarthi envisions would inevitably move a person away from states that can accurately be classified as angry ones. After all, tapping into our propensities for compassion is hardly compatible with the feeling of rage and the attendant desire to inflict suffering onto others that is clearly part and parcel of anger. Clearly, it seems that developing a more compassionate nature also involves a cognitive dimension insofar as doing so entails making judgments regarding a situation as well as the place of those who comprise it (judgments, for example, about how responsible someone is for producing that situation). Anger, to reiterate, involves making negative judgments pertaining to one’s level of control as well as to one’s status with others. Compassion, however, can be seen to involve (among other things) positively assessing the likelihood for realizing heretofore un-actualized possibilities. Having a positive conception of others is integral to such assessments. When one is focusing on the good they perceive in others, anger can be said to inevitably lose the mental space it needs to fester. Ultimately, the conditions that give rise to compassion are not compatible with those that bring about actual anger. Furthermore, as a motivator for right action there is no prima facie reason to suppose that compassion has a less promising track record than anger of inspiring morally valuable behavior that results in genuinely positive and lasting change. On the contrary, it seems that exponents of the most successful social reform movements are better known for exhibiting qualities we more commonly associate with compassion and love not anger. CONCLUSION Whether considered primarily in terms of its qualitative contents or as a functional state, we have seen that the value of anger is not only questionable but over-stated. When experienced, anger yields and perpetuates a false (or at least an incomplete) understanding of one’s actual situation. Such false understandings can be thought of as more problematic than whatever external events one’s anger is attributed to. As a motivator, anger entails costs (both real and potential) that offset whatever value it is alleged to have. There is, furthermore, no reason to suppose that other (less damaging) emotions cannot better serve the function anger is said perform by its defenders. In the contemporary world there is obviously no shortage of problems that demand attention. Engendering the state of anger in ourselves however seems to only create more. ENDNOTES 1Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1378a31-3, accessed August 5, 2022, http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/rhetoric.1.i.html. 2Nussbaum, Martha C. "Transitional anger." Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1, no. 1 (2015): 45. 3Epictetus in Epictetus: The Discourses and Manual, reprinted in Ethics: History, Theory, and Contemporary Issues (5th ed.). Cahn, Markie (eds.) Oxford: University Press 2012 (p. 204). 4Ibid. 203. 5Epictetus in The Enchiridion v. 20. Accessed August 5, 2022, http://classics.mit.edu/Epictetus/epicench .html. 6 Jeffry M Blustein. 2014. Forgiveness and Remembrance: Remembering Wrongdoing in Personal and Public Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 58. 7Marshall B. Rosenberg. Nonviolent communication: A language of life: Life-changing tools for healthy relationships. PuddleDancer Press, 2015. 143 8Ibid. v. 12. 9AmodLele. Accessed August 5, 2022, https://indianphilosophyblog.org/2021/06/20/frustration-where-mind-meets-world/#more-4932 10Epictetus in Discourses chapter 1. Accessed August 5, 2022, http://classics.mit.edu/Epictetus/discourses.1.one.html. 11 Jennifer Kling. “Rage Against the Machine: The Virtues of Anger in Response to Oppression” in The Ethics of Anger, eds. Court Lewis, Gregory Brock (Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2020), 206. 12Ibid. 50. 13 Martin Daley. Killing the Competition: Economic Inequality and Homicide. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 2016. 14Ibid. 48. 15Richard Sorabji. Gandhi and the Stoics: Modern Experiments on Ancient Values. University of Chicago Press, 2012. 62. 16Ibid. 204. 17P.F. Strawson. “Freedom and Resentment” In Free Will, ed. Gary Watson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 72-ff. 18Ibid. 55. 19Krista Thomason. “The Moral Necessity of Anger” in Ethics of Anger, 83. 20Everett L. Worthington Jr. “The Psychology of Anger” in The Ethics of Anger, 56. 21Ibid. 62. 22 Kailash Satyarthi. Accessed August 5, 2022, https://www.ted.com/talks/view/transcript?language=en 23Robert Ellsberg (ed.) 2001. Thich Nhat Hanh: Essential Writings. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2001. 97. PAGE \* MERGEFORMAT 14