Article

Shielding applications from an untrusted cloud with Haven

Authors:

Andrew Baumann,

Marcus Peinado,

Galen HuntAuthors Info & Claims

OSDI'14: Proceedings of the 11th USENIX conference on Operating Systems Design and Implementation

Pages 267 - 283

Published: 06 October 2014 Publication History

Publisher Site

Abstract

Today's cloud computing infrastructure requires substantial trust. Cloud users rely on both the provider's staff and its globally-distributed software/hardware platform not to expose any of their private data.

We introduce the notion of shielded execution, which protects the confidentiality and integrity of a program and its data from the platform on which it runs (i.e., the cloud operator's OS, VM and firmware). Our prototype, Haven, is the first system to achieve shielded execution of unmodified legacy applications, including SQL Server and Apache, on a commodity OS (Windows) and commodity hardware. Haven leverages the hardware protection of Intel SGX to defend against privileged code and physical attacks such as memory probes, but also addresses the dual challenges of executing unmodified legacy binaries and protecting them from a malicious host. This work motivated recent changes in the SGX specification.

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Cited By

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Tzialla IWang JZhu JPanda AWalfish M(2024)Efficient Auditing of Event-driven Web ApplicationsProceedings of the Nineteenth European Conference on Computer Systems10.1145/3627703.3650089(1208-1224)Online publication date: 22-Apr-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3627703.3650089
Holmes BWaterman JWilliams DTsafrir DMusuvathi MGupta RAbu-Ghazaleh N(2024)SEVeriFast: Minimizing the root of trust for fast startup of SEV microVMsProceedings of the 29th ACM International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems, Volume 210.1145/3620665.3640424(1045-1060)Online publication date: 27-Apr-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3620665.3640424
Miwa SMatsuo S(2023)Analyzing the Performance Impact of HPC Workloads with Gramine+SGX on 3rd Generation Xeon Scalable ProcessorsProceedings of the SC '23 Workshops of The International Conference on High Performance Computing, Network, Storage, and Analysis10.1145/3624062.3624267(1850-1858)Online publication date: 12-Nov-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3624062.3624267
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Index Terms

Shielding applications from an untrusted cloud with Haven
1. Networks
  1. Network protocols
2. Security and privacy
  1. Systems security
    1. Operating systems security

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Reviews

Reviewer: A. Squassabia

Cloud computing is a recent model for provisioning commodity hardware with a preinstalled software environment to run a custom software executable, where the provider of the commodity environment has enormous latitude for its provisioning. The term is new and its definition still coalescing, but the provider controls the hardware and software stack. Cloud computing subverts the longstanding tenet that the computing environment is largely trusted, whereas application software is untrustworthy. From the perspective of a custom application running in the cloud, trust in the environment is misplaced, because security guarantees are puny and expensive, and trust is difficult or impossible to enforce and validate. Very little help in support of a healthy general presumption of mutual distrust between application code and the cloud environment is available. This paper provides a proof-of-concept implementation enabling mutual distrust between a general-purpose, user-level application and its operating environment, even when the user application is written without particular care to validate and enforce trust. This remarkable goal is achieved by embracing and sensibly extending the newly available Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) instructions and specification. Originally, SGX enabled only parts of an application written to take advantage of this feature some degree of execution trust guaranteed by the hardware itself. SGX has limitations precluding the extension of trust to an entire application; for instance, SGX does not allow trust when processing interrupts. Haven succeeded in defining and implementing shielded execution for an entire, unmodified legacy application affording mutual distrust in a working prototype running Microsoft SQL Server and an Apache Web Server. This brilliant accomplishment could be celebrated as a harbinger of trust in the increasingly pervasive cloud computing model. Online Computing Reviews Service

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Information & Contributors

Information

Published In

OSDI'14: Proceedings of the 11th USENIX conference on Operating Systems Design and Implementation

October 2014

676 pages

ISBN:9781931971164

Program Chairs:
Jason Flinn
University of Michigan
,
Hank Levy
University of Washington

In-Cooperation

SIGOPS: ACM Special Interest Group on Operating Systems

Publisher

USENIX Association

United States

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Published: 06 October 2014

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Tzialla IWang JZhu JPanda AWalfish M(2024)Efficient Auditing of Event-driven Web ApplicationsProceedings of the Nineteenth European Conference on Computer Systems10.1145/3627703.3650089(1208-1224)Online publication date: 22-Apr-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3627703.3650089
Holmes BWaterman JWilliams DTsafrir DMusuvathi MGupta RAbu-Ghazaleh N(2024)SEVeriFast: Minimizing the root of trust for fast startup of SEV microVMsProceedings of the 29th ACM International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems, Volume 210.1145/3620665.3640424(1045-1060)Online publication date: 27-Apr-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3620665.3640424
Miwa SMatsuo S(2023)Analyzing the Performance Impact of HPC Workloads with Gramine+SGX on 3rd Generation Xeon Scalable ProcessorsProceedings of the SC '23 Workshops of The International Conference on High Performance Computing, Network, Storage, and Analysis10.1145/3624062.3624267(1850-1858)Online publication date: 12-Nov-2023
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Zhuo DZhang KLi ZZhuang SWang SChen AStoica I(2022)Rearchitecting in-memory object stores for low latencyProceedings of the VLDB Endowment10.14778/3494124.349413815:3(555-568)Online publication date: 4-Feb-2022
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Anzai SMisono MNakamura RKuga YShinagawa TSerafini MXu H(2022)Towards isolated execution at the machine levelProceedings of the 13th ACM SIGOPS Asia-Pacific Workshop on Systems10.1145/3546591.3547530(68-77)Online publication date: 23-Aug-2022
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