Xi Jinping

This book places the presidency of Donald Trump as well as the brewing Sino-American Cold War within the broader historical context of American hegemony in Asia, which traces its roots to Alfred Thayer Mahan’s call for a naval build up in the Pacific, the subsequent colonization of the Philippines and, ultimately, reaching its apotheosis after the defeat of Imperial Japan in the Second World War. The book, drawing on visits from Cairo to California and Perth to Pyongyang as well as interviews and exchanges with heads of state and senior officials from across the Indo-Pacific, provides an overview of the arc of American primacy in the region for scholars, journalists, and concerned citizens.

In political science an accent on individuals (political leaders) in researching politics is neither popular nor advocated one. In authoritarian countries like Russia or China, however, political leaders and their personalities are a crucial factor in trying to understand the political processes there. Both Vladimir Putin in Russia and Xi Jinping in China have dominated their respective political systems. This, combined with good state of Russia-China relations makes it an interesting case study of the influence of political leaders on authoritarian countries. Both Putin and Xi are new type of leaders: they both follow the main ideas of political realism (though with "national differences") and they share a 19 th century outlook on the global affairs ("concert of powers") yet they use contemporary means to fulfil these interests. Their personal understanding provides a predictability and stability: both Putin and Xi function in accordance with balance of power and respect for zones of influence concepts. That is why differences in other spheres, like Rus-sia's and China's approaches to the USA do not influence the general good mood of Sino-Russian relationship.

“En tiempos difíciles tengamos presente nuestros éxitos, ver nuestra brillante perspectiva y aumentar nuestro coraje.”
Mao Zedong

No hay institución en China más poderosa que el Partido Comunista; controla el gobierno, es el único partido político del gigante asiático; con 88.7 millones de militantes es el más grande partido político del mundo e incluso por cifras supera la población de muchos países del mundo. Su historia no puede desvincularse de los últimos cien años de China. De hecho en 1921 año de su creación; solo contaba con 50 miembros; pero Desde 1949, cuando se fundó la República Popular de China, el número de miembros asciende constantemente haciendo que al día de hoy, uno de cada 15 chinos sea miembro del partido.

Los “taizidang” o príncipes comunistas y la 5ta generación de líderes
Los estudios occidentales clasifican a la dirigencia del PCCh de acuerdo a las hasta ahora cinco generaciones de líderes identificadas que aglutinan ciertas características. Xi Jinping pertenece ya a la quinta y actual y prepara el terreno para la sexta generación de líderes. La primera generación fue la de los fundadores del PCCh y la actual China. Mao la encabezó y se caracterizó por el denominado “culto a la personalidad” y el afianzamiento de las tesis comunistas. La segunda generación es la de las transformaciones y el viraje a la economía de mercado con Deng Xiaoping de líder. La tercera corresponde al liderazgo de Jiang Zemin; a quien le correspondió afianzar el crecimiento chino y su irrupción en el escenario global.

El “Presidente de todo” y el riesgo del “autoritarismo fragmentado”

Desde Deng Xiaoping, ningún otro dirigente chino acumuló tanto poder como Xi Jinping. Todos pasaron al retiro discretamente incluso luego de incluso aprobar “purgas” políticas para consolidar el poder. Pero la designación de Xi Jinping de “núcleo” del partido le otorga un poder casi absoluto; su afianzamiento se debió a que encabezó una lucha contra la corrupción pero se le acusa que para limpiar el PCCh y librarse de los opositores. De hecho textualmente el comunicado oficial del PCCh al término del cónclave fue que “todos los miembros del partido deben "estrechamente unirse en torno al Comité Central con el camarada Xi Jinping como el núcleo" pero matiza diciendo también que la dirección de la nación es colegiada.

El poder de las políticas de mercado y el año de la transición

Con una dirección comunista en lo político y en políticas públicas sociales, el PCCh ha sido también garante de la conducción económica de mercado y de apertura comercial. Con el nombramiento de “núcleo” del partido, Xi Jinping se asegura el liderazgo en la conducción política interna y externa, la económica y también en materia de seguridad nacional. La reunión del pleno de este año, es interpretada como el banderazo de salida hacia un año de transición, en donde a finales del año que viene, tendrá que elegirse un nuevo dirigente.

This article aims to analyze how the One Belt and One Road Initiative (OBOR) is framed by the European Italian speaking press. It provides a deductive content analysis on the historical visit of President Xi Jinping in Italy, the first G7 country to sign a memorandum of understating on One Belt and One Road Initiative, on March 2019. The article analyses the reports published on the most popular Italian newspapers on Xi’s visit to Italy. Providing four categories to interpret the news frames, it empirically demonstrates how China is negatively presented and perceived in the Italian press.

Doomsday predictions on China and on Xi’s future, must be made with caution. Projections that Xi faces ingrained resistance from intra-party factionalism, or is locked in a battle for control, and that his apparent failures in handling the economy or the pandemic may lead to thwarting of his ambitions are either overblown, or mere wishful thinking. In fact, the widely prevalent theory that Xi may be forced to make key concessions on admitting his followers into the CCP’s highest decision-making body in exchange for another stint is unsupported by any concrete evidence.

