- King's College London, War Studies, Faculty MemberNorwegian Defence Research Establishment, Strategic Analysis and Joint Systems, Faculty Memberadd
- Stig Stenslie is Research Director at the Norwegian Intelligence School (NORIS) and Head of the Centre for Intelligen... moreStig Stenslie is Research Director at the Norwegian Intelligence School (NORIS) and Head of the Centre for Intelligence Studies. He is also Affiliated Senior Researcher at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment and Visiting Professor at King’s College London. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Oslo and has written and lectured extensively on politics in the Middle East, China’s return as a great power, and intelligence. The author can be contacted at stig.stenslie@gmail.com.edit
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In Xi Jinping’s China, the top leadership is getting even more closed, whereas their decisions carry ever more global weight. Ahead of the Chinese Communist Party’s highly important 20th National Congress to be held in the late autumn of... more
In Xi Jinping’s China, the top leadership is getting even more closed, whereas their decisions carry ever more global weight. Ahead of the Chinese Communist Party’s highly important 20th National Congress to be held in the late autumn of 2022, the eyes of the global Intelligence Community are turning to Beijing. How to divine what exactly is going on in the black box of Chinese elite politics at this sensitive moment? This is the million-dollar-question facing analysts of Chinese politics. We argue that there is a gap asking to be bridged between the “art” and “science” of reading Chinese elite politics, or between on the one hand, the traditional Beijingology, and on the other hand, purely academically relevant research. There is a pressing need for a “Beijingology 2.0,” combining the traditional art of the China hands with the most innovative methods and tools derived from social science research into elite studies and text analysis, respectively.
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Stig Stenslie (Senter for etterretningsstudier, Etterretningsskolen) anmelder de tre følgende bøkene: The Problem of Secret Intelligence av Kjetil Anders Hatlebrekke (Edinburgh University Press, 2019); Intelligence Oversight in the... more
Stig Stenslie (Senter for etterretningsstudier, Etterretningsskolen) anmelder de tre følgende bøkene: The Problem of Secret Intelligence av Kjetil Anders Hatlebrekke (Edinburgh University Press, 2019); Intelligence Oversight in the Twenty-First Century, redigert av Ian Leigh og Njord Wegge (Routledge, 2019); og Intelligence Relations in the 21st Century, redigert av Tom Røseth og John Michael Weaver (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020).
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In Xi Jinping’s China, the top leadership is getting even more closed, whereas their decisions carry ever more global weight. Ahead of the Chinese Communist Party’s highly important 20th National Congress to be held in the late autumn of... more
In Xi Jinping’s China, the top leadership is getting even more closed, whereas their decisions carry ever more global weight. Ahead of the Chinese Communist Party’s highly important 20th National Congress to be held in the late autumn of 2022, the eyes of the global Intelligence Community are turning to Beijing. How to divine what exactly is going on in the black box of Chinese elite politics at this sensitive moment? This is the million-dollar-question facing analysts of Chinese politics. We argue that there is a gap asking to be bridged between the “art” and “science” of reading Chinese elite politics, or between on the one hand, the traditional Beijingology, and on the other hand, purely academically relevant research. There is a pressing need for a “Beijingology 2.0,” combining the traditional art of the China hands with the most innovative methods and tools derived from social science research into elite studies and text analysis, respectively.
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Hvilke roller spiller saudiske kvinner i militante bevegelser? Hvordan kan vi forstå at stadig flere kvinner det siste tiåret har engasjert seg innenfor slike bevegelser?
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China’s contemporary leadership does not have a “grand strategy” for the 21st century and it is unlikely that the new leaders, who came into power in 2012–13, will be able to craft one. This is a viewpoint that goes against the... more
China’s contemporary leadership does not have a “grand strategy” for the 21st century and it is unlikely that the new leaders, who came into power in 2012–13, will be able to craft one. This is a viewpoint that goes against the established truth about China’s comeback as a great power in the international arena. China observers concur and to some extent admire the Chinese leadership’s ability to think long term and commitment to patiently work towards the realisation of a grand vision for the “Middle Kingdom”. There is, undoubtedly, a great deal of strategic thinking going on in China, but it has not been translated into any coherent strategy. Today’s Chinese leaders are pragmatists, seeing and seizing every opportunity that arises without a binding plan. They are also introverted, however, and forced to engage in short-term fire-fighting rather than think long term.
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The chapter compares the survival of old regime elites in Tunisia and Egypt after the 2011 uprisings and analyses its enabling factors. Although democracy progressed in Tunisia and collapsed in Egypt, the countries show similarities... more
The chapter compares the survival of old regime elites in Tunisia and Egypt
after the 2011 uprisings and analyses its enabling factors. Although democracy
progressed in Tunisia and collapsed in Egypt, the countries show similarities
in the old elite’s ability to survive the Arab Spring. In both cases, the popular
uprisings resulted in the type of elite circulation that John Higley and György
Lengyel refer to as ‘quasi-replacement circulation’, which is sudden and coerced,
but narrow and shallow. To account for this converging outcome, the chapter
foregrounds the instability, economic decline and information uncertainty in
the countries post-uprising and the navigating resources, which the old elites
possessed. The roots of the quasi-replacement circulation are traced to the old
elites’ privileged access to money, network, the media and, for Egypt, external
support. Only parts of the structures of authority in a political regime are formal. The findings show the importance of evaluating regime change in a broader
view than the formal institutional set-up. In Tunisia and Egypt, the informal
structures of the anciens régimes survived – so did the old regime elites.
after the 2011 uprisings and analyses its enabling factors. Although democracy
progressed in Tunisia and collapsed in Egypt, the countries show similarities
in the old elite’s ability to survive the Arab Spring. In both cases, the popular
uprisings resulted in the type of elite circulation that John Higley and György
Lengyel refer to as ‘quasi-replacement circulation’, which is sudden and coerced,
but narrow and shallow. To account for this converging outcome, the chapter
foregrounds the instability, economic decline and information uncertainty in
the countries post-uprising and the navigating resources, which the old elites
possessed. The roots of the quasi-replacement circulation are traced to the old
elites’ privileged access to money, network, the media and, for Egypt, external
support. Only parts of the structures of authority in a political regime are formal. The findings show the importance of evaluating regime change in a broader
view than the formal institutional set-up. In Tunisia and Egypt, the informal
structures of the anciens régimes survived – so did the old regime elites.
