Patrick Porter

An article in The National Interest in July 2016, anticipating the Chilcot Inquiry and arguing that the main warning is not about deception or illegality, but about dogma, unexamined ideological beliefs sincerely held by the architects of the war.

We offer this submission to contribute to one central aspect of the Labour Party's current inquiry into UK Defence, namely whether to retain and renew the British nuclear weapons system. This is not the only choice facing British security strategy, but it is an important choice given the emerging strategic context in which UK Defence will have to operate. It is also a choice contingent on certain decisions that will be made within the current Parliament, particularly the decision to proceed with the construction of four new Successor-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) to replace the aging Vanguard-class boats. We offer four 'bedrock' arguments in favour of retaining the existing UK nuclear posture, commonly known as 'Trident'. Trident includes the D5 ballistic missiles and their warheads, the four Royal Navy SSBNs that carry them, the associated supporting infrastructure, and the Continuous At-Sea Deterrence (CASD) patrols that this complex of equipment and personnel supports. It represents the opinions of the authors alone, and does not represent the opinions of the Strategy and Security Institute, or the University of Exeter. We would welcome your feedback, and would be happy to contribute further if requested. Why should the UK retain the Trident nuclear weapons system? Consider four key points:  The 'nuclear revolution' has happened and cannot be undone. Nuclear technology, materials and know-how cannot be erased. However much we might desire a post-nuclear world, free from the shadow of this potentially genocidal form of weaponry, that bell cannot be unrung. Even in a world where all nuclear states had disarmed, there would still be the possibility that one or more states could reconstitute their nuclear weapons capability, clandestinely or out in the open. A rearmament race in a crisis would be more dangerous and destabilising than the current situation. Worse, insecurity and conflict in a world without nuclear states would probably tempt at least one actor to acquire the capability. Ours is a recursive world, one where 'the other person' reacts to the moves of everyone else. General disarmament would probably offer powerful incentives to one or more states to seize an advantage. This would pose the threat of a nuclear monopoly, and in the hands of a predatory state, one that would go undeterred. We can be thankful that the last time there was a nuclear monopoly, it was in the hands of President Harry Truman, rather than Adolf Hitler. Neither would a world that had finally rid itself of nuclear weapons necessarily be more secure or peaceful, as the pre-nuclear world of major wars and genocide suggests. The question therefore is not how to reverse the nuclear revolution. The question is how should Britain, and the international community, best respond to this irreversible development, and do everything possible to ensure that nuclear weapons form part of the structure of peace.

My forthcoming article in the European Journal of International Security, 2016. I argue that while western states like the UK rightly recognise problems of uncertainty and 'non-linearity' in international life, they also show too much confidence in their capacity to anticipate and prevent problems 'upstream', thus implicitly exempting themselves from the chaos they see in the external environment. Classical realism, that looks to guide thinking beyond 'predicting better', is a valuable resource to draw on. Here's an abstract:

Those who make decisions about national security have to make forecasts, as best they can, even though forecasts are often wrong and life is full of surprises. While this problem is inevitable, policymakers do have control over the assumptions they bring to the task. As I argue, in recent years they have taken a troubling course. In a major recent strategic review in 2010, and again in 2015, British policymakers rightly affirmed the uncertainty of the world, but implicitly regarded their own state as a bringer of order into chaos, somehow transcending the non-linearity of international life. The unintended consequences that interventions have sown suggests this confidence is misplaced. Classical realism is a useful corrective to this temptation. Modern social science focuses predominantly on finding patterns in order to reduce uncertainty and hone imperfect predictive powers. That is a reasonable and necessary project, even if agency, contingency and the limits on knowledge mean that foresight can only modestly improve. Classical realism, however, counsels that governments should go beyond attempts to improve foresight. Those making decisions should insure against the fallibility of their assumptions, marshal their power more conservatively, and prepare for the likelihood of predictive failure by developing the intellectual capability to react to the unknown.