research-article

Almost (Weighted) Proportional Allocations for Indivisible Chores✱✱

Authors:

Xiaowei WuAuthors Info & Claims

WWW '22: Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2022

Pages 122 - 131

https://doi.org/10.1145/3485447.3512057

Published: 25 April 2022 Publication History

Abstract

In this paper, we study how to fairly allocate a set of indivisible chores to a number of (asymmetric) agents with additive cost functions. We consider the fairness notion of (weighted) proportionality up to any item (PROPX), and show that a (weighted) PROPX allocation always exists and can be computed efficiently. We also consider the partial information setting, where the algorithms can only use agents’ ordinal preferences. We design algorithms that achieve 2-approximate (weighted) PROPX, and the approximation ratio is optimal. We complement the algorithmic results by investigating the relationship between (weighted) PROPX and other fairness notions such as maximin share and AnyPrice share, and bounding the social welfare loss by enforcing the allocations to be (weighted) PROPX.

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Cited By

Guo HLi WDeng B(2023)A Survey on Fair Allocation of ChoresMathematics10.3390/math1116361611:16(3616)Online publication date: 21-Aug-2023
https://doi.org/10.3390/math11163616
Wei TLi BLi MElkind E(2023)Maximin-aware allocations of indivisible chores with symmetric and asymmetric agentsProceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.24963/ijcai.2023/323(2897-2905)Online publication date: 19-Aug-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.24963/ijcai.2023/323
Gafni YHuang XLavi RTalgam-Cohen I(2023)Unified Fair Allocation of Goods and Chores via CopiesACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/361811611:3-4(1-27)Online publication date: 19-Dec-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3618116
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

Almost (Weighted) Proportional Allocations for Indivisible Chores✱✱
1. Applied computing
  1. Law, social and behavioral sciences
2. Theory of computation
  1. Design and analysis of algorithms
    1. Approximation algorithms analysis

Index terms have been assigned to the content through auto-classification.

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cover image ACM Conferences

WWW '22: Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2022

April 2022

3764 pages

ISBN:9781450390965

DOI:10.1145/3485447

Editors:
Frédérique Laforest
INSA Lyon, France
,
Raphaël Troncy
EURECOM, France
,
Elena Simperl
King’s College London, UK
,
Deepak Agarwal
Pinterest, USA
,
Aristides Gionis
KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden
,
Ivan Herman
W3C / retired
,
Lionel Médini
Université Lyon 1, France

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Published: 25 April 2022

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WWW '22: The ACM Web Conference 2022

April 25 - 29, 2022

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Cited By

Guo HLi WDeng B(2023)A Survey on Fair Allocation of ChoresMathematics10.3390/math1116361611:16(3616)Online publication date: 21-Aug-2023
https://doi.org/10.3390/math11163616
Wei TLi BLi MElkind E(2023)Maximin-aware allocations of indivisible chores with symmetric and asymmetric agentsProceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.24963/ijcai.2023/323(2897-2905)Online publication date: 19-Aug-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.24963/ijcai.2023/323
Gafni YHuang XLavi RTalgam-Cohen I(2023)Unified Fair Allocation of Goods and Chores via CopiesACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/361811611:3-4(1-27)Online publication date: 19-Dec-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3618116
Viswanathan VZick YLeyton-Brown KSamuelson LHartline J(2023)A General Framework for Fair Allocation under Matroid Rank ValuationsProceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3580507.3597675(1129-1152)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3580507.3597675
Miao HDai SXu YZhang Y(2023)EFX Allocation to Chores over Small GraphCombinatorial Optimization and Applications10.1007/978-3-031-49614-1_21(279-291)Online publication date: 15-Dec-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-031-49614-1_21
Wu XZhang CZhou S(2023)One Quarter Each (on Average) Ensures ProportionalityWeb and Internet Economics10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_33(582-599)Online publication date: 4-Dec-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-031-48974-7_33
Kobayashi YMahara RSakamoto S(2023)EFX Allocations for Indivisible Chores: Matching-Based ApproachAlgorithmic Game Theory10.1007/978-3-031-43254-5_15(257-270)Online publication date: 4-Sep-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-031-43254-5_15
Aziz HLi BWu X(2022)Approximate and strategyproof maximin share allocation of chores with ordinal preferencesMathematical Programming: Series A and B10.1007/s10107-022-01855-y203:1-2(319-345)Online publication date: 5-Jul-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s10107-022-01855-y
Mishra SPadala MGujar S(2022)Fair Allocation with Special ExternalitiesPRICAI 2022: Trends in Artificial Intelligence10.1007/978-3-031-20862-1_1(3-16)Online publication date: 10-Nov-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-031-20862-1_1

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