Le récit des crimes du 7 janvier 2015 comme leur motif le plus évident - les caricatures du prophète Mahomet - ont fait le tour du monde, nourrissant des réactions et des interprétations multiples et divergentes malgré l’unanimisme des condamnations. Les lignes qui suivent se penchent sur la réception de cette tragédie en Chine. Ce texte ne s’aventure pas sur les causes multiples et complexes qui ont rendu possible ces drames sauf à préciser qu’une idéologie mortifère et totalitaire s’est épanouie sur une pluralité de facteurs et de temporalités indémêlables. Parmi les enjeux de dimension globale soulevés par ces évènements, il est possible d’identifier pêle-mêle les pratiques terroristes de l’islamisme radical, la place des minorités dans les états-nations contemporains, la question du blasphème visant des figures politiques ou religieuses, la liberté d’expression et ses limites. Dans la longue durée, ces évènements percutent aussi la condition postcoloniale du monde, et le legs d’une hégémonie non seulement géopolitique et économique mais aussi culturelle et épistémologique des sociétés occidentales. Si les sujets évoqués dans les lignes précédentes ont bien été mobilisés parmi les interprétations « chinoises » de ces attentats, la distance culturelle, politique et affective avec les évènements a parfois empêché les commentateurs chinois de saisir certains aspects du drame propres à un imaginaire national, un contexte idéologique et un langage politique spécifiquement français. La résonance globale de ces évènements ne saurait ainsi occulter que leur interprétation se déploya au sein d’un imaginaire institué déterminé par des enjeux politiques, idéologiques et linguistiques propres à la société chinoise. Parler d’une réception « chinoise » comporte le risque d’une simplification abusive et d’une essentialisation discutable d’un espace social, politique et culturel hétérogène. Un imaginaire dominant quelque peu paresseux qui réduit la « Chine » à son régime politique autoritaire empêche trop souvent de saisir les nuances, les variations et les dynamiques internes à la société chinoise. Des points de vue parfois divergents ont pu apparaitre dans les commentaires et les interprétations des évènements de janvier 2015, en fonction du statut des auteurs, des rubriques ou des titres de presse. Cette absence d’opinion unanime fut encore plus flagrante sur les réseaux sociaux pendant les quelques jours qui ont suivi les évènements. Plus tardivement, des articles de facture plus théoriques se sont confrontés au sujet dans des revues académiques et à partir de perspectives disciplinaires variées telles que la sociologie des media, les sciences de la communication, la philosophie, les études françaises. Des publications de think tanks rattachés au Parti ont aussi proposés des analyses visant à rappeler la doxa marxiste-léniniste sur la nature et le rôle de la presse dans les sociétés occidentales. Qu’il s’agisse de la presse, des textes académiques ou des interventions d’acteurs étatiques, la position dominante peut se synthétiser à grand traits de la façon suivante : une condamnation unanime et ferme du terrorisme associée à des marques appuyées de solidarité avec les victimes et, quasi-simultanément, l’apparition de critiques à l’endroit des journalistes de Charlie Hebdo en tant qu’ils incarnaient une position, un discours et des valeurs « occidentales » antagonistes avec le modèle défendu par l’Etat-Parti.
Ce sont les fondements idéologiques et politiques, mais aussi parfois épistémologiques et historiographiques, de cette critique, que cet essai se propose d’interroger, sachant que la fonction métonymique de « Charlie » en tant que symbole global de « valeurs occidentales » putatives ne s’est évidemment pas limitée pas au contexte chinois. Dans quelle mesure, et comment, ces évènements ont-ils trouvé une résonance discursive et des correspondances idéologiques dans l’espace politico-médiatique chinois ? Quelle fut la fonction de cette critique du journal satirique dans le contexte idéologique et politique chinois ? Bref, de quoi les caricatures de Charlie Hebdo ont-elles été le nom en Chine continentale ?

La globalizzazione è davvero morta? Oppure sta cambiando solo pa-drone? Ma è davvero possibile guidarla? E ancora: cosa ha significato la presidenza Trump? Cosa sarà l'America di Biden? La Cina di Xi sarà il nuovo impero e l'Europa la sua ancella? Cosa resterà di una civilizza-zione, quella occidentale, sempre più attratta dalla cancel culture e dal-le retoriche del politicamente corretto?
Mentre la cultura europea pare imprigionata tra purificazione ed autoepurazione della propria storia passata, il resto del mondo si muove a velocità supersonica e lo sguardo degli analisti è annebbiato, la loro mente confusa da una folla di do-mande suscitate da sfide epocali. Sono passati poco più di trent'anni dal crollo del Muro di Berli-no e oggi possiamo affermare che il mondo è così profondamente mu-tato che di questo trentennio, a suo modo rivoluzionario, è giunto il momento di trarre un primo bilancio.
Inedite potenze ideologiche e militari emergono, gli spazi del conflitto internazionale aumentano, il disorientamento culturale avanza mentre tutto diventa digitale, la co-municazione soffoca tra social media e fake news, la geografia politica è stravolta: nuove mappe sono dunque necessarie.
Il libro offre tre punti di vista sulla crisi, differenti per sensibilità e formazione (filosofico-politologica, storica, geopolitica), che convergo-no su un punto: le classi dirigenti occidentali devono possedere almeno una virtù, la lungimiranza, ovvero una certa capacità di previsione per non condannare le società da esse guidate a far la fine dei sonnambuli.

