We study deviations by a group of agents in the three main types of matching markets: the house allocation, the marriage, and the roommates models. For a given instance, we call a matching k-stable if no other matching exists that is more beneficial to at ...

In this study, we propose a polyhedral clinching auction for indivisible goods, which has so far been studied for divisible goods. As in the divisible setting by Goel et al. (2015), our mechanism enjoys incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and ...

In the impartial selection problem, a subset of agents up to a fixed size k among a group of n is to be chosen based on votes cast by the agents themselves. A selection mechanism is impartial if no agent can influence its own chance of being selected by ...

We study the inefficiency of pure Nash equili bria in symmetric unweighted network congestion games. We first explore the impact of symmetry on the worst-case PoA of network congestion games. For polynomial delay functions with highest degree p, we ...

In the stable marriage (SM) problem, there are two sets of agents—traditionally referred to as men and women—and each agent has a preference list that ranks (a subset of) agents of the opposite sex. The goal is to find a matching between men and women ...

In the NP-hard Hospital Residents problem with lower and upper quotas (HR-Q_L^U), the goal is to find a stable matching of residents to hospitals where the number of residents matched to a hospital is either between its lower and upper quota or zero. We ...

Routing games over time are widely studied due to various applications, e.g., transportation, road and air traffic control, logistic in production systems, communication networks like the internet, and financial flows. In this article, we present a new ...

Stable matching in a community consisting of \(N\) men and \(N\) women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal work by Gale and Shapley.

When the input ...

We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise preferences. In the most general setting, agents are allowed to express their preferences as comparisons of any two of their edges, and they also have the right to declare a draw ...

In this article, we study fairness in committee selection problems. We consider a general notion of fairness via stability: A committee is stable if no coalition of voters can deviate and choose a committee of proportional size, so that all these voters ...

We consider the efficiency of taxation in congestion games with polynomial latency functions along the line of research initiated by Caragiannis et al. [ACM Transactions on Algorithms, 2010], who focused on both pure and mixed Nash equilibria in games ...

The work we present in this article initiated the formal study of fractional hedonic games (FHGs), coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among other settings, this ...

We study pricing equilibria for graphical valuations, whichare a class of valuations that admit a compact representation. These valuations are associated with a value graph, whose nodes correspond to items, and edges encode (pairwise) complementarities/...

We consider network cost-sharing games with nonanonymous cost functions, where the cost of each edge is a submodular function of its users, and this cost is shared using the Shapley value. Nonanonymous cost functions model asymmetries between the ...

We consider the problem of auctioning time - a one-dimensional continuously-divisible heterogeneous good - among multiple agents. Applications include auctioning time for using a shared device, auctioning TV commercial slots, and more. Different agents ...

The price of anarchy (PoA) in congestion games has attracted a lot of research over the past decade. This has resulted in a thorough understanding of this concept. In contrast, the price of stability (PoS), which is an equally interesting concept, is ...

We consider the problem of designing incentive-compatible, ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms for covering problems in the Bayesian setting, where players' types are drawn from an underlying distribution and may be correlated, and the goal is ...

Congestion games model several interesting applications, including routing and network formation games, and also possess attractive theoretical properties, including the existence of and convergence of natural dynamics to a pure Nash equilibrium. ...

A network creation game simulates a decentralized and noncooperative construction of a communication network. Informally, there are n players sitting on the network nodes, which attempt to establish a reciprocal communication by activating, thereby ...

We provide results on the computational complexity of goodness-of-fit measures (i.e., Afriat’s efficiency index, Varian’s efficiency vector-index, and the Houtman-Maks index) associated with several revealed preference axioms (i.e., WARP, SARP, GARP, ...