Zoltan Pozsar-Szentmiklosy

In a case of first impression, the Constitutional Court of Hungary (CCH or Court) ruled on November 30, 2016 that, in exceptional cases, it is competent to consider whether Hungary's obligations to the European Union (EU) violate fundamental individual rights (including human dignity) or Hungarian sovereignty as protected by the Hungarian Constitution. The decision places Hungary squarely within the growing group of EU member states whose constitutional courts have decided that, despite the decisions of the European Court of Justice regarding the primacy of EU law, EU member states are not compelled to violate their domestic constitutional obligations in carrying out their shared EU commitments.

There are several additional advantages to analysing direct democracy within the complex framework of the separation of powers. This model highlights that in manifestations of direct democracy where there is effective control of the legislative organs and a plurality of interests are represented (minority direct democracy), it is possible to handle the classic conflict between representative and direct democracy. On the contrary, manifestations of plebiscitarian direct democracy – designed to support the will of the majority – do not fit into the complex model of the separation of powers. Moreover, this new approach allows us to identify the criteria for an appropriate exercise of direct democracy which is in accordance with its constitutional function.

In Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) CC the Hungarian Constitutional Court introduced in the "vocabulary" of Hungarian Constitutional Law the concept of constitutional identity. The case was based on the request of the ombudsperson for abstract interpretation of the provisions of the Fundamental Law related to the implementation of EU Law, namely an EUC decision on the resettlement of asylum-seekers. While the Constitutional Court did not answer the question of the ombudsperson, it has expressed its position on ultra vires acts of the European Union in general terms. According to the Court, sovereignty of the state, protection of fundamental rights and constitutional identity can pose limits against the implementation of EU Law. Since then, the Seventh Amendment to the Fundamental Law (2018) included these requirements into the text of the constitution. The article offers a detailed overview and a critical analysis of the Decision of the Constitutional Court.

This paper aims at giving an overview of the unique methods of constitutional interpretation used by Canadian courts and their special relevance in fundamental rights disputes, especially those examined based on the principle of proportionality. As the Canadian literature and the practice of the Supreme Court of Canada demonstrates, the well-founded, consistently and transparently used methods of legal interpretation and legal argumentation can strengthen each other and lead to justified and acceptable decisions. In the long run, methodological clarity and certainty supports the more effective protection of fundamental rights.

The approach of this paper is descriptive. First I will present the origins and particularities of the most influential methods of constitutional interpretation used by Canadian courts, the progressive, the purposive, and the generous interpretation. In the second step, I will present
the Canadian form of the proportionality analysis, which, despite its relatively short history, has a significant impact on Comparative Constitutional Law. The hypothesis of this paper is that constitutional interpretation and proportionality reasoning are intertwined. Accordingly,
the appropriate and transparent use of these methods in a common framework enhances the convincing nature and justification of judicial decisions. To test this assumption, I will include a case study analysis in this paper by presenting a classic decision, the Alberta v Hutterian
Brethren case. No doubt many more cases could be examined; however, the author hopes that this model-analysis convinces the reader that the ‘Canadian approach’ to fundamental rights disputes is worth following.

This paper focuses on the theoretical grounds of supermajority, its special relevance in parliamentary systems and the related experiences from Central and Eastern Europe, especially Hungary. In parliamentary systems, the support of the parliamentary majority is a necessity and sufficient condition for governance – there is no need for supermajoritarian decision-making in issues of daily politics. A qualified majority has a different function and is an internal institutional limit of the legislative power – protecting the minority interests against the unilateral decisions of the majority in the most important issues of the political community. The Hungarian situation from 2010–2015 demonstrates that minorities cannot influence the decisions where the supermajority represents a one-party opinion. Moreover, decisions of the supermajority can block future modifications of the future parliamentary majority as well. It will be argued in this paper that only a substantive approach to supermajority can support its basic function.

A magyar Alkotmánybíróság újabb döntéseiben azzal összefüggésben alakult ki vita, hogy az Alaptörvény I. cikk (3) bekezdésében foglalt arányossági mérce csak a jogalkotót köti-e, vagy arra általában az alapjogokat érintő jogalkalmazás (így a bírósági gyakorlat) során is tekintettel kell-e lenni. A vitára reflektálva, az elemzés amellett érvel, hogy az arányossági teszt a bírói gyakorlatban is alkalmazandó módszer, amely összhangba hozható a szakjogágak által támasztott követelményekkel.

Jelen elemzésben az arányossági teszt érvelési keretrendszerében az egyes vizsgálati szakaszokhoz kapcsolódóan kifejtett érvelés jellemzőit vizsgálom. Elsősorban arra keresem a választ, hogy melyek azok az érvelési technikák, amelyek alkalmazása – összhangban az egyes vizsgálati szakaszok funkcionális sajátosságaival – támogatja az arányossági teszt szakszerű alkalmazását, végső soron pedig igazolható döntésekhez vezet.

