Article

A multivariate complexity analysis of determining possible winners given incomplete votes

Authors:

Nadja Betzler,

Susanne Hemmann,

Rolf NiedermeierAuthors Info & Claims

IJCAI'09: Proceedings of the 21st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Pages 53 - 58

Published: 11 July 2009 Publication History

Abstract

The POSSIBLE WINNER problem asks whether some distinguished candidate may become the winner of an election when the given incomplete votes are extended into complete ones in a favorable way. POSSIBLE WINNER is NP-complete for common voting rules such as Borda, many other positional scoring rules, Bucklin, Copeland etc. We investigate how three different parameterizations influence the computational complexity of POSSIBLE WINNER for a number of voting rules. We show fixed-parameter tractability results with respect to the parameter "number of candidates" but intractability results with respect to the parameter "number of votes". Finally, we derive fixed-parameter tractability results with respect to the parameter "total number of undetermined candidate pairs" and identify an interesting polynomial-time solvable special case for Borda.

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Cited By

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Tao LChen LXu LShi WSunny AZaman MPelachaud CTaylor MFaliszewski PMascardi V(2022)How Hard is Bribery in Elections with Randomly Selected VotersProceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3535850.3535991(1265-1273)Online publication date: 9-May-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3535850.3535991
Chakraborty VDelemazure TKimelfeld BKolaitis PRelia KStoyanovich J(2021)Algorithmic Techniques for Necessary and Possible WinnersACM/IMS Transactions on Data Science10.1145/34584722:3(1-23)Online publication date: 21-Jul-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3458472
Kenig BElkind EVeloso MAgmon NTaylor M(2019)The Complexity of the Possible Winner Problem with Partitioned PreferencesProceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3306127.3332007(2051-2053)Online publication date: 8-May-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3306127.3332007
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IJCAI'09: Proceedings of the 21st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

July 2009

2107 pages

Editor:
Hiroaki Kitano

Publisher

Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc.

San Francisco, CA, United States

Publication History

Published: 11 July 2009

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Tao LChen LXu LShi WSunny AZaman MPelachaud CTaylor MFaliszewski PMascardi V(2022)How Hard is Bribery in Elections with Randomly Selected VotersProceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3535850.3535991(1265-1273)Online publication date: 9-May-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3535850.3535991
Chakraborty VDelemazure TKimelfeld BKolaitis PRelia KStoyanovich J(2021)Algorithmic Techniques for Necessary and Possible WinnersACM/IMS Transactions on Data Science10.1145/34584722:3(1-23)Online publication date: 21-Jul-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3458472
Kenig BElkind EVeloso MAgmon NTaylor M(2019)The Complexity of the Possible Winner Problem with Partitioned PreferencesProceedings of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3306127.3332007(2051-2053)Online publication date: 8-May-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3306127.3332007
Kimelfeld BKolaitis PTibi MSuciu DSkritek SKoch C(2019)Query Evaluation in Election DatabasesProceedings of the 38th ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGAI Symposium on Principles of Database Systems10.1145/3294052.3319692(32-46)Online publication date: 25-Jun-2019
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3294052.3319692
Filtser ATalmon NLarson KWinikoff MDas SDurfee E(2017)Distributed Monitoring of Election WinnersProceedings of the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3091125.3091287(1160-1168)Online publication date: 8-May-2017
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Dey PMisra NNarahari Y(2016)Kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in votingTheoretical Computer Science10.1016/j.tcs.2015.12.023616:C(111-125)Online publication date: 22-Feb-2016
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Bredereck RChen JFaliszewski PNichterlein ANiedermeier R(2016)Prices matter for the parameterized complexity of shift briberyInformation and Computation10.1016/j.ic.2016.08.003251:C(140-164)Online publication date: 1-Dec-2016
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Naamani-Dery LKalech MRokach LShapira B(2016)Reducing preference elicitation in group decision makingExpert Systems with Applications: An International Journal10.1016/j.eswa.2016.05.04161:C(246-261)Online publication date: 1-Nov-2016
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Bredereck RChen JNiedermeier RWalsh T(2015)Parliamentary voting proceduresProceedings of the 24th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/2832249.2832272(164-170)Online publication date: 25-Jul-2015
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Dey PMisra NNarahari YWeiss GYolum PBordini RElkind E(2015)Kernelization Complexity of Possible Winner and Coalitional Manipulation Problems in VotingProceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/2772879.2772894(87-96)Online publication date: 4-May-2015
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Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders

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