Adam Burke

International development agencies often promote approaches that link aid and peacebuilding. However, the gap between what agencies say and what they actually do is demonstrated by the mixed response to subnational conflict in Thailand’s Far South between 2007 and 2012. Over this period, numerous agencies demonstrated little interest in addressing the conflict. Some agencies did over time try to support peacebuilding, although domestic government resistance and practical barriers generated obstacles. Conflict guidelines and toolkits were rarely used, while only a few agencies implemented the context-driven and knowledge-based approaches to local partnerships that peace promotion in a complex and politically sensitive environment demands.

Comment les agences de de´veloppement internationales abordent-elles la construction de la paix lors d’un conflit infranational ? Les agences de de´veloppement internationales promeuvent souvent des approches qui relient l’aide et la construction de la paix. Cependant, le fosse´ entre les dires des agences et leurs actions est de´montre´ par la riposte peu constante au conflit infranational dans l’extreˆme sud tha¨ılandais  entre  2007  et  2012.  Durant  cette  pe´riode,  de  nombreuses  agences  n’ont  gue`re fait preuve d’inte´reˆt concernant la re´solution du conflit. Certaines agences, au fil du temps, ont tente´  de soutenir la construction de la paix, mais la re´sistance gouvernementale au sein meˆme du pays et les barrie`res d’ordre pratique ont engendre´ des obstacles. Les lignes direc- trices et les trousses a`  outils pour reme´dier aux conflits ont e´te´ rarement utilise´s, et rares ont e´te´ les agences qui ont mis en œuvre les approches impulse´es par les contextes et base´es sur les connaissances concernant les partenariats locaux que requiert la promotion de la paix dans un environnement complexe et politiquement sensible.

¿De que´  manera las agencias de desarrollo internacionales abordan la construccio´n de paz en un conflicto subnacional?  Frecuentemente, las agencias de desarrollo internacionales promueven enfoques que vinculan la ayuda con la construccio´n de paz. Sin embargo, la brecha entre lo que dicen las agencias y lo que en realidad hacen queda demostrada por la respuesta matizada ante el conflicto subnacio- nal que tuvo lugar en el Extremo Sur de Tailandia entre 2007 y 2012. Durante este periodo, numerosas  agencias  demostraron  poco  intere´s  en  abordar  el  conflicto.  A  pesar  de  los obsta´culos que representaron la resistencia del gobierno nacional y las barreras pra´cticas, con el  transcurso  del  tiempo  algunas  agencias  intentaron  apoyar  la  construccio´n  de  paz.  Sin embargo, en pocas ocasiones usaron las normas y los manuales existentes en torno a conflictos. So´lo unas pocas agencias implementaron los enfoques basados en el contexto y en el conoci- miento para crear alianzas locales, las cuales resultan imprescindibles para promover la paz en un entorno complejo y pol´ıticamente sensible.

Como as ageˆncias internacionais de desenvolvimento abordam a construc¸a˜o da paz em um conflito subnacional? As  ageˆncias  internacionais  de  desenvolvimento  frequentemente  promovem  abordagens  que fazem a conexa˜o entre ajuda e construc¸a˜o da paz. Pore´m, a variac¸a˜o entre o que as ageˆncias afirmam e o que elas realmente fazem e´ demonstrada pela resposta mesclada a um conflito sub- nacional no extremo sul da Tailaˆndia entre 2007 e 2012. Durante esse per´ıodo, va´rias ageˆncias demonstraram pouco interesse em abordar o conflito. Algumas ageˆncias realmente tentaram, no decorrer do tempo, apoiar a construc¸a˜o da paz, embora a resisteˆncia do governo local e barreiras  pra´ticas  geraram  obsta´culos.  Orientac¸o˜es  e  kits  de  ferramentas  sobre  o  conflito foram raramente utilizados, enquanto que apenas algumas poucas ageˆncias implementaram abordagens direcionadas ao conflito e baseadas no conhecimento de parcerias locais que a promoc¸a˜o da paz demanda em um ambiente complexo e politicamente delicado.

'The Contested Areas of Myanmar: Subnational Conflict, Aid, and Development' is released at a pivotal moment amid longstanding conflicts in many parts of Myanmar, political dialogue to address the concerns of numerous ethnic groups, and a desire among international donors and aid agencies to support the peacebuilding process and the country’s political transition.

Findings from the year-long study reveal the intimate connections between subnational conflicts and national politics in Myanmar, instances where development interventions have contributed to uneven power dynamics and fueled armed resistance, and ways in which international aid can sometimes damage prospects for peace when initiatives are not sensitive to conflict. The study underscores a critical need to continue the ongoing political and economic reforms while building a system of government that is widely recognized as legitimate by people of all ethnic nationalities.