The recent course of events suggest an upswing in the diplomatic equation shared between China and Japan. The frosty relationship seems to be experiencing ‘new warmth’ after a hiatus of tensions over historical issues and territorial dispute in the East China Sea. The ongoing reciprocity can be gauged from the change in their respective attitude towards the other. Most significantly, the sign of progress was witnessed at the 40 minutes long meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on the sidelines of the G20 Summit at Hamburg, Germany. This marked the first one-on-one meeting between the two leaders after an interregnum since a brief meeting on the sidelines of the 2016 APEC Summit. Thereby, the Xi-Abe meeting at G20 is not just symbolic but also significant.

For UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet, a visit to China has been in the works for years, and with it comes high stakes. Responding to reports that in the western Chinese province of Xinjiang, more than one million Uyghur Muslims had been subject to torture as well as imprisoned in so-called re-education camps, the United Nations requested direct access to Chinese facilities as early as 2018. Despite the fact that information has been slow to trickle out of authoritarian China due to strict control over national media, international researchers and human rights activists gathered convincing evidence, calling out the deplorable conditions facing the Uyghur Muslim population, from prolonged detainment, mass surveillance, forced sterilization, to the accusation of cultural genocide. A trove of data recently obtained by hackers includes 2,800 photographs, hundreds of spreadsheets, and speeches that link Chinese President Xi Jinping directly with abusive policies aimed at the Uyghur population.

This article is a case study of a lay Buddhist community that employs a business model called “living hall” (Shenghuo guan 生活馆) to facilitate the practice of Tibetan Buddhism among its members. The living hall model is explored in the context of the politics of religion in the People’s Republic of China (prc) and the dynamics of Tibetan Buddhism among Han Chinese in the past decades. The author investigates the model’s origin, its implementation in a contemporary Buddhist community, and its interaction with the discourse on Buddhism in the prc. The article joins a recent academic endeavor to illuminate the different modalities in which lay practitioners carry out Buddhist practice outside the sphere of institutionalized Buddhism. The article sheds light on the delicate dynamics between religion and state control in the prc and the role of entrepreneurs and materiality within lay Tibetan Buddhism.

To suggest, 19th Party Congress had two significant implications: first, it acted as the test case to Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power and, second, it provided a trajectory to assess China’s future political transition. Given this context, the present paper reflects on changing nature of China’s politics and military under the rule of Xi Jinping. Does this exemplify that China is retreating back to its “One-Man Rule”? Is Xi Jinping the new “Tianxia” of PRC?

From past to now, China, as a socialist-communist country, has always kept its citizens under control. In modern world, technology and digitalization develop rapidly and hence it is difficult to control every single person, hereby the government fearing to lose its control. The Chinese Government is currently attempting to find solutions and prevent the worst case scenario. Consequently, the government decided to apply a digital scheme that can control every single person in the nation. This system is called the Social Credit System (SCS). This system has developed to control different ethnic groups and opponents in particular, according to politicians and resources. It is planned to be fully implemented by 2020, but the system has already been examined by the government and private mega companies such as Alibaba and WeChat who are cooperating with the government to implement the SCS. Data collection and its application play a crucial role in the system, as well as maintaining citizens’ approval. The government can ultimately have power not only in the physical world but also in the digital world, where things of digitalization has drastically changed people’s lives, in turn giving away their privacy.

A speech by China's leader, Xi Jinping, at the Beijing Forum on Literature and Art in 2014 provides background to understand why the opening of a PRC film set in World War II, "The Eight Hundred," due to premiere on July 5, 2019, was canceled.  Comparisons with Mao Zedong’s 1942 Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art, and Lenin’s 1905 “Party Organization and Party Literature” seem apt.

China’s OBOR has been presented as China’s leading and very ambitious development project for the next four decades. Some see in it the Chinese Marshall Plan aiming to integrate China in its environment and accommodate the policies of the East Asian countries into Beijing’s own ambitions and priorities. China has the financial resources, the institutional frameworks such as the AIIB, the will and the power to make it work. The megaproject comes at a time of America’s retreat from East Asian initiatives like the TPP and downgrade of the security and defense alliances that the U.S. maintains with several Asian nations. The initiative was received initially with reservations from Russia, a major Eurasian power, and as a security challenge in Russia’s backyard. But the very special “momentum” in Putin-Xi relationship seems to reunite Russia-China divergent interests. If this megaproject succeeds what will be the long-term consequences for the international order, as we know it?

Este artículo analiza la conexión entre el cambio político interno y la reestructuración de la política exterior de Brasil y su influencia en el diseño, la definición, la potencialización y la limitación de la relación política y económica con China en el periodo de Luiz Inácio Lula
da Silva (enero 2003-enero 2011) a Jair Bolsonaro (enero 2019-enero 2023). Se destacan dos etapas contrapuestas de cambios políticos importantes que han incidido en la reestructuración de la política exterior brasileña: de la izquierda progresista de alcances globales a la ultraderecha neonacionalista y antiglobal. Argumenta que en el marco de un sistema multipolar creado por el nuevo equilibrio de poderes, la decisión política del presidente Bolsonaro de alinearse a Estados Unidos no es en función de Washington, sino en función de China: en la política de contención al poderío chino. Concluye que China como primer socio comercial de Brasil y con una balanza comercial a favor de la última
desde los inicios del siglo XXI, la nueva administración brasileña difícilmente podrá disociarse del factor chino, por buenas o malas razones.