En utvikling i Saudi-Arabia som rokker ved sa’ ud-familiens politiske makt vil få betydelige regionale og globale konsekvenser. Tiden etter 11. september 2001 har tydeliggjort at Sa’ udfamilien er presset på hjemmebane. Folket krever... more
En utvikling i Saudi-Arabia som rokker ved sa’ ud-familiens politiske makt vil få betydelige regionale og globale konsekvenser. Tiden etter 11. september 2001 har tydeliggjort at Sa’ udfamilien er presset på hjemmebane. Folket krever endring. Hvor trygt sitter egentlig Saudi-Arabias kongefamilie med makten?
I september 2004 var det 35 år siden Mu’ ammar al-Gadafi grep makten i Libya. Hans regime feiret seg selv, men den store folkefesten uteble. I hvilken grad er libyerne tilfreds med sin hersker?
Hosni Mubarak har styrt Egypt siden 1981. Ikke siden Muhammed ’ Ali hersket i landet på begynnelsen av 1800-tallet har Egypt opplevd et så stabilt styre. Men Mubarak er 76 år, og et presidentskifte vil komme innen få år. Hvem etterfølger... more
Hosni Mubarak har styrt Egypt siden 1981. Ikke siden Muhammed ’ Ali hersket i landet på begynnelsen av 1800-tallet har Egypt opplevd et så stabilt styre. Men Mubarak er 76 år, og et presidentskifte vil komme innen få år. Hvem etterfølger Hosni Mubarak som egyptisk president? Og hvilke følger vil et presidentskifte ha for landets innenriks- og utenrikspolitikk?
Mandag 1. august ble bortgangen til Saudi-Arabias kong Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud kunngjort. Kongen ble trolig 83 år. Fahd hadde vært landets konge siden 1982. Han var den fjerde i rekken av sønnene til Ibn Saud, Saudi-Arabias... more
Mandag 1. august ble bortgangen til Saudi-Arabias kong Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud kunngjort. Kongen ble trolig 83 år. Fahd hadde vært landets konge siden 1982. Han var den fjerde i rekken av sønnene til Ibn Saud, Saudi-Arabias grunnlegger, til å inneha kongevervet. Hva har Fahds styre og bortgang å si for Saudi-Arabias videre politiske utvikling og stabilitet?
Saudi-Arabias prinsesser øver betydelig politisk innflytelse. Dette til tross for at de ikke besitter noen viktige formelle politiske posisjoner. Enda viktigere er kvinnenes bidrag til å holde samlet kongefamilien, Al Sa‘ud, og dermed... more
Saudi-Arabias prinsesser øver betydelig politisk innflytelse. Dette til tross for at de ikke besitter noen viktige formelle politiske posisjoner. Enda viktigere er kvinnenes bidrag til å holde samlet kongefamilien, Al Sa‘ud, og dermed sikre dens grep om makten.
Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah died the night of January 23, 2015. The king, who was 91, had ruled the kingdom for two decades. After then-King Fahd suffered a stroke in 1995, Abdullah became the country’s de facto ruler, and Abdullah... more
Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah died the night of January 23, 2015. The
king, who was 91, had ruled the kingdom for two decades. After then-King Fahd
suffered a stroke in 1995, Abdullah became the country’s de facto ruler, and Abdullah was formally appointed king when his predecessor died in 2005. Ten years
later, shrouded in a simple white cloth, King Abdullah was buried in an unmarked
grave the same day he died—in line with Wahhabi Islamic teachings. The same
day, Abdullah’s half-brother Salman became the new king, and named his own
brother, Muqrin, crown prince and his nephew, Muhammad bin Nayef, deputy
crown prince. Later that spring, in April, Muqrin was replaced by Muhammad
bin Nayef as crown prince. Meanwhile, the king’s young son, Muhammad bin
Salman, was appointed new deputy crown prince.
king, who was 91, had ruled the kingdom for two decades. After then-King Fahd
suffered a stroke in 1995, Abdullah became the country’s de facto ruler, and Abdullah was formally appointed king when his predecessor died in 2005. Ten years
later, shrouded in a simple white cloth, King Abdullah was buried in an unmarked
grave the same day he died—in line with Wahhabi Islamic teachings. The same
day, Abdullah’s half-brother Salman became the new king, and named his own
brother, Muqrin, crown prince and his nephew, Muhammad bin Nayef, deputy
crown prince. Later that spring, in April, Muqrin was replaced by Muhammad
bin Nayef as crown prince. Meanwhile, the king’s young son, Muhammad bin
Salman, was appointed new deputy crown prince.
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Hvordan har den «arabiske våren» blitt fortolket i Kina? Styresmaktene i Beijing ble tatt på senga av de brå regimeendringene i Midtøsten, og fryktet at uroen skulle inspirere egne opposisjonelle og lede til uro også i Kina. Det er grunn... more
Hvordan har den «arabiske våren» blitt fortolket i Kina? Styresmaktene i Beijing ble tatt på senga av de brå regimeendringene i Midtøsten, og fryktet at uroen skulle inspirere egne opposisjonelle og lede til uro også i Kina. Det er grunn til å tro at de så likheter mellom situasjon i Kina og den i Midtøsten før den arabiske våren. Kinesiske politikere og analytikere har i ettertid pekt på flere årsaker til folkereisningene, blant annet manglende politiske reform, nepotisme og korrupsjon, ujevn fordeling, arbeidsledige unge i byene, spredning av internett og vestlig innblanding. I motsetning til vestlige analyser, vektlegger kinesiske studier i liten grad betydningen av sivilsamfunnet, fraværet av et reelt flerpartisystem og sivil-militære relasjoner. Med henblikk på konsekvensene av den arabiske våren, så er kinesiske analytikere gjennomgående langt mer negative enn de vestlige. Uroen hevdes å ha undergravd stabiliteten i Midtøsten, noe som igjen har skadet regionens økonomiske utvikling og skapt større rom for islamistiske bevegelser.