Key findings:
- Myanmar’s subnational conflicts are not a peripheral issue and directly affect much of the country: In 2016, areas affected by active or latent subnational conflict were found in at least 11 of Myanmar’s 14 states and regions. One hundred and eighteen of 330 townships, containing almost one-quarter of Myanmar’s population, currently demonstrate live or latent characteristics of conflict.
- Myanmar’s conflicts are not caused by underdevelopment: There is no simple correlation between human development, economic growth, and conflict in Myanmar, and subnational conflicts will not be resolved by measures to improve development outcomes. Conflict townships are on average only marginally less developed than non-conflict townships, particularly when Yangon is excluded. Some conflict townships exceed national averages, while others have the lowest development indicators in the country.
- Tackling underdevelopment alone will not create peace: Development interventions alone can never lead to peace. Myanmar’s conflicts are inherently political and connect to the structure of the state. Political solutions are, therefore, required to solve subnational conflict. Given the complex nature of Myanmar’s armed conflicts, interventions and policies should be strengthened to address the underlying drivers of conflict and be more responsive to the power inequities that have driven conflict over years, especially during transitional political periods.
- Development policies can drive subnational conflict: In many contested areas, economic changes and increased natural resource exploitation have ratcheted up tensions, engendered rivalries, fueled grievances, and provided funds that have sustained conflict. Foreign assistance can sometimes be manipulated to serve security objectives, particularly where government officials or leaders of ethnic armed organizations are able to decide project locations. In short, development interventions are never neutral.
- Aid can build momentum for peace as well as damage the prospects for peace: Projects that serve the security aims of one side can damage the confidence of ethnic groups in the country’s transition, while programs that support political reforms, such as decentralization, can help build momentum. Closer alignment of donors with government offers advantages in coverage, cost effectiveness, and sustainability, but it also poses risks for peace.

Violence in Rakhine State of Myanmar in 2012 and 2013 caused up to 1,000 deaths and forced the long-term displacement of entire communities. Using evidence from interviews, media coverage and secondary literature, this article explores recent events and considers contextual factors behind the unrest. The conflict is a symptom of long-term historical tensions between Rakhine Buddhists and Muslims, and contemporary political changes that reinvigorated anti-Muslim sentiment across Myanmar. Rigid ethnic classifications that are enshrined in Myanmar’s laws and political system have encouraged territorial attitudes and furthered discrimination against Muslims and others perceived as migrants. This environment generates incentives for local politicians to strengthen group identity and present themselves as the guardians of their electorate. Raised tensions and a background of violence made it easier for Rakhine politicians to promote identity-based voting and to ensure that most Muslim voters in Rakhine State were disenfranchised, paving the way for some local success in the national elections of November 2015. Following the elections, Aung San Suu Kyi’s new government indicated that past policies would continue, rapidly disappointing those hoping for rapid change and demonstrating the entrenched nature of Rakhine State’s problems.

This paper asks why ethnic minority parties generally performed poorly  in Myanmar’s 8 November elections. It offers seven reasons:  Fragmented ethnic parties; limited time and resources;  weak local politics; inability to translate stronger ethnic affiliation into votes; the immense attraction of Aung San Suu Kyi; dislike of the military; and national parties that fielded local candidates.

The most successful ethnic party was the ANP in Rakhine State.  Their achievement was based partly on extreme chauvinism targeting the State’s Muslim population, but also on strong local campaigning, networks, and alliances.

This study  delves into the  impact of conflict, governance and political economy on vegetable markets at the local and national levels. It was conducted to support the planning of a  rural development program run by Mercy Corps in Shan State of Myanmar (Burma).

Interviews and related field research revealed a range of factors that limit vegetable farmers' willingness to take on risk such as: fluctuating prices, high costs of inputs, lack of affordable credit, weak support groups, absence of government support, and concern over the effect of any political instability.  This reduces their scope to innovate. It shows efforts to improve production quality and quantity will encounter many challenges.

Unless their  vulnerability is tackled, it is unlikely that smaller farmers in particular will be able to respond optimally to new market opportunities. Technical advice on better farming methods may not be heeded for rational reasons of risk avoidance.  Efforts to support farmers need to consider how they can address or find ways around wider constraints.

The second edition of The Asia Foundation’s State of Conflict and Violence in Asia explores recent events and patterns of events through regional assessments and country-specific overviews. In particular, this report addresses contemporary concerns over political polarization and identity-based tensions. Following the overview chapter, three keynote essays featuring regional experts offer closer assessments of recent conflict trends. Ten concise country summaries then present greater detail. The data draws from a range of primary and secondary sources, including country-level and regional datasets on violence and conflict, academic analyses, reporting on contemporary events, and other research conducted by The Asia Foundation.