Conflict in Aceh

PENULIS: LINDA CHRISTANTY

Film " Playing Between Elephants " Seekor Pelanduk di antara Gajah Di aula itu berkumpul banyak orang. Geuchik atau kepala desa menyampaikan laporan penggunaan uang. Dari penjelasan geuchik, semua orang jadi tahu bahwa terjadi pembengkakan biaya pembangunan rumah, lebih dari taksiran semula. Uang yang diperkirakan sisa, malah kurang. seorang warga langsung protes. Geuchik berusaha menjelaskan lagi hitung-hitungannya. Orang-orang dari lembaga bantuan ikut membantu geuchik menjelaskan duduk perkara. Tetapi lelaki yang emosi itu tak terima. Ia merobek-robek buku anggaran, mengumpat-umpat, lalu meninggalkan aula. Tingkah lakunya menular pada sebagian besar yang hadir. Ada yang menggerutu, ada yang mengajak yang lain pergi ke kantor lembaga bantuan untuk mengadu. Suasana hiruk-pikuk. Geuchik tak bisa mencegah mereka. Namun, ia tetap tegar dan bahkan, masih bisa tertawa. Inilah konflik yang paling menegangkan dalam film dokumenter garapan Aryo Danusiri, Playing Between Elephants. Sang geuchik menjadi karakter utama cerita ini. Ia hadir dalam setiap sekuel, menjadi sorotan sekaligus perekat tiap