The paper intends to reach a better understanding of the relevance of media campaign in protecting the fairness of elections. Limitations related to media campaign in the election-period are well-known. Country regulations – based on their different historical background, social context and political culture – vary on a wide range in this respect. Even these limitations in most of the cases have a legitimate aim (the most common of these is preventing powerful political groups from distorting the political contest by using their significantly larger financial resources in promoting themselves) there is no international standard related to the conditions and the extent of the limitations. My position is that such limitations not only affect the sphere of action of political parties and media broadcasting companies, but also the freedom of speech of the members of the political community and the principle of free elections – therefore a careful approach is needed when assessing these regulations.

Az elemzés a Nemzeti Választási Bizottság és a Kúria 2016-os magyarországi "kvótanépszavazást" megelőző döntéseit vizsgálja. Az elemzés konklúziója szerint a Kormány által kezdeményezett népszavazási kérdés több szempontból nem felelt meg az alkotmányos követelményeknek.

Az alkotmányos kultúra – az alkotmány írott szabályain túl – jelentős hatást gyakorol arra, hogy milyen elvek mentén és milyen formában születnek a közhatalmat gyakorló szervek döntései, milyen mozgástér áll rendelkezésükre a társadalmi viszonyok formálásában. Hasonlóképpen az is részben az alkotmányos kultúra függvénye, hogy a társadalmi közeg, amelyben a közhatalmat gyakorló szervek kifejtik tevékenységüket, milyen módon reagál az alkotmányos intézmények döntéseire, milyen elvárásokat támaszt azok tevékenységével szemben. Az alkotmányos kultúrát természetesen az állami szervek, a társadalom, a civil szféra, és a politikai részvételi jogaikkal élő választópolgárok közösen formálják, és az nem függetleníthető az adott társadalom történelmi és kulturális tapasztalataitól. Az alkotmányos kultúrák több szempont szerint csoportosíthatók – azokat nem határozza meg kizárólagosan az adott állam jogrendszere és politikai rendszere. Az alkotmányos és jogállami értékek alapján szerveződő demokráciák vizsgálata során elválasztható egymástól az európai és az amerikai alkotmányos hagyomány. Az elemzés amellett érvel, hogy bár a modern magyar alkotmányosság mindig az európai modellt követte, az Alaptörvényhez köthető tapasztalatok közelebb állnak az amerikai alkotmányos kultúra hagyományához.

Since 1989 in Hungary there have been organised six national referenda related to twelve questions. Based on the content of the questions raised, one can draw a line of evolution in the history of the institution. In 1989 and in 1990 the questions were closely connected to the big political issues of the transition and democracy-building: the timing and procedure of the election of the head of the state and symbolic questions related to the state-socialist period. The 1997 referendum regarded the NATO membership, while the 2003 referendum the EU accession – therefore this period was in close connection with the country's main strategic aims. The 2004 and 2008 referenda were about core political questions – therefore functioned as instruments of outsourced daily political debate between government and opposition. Moreover, during this period sixteen questions were set on the National Assembly's agenda based on succesful popular initiatives. Since 2010 the legislative and the executive power's approach to the classic tools of direct democracy has radically transformed. The Government started to use frequently the so called 'national consultation' in important legislative issues, including the constitution-drafting process. This tool has neither constitutional foundations nor legislative background in the Hungarian legal order. Moreover, it lacks the possible benefits of direct democracy and bears the typical weaknesses of it. Besides, based on the new Fundamental Law of Hungary (2011) and the new Act on Electoral Procedure (2013) the possibility of a successful national referendum has been greatly restricted: there is prescribed as a necessary condition for validity the participation of the majority of the voters in the referendum. This condition was barely reached twice in the preceding decades. Furthermore, the institution of popular initiative is not part of the legal system anymore. The latest events related to direct democracy bear more worrisome developments. The Government initiated a referendum which adressed the European Union related to its competence to decide on settlement of migrants in Hungary – a question which is obviously excluded from the possible topics of national referenda based on the constitutional background and European law. The National Election Committee authenticated the question and its decision was surprisingly upholded by the Curia (the Supreme Court of Hungary). The seventh national referendum in the history of the democratic Hungary (on October 2, 2016) will symbolize a new stage in the line evolution of national referenda, the institution itself becoming an instrument of populist governmental politics. All in all, these tendencies are demonstrating that the classic tools of direct democracy are loosing their relevance in practice while populist instruments are used more frequently. That is why it is of key importance to identify precisely the set of constitutional requiremets related to the genuine exercise of direct democracy and to separate other populist political instruments from these. The aim of the paper is to contribute to the contemporary debate related to this challenge.

There are several additional advantages to analysing direct democracy within the complex framework of the separation of powers. This model highlights that in manifestations of direct democracy where there is effective control of the legislative organs and a plurality of interests are represented (minority direct democracy), it is possible to handle the classic conflict between representative and direct democracy. On the contrary, manifestations of plebiscitarian direct democracy – designed to support the will of the majority – do not fit into the complex model of the separation of powers. Moreover, this new approach allows us to identify the criteria for an appropriate exercise of direct democracy which is in accordance with its constitutional function.