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Saudi Arabia's princesses possess substantial political influence — even though none of them hold important formal positions. Whoever has the king's ear has the potential to have influence, and fewer are closer to a Saudi king than his... more
Saudi Arabia's princesses possess substantial political influence — even though none of them hold important formal positions. Whoever has the king's ear has the potential to have influence, and fewer are closer to a Saudi king than his mother, sister, wife, and daughter. The areas that the female members of the Al Saud actively seek to influence are related to women's education and job opportunities, and women's health and legal rights. Even more important is their role when it comes to keeping the ruling Al Saud family united and, hence, securing its grip on the power. The princesses perform three important roles in the cohesion of the royal family: they play a key role in the socialisation of young royals, which is an essential precondition for cohesion within the royal family; they are responsible for organising gatherings that bring the extended family together; and some intervene to resolve problems and mediate disputes within the royal family.
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China’s contemporary leadership does not have a “grand strategy” for the 21st century and it is unlikely that the new leaders, who came into power in 2012–13, will be able to craft one. This is a viewpoint that goes against the... more
China’s contemporary leadership does not have a “grand strategy” for the 21st century and it is unlikely that the new leaders, who came into power in 2012–13, will be able to craft one. This is a viewpoint that goes against the established truth about China’s comeback as a great power in the international arena. China observers concur and to some extent admire the Chinese leadership’s ability to think long term and commitment to patiently work towards the realisation of a grand vision for the “Middle Kingdom”. There is, undoubtedly, a great deal of strategic thinking going on in China, but it has not been translated into any coherent strategy. Today’s Chinese leaders are pragmatists, seeing and seizing every opportunity that arises without a binding plan. They are also introverted, however, and forced to engage in short-term fire-fighting rather than think long term.
Research Interests:
Saudi-Arabias prinsesser øver betydelig politisk innflytelse. Dette til tross for at de ikke besitter noen viktige formelle politiske posisjoner. Enda viktigere er kvinnenes bidrag til å holde samlet kongefamilien, Al Sa‘ud, og dermed... more
Saudi-Arabias prinsesser øver betydelig politisk innflytelse. Dette til tross for at de ikke besitter noen viktige formelle politiske posisjoner. Enda viktigere er kvinnenes bidrag til å holde samlet kongefamilien, Al Sa‘ud, og dermed sikre dens grep om makten.
Will China replace the US as the hegemon in the Middle East? Although its interests in and influence over the troubled region are increasing, there is in fact little reason to expect any major shift in China’s strategy. The United States... more
Will China replace the US as the hegemon in the Middle East? Although its interests in and influence over the troubled region are increasing, there is in fact little reason to expect any major shift in China’s strategy. The United States may pull back from the Middle East, but any reduction in American forces or engagement there is likely to be highly calibrated. Beijing will seek to expand its influence in the region, but in a less forward way than the US, adopting more subtle means and a more flexible policy towards its partners. China’s foreign and security policy in the Middle East will probably remain pragmatic and restrained.
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Etter flere tiår med rask økonomisk vekst satser en rekke stater i Asia-og Stillehavsområdet på å utvikle sterkere militærmakt. I denne artikkelen hevdes det at det nå foregår flere våpenkappløp i regionen. Våpenkappløpene skjer på flere... more
Etter flere tiår med rask økonomisk vekst satser en rekke stater i Asia-og Stillehavsområdet på å utvikle sterkere militærmakt. I denne artikkelen hevdes det at det nå foregår flere våpenkappløp i regionen. Våpenkappløpene skjer på flere militære og militærteknologiske områder og mellom ulike kombinasjoner av stater. Et fellestrekk er imidlertid at de er drevet fram av et Kina som ikke bare har vokst seg sterkere, men som også uroer sine naboer på grunn av en mer selvhevdende atferd og en økende satsing på offensive militære kapabiliteter. Våpenkappløpene er ikke like intense som for eksempel det klassiske «Dreadnought-kappløpet» mellom Tyskland og Storbritannia, men de gir like fullt grunnlag for bekymring over det framtidige sikkerhetspolitiske klimaet i Asia-og Stillehavsområdet.
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In January 2015, King Abdullah died and his half-brother, Salman, became king. Three months later, King Salman sparked an apparent succession crisis, reshuffling his own son, Muhammad bin Salman, to be deputy crown prince. In a country... more
In January 2015, King Abdullah died and his half-brother, Salman, became king. Three months later, King Salman sparked an apparent succession crisis, reshuffling his own son, Muhammad bin Salman, to be deputy crown prince. In a country that does not follow primogeniture, is the battle among “third-generation princes” for the House of Saud’s future already on?
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By the end of September, Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen has lasted for six months: The Houthi militiamen and their allies in the Yemeni army are still fighting fiercely, and Sanaa is still not recaptured. The war has from it was initiated... more
By the end of September, Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen has lasted for six months: The Houthi militiamen and their allies in the Yemeni army are still fighting fiercely, and Sanaa is still not recaptured. The war has from it was initiated carried significant political risk, for King Salman, and his son Muhammad bin Salman, who has been portrayed as the mastermind behind Saudi Arabia’s strategy in Yemen. Among the Saudis, one can now notice that the wave of euphoric nationalism that the war initially triggered is being weakened, and criticism of Riyadh’s war is brewing, especially in social media. Far more alarming for King Salman and his son, there appears to be a mounting campaign by some of the senior princes to defenestrate the current monarch and his son. The latter is particularly being criticized for his role in leading the country’s troublesome war in Yemen. King Salman and Muhammad bin Salman cannot accept anything other than Saudi-led success in the war in Yemen. The fact that the war is of existential importance for them, is a powerful incentive to use disproportionate force to achieve a complete victory. This is bad news for the already suffering Yemenis.
