Bryan Gibson

This book analyses the ways in which U.S. policy toward Iraq was dictated by its broader Cold War strategy between 1958 and 1975. While most historians have focused on ‘hot’ Cold War conflicts such as Cuba, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, few have recognized Iraq’s significance as a Cold War battleground. This study shows where Iraq fits into the broader historiography of the Cold War in the Middle East. It argues that U.S. decisions and actions were designed to deny the Soviet Union influence over Iraq and a strategic base in the oil-rich Gulf region. This was evident in the Eisenhower administration’s response to Iraq’s revolution in 1958, when it engaged in covert action to prevent communists from gaining control of the state; in the Kennedy administration’s efforts to bolster the first Ba’th regime during its war with the Kurds in 1963 because it perceived it as anti-communist; in the Johnson administration’s support for the anti-communist, Arab nationalist regimes during the mid-1960s; and in the Nixon administration’s decision to support the Kurdish rebels in 1972-75 after the second Ba’thist regime drew Iraq partially into the Soviet orbit. This suggests a clear pattern.

Using newly available primary sources and interviews, this analysis reveals new details on America’s decision-making toward and actions against Iraq during a key part of the Cold War. Significantly, it raises questions about widely held notions, such as the CIA’s alleged involvement in the 1963 Ba’thist coup and the theory that the U.S. sold out the Kurds in 1975. Finally, it argues scholars have relied excessively and uncritically on a leaked congressional report, the Pike Report, which has had a distorting affect on the historiography of U.S.-Iraqi relations. This book seeks to redress these historiographical deficiencies and bring new details to light.

This volume offers a wide-ranging examination of the Iran–Iraq War (1980–88), featuring fresh regional and international perspectives derived from recently available new archival material.

Three decades ago Iran and Iraq became embroiled in a devastating eight-year war which served to re-define the international relations of the Gulf region. The Iran–Iraq War stands as an anomaly in the Cold War era; it was the only significant conflict in which the interests of the United States and Soviet Union unwittingly aligned, with both superpowers ultimately supporting the Iraqi regime.

The Iran–Iraq War re-assesses not only the superpower role in the conflict but also the war’s regional and wider international dimensions by bringing to the fore fresh evidence and new perspectives from a variety of sources. It focuses on a number of themes including the economic dimensions of the war and the roles played by a variety of powers, including the Gulf States, Turkey, France, the Soviet Union and the United States. The contributions to the volume serve to underline that the Iran–Iraq war was a defining conflict, shaping the perspectives of the key protagonists for a generation to come.

This book will be of much interest to students of international and Cold War history, Middle Eastern politics, foreign policy, and International Relations in general.

This modern study of the Iran-Iraq War utilizes newly available primary materials to analyze American policy towards the war and question the veracity of the United States' claims of strict neutrality.

The Iran-Iraq War was one of the deadliest and most costly conflicts in the modern era; thousands of lives were lost. But evidence suggests that the United States was not as neutral a party as it claimed—despite funding and providing intelligence to both countries.

The Iran-Iraq War lasted from September 1980 to August 1988, dominating the landscape of the Middle East and polarizing many of the world's nations for nearly a decade. This new work analyzes the United States' policy towards this vicious and extremely costly war, and questions the veracity of America's claims of strict neutrality.

The contents of Covert Relationship: American Foreign Policy, Intelligence, and the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988 can be broken down into five sections: the conflict's origins, the Carter administration's response to the war, the Reagan administration's actions, changes to American policy during the Iran-Contra Affair, and the collapse of neutrality in the final two years of the war. The author boldly refutes the arguments of other authors about the war, and provides timely and relevant insights regarding American-Iraqi relations in light of the U.S. invasion of Iraq.

Iran’s threat to close the Strait of Hormuz is nothing new, and its neighbors have been preparing for this eventuality for decades.

Ever since the 1980s, fears of Iranian action in the straits have led the Gulf states to build pipelines as a hedge against bad times. Now that tensions are rising once more, the Majalla shines a spotlight on their preparations.