Matteo Bozzon

The aim of this article is to investigate the Habermasian way of problematizing the European political situation through consideration of the conceptual framework within which he develops his proposal. I begin by clarifying various conceptual difficulties that emerge when thinking about politics within the European Union. I then focus on the concept of popular sovereignty as procedure, which Habermas develops in Between Facts and Norms against the historical backdrop of the nation state. In the debate regarding European constitutionalization, the concept of popular sovereignty as procedure first assumes a critical function (made possible owing to its desubstantializing effect) against proponents of the no demos thesis. More recently, Habermas has advanced a concept of shared/divided sovereignty, which becomes indispensable when we consider Europe as a democratic federation. The conclusions hereby drawn disclose two problematic aspects of Habermas’s recent proposal. Respectively, these concern the viability of his approach and the questionable plausibility of this proposed federation’s ability to uphold democracy in terms of self-determination.

(Political Unity and «Secession» Beyond the State. Remarks on Brexit).
Starting out from considering the recent development of Brexit as secessionist movement, the essay investigates into the meaning of the right of withdrawal within a non-state federal community like the European Union. After having analyzed the difficulties raised in the discussion of art. 50 TEU about the right of withdrawal interpreted as constitutional right for the European Union, the essay shows why this right might have the positive function of enhancing the political plurality and of conceiving of a structurally plural political unity. To acquire this function, the withdrawal right requires to be decoupled from the concept of sovereignty and to be considered in its relation to the purposes which justify the creation of the federal union.

Jurgen Habermas is regarded amongst philosophers who have analyzed the new political configurations beyond the nation-state, playing a vital role in the contemporary debate on the European constitution and democracy. Focusing primarily on his works devoted to the Eu-ropean integration, the intent of this paper is to analyze the implications of his rethinking of the " constitution " and the democracy in Europe, starting from the theme of the national constellation crisis. It argues that Habermas' attempt to rethink political identity at the European level is somewhat of an extension of his analysis in Facts and Norms which reveals tensions in relations to the constitu-tive political plurality of Europe. Moreover, the paper outlines in which sense Habermas' recent appeal to the concepts of " divided sovereignty " and " divided/shared constituent power " represents a novelty since it explicitly tries to theorize the EU as a federal, non-statal community. In this regard, this paper discusses some objections to Habermas' proposal which have surfaced in the debate.

This work critically confronts some of the most significant contributions to the political-philosophical and juridical debate over the “constitution” of Europe since the 1990s. The aim of this inquiry is to analyze and problematize the juridical and philosophical categories that have been proposed in attempts to conceive of the constitution beyond the State. I begin by inquiring into a conviction – widespread in jurisprudence, political sciences, sociology and philosophy – that the European Union is characterized by processes which can no longer be captured by relying on the political and juridical categories proper of modern national States.
To fulfill the task of re-thinking the European constitution, scholars have brought two concepts into the spotlight: “political unity” and democratic legitimation. I turn this aforementioned approach around, seeking first to answer the question in the title: Which political and legal concepts need to be considered for a “constitution” of Europe? This question will be taken up from the perspective of historical-conceptual analysis. Such an approach is concerned primarily with the concepts and values that underpin the Constitution and its procedure, taking as secondary an analysis of constitutional mechanisms.
Each chapter of the thesis is mainly dedicated to a single author except for the fourth, which is dedicated to an established theory.
The first two chapters revisit the so-called Grimm-Habermas debate of the mid-90s, named after its most prominent voices, constitutionalist Dieter Grimm and philosopher Jürgen Habermas. Based also on the most recent developments in this debate, these chapters will inquire into Habermas’ and Grimm’s positions on the European Constitution against the backdrop of their analyses of modern constitutionalism and democratic legitimacy.
Dieter Grimm’s contribution on the European Constitution has been correlated both with his historical conceptual inquiries on the genesis of modern constitutionalism and with the topic of the “future of the constitution” in light of the erosion of the national State. The aim of this analysis is to determine the structural link between the modern Constitution and the national State, as it represents the primary obstacle to translating the categories into a Constitution beyond the State. If unity is essentially part of the modern Constitution in relation to its function of constituting and limiting political power, the obstacle to project it into a constitution which has States as its members consists in the impossibility of conserving the plurality and individuality of different political subjects, while simultaneously producing their union.
Chapter 2 addresses Jürgen Habermas’ contribution on the European Constitution from the point of view of Habermas’ masterpiece Fact and Norms (1992). I argue that Habermas’ attempt to rethink political identity and democratic citizenship at the European level is a sort of extension of his analysis in Facts and Norms, because his use of the notion of “solidarity among strangers” represents an attempt to find a new dimension for those categories (or for the political participation) within the post-national constellation. Moreover, Habermas’ recent appeal to the concept of “divided sovereignty” and “pouvoir constituant mixte” in theorizing a federal non-statal community reveals (in)consistencies when coupled with the assumption of democratic self-determination.
Chapter 3 is dedicated to Ingolf Pernice’s theorization of the Verfassungsverbund. On one hand, the chapter individuates the positive elements of Pernice’s theory of constitutionalism (multilevel structure/plurality, dynamicity, etc.), for these elements avoid any reduction of this form of constitutionalism both to statal constitutionalism, and to alternative forms such as the Staatenverbund. On the other hand, my analysis shows the difficulties that arise from grounding this model on a social contract-like theory, especially if at bottom there is a pact among citizens and not the constitution of the body politic.
Chapter 4 inquires into those attempts to rethink the political union within the EU which move from the political and juridical category of “Bund”. Olivier Beaud’s contribution to develop the category of federation also receives a critical analysis, for it clearly insists on the necessity of categories which radically differ from those proper of the State to conceive of politics at the European level. Only radically new categories can help in attributing political dimension to a plurality of subjects whose aim is grounding a new horizon of political action through their political participation. Towards this aim, a relevant role is assumed by the “contractual” dimension of politics and law. This chapter demonstrates why such theories must meet the challenge of relativizing the category of democratic legitimation at the European level; their challenge consists instead in re-thinking the political command not in terms of modern representation. Only this new form of command can warrant the political character of the members constituting a Union, whilst affirming a form of control over it.