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Saudi Arabia's princesses possess substantial political influence — even though none of them hold important formal positions. Whoever has the king's ear has the potential to have influence, and fewer are closer to a Saudi king than his... more
Saudi Arabia's princesses possess substantial political influence — even though none of them hold important formal positions. Whoever has the king's ear has the potential to have influence, and fewer are closer to a Saudi king than his mother, sister, wife, and daughter. The areas that the female members of the Al Saud actively seek to influence are related to women's education and job opportunities, and women's health and legal rights. Even more important is their role when it comes to keeping the ruling Al Saud family united and, hence, securing its grip on the power. The princesses perform three important roles in the cohesion of the royal family: they play a key role in the socialisation of young royals, which is an essential precondition for cohesion within the royal family; they are responsible for organising gatherings that bring the extended family together; and some intervene to resolve problems and mediate disputes within the royal family.
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Xi Jinping is assumed to be China’s strongest leader since Deng Xiaoping – even since Mao, some argue. It might therefore be expected that Xi Jinping, at the top of a oneparty state, has the power and ability to reform China. This article... more
Xi Jinping is assumed to be China’s strongest leader since Deng Xiaoping – even since Mao, some argue. It might therefore be expected that Xi Jinping, at the top of a oneparty state, has the power and ability to reform China. This article analyses how structural constraints limit Xi Jinping’s power and freedom of action using his ability to implement a new course for the country’s economic policy as case. To avoid being caught in the middle-income trap, China must adjust its investment and export-driven model to a more innovation, consumer and welfare-based development model. We use the school of historical institutionalism as framework, and examine how (i) path dependency, (ii) informal structures, norms and values, (iii) institutional autonomy, and (iv) institutional capacity in different ways limit and constrain the power and ability of Xi Jinping to implement a successful restructuring of the country’s economic model.
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On 29 April, the official Saudi Press Agency announced a royal decree stating that the king’s half-brother Muqrin was replaced by Muhammed bin Nayif, the nephew of the king and interior minister, as new heir apparent. At the same time,... more
On 29 April, the official Saudi Press Agency announced a royal decree stating that the king’s half-brother Muqrin was replaced by Muhammed bin Nayif, the nephew of the king and interior minister, as new heir apparent. At the same time, Muhammad bin Salman, son of King Salman, was appointed deputy crown prince, while Foreign Minister Prince Sa‘ud Al Faysal was replaced by Adel al-Jubeir, the Saudi ambassador to the United States. King Salman’s reshuffling will arguably not bring more stability to Saudi Arabia, but rather increase the long-term risk of political instability. It underpins the notion that the Al Sudayri clan of the royal family has carried out a "palace coup". The survival of a dynastic regime like the Saudi depends on unity within the elite. Because of Salman’s reshuffling, the Sudayris are now on their own at the helm of the kingdom. The new king’s ultimate goal seems to be consolidating the succession within at his branch of the family and for his favorite son. Salman’s recent appointments will probably trigger considerable dissatisfaction within the royal family, and nurture future rivalry and potential conflicts between the various family fractions. In particular, the appointment of Muhammad bin Salman is likely to be a source of discord.
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On March 26, Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes on the Houthis and their allies in Yemen. The operation, “Decisive Storm”, was supported by a coalition of Sunni Muslim countries. The military campaign was initiated after Yemeni President... more
On March 26, Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes on the Houthis and their allies in Yemen. The operation, “Decisive Storm”, was supported by a coalition of Sunni Muslim countries. The military campaign was initiated after Yemeni President ‘Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi on March 25 asked the UN Security Council for assistance to stop Houthi militia advancing towards Aden. For Saudi Arabia’s new king, Salman, the military operation is opportune for several reasons. Firstly, through the operation the king hopes that the campaign against the Houthis will strengthen the standing of his son, Muhammad bin Salman, and that a successful end-result will make the young prince respected as an effective leader. Secondly, Salman sees the attack on the Houthis – portrayed as clients of Iran – as an opportune move to rally support among Saudis for the new king and the monarchy. Thirdly, by building a broad coalition behind the military campaign, King Salman seeks to establish Saudi hegemony in the Sunni Muslim world. The operation against the Yemeni Houthis reflects Saudi Arabia’s new adventurous, militaristic foreign policy, and comes with great risk. Hence, the new foreign policy doctrine is controversial within the royal family, and Salman’s decision to attack the Houthis was contested.
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On 23 January, Salman succeeded ‘Abd Allah as king of Saudi Arabia. The same day the new king named his half-brother, Muqrin, crown prince and his nephew, Muhammad bin Nayef, deputy crown prince, making him second in line of succession.... more
On 23 January, Salman succeeded ‘Abd Allah as king of Saudi Arabia. The same day the new king named his half-brother, Muqrin, crown prince and his nephew, Muhammad bin Nayef, deputy crown prince, making him second in line of succession. The king also named his son, Muhammad bin Salman, defence minister and head of the royal court. Through these appointments, Salman initiated the much-debated generational change within the royal family, transferring power from the sons to the grandsons of Ibn Sa‘ud. King Salman has in public pledged to stay on the path of his predecessors, and there are reasons to expect continuity rather than change in the foreign, energy, and domestic politics of Saudi Arabia.
Hvilke roller spiller saudiske kvinner innenfor militante bevegelser? Hvordan kan vi forstå at stadig flere kvinner det siste tiåret har engasjert seg innenfor slike bevegelser?