As part of a larger project, this paper serves as an overview that examines how “ai” 愛 (love) as an affective concept made its way into the Chinese vocabulary, how it gained popularity at specific junctures in modern Chinese history, and the ways in which it has been adapted as a marker of modernity and a political discourse in Republican (1911–49) an  Communist China (1949–) in distinct ways. Although literary scholars have noted the significance of the shaping of love as an affective concept for the project of Chinese modernity, they mainly focus on the conceptions and interpretations of love in the literature, and with a time frame from late imperial (1368–1911) to Maoist China (1949–76). The few studies about love in post-Mao era usually attribute the sources of such affect to Christianity. My paper makes a fresh contribution in three aspects. First, I take a longer historical perspective, from the 1910s to the 2010s, and dedicate, secondly, a large part of my study to the decisive impact from revolutionary radicalism to popular religions on the formation of the discourse of state propaganda and everyday politics, rather than manifestations in the literature and sources from Christianity. Third, I study some of the most controversial political figures in modern China, including Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), Mao Zedong (1893–1976), and Xi Jinping (1953–), rather than intellectuals and writers only.

An assessment of "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” which was added to China’s constitution following the 19th Communist Party Congress. What sort of Marxism is Xi Thought? It is state Marxism. Xi's goal of making China Marxist again is to shore up state authority, rejuvenate the Chinese people, and polish the global image both of the country as well as “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” It is not to help the people rise up—workers of the world seeking to lose their chains will have to look elsewhere.

After Xi Jinping's 2012 took over as the general secretary of the CCP, many experts pointed out some that his political agenda and style of politics present a gradual break of long-standing way of Chinese collective leadership, which has been one of the hallmarks of the post-1978 reform era. Furthermore, many experts interpret Xi's strong position within Chinese political system together with his reliance on more stringent control of ideological and factual control of the Chinese society as gradual of return to Maoism. Xi is seen by many as quite different kind of politician than were two previous Chinese " paramount leaders " (Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao), who is not afraid to centralize power within the party and state apparatus together with stronger reliance on more orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideological tenants. In my paper, I analyze Xi's political strategies and leadership style by comparison with that of the Maoist era of the PRC (1949-1976). I come to conclusion than superficially there are some resemblances between Xi and Mao, however, Maoist slogans are mostly used as a tool for installing better party discipline. Furthermore, some of the most controversial (and in the end counterproductive) characteristics of Mao's rule over China are missing from the political strategy of contemporary Chinese president and CCP general secretary, primarily the emphasis on nationwide mass campaign with goal to mobilize the revolutionary potential of Chinese masses.

I numeri di un successo straordinario, 11 – La prima fase:
1949-1978. Mao e la costruzione del «sistema socialista di
base», 14 – La seconda fase: dal 1978 a oggi. La svolta di
Deng e la «politica di riforme e apertura», 19 – Forme di
distribuzione e di proprietà nella Cina contemporanea,
26 – Le SOE e il ruolo della proprietà pubblica, 30 – La
«mano visibile» dello Stato e la strategia di sviluppo, 41 –
The Clash of Names. La Cina: capitalismo o socialismo?,
44 – Confronto con i caratteri della società di transizione
e della prima fase del comunismo secondo Marx, 46 – I
problemi di definizione delle società postrivoluzionarie: tre
nodi problematici, 56 – Soluzioni del problema: società di
transizione, socialismo come formazione sociale relativamente
indipendente e «fase primaria» del socialismo, 62 –
Conclusione, 66

Relations between Latin America and Asia—by Asia in this case we refer to that broad swath of the Asian land mass that goes from East Asia through Southeast Asia all the way to South Asia—are undergoing a very special moment. It is precisely at moments like this that systematic reflection and analysis about the future course and direction of these links needs to happen. Much work has been done on Sino-LAC relations; some (particularly in previous decades) on the long-standing ties between Japan and the region; and Indo-LAC links are only now starting to trigger some interest. But broader reflections on the direction, pace, and quality of Asia-LAC links remain relatively few and far between.

The purpose of this volume, designed as the first part of a broader project, is to help fill this void and initiate a wide-ranging discussion about the current course of these ties: whether they should be nudged in one direction or another; what to make of present economic opportunities, and what the implications of the latter are for Latin America’s long-term development goals. Starting from current economic trends, its goal is to explore the implications of existing trade and investment patterns in Asia-LAC links. We have selected some of the most important cases in the region, but by no means all of them. Missing from this volume are significant players such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Cuba, and Costa Rica, among others, including the small states of the Caribbean. We hope to include them in future stages.

Among the questions we consider are the following: What can be done to mitigate, if not totally avoid, the “de-industrializing” effects of the demand for Latin American natural resources coming from Asia? What is the significance, if any, of the fact that trade between the two regions is largely intersectoral, with Latin America exporting mostly commodities to Asia and Asia in turn selling mostly industrial and consumer products, including many high-tech ones, to Latin America? What can Latin American countries do to get into the Asian value-added chains of production? Given that since 2003, an average of 2.3 regional trade agreements (RTAs) per year have been signed between countries of these two regions, are further FTAs and RTAs between Asia and LAC countries, like the ones between Chile and China, India and South Korea, or the one between MERCOSUR and India, the way forward? Is Taiwan still a relevant actor or have countries that have historically maintained diplomatic relations with it been seduced by the opportunities that China represents, thus leaving Taiwan behind? Are Argentina’s measures to limit foreign ownership of agricultural land a harbinger of things to come, as Asian companies move into South America? And, without downplaying China’s unmistakable role in South America’s recent prosperity, what are the sources of conflict and friction and how can they best be addressed?

