Daniel Schwartz

Medieval theologians commonly held that angels are subordinated one to the other. However, they did not agree on the foundations and nature of this order of subjection. This article traces the trajectory of the theological discussion on the nature of the angelic prelacy. While there is extensive scholarly literature on medieval theologians' conceptions of the angelic hierarchy, there is next to nothing on their views of angelic prelacy. This article suggests that one of the questions that drives the route taken by the discussions on angelic prelacy is a tension internal to the very idea of angelic prelacy. To be a subject involves some degree of unfreedom. Yet it seemed unsuitable to medieval theologians to attribute unfreedom to angels. A satisfactory picture of angelic prelacy had to posit a form of subjection that did not imply any loss of liberty for the subject angels.

Suárez was probably the first theologian to propose a political understanding of the order of subordination among the demons. According to Aquinas, this subordination immediately reflects the natural differences in perfection between the demons. Suárez charged that a natural-based order of demonic subordination could not ground the capacity of the demons' ruler-Lucifer-to use his power to impose civic obligations on fellow demons so as to pursue their joint evil goals. But can there be obligations ad malum? This paper explores a number of possible paths seemingly available to Suárez to defend his controversial view. I argue that the most promising interpretation of Suárez is one according to which the obligations created by Lucifer's commands are not obligations in conscience but rather what we may call "non-moral obligations."

This article examines how Catholic moral theologians analyzed the constraints imposed by the rights of the dead to their good name on historical writing and research.  The concern of Catholic moral theologians for persons’ rights to their good name coupled with their concern for the rights of dead persons placed serious moral constrains on the work of historians. At the same time, from very early on, these moral theologians showed appreciation of the benefits of historical writing, including writing on the less public aspects of historical figures. The general tendency was to allow to historians some greater moral elbow room. There was, however, a clear red line: what was and had been always secret could not be revealed, regardless of the benefits.

By the end of the nineteenth century the authors of the casuist manualists revised the traditional doctrine and removed the moral red line that was accepted up to then. Historians could now reveal what had always been secret. This doctrinal development resulted from two historical events. On the one hand the opening of the Vatican Archives and the need to give to propagandists and journalists within politically organized Catholic conservatism to fight as equals in the printed media.

This paper surveys two controversies about electoral ethics among canonists and moral theologians from the Baroque period. The first controversy concerned the desirability of pre-vote electoral deliberations. The second controversy concerned the moral permissibility of electoral persuading.  The dominant view was that the means of persuasion permitted to voters who objectively promote the common good are not permitted to voters who objectively seek to harm the common good. In the paper I assess the extent to which ‘just canvassing’ was held to be in some ways morally analogous to fighting in a just war.

Revisionists about Aquinas' teaching on private self-defence take the standard reading to hold that Aquinas applies a version of the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) according to which the intentional killing of a wrongful attacker by a private person is morally prohibited while the non-intentional but foreseeable killing of the attacker is permitted. Revisionists dispute this reading and argue that Aquinas permits the intentional killing of wrongful attackers. I argue that revisionists mischaracterize the standard reading of Aquinas. I consider one of its main proponents, Antonio de Córdoba (1485– 1579). When Córdoba condemned the intentional killing of wrongful attackers by private persons, he was not applying DDE. Rather, he was arguing that when you decide to kill an attacker you treat the attacker as a resource for the private end of saving your life. Killing a member of your community is a form of irrevocable social exclusion. This decision ought to be left to the public authorities. The disagreement between the authors defending the standard view and their critics was not about DDE but rather about the moral limits that membership in a community sets on the pursuit of private ends, including the private end of staying alive.