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Hvordan har den «arabiske våren» blitt fortolket i Kina? Styresmaktene i Beijing ble tatt på senga av de brå regimeendringene i Midtøsten, og fryktet at uroen skulle inspirere egne opposisjonelle og lede til uro også i Kina. Det er grunn... more
Hvordan har den «arabiske våren» blitt fortolket i Kina? Styresmaktene i Beijing ble tatt på senga av de brå regimeendringene i Midtøsten, og fryktet at uroen skulle inspirere egne opposisjonelle og lede til uro også i Kina. Det er grunn til å tro at de så likheter mellom situasjon i Kina og den i Midtøsten før den arabiske våren. Kinesiske politikere og analytikere har i ettertid pekt på flere årsaker til folkereisningene, blant annet manglende politiske reform, nepotisme og korrupsjon, ujevn fordeling, arbeidsledige unge i byene, spredning av internett og vestlig innblanding. I motsetning til vestlige analyser, vektlegger kinesiske studier i liten grad betydningen av sivilsamfunnet, fraværet av et reelt flerpartisystem og sivil-militære relasjoner. Med henblikk på konsekvensene av den arabiske våren, så er kinesiske analytikere gjennomgående langt mer negative enn de vestlige. Uroen hevdes å ha undergravd stabiliteten i Midtøsten, noe som igjen har skadet regionens økonomiske utvikling og skapt større rom for islamistiske bevegelser.
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I ys av Kinas historiske «comeback» blir det å forstå det kinesiske lederskapets intensjoner særlig viktig, også for Norge. Norske og kinesiske myndigheter har en rekke sammenfallende interesser, blant annet knyttet til utviklingen i... more
I ys av Kinas historiske «comeback» blir det å forstå det kinesiske
lederskapets intensjoner særlig viktig, også for Norge. Norske og kinesiske myndigheter har en rekke sammenfallende interesser, blant annet knyttet til utviklingen i Arktis, fredsbevarende operasjoner, nedrustning, energi- og maritim sikkerhet. Men det finnes også interessemotsetninger, knyttet til spørsmål om demokrati og mennes
kerettigheter. En tydelig illustrasjon på dette er de skarpe sanksjonene mot norske myndigheter og næringsinteresser i kjølvannet av nobelprisutdelingen i 2010. Norske interesser påvirkes også indirekte av Kina. Et mer ambisiøst Kina på den internasjonale arena vil medføre endrede prioriteringer hos internasjonale aktører og således
påvirke norske in teresser indirekte. Russland vil kunne velge å spre sitt strategiske fokus og dermed nedprioritere nordområdene militært for også å ivareta interessene i Sentral-Asia og Østen. Dette får i så fall betydning for Norge. USA vil fortsette å forskyve det militære tyngdepunket fra Atlanterhavet til Stillehavet, noe som igjen
vil ha betydning for Norge og vårt lands sikkerhetspolitiske omgivelser.
I drøftingen av hvorvidt det kinesiske lederskapet har en storstrategi
for landets utenriks- og forsvarspolitikk, etablerer jeg et skille mellom
«storstrategisk tenkning» på den ene siden og «storstrategi» på den andre. Argumentet er enkelt: Det tenkes utvilsomt mye rundt strategiske spørsmål i dagens Kina, men min påstand vil være at denne tenkningen ikke har munnet ut i noen helhetlig storstrategi. En forklaring på dette er at dagens kinesiske ledere først og fremst er pragmatikere som verken er drevet av ideologi eller tro, en hindring for realisering av storstrategi. I tillegg er de i økende grad spist opp av kortsiktig «brannslukking» på hjemmebane. Når det gjelder spørsmålet
om Kinas nye ledere, argumenterer jeg for at det er lite trolig at den ny
e generasjonen ledere vil legge en storstrategi til grunn for utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikken. I likhet med sine forgjengere er de pragmatikere, og de vil ha minst like mange presserende, kortsiktige oppgaver de må hanskes med.
lederskapets intensjoner særlig viktig, også for Norge. Norske og kinesiske myndigheter har en rekke sammenfallende interesser, blant annet knyttet til utviklingen i Arktis, fredsbevarende operasjoner, nedrustning, energi- og maritim sikkerhet. Men det finnes også interessemotsetninger, knyttet til spørsmål om demokrati og mennes
kerettigheter. En tydelig illustrasjon på dette er de skarpe sanksjonene mot norske myndigheter og næringsinteresser i kjølvannet av nobelprisutdelingen i 2010. Norske interesser påvirkes også indirekte av Kina. Et mer ambisiøst Kina på den internasjonale arena vil medføre endrede prioriteringer hos internasjonale aktører og således
påvirke norske in teresser indirekte. Russland vil kunne velge å spre sitt strategiske fokus og dermed nedprioritere nordområdene militært for også å ivareta interessene i Sentral-Asia og Østen. Dette får i så fall betydning for Norge. USA vil fortsette å forskyve det militære tyngdepunket fra Atlanterhavet til Stillehavet, noe som igjen
vil ha betydning for Norge og vårt lands sikkerhetspolitiske omgivelser.
I drøftingen av hvorvidt det kinesiske lederskapet har en storstrategi
for landets utenriks- og forsvarspolitikk, etablerer jeg et skille mellom
«storstrategisk tenkning» på den ene siden og «storstrategi» på den andre. Argumentet er enkelt: Det tenkes utvilsomt mye rundt strategiske spørsmål i dagens Kina, men min påstand vil være at denne tenkningen ikke har munnet ut i noen helhetlig storstrategi. En forklaring på dette er at dagens kinesiske ledere først og fremst er pragmatikere som verken er drevet av ideologi eller tro, en hindring for realisering av storstrategi. I tillegg er de i økende grad spist opp av kortsiktig «brannslukking» på hjemmebane. Når det gjelder spørsmålet
om Kinas nye ledere, argumenterer jeg for at det er lite trolig at den ny
e generasjonen ledere vil legge en storstrategi til grunn for utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikken. I likhet med sine forgjengere er de pragmatikere, og de vil ha minst like mange presserende, kortsiktige oppgaver de må hanskes med.