Além de promover objetivos domésticos do presidente dos EUA, a Doutrina Trump sinaliza uma perda de fôlego das democracias liberais frente ao crescimento de regimes que contestam as regras prevalentes no sistema internacional após o fim da Guerra Fria.

A busca da aquiescência chinesa se articula com a tentativa de isolar a Rússia, logo após as reeleições dos presidentes Jinping e Putin.

A crise das democracias liberais se torna mais aguda e visível, diante da cautela e ação reativas que seus protagonistas adotam, face à ascensão da China e à busca de protagonismo da Rússia.

Publicado em SRZD em 09 de Maio de 2018

http://www.srzd.com/geral/arte-negociacao-coreias-ira-donald-trump/

Статья посвящена современным подходам КНР к международным проблемам и основным изменениям в китайской дипломатии после прихода Си Цзиньпина к власти в 2012 г. Дипломатия Си Цзиньпина характеризуется постепенным отходом от внешнеполитической концепции Дэн Сяопина. В статье рассматриваются инновации, стратегические идеи и новые дипломатические инициативы китайского руководства, а также вызовы, с которыми сталкивается Китай как один из ведущих глобальных игроков. С точки зрения автора, зарубежные оценки внешней политики Китая остаются в русле официальных китайских концепций, которые склонны преувеличивать стремительность и революционность изменений в дипломатическом курсе Си Цзиньпина.
ДЛЯ ЦИТИРОВАНИЯ: Денисов И.Е. (2017). Внешняя политика Китая при Си Цзиньпине: преемственность и новаторство. Контуры глобальных трансформаций: политика, экономика, право, 10 (5). 83-98. DOI: 10.23932/2542- 0240-2017-10-5-83-98

As part of the gLAWcal - Global Law Initiatives for Sustainable Development (United Kingdom) results and book series, a book was published CHINA’S INFLUENCE ON NON-TRADE CONCERNS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, Climate Change, Sustainable Development, Protection of Environment, Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, Labour Rights, Public Health, Food and Product Safety, Global Law and Sustainable Development Book Series, Routledge Publishing (London/New-York), September 2016, pp. 1-584 TO DOWNLOAD FRONT AND BACK COVER, TABLE OF CONTENTS, INTRODUCTION OF THE BOOK, FOREWORDS AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS, PLEASE SEE THE FOLLOWING LINK: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2876883 To purchase the book, you can refer to the publisher website: https://www.routledge.com/Chinas-Influence-on-Non-Trade-Concerns-in-International-Economic-Law/Farah-Cima/p/book/9781409448488

FP7-PEOPLE-2010 IRSES
Marie Curie Irses

The event is organized by

gLAWcal – Global Law Initiatives for Sustainable Development (United Kingdom)

Institutions organizing the Workshop within the LIBEAC Consortium:

University Institute of European Studies (IUSE) in Turin, Italy
University of Piemonte Orientale, Novara, Italy
Peking University, School of Government, Center for European Studies (China)
Tsinghua University, Department of Philosophy (China)
Tsinghua University, School of Public Policy and Management (China)
Aix-Marseille University, CEPERC (France)

        Project LIBEAC
Liberalism in Between Europe and China

    WORKSHOP ON

SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVE ON CHINESE –POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC – LIBERALISM TODAY

held at
Peking University, School of Government, Center for European Studies (China)

                                    Time: Morning, 8 Aug. 2014
                               
                      Beijing, China

8:00 - 8:30 Registration

8:30  Welcoming speeches

8:30 – 8:40
Addressing – Paolo Davide FARAH, West Virginia University (WV, USA), LIBEAC Legal Work-package Leader & Research Unit Coordinator at University Institute of European Studies – IUSE (Italy), gLAWcal – Global Law Initiatives for Sustainable Development (United Kingdom)

Addressing – Jean-Yves HEURTEBISE, LIBEAC Vice-coordinator at Aix-Marseille University, CEPERC - Research Center for Comparative Epistemology and Ergology (France); FuJen Catholic University (Taipei), Department of French Language and Culture; Kozmetsky Global Collaboratory in Stanford University (KGC, USA)

SESSION ONE

Chair and Moderator: Paolo Davide FARAH, LIBEAC Legal Work-package Leader & Research Unit Coordinator at University Institute of European Studies – IUSE (Italy)

8:45 – 9:25

LI Qiang, Assistant to the President, Peking University, School of Government,  Center for European Studies (China), LIBEAC Research Unit Coordinator at Peking University

The Influence of Liberalism in China

9:25 – 9:40  Discussants of the Paper – Vanessa KOPEC, Aix-Marseille University, CEPERC - Research Center for Comparative Epistemology and Ergology (France) & EU Commission Marie Fellow

Questions and Answers

9:40 – 10:20 Cui Zhiyuan, Tsinghua University, School of Public Policy and Management; LIBEAC Research Unit Coordinator at Tsinghua University, School of Public Policy and Management

Understanding Xi Jiping's Grand Strategy".

