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Group Fairness in Committee Selection

Authors:

Kamesh Munagala,

Kangning WangAuthors Info & Claims

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC), Volume 8, Issue 4

Article No.: 23, Pages 1 - 18

https://doi.org/10.1145/3417750

Published: 16 October 2020 Publication History

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Abstract

In this article, we study fairness in committee selection problems. We consider a general notion of fairness via stability: A committee is stable if no coalition of voters can deviate and choose a committee of proportional size, so that all these voters strictly prefer the new committee to the existing one. Our main contribution is to extend this definition to stability of a distribution (or lottery) over committees. We consider two canonical voter preference models: the Approval Set setting where each voter approves a set of candidates and prefers committees with larger intersection with this set; and the Ranking Representative setting where each voter ranks committees based on how much she likes her favorite candidate in a committee. Our main result is to show that stable lotteries always exist for these canonical preference models. Interestingly, given preferences of voters over committees, the procedure for computing an approximately stable lottery is the same for both models and therefore extends to the setting where some voters have the former preference structure and others have the latter. Our existence proof uses the probabilistic method and a new large deviation inequality that may be of independent interest.

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Cited By

Ebadian SKahng APeters DShah N(2024)Optimized Distortion and Proportional Fairness in VotingACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/364076012:1(1-39)Online publication date: 19-Jan-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3640760
McCune DMartin ELatina GSimms K(2024)A comparison of sequential ranked-choice voting and single transferable voteJournal of Computational Social Science10.1007/s42001-024-00249-87:1(643-670)Online publication date: 11-Mar-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/s42001-024-00249-8
Mavrov IMunagala KShen YLeyton-Brown KSamuelson LHartline J(2023)Fair Multiwinner Elections with Allocation ConstraintsProceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3580507.3597685(964-990)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3580507.3597685
Show More Cited By

Index Terms

Group Fairness in Committee Selection
1. Mathematics of computing
  1. Discrete mathematics
    1. Combinatorics
      1. Combinatoric problems
  2. Probability and statistics
    1. Probabilistic algorithms
2. Theory of computation
  1. Theory and algorithms for application domains
    1. Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
      1. Algorithmic game theory
      2. Solution concepts in game theory

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Published In

cover image ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation

ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation Volume 8, Issue 4

Special Issue on EC’19

November 2020

139 pages

ISSN:2167-8375

EISSN:2167-8383

DOI:10.1145/3430681

Editors:
David Pennock
Microsoft
,
Ilya Segal
Stanford University

Issue’s Table of Contents

Copyright © 2020 ACM.

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 16 October 2020

Accepted: 01 July 2020

Revised: 01 March 2020

Received: 01 August 2019

Published in TEAC Volume 8, Issue 4

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Cited By

Ebadian SKahng APeters DShah N(2024)Optimized Distortion and Proportional Fairness in VotingACM Transactions on Economics and Computation10.1145/364076012:1(1-39)Online publication date: 19-Jan-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3640760
McCune DMartin ELatina GSimms K(2024)A comparison of sequential ranked-choice voting and single transferable voteJournal of Computational Social Science10.1007/s42001-024-00249-87:1(643-670)Online publication date: 11-Mar-2024
https://doi.org/10.1007/s42001-024-00249-8
Mavrov IMunagala KShen YLeyton-Brown KSamuelson LHartline J(2023)Fair Multiwinner Elections with Allocation ConstraintsProceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3580507.3597685(964-990)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3580507.3597685
Hao FYang YShang JPark D(2023)AFCMiner: Finding Absolute Fair Cliques From Attributed Social Networks for Responsible Computational Social SystemsIEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems10.1109/TCSS.2023.324507510:6(3000-3011)Online publication date: Dec-2023
https://doi.org/10.1109/TCSS.2023.3245075
Ebadian SKahng APeters DShah NPennock DSegal ISeuken S(2022)Optimized Distortion and Proportional Fairness in VotingProceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3490486.3538339(563-600)Online publication date: 12-Jul-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3490486.3538339
Munagala KShen ZWang KBiró PChawla SEchenique F(2021)Optimal Algorithms for Multiwinner Elections and the Chamberlin-Courant RuleProceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3465456.3467624(697-717)Online publication date: 18-Jul-2021
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3465456.3467624

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