Research Interests:
While a wave of revolutions rolled over the Arab world during the spring of 2011, Saudi Arabia was frequently mentioned as an exception. The unrest apparently never reached the kingdom. But even though few Saudis took to the streets,... more
While a wave of revolutions rolled over the Arab world during the spring of 2011, Saudi Arabia was frequently mentioned as an exception. The unrest apparently never reached the kingdom. But even though few Saudis took to the streets, there was in fact a more extensive political awakening in the kingdom—in the online
sphere. Media organizations and activities in Saudi Arabia are strictly regulated by the ruling Al Saud regime, especially with regard to political topics of high sensitivity. This became particularly apparent when the uprisings started. While the state-controlled media were carefully presenting Al Saud’s stand on developments, many people embraced social media, which were telling another story. The use of social media has since exploded, and it is now the primary arena for
political debate in the kingdom. This article tries to briefly examine media as a means of political opposition and struggle for rights and liberties in Saudi Arabia.
sphere. Media organizations and activities in Saudi Arabia are strictly regulated by the ruling Al Saud regime, especially with regard to political topics of high sensitivity. This became particularly apparent when the uprisings started. While the state-controlled media were carefully presenting Al Saud’s stand on developments, many people embraced social media, which were telling another story. The use of social media has since exploded, and it is now the primary arena for
political debate in the kingdom. This article tries to briefly examine media as a means of political opposition and struggle for rights and liberties in Saudi Arabia.
Research Interests:
Saudierne mobiliserer online, og krever i kraft av å være statsborgere en ny sosial kontrakt som også garanterer deres politiske og sivile rettigheter. Denne utviklingen viser renteniststatens begrensninger når det kommer til å “kjøpe”... more
Saudierne mobiliserer online, og krever i kraft av å være statsborgere en ny sosial kontrakt som også garanterer deres politiske og sivile rettigheter. Denne utviklingen viser renteniststatens begrensninger når det kommer til å “kjøpe” folkets lydighet.
Saudi-Arabia Inc. gir innblikk i de ulike mekanismene som holder kongefamilien ved makten. Siden dets opprettelse i 1932 har vestlige observatører gjentatte ganger spådd kongedømmets fall. Tronfølge, fall i oljeprisen, krig og terror... more
Saudi-Arabia Inc. gir innblikk i de ulike mekanismene som holder kongefamilien ved makten. Siden dets opprettelse i 1932 har vestlige observatører gjentatte ganger spådd kongedømmets fall. Tronfølge, fall i oljeprisen, krig og terror setter alltid fart på dommedagsprofetiene. Likevel har regimet forblitt blant de mest stabile i Midtøsten, og står i så måte i skarp kontrast til de turbulente nabolandene. Sa‘ud-regimets stabilitet er av essensiell betydning langt utenfor kongdømmets grenser, både med tanke på utviklingen i den muslimske verden og det internasjonale energimarkedet. Kombinasjonen av flere forhold forklarer regimets stabilitet. De viktigste forholdene er samholdet innad i Sa‘ud-familien, islam som kilde til politisk legitimitet, oljeinntekter og alliansen med USA.
Research Interests:
This book examines the structure of political power amongst elites inside Saudi Arabia and how they might cope with the very serious challenge posed by succession. Presenting a new and refreshing theoretical approach that links elite... more
This book examines the structure of political power amongst elites inside Saudi Arabia and how they might cope with the very serious challenge posed by succession. Presenting a new and refreshing theoretical approach that links elite integration with regime stability, the author shows that the kingdom’s royal elite is far more integrated than it has generally been given credit for.
Based on extensive field work inside Saudi Arabia, the book offers a detailed, up-to-date survey and assessment of all the key sectors of the elites in the country. The author examines how the succession process has been used in highly different circumstances - including deposition, assassination, and death by old age - and demonstrates how regime stability in Saudi Arabia rests on the royal family’s ability to unite and to solve the challenge of succession. He offers a strong analysis of intra-ruling family mechanisms and dynamics in this notoriously private royal family, and addresses the question of whether, as the number of royals rapidly grows, the elite is able to remain integrated.
Providing a rare insight into the issues facing the royal family and ruling elite in Saudi Arabia, this book will be of great interest to scholars and students of Middle Eastern politics, and Saudi Arabia in particular.
Based on extensive field work inside Saudi Arabia, the book offers a detailed, up-to-date survey and assessment of all the key sectors of the elites in the country. The author examines how the succession process has been used in highly different circumstances - including deposition, assassination, and death by old age - and demonstrates how regime stability in Saudi Arabia rests on the royal family’s ability to unite and to solve the challenge of succession. He offers a strong analysis of intra-ruling family mechanisms and dynamics in this notoriously private royal family, and addresses the question of whether, as the number of royals rapidly grows, the elite is able to remain integrated.
Providing a rare insight into the issues facing the royal family and ruling elite in Saudi Arabia, this book will be of great interest to scholars and students of Middle Eastern politics, and Saudi Arabia in particular.
Research Interests:
Sett utenfra fremstår politikk i Midtøsten som forvirrende, kaotisk og ofte voldelig. Mediene skaper et bilde av Midtøsten som preges av krig, religiøs ekstremisme, terror, uforutsigbarhet og raske omveltninger. Men er regionen virkelig... more
Sett utenfra fremstår politikk i Midtøsten som forvirrende, kaotisk og ofte voldelig. Mediene skaper et bilde av Midtøsten som preges av krig, religiøs ekstremisme, terror, uforutsigbarhet og raske omveltninger. Men er regionen virkelig så ustabil?
Stabilitetens pris setter den populære oppfatningen på hodet og viser at stabilitet faktisk er et fremtredende trekk ved Midtøsten-politikk: Med stabilitet menes regimestabilitet som har preget regionen siden 1970. I tråd med denne observasjonen reiser boka tre viktige spørsmål: Hvordan har regimene i Midtøsten festet sitt grep om makten? Hvilke følger har regimenes maktstrategier for den politiske og sosioøkonomiske utviklingen? Og hvilke krefter truer regimene i dag? Spørsmålene belyses gjennom et bredt spekter av tema: relasjonene mellom samfunn og stat, ideologi og legitimitet, statsmaktens organisering, og perspektiver for fremtiden i form av demokratisering eller sammenbrudd. Hvert tema utdypes gjennom landeksempler hentet fra Jemen, Iran, Marokko, Egypt, Oman, Syria, Irak og Saudi-Arabia.