10:20 – 10:35 Discussants of the Paper – Jean-Yves HEURTEBISE, FuJen Catholic University (Taipei), Department of French Language and Culture; LIBEAC Vice-coordinator at Aix-Marseille University, CEPERC - Research Center for Comparative Epistemology and Ergology (France); Kozmetsky Global Collaboratory in Stanford University (KGC, USA)

10:35 – 11:05 ZHU Tianbiao, Peking University, School of Government

Neoliberalism and China’s Compressed Development

11:05 – 11:20  Discussant of the Paper - Paolo Davide FARAH, LIBEAC Legal Work-package Leader & Research Unit Coordinator at University Institute of European Studies – IUSE (Italy)

11:20 - 11:40  Zhang Xiang, Tsinghua University, School of Public Policy and Management

K’ang Yu-wei's Thoughts about the Problem of the Relationship of Politics and Religion

11:40 – 12:00 Roundtable Questions & Answers

12:00 – 12:15 Break




Chair and Moderator: ZHU Tianbiao, Professor of Peking University, School of Government

12:15 – 12:30
Paolo Davide FARAH, West Virginia University (WV, USA), LIBEAC Legal Work-package Leader & Research Unit Coordinator at University Institute of European Studies – IUSE (Italy), gLAWcal – Global Law Initiatives for Sustainable Development (United Kingdom)

Advantages and Disadvantages of Globalization and Liberalism toward Social, Economic, Environmental and Cultural Rights

12:30 – 12:45
Jean-Yves HEURTEBISE, FuJen Catholic University (Taipei), Department of French Language and Culture; Aix-Marseille University, CEPERC - Research Center for Comparative Epistemology and Ergology (France); Kozmetsky Global Collaboratory in Stanford University (KGC, USA)

The future of Chinese liberalism and the limits of Developmentalism

12:45 – 13:00
Fernando DIAS SIMOES, University of Macau, Faculty of Law (China) & Member of the Scientific Committee of gLAWcal – Global Law Initiatives for Sustainable Development (United Kingdom)

From Civic Behaviour to Environmental Citizenship

13:00 – 13:15
Round Table Discussion with all the participants

LI Qiang, Assistant to the President and Professor of Peking University, School of Government,  Director of the Center for European Studies (China), LIBEAC Research Unit Coordinator at Peking University

Vanessa KOPEC, Aix-Marseille University, CEPERC - Research Center for Comparative Epistemology and Ergology (France) & EU Commission Marie Fellow

ZHU Tianbiao, Professor of Peking University, School of Government

Jean-Yves HEURTEBISE, FuJen Catholic University (Taipei), Department of French Language and Culture; LIBEAC Vice-coordinator at Aix-Marseille University, CEPERC - Research Center for Comparative Epistemology and Ergology (France); Kozmetsky Global Collaboratory in Stanford University (KGC, USA)

Paolo Davide FARAH, West Virginia University (WV, USA), LIBEAC Legal Work-package Leader & Research Unit Coordinator at University Institute of European Studies – IUSE (Italy), gLAWcal – Global Law Initiatives for Sustainable Development (United Kingdom)

Fernando DIAS SIMOES, University of Macau, Faculty of Law (China) & Member of the Scientific Committee of gLAWcal – Global Law Initiatives for Sustainable Development (United Kingdom)


The event is organized by gLAWcal – Global Law Initiatives for Sustainable Development (United Kingdom) in collaboration with the following beneficiaries  and partner institutions of the European Union Research Executive Agency IRSES Project “Liberalism in Between Europe And China” (LIBEAC) coordinated by Aix-Marseille University (CEPERC): University Institute of European Studies (IUSE) in Turin, Italy and the University of Piemonte Orientale, Novara, Italy Peking University, School of Government, Center for European Studies (China), Tsinghua University, Department of Philosophy (China). Workpackages 2 and 4

As part of the gLAWcal - Global Law Initiatives for Sustainable Development (United Kingdom) results and book series, a book was published CHINA’S INFLUENCE ON NON-TRADE CONCERNS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, Climate Change, Sustainable Development, Protection of Environment, Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, Labour Rights, Public Health, Food and Product Safety, Global Law and Sustainable Development Book Series, Routledge Publishing (London/New-York), September 2016, pp. 1-584 TO DOWNLOAD FRONT AND BACK COVER, TABLE OF CONTENTS, INTRODUCTION OF THE BOOK, FOREWORDS AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS, PLEASE SEE THE FOLLOWING LINK: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2876883 To purchase the book, you can refer to the publisher website: https://www.routledge.com/Chinas-Influence-on-Non-Trade-Concerns-in-International-Economic-Law/Farah-Cima/p/book/9781409448488

This essay aims to examine some mainstream Indian perspectives on BRI and analyze the likely adverse ramifications of BRI on India. Based on these findings, the essay considers how India should (and is likely to) tailor its foreign policy and national security responses to this Chinese initiative.

China’s President Xi Jinping has placed great emphasis on power consolidation, focusing on domestic restructuring to enhance the centrality of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its communist ideology. This has compelled political pundits to mull over the bearing of a strong authoritarian Chinese regime on Xi Jinping’s foreign policy. China is already casting strong regional maritime advances and leveraging its economic might over its continental periphery. In this regard, tensions are rising in the Indo-Pacific region with countries like India and Japan coalescing to negate China’s assertiveness. Nonetheless, the new security architecture of Asia demands balanced strategic manoeuvring, exemplified by China and India pushing their bilateral ties forward while striking new deals with other like-minded countries.

My theoretical contribution to the debate on China's rise and the increasing assertiveness under Xi Jinping.

Also features a critique of Michael Pillsbury’s thesis as developed in the book "The One-Hundred Year Marathon" regarding the assertion that China is conducting a full-scale effort (across all elements of power to include the military) to assert dominance over the United States and Western powers and achieve the status of unipolar hegemonic power of the globe.

