research-article

Auctions between Regret-Minimizing Agents

Authors:

Noam NisanAuthors Info & Claims

WWW '22: Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2022

Pages 100 - 111

https://doi.org/10.1145/3485447.3512055

Published: 25 April 2022 Publication History

Abstract

We analyze a scenario in which software agents implemented as regret-minimizing algorithms engage in a repeated auction on behalf of their users. We study first-price and second-price auctions, as well as their generalized versions (e.g., as those used for ad auctions). Using both theoretical analysis and simulations, we show that, surprisingly, in second-price auctions the players have incentives to misreport their true valuations to their own learning agents, while in first-price auctions it is a dominant strategy for all players to truthfully report their valuations to their agents.

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Cited By

Feng YLucier BSlivkins AMohar BShinkar IO'Donnell R(2024)Strategic Budget Selection in a Competitive Autobidding WorldProceedings of the 56th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing10.1145/3618260.3649688(213-224)Online publication date: 10-Jun-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3618260.3649688
Chen ZYang MWang CLi JCai ZRen YZhu ZDeng XChua TNgo CKa-Wei Lee RKumar RLauw H(2024)Budget-Constrained Auctions with Unassured Priors: Strategic Equivalence and Structural PropertiesProceedings of the ACM on Web Conference 202410.1145/3589334.3645344(14-24)Online publication date: 13-May-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3589334.3645344
Fikioris GTardos ELeyton-Brown KSamuelson LHartline J(2023)Liquid Welfare Guarantees for No-Regret Learning in Sequential Budgeted AuctionsProceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3580507.3597772(678-698)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3580507.3597772
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cover image ACM Conferences

WWW '22: Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2022

April 2022

3764 pages

ISBN:9781450390965

DOI:10.1145/3485447

Editors:
Frédérique Laforest
INSA Lyon, France
,
Raphaël Troncy
EURECOM, France
,
Elena Simperl
King’s College London, UK
,
Deepak Agarwal
Pinterest, USA
,
Aristides Gionis
KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden
,
Ivan Herman
W3C / retired
,
Lionel Médini
Université Lyon 1, France

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Published: 25 April 2022

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Cited By

Feng YLucier BSlivkins AMohar BShinkar IO'Donnell R(2024)Strategic Budget Selection in a Competitive Autobidding WorldProceedings of the 56th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing10.1145/3618260.3649688(213-224)Online publication date: 10-Jun-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3618260.3649688
Chen ZYang MWang CLi JCai ZRen YZhu ZDeng XChua TNgo CKa-Wei Lee RKumar RLauw H(2024)Budget-Constrained Auctions with Unassured Priors: Strategic Equivalence and Structural PropertiesProceedings of the ACM on Web Conference 202410.1145/3589334.3645344(14-24)Online publication date: 13-May-2024
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3589334.3645344
Fikioris GTardos ELeyton-Brown KSamuelson LHartline J(2023)Liquid Welfare Guarantees for No-Regret Learning in Sequential Budgeted AuctionsProceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation10.1145/3580507.3597772(678-698)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3580507.3597772
Kolumbus YNisan NKoyejo SMohamed SAgarwal ABelgrave DCho KOh A(2022)How and why to manipulate your own agentProceedings of the 36th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems10.5555/3600270.3602306(28080-28094)Online publication date: 28-Nov-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3600270.3602306
Chen ZDeng XLi JWang CYang M(undefined)Budget-Constrained Auctions with Unassured PriorsSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.4071291
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4071291

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