Stabilitetens pris setter den populære oppfatningen på hodet og viser at stabilitet faktisk er et fremtredende trekk ved Midtøsten-politikk: Med stabilitet menes regimestabilitet som har preget regionen siden 1970. I tråd med denne observasjonen reiser boka tre viktige spørsmål: Hvordan har regimene i Midtøsten festet sitt grep om makten? Hvilke følger har regimenes maktstrategier for den politiske og sosioøkonomiske utviklingen? Og hvilke krefter truer regimene i dag? Spørsmålene belyses gjennom et bredt spekter av tema: relasjonene mellom samfunn og stat, ideologi og legitimitet, statsmaktens organisering, og perspektiver for fremtiden i form av demokratisering eller sammenbrudd. Hvert tema utdypes gjennom landeksempler hentet fra Jemen, Iran, Marokko, Egypt, Oman, Syria, Irak og Saudi-Arabia.
Research Interests:
Communism is dead in China. “China Inc.” is buying up the world. China has the United States over a barrel. The Chinese are just copycats. China is an environmental baddie, China is colonizing Africa. Mao was a monster. The end of the... more
Communism is dead in China. “China Inc.” is buying up the world. China has the United States over a barrel. The Chinese are just copycats. China is an environmental baddie, China is colonizing Africa. Mao was a monster. The end of the Communist regime is near. The 21st century belongs to China. Or does it? Marte Kjær Galtung and Stig Stenslie highlight 49 prevalent myths about China’s past, present, and future and weigh their truth or fiction. Leading an enlightening and entertaining tour, the authors debunk widespread “knowledge” about Chinese culture, society, politics, and economy. In some cases, Chinese themselves encourage mistaken impressions. But many of these myths are really about how we Westerners see ourselves, inasmuch as China or the Chinese people are depicted as what we are not. Western perceptions of the empire in the East have for centuries oscillated between sinophilia and sinophobia, influenced by historical changes in the West as much as by events in China. This timely and provocative book offers an engaging and compelling window on a rising power we often misunderstand.
Research Interests:
I den digitale tid fremstår internasjonal politikk som stadig mer omskiftelig og kompleks. Teknologiutviklingen generelt, og digitaliseringsprosesser spesielt, har utvidet staters og ikke-statlige aktørers handlingsrom. Dette gjør... more
I den digitale tid fremstår internasjonal politikk som stadig mer omskiftelig og kompleks. Teknologiutviklingen generelt, og digitaliseringsprosesser spesielt, har utvidet staters og ikke-statlige aktørers handlingsrom. Dette gjør etterretning mer relevant enn noensinne for de som skal styre Norge.
Hvordan arbeide med etterretningsanalyse i den digitale tid?
Hva slags type spørsmål vil oppdragsgivere ha svar på?
Hvilke metoder og verktøy kan en analytiker støtte seg til?
Hvordan varsle om dagens subtile trusler?
Hvordan fange oppmerksomheten til travle beslutningstakere?
Hvilke særskilte utfordringer er knyttet til politisering og etikk i den digitale tid?
Dette er blant de spørsmålene som drøftes i Etterretningsanalyse i den digitale tid.
Boka vil forberede dagens og morgendagens etterretningsanalytikere på de utfordringer som venter i møte med et stadig mer komplekst trusselbilde.
Hvordan arbeide med etterretningsanalyse i den digitale tid?
Hva slags type spørsmål vil oppdragsgivere ha svar på?
Hvilke metoder og verktøy kan en analytiker støtte seg til?
Hvordan varsle om dagens subtile trusler?
Hvordan fange oppmerksomheten til travle beslutningstakere?
Hvilke særskilte utfordringer er knyttet til politisering og etikk i den digitale tid?
Dette er blant de spørsmålene som drøftes i Etterretningsanalyse i den digitale tid.
Boka vil forberede dagens og morgendagens etterretningsanalytikere på de utfordringer som venter i møte med et stadig mer komplekst trusselbilde.
Research Interests:
In this ground-breaking book, aimed at new generation of students, Stig Stenslie and Kjetil Selvik provide a new introduction to the contemporary Middle East, using topical questions about stability and change as a way of interrogating... more
In this ground-breaking book, aimed at new generation of students, Stig Stenslie and Kjetil Selvik provide a new introduction to the contemporary Middle East, using topical questions about stability and change as a way of interrogating the politics, economics and history of the region. How have regimes from North Africa to the Gulf perpetuated themselves in spite of the weakness of the Western-style state, the Islamist trend, and the destabilising effects of war and terrorism? What strategies have states used to control their societies, and how have both states and societies adapted over time? Both an accessible reference resource and a thought-provoking analysis, Stability and Change in the Modern Middle East introduces the key theoretical concepts for understanding the region and the freshest thinking on debates surrounding them, and brings the empirical material in to sharp focus through its unique thematic approach.
Research Interests:
This book examines the structure of political power amongst elites inside Saudi Arabia and how they might cope with the very serious challenge posed by succession. Presenting a new and refreshing theoretical approach that links elite... more
This book examines the structure of political power amongst elites inside Saudi Arabia and how they might cope with the very serious challenge posed by succession. Presenting a new and refreshing theoretical approach that links elite integration with regime stability, the author shows that the kingdom’s royal elite is far more integrated than it has generally been given credit for.
Based on extensive field work inside Saudi Arabia, the book offers a detailed, up-to-date survey and assessment of all the key sectors of the elites in the country. The author examines how the succession process has been used in highly different circumstances - including deposition, assassination, and death by old age - and demonstrates how regime stability in Saudi Arabia rests on the royal family’s ability to unite and to solve the challenge of succession. He offers a strong analysis of intra-ruling family mechanisms and dynamics in this notoriously private royal family, and addresses the question of whether, as the number of royals rapidly grows, the elite is able to remain integrated.