By identifying 'periods of opportunity' (机遇期) within Chinese foreign policy-making, this article argues that we can expect a greater urgency on the part of China.

This paper attempts to shed light on China’s assertive foreign policy strategy in Xi Jinping’s era. What is the nature of this strategy and how it differs from the foreign policy strategy established since Deng Xiaoping, are two questions that this paper aims to answer. By doing a textual analysis of data gathered from different authoritative sources, this paper argues, on the one hand, that there has been a continuity in China’s foreign policy strategy since Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao, followed by a transition between this latter and Xi Jinping, and finally an adjustment, from the “keeping a low profile” strategy to the “striving for achievement” strategy, since the year 2014. On the other hand, that the foreign policy themes and initiatives stressed by Xi Jinping at the 19th Party Congress held in October 2017, suggest that China will follow a more assertive foreign policy approach seeking to deepen the foreign policy actions implemented so far, aiming at turning China into a moderately prosperous society and a developed country, as well as increasing its worldwide influence.

Keywords: Chinese foreign policy, foreign policy strategies, 19th Party Congress, foreign policy initiatives, assertiveness.

Amidst China’s emergence as a global power, Xi Jinping is pushing through a range of ambitious reform plans that are reconfiguring both Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy. A fierce anti-corruption campaign has led to the dismissal of a large number of powerful figures, while a major effort has begun to bring party, state, and military power within Xi’s control. Many observers have interpreted these moves as radically altering the rules of game of elite politics, if not creating a personalistic political system. Our analysis shows that Xi’s corruption fighting and power centralisation represent part of his state-building project, in order to enhance the party-state’s capacity for the pursuit of governance objectives. We identify three rules regarding the Party’s power succession that would provide a critical test regarding how radically Xi is prepared to alter the Party’s key norms. The outcome of the 19th party congress in late 2017 would make it clearer whether Xi is in an effort to further institutionalise Party politics or turning the regime into his one-man rule.

La aparición de la República Popular China en el tablero global como nuevo competidor al “trono” de la hegemonía mundial es uno de los movimientos geopolíticos que caracterizan el siglo XXI. No obstante, no es hasta la llegada al poder de Xi Jinping en el año 2013 cuando podemos comenzar a hablar de China como un verdadero aspirante a contrarrestar a los Estados Unidos en el sistema internacional. Los elementos clave que han contribuido a esta nueva imagen de la RPC como futurible primer poder mundial son la Iniciativa del Cinturón y Ruta y la configuración del llamado “Collar de Perlas” chino en el Océano Índico. En este estudio analizaremos los puntos característicos de cada uno de estos proyectos estratégico y analizaremos las prospectivas para la RPC para la década de los años 20 del siglo XXI, marcados en su inicio por la pandemia de la Covid-19 y sus externalidades.

Wirtschaft und Eigentum. Staat und Markt im heutigen China (übersetzt von Hermann Kopp)
1. Die Zahlen eines außergewöhnlichen Erfolgs
2. Die erste Phase: 1949-1978. Mao und der Aufbau des „sozialistischen Grundsystems“
3. Die zweite Phase: von 1978 bis heute. Dengs Wendepunkt und die „Politik der Reform und Öffnung“
4. Vertriebs- und Eigentumsformen im heutigen China
5. Staatliche Unternehmen und die Rolle des öffentlichen Eigentums
6. Die „sichtbare Hand“ des Staates und die Entwicklungsstrategie
7. The Clash of Names. China: Kapitalismus oder Sozialismus?
8. Vergleich mit den Merkmalen der Übergangsgesellschaft und der ersten Phase des Kommunismus nach Marx
9. Die Probleme der Definition nachrevolutionärer Gesellschaften: drei zentrale Punkte
10. Lösungen des Problems: Übergangsgesellschaft, Sozialismus als relativ eigenständige Gesellschaftsformation und „Primärphase“ des Sozialismus
11. Fazit

Anggapan bahwa pemimpin negara membentuk kebijakan luar negeri mendapat dukungan dan kritikan dari akademisi-akademisi politik dan hubungan internasional. Beberapa akademisi setuju dengan pernyataan tersebut, namun beberapa lainnya percaya adanya faktor sejarah dan lingkungan yang mendorong pemimpin untuk memilih suatu keputusan. Namun di luar itu, peran pemimpin dapat terlihat paling jelas pada keadaan konflik dengan negara lain. Pilihan pemimpin secara relatif terbatas di dalam spektrum menyerang balik dan menyerah. Dalam keadaan seperti itu refleksi pemikiran pribadi pemimpin untuk melindungi negara dapat terlihat (Breuning 2007, 1). Laut Cina Selatan (LCS) adalah salah satu area di mana eskalasi ketegangannya dalam beberapa waktu terakhir mengkhawatirkan pengamat dapat memicu konflik terbuka. Seiring dengan meningkatnya kekuatan ekonomi dan militer Tiongkok, postur militer Tiongkok di Laut Cina Selatan semakin besar. Tiongkok—yang mengklaim daerah terbesar—telah mempertahankan klaimnya dengan membangun pulau-pulau dan patroli kelautan.  Tulisan ini mencari hubungan Xi Jinping, pemimpin Tiongkok, dengan meningkatnya agresivitas Tiongkok dalam konflik Laut Cina Selatan dalam tingkat analisis individu melalui dua metode yaitu kode operasional dan leadership trait analysis.

