research-article

Fractional Hedonic Games

Authors:

Florian Brandl,

Paul Harrenstein,

Dominik PetersAuthors Info & Claims

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), Volume 7, Issue 2

Article No.: 6, Pages 1 - 29

https://doi.org/10.1145/3327970

Published: 10 June 2019 Publication History

Abstract

The work we present in this article initiated the formal study of fractional hedonic games (FHGs), coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition. Among other settings, this covers situations in which players only distinguish between friends and non-friends and desire to be in a coalition in which the fraction of friends is maximal. FHGs thus not only constitute a natural class of succinctly representable coalition formation games but also provide an interesting framework for network clustering. We propose a number of conditions under which the core of FHGs is non-empty and provide algorithms for computing a core stable outcome. By contrast, we show that the core may be empty in other cases, and that it is computationally hard in general to decide non-emptiness of the core.

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Cited By

Brandt FBullinger MTappe L(2024)Stability based on single-agent deviations in additively separable hedonic gamesArtificial Intelligence10.1016/j.artint.2024.104160334(104160)Online publication date: Sep-2024
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2024.104160
Caskurlu BKizilkaya F(2024)On hedonic games with common ranking propertyAnnals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence10.1007/s10472-023-09892-992:3(581-599)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s10472-023-09892-9
Kerkmann ARothe J(2024)The complexity of verifying popularity and strict popularity in altruistic hedonic gamesAutonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems10.1007/s10458-024-09679-038:2Online publication date: 1-Oct-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-024-09679-0
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Index Terms

Fractional Hedonic Games
1. Mathematics of computing
  1. Discrete mathematics
    1. Graph theory
2. Theory of computation

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Published In

cover image ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Volume 7, Issue 2

May 2019

170 pages

ISSN:2167-8375

EISSN:2167-8383

DOI:10.1145/3340299

Editors:
David Pennock
Microsoft
,
Ilya Segal
Stanford University

Issue’s Table of Contents

Copyright © 2019 ACM.

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Publication History

Published: 10 June 2019

Accepted: 01 February 2019

Revised: 01 March 2018

Received: 01 May 2017

Published in TEAC Volume 7, Issue 2

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European Research Council
Australian Research Council
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Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, Australian Government
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Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council

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Cited By

Brandt FBullinger MTappe L(2024)Stability based on single-agent deviations in additively separable hedonic gamesArtificial Intelligence10.1016/j.artint.2024.104160334(104160)Online publication date: Sep-2024
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2024.104160
Caskurlu BKizilkaya F(2024)On hedonic games with common ranking propertyAnnals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence10.1007/s10472-023-09892-992:3(581-599)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s10472-023-09892-9
Kerkmann ARothe J(2024)The complexity of verifying popularity and strict popularity in altruistic hedonic gamesAutonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems10.1007/s10458-024-09679-038:2Online publication date: 1-Oct-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-024-09679-0
McKay MCseh ÁManlove D(2024)Envy-freeness in 3D hedonic gamesAutonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems10.1007/s10458-024-09657-638:2Online publication date: 1-Dec-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s10458-024-09657-6
Aloisio AFlammini MVinci C(2024)Generalized Distance Polymatrix GamesSOFSEM 2024: Theory and Practice of Computer Science10.1007/978-3-031-52113-3_2(25-39)Online publication date: 7-Feb-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-52113-3_2
Aloisio AAgmon NAn BRicci AYeoh W(2023)Distance Hypergraph Polymatrix Coordination GamesProceedings of the 2023 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3545946.3599041(2679-2681)Online publication date: 30-May-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3545946.3599041
Cohen SAgmon NWilliams BChen YNeville J(2023)Complexity of probabilistic inference in random dichotomous hedonic gamesProceedings of the Thirty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Thirty-Fifth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence and Thirteenth Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25692(5573-5581)Online publication date: 7-Feb-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25692
Boehmer NBullinger MKerkmann AWilliams BChen YNeville J(2023)Causes of stability in dynamic coalition formationProceedings of the Thirty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Thirty-Fifth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence and Thirteenth Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25683(5499-5506)Online publication date: 7-Feb-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1609/aaai.v37i5.25683
Brandt FBullinger MWilczynski A(2023)Reaching Individually Stable Coalition StructuresACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/358875311:1-2(1-65)Online publication date: 24-Jun-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3588753
Ma WXu PXu Y(2023)Fairness Maximization among Offline Agents in Online-Matching MarketsACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/356970510:4(1-27)Online publication date: 5-Apr-2023
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