Providing a rare insight into the issues facing the royal family and ruling elite in Saudi Arabia, this book will be of great interest to scholars and students of Middle Eastern politics, and Saudi Arabia in particular.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction 2. Elite Integration and Regime Stability 3. The Royal Strategic Elite 4. Non-Royal Segment Elites 5. Mechanisms of Elite Integration 6. The Challenge of Succession 7. Conclusion. Appendices
Based on extensive field work inside Saudi Arabia, the book offers a detailed, up-to-date survey and assessment of all the key sectors of the elites in the country. The author examines how the succession process has been used in highly different circumstances - including deposition, assassination, and death by old age - and demonstrates how regime stability in Saudi Arabia rests on the royal family’s ability to unite and to solve the challenge of succession. He offers a strong analysis of intra-ruling family mechanisms and dynamics in this notoriously private royal family, and addresses the question of whether, as the number of royals rapidly grows, the elite is able to remain integrated.
Providing a rare insight into the issues facing the royal family and ruling elite in Saudi Arabia, this book will be of great interest to scholars and students of Middle Eastern politics, and Saudi Arabia in particular.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction 2. Elite Integration and Regime Stability 3. The Royal Strategic Elite 4. Non-Royal Segment Elites 5. Mechanisms of Elite Integration 6. The Challenge of Succession 7. Conclusion. Appendices
Research Interests:
This book examines intelligence analysis in the digital age and demonstrates how intelligence has entered a new era. While intelligence is an ancient activity, the digital age is a relatively new phenomenon. This volume uses the concept... more
This book examines intelligence analysis in the digital age and demonstrates how intelligence has entered a new era.
While intelligence is an ancient activity, the digital age is a relatively new phenomenon. This volume uses the concept of the "digital age" to highlight the increased change, complexity, and pace of information that is now circulated, as new technology has reduced the time it takes to spread news to almost nothing. These factors mean that decision-makers face an increasingly challenging threat environment, which in turn increases the demand for timely, relevant, and reliable intelligence to support policymaking. In this context, the book demonstrates that intelligence places greater demands on analysis work, as the traditional intelligence cycle is no longer adequate as a process description. In the digital age, it is not enough to accumulate as much information as possible to gain a better understanding of the world. To meet customers’ needs, the intelligence process must be centred around the analysis work – which in turn has increased the demand for analysts. Assessments, not least predictions, are now just as important as revealing someone else’s secrets.
This volume will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, security studies, and international relations.
While intelligence is an ancient activity, the digital age is a relatively new phenomenon. This volume uses the concept of the "digital age" to highlight the increased change, complexity, and pace of information that is now circulated, as new technology has reduced the time it takes to spread news to almost nothing. These factors mean that decision-makers face an increasingly challenging threat environment, which in turn increases the demand for timely, relevant, and reliable intelligence to support policymaking. In this context, the book demonstrates that intelligence places greater demands on analysis work, as the traditional intelligence cycle is no longer adequate as a process description. In the digital age, it is not enough to accumulate as much information as possible to gain a better understanding of the world. To meet customers’ needs, the intelligence process must be centred around the analysis work – which in turn has increased the demand for analysts. Assessments, not least predictions, are now just as important as revealing someone else’s secrets.
This volume will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, security studies, and international relations.
Research Interests:
Xi Jinping er en av verdens mest innflytelsesrike politiske ledere. Mytene om ham er mange. Men hvem er han? Og hva er egentlig hans politiske prosjekt for Kina? Under Xi har Kina blitt en global supermakt som utfordrer USAs rolle og er... more
Xi Jinping er en av verdens mest innflytelsesrike politiske ledere. Mytene om ham er mange. Men hvem er han? Og hva er egentlig hans politiske prosjekt for Kina?
Under Xi har Kina blitt en global supermakt som utfordrer USAs rolle og er et land Norge i stadig større grad føler på tennene. Samtidig har Xi sentralisert og monopolisert makt på hjemmebane på en måte ingen har klart i Kina siden Mao. Hans kontroll over det politiske apparatet, rettsvesenet, sikkerhetstjenestene og mediene er nærmest absolutt, og landet har de siste årene utviklet seg raskt i en stadig mer autoritær retning.
Observatører som har fulgt Kina tett, har blitt overrasket over retningen landet har tatt under Xi. Under Kulturrevolusjonen ble Xis familie utstøtt og forfulgt. Allerede som barn erfarte han hva det ville si å få en hard behandling av partiet. Mange forventet derfor en pragmatisk og reformorientert leder da Xi kom til makten. I stedet har Xi vist seg som det motsatte: en ekstremt partitro og autoritær leder som ikke skyr noen midler i kampen for å revitalisere den kommunistiske revolusjon.
For å forstå Kina i dag er det helt nødvendig å forstå Xi Jinping. I denne boka bruker forfatterne Xis liv som prisme for å forstå landets politiske utvikling de siste ti årene. I hvilken retning går Kina, og hva har det å si for kinesere flest - og verden for øvrig?
Under Xi har Kina blitt en global supermakt som utfordrer USAs rolle og er et land Norge i stadig større grad føler på tennene. Samtidig har Xi sentralisert og monopolisert makt på hjemmebane på en måte ingen har klart i Kina siden Mao. Hans kontroll over det politiske apparatet, rettsvesenet, sikkerhetstjenestene og mediene er nærmest absolutt, og landet har de siste årene utviklet seg raskt i en stadig mer autoritær retning.
Observatører som har fulgt Kina tett, har blitt overrasket over retningen landet har tatt under Xi. Under Kulturrevolusjonen ble Xis familie utstøtt og forfulgt. Allerede som barn erfarte han hva det ville si å få en hard behandling av partiet. Mange forventet derfor en pragmatisk og reformorientert leder da Xi kom til makten. I stedet har Xi vist seg som det motsatte: en ekstremt partitro og autoritær leder som ikke skyr noen midler i kampen for å revitalisere den kommunistiske revolusjon.
For å forstå Kina i dag er det helt nødvendig å forstå Xi Jinping. I denne boka bruker forfatterne Xis liv som prisme for å forstå landets politiske utvikling de siste ti årene. I hvilken retning går Kina, og hva har det å si for kinesere flest - og verden for øvrig?