This paper is constructed in four sections. The first section is a brief overview of the South China Sea dispute. The second section offers four reasons why China has acted the way it has in the South China Sea, covering economic reasons, historical reasons, power reasons, and political reasons. These reasons cover all three levels of analysis. The third section details these motivations in the backdrop of international relations theory, including realism, neorealism, classic liberalism, institutional liberalism, democracy-based liberalism, economic interdependence liberalism, and constructivism.  Based on these observations, the fourth section offers a bleak outlook for the possibility of cooperation in the region.

In 2017, the Chinese government unveiled a plan to develop the country into the world’s primary innovation centre for artificial intelligence (AI) by 2030. In doing so, it identified AI as a strategic industry, crucial for enhancing economic development, national security and governance.

This report evaluates the strategy that has been adopted by the Chinese
government in order to achieve these objectives. It examines the peculiarities of the Party-state-led economic model along with the evolving geopolitical and economic faultlines regarding trade and technology. In addition, it assesses China’s policies with regard to factors such as core technologies, research, manpower, data and the commercial environment, which are crucial to ensure the development of the AI industry.

The assessment finds that the Chinese government’s command innovation
approach towards AI development is crafting a political economy that tolerates sub-optimal and even wasteful outcomes in the quest for expanding the scale of the industry. Consequently, going forward, the industry is likely to be plagued by concerns of overinvestment, overcapacity, quality of products and global competitiveness. In addition, increasing friction over trade with other states and President Xi Jinping’s turn towards techno-nationalism along with tightening political control could further undermine China’s AI industry.

The rise of Xi Jinping to supreme leadership in China does not indicate a return to a radical Maoist style of rule, but does mark a major break with the ruling style that seemed to be evolving in the decades since Mao's death. Xi's dictatorship, a variation of autocratic conservatism, opens the possibility of breaking through the various factional and interest deadlocks that have fostered corruption and policy inconsistency, but this is balanced by risks of insecurity and intensified power struggles.

Between late 2012 and early 2013, Xi Jiping and "Fifth Generation of Leaders" of the PRC
came to power. In this article we will approach the study of this new leadership and its political
message in three steps. In the first part, we describe the essential characteristics of the Chinese
regime. In the second, who the people that form the leadership are, and under what influences
they are. And thirdly, we explain what we understand by "Chinese dream", the government
program of the new party leadership.

Entre finales de 2012 y principios de 2013 accedió al poder Xi Jiping y la “Quinta Generación
de Dirigentes” de la RPCh. En este artículo vamos a abordar el estudio de esa nueva cúpula y
de su mensaje político en tres pasos. En una primera parte planteando las características esenciales
del Régimen chino; en una segunda quiénes y bajo que influencias se hallan los hombres
de la “quinta generación” y en tercer lugar, que podemos entender por “el sueño chino”, el
programa de gobierno de la nueva cúpula.

Since seizing power in 1949, China’s Communist Party has exerted firm control over all aspects of cultural expression. This policy took its most radical turn in the mid 1960s when Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), aiming to rid the country of bourgeois elements. The composer Zhao Jiping was a student at the Xi’an Conservatory during this period. He graduated in 1970, but was able to continued his studies only when the Central Conservatory reopened in 1978. On completing his studies, he established himself as a composer of folk-inspired music for film and the concert stage.

This article focuses on Zhao’s score for director Zhang Yimou’s Red Sorghum (Hong gao liang, 1987), a film based on the 1986 novel by 2012 Nobel laureate Mo Yan. While the novel stretches over a period of forty-three years, from 1923 to 1976, the film focuses on the period up to and including the Japanese invasion. The film won the Golden Bear at the Berlin International Film Festival and brought both the director and actress Gong Li international acclaim. While the composer enjoyed only limited recognition beyond China, he went on to score other successful films, among them Raise the Red Lantern (1991) and Farewell, My Concubine (1993), and achieve success as a composer of concert music. The article connects Zhao’s musical language to the impact of the Cultural Revolution by examining how in Red Sorghum his music was employed to evoke a virile image of rural China.

自1949年掌權以來，中國共產黨嚴格控制各方面的文化表達。這個政策在20世紀60年代中期發生了最激進的轉變。毛澤東發動了文化大革命（1966-1976），旨在擺脫國內資產階級的元素。作曲家趙吉平在這段時期是西安音樂學院的學生。他畢業於1970年，但要直至中央音樂學院在1978年重新開放才能繼續他的學習。完成他的學業後，他將自己塑造成一個具民族風格的電影和音樂會音樂的作曲家。

本文重點介紹了趙氏為張藝謀執導，改編自1986年諾貝爾獎得主莫言的小說的電影“紅高粱”（1987）配樂。雖然原著時間軸設定為1923年至1976年，長達四十三年，這部電影只專注於開始到日本入侵的部份。這部電影贏得了柏林國際電影節金熊獎，為導演和女演員鞏俐帶來了國際讚譽。雖然趙氏作曲家在中國以外的認可有限，他繼續為其他成功的電影配樂，包括"大紅燈籠高高掛"（1991年）和"霸王別姬"（1993年），作為音樂會音樂作曲家方面亦取得成功。本文將趙氏的音樂語言與文化大革命的影響聯繫起來，探討他的音樂如何在"紅高粱"中塑造中國農村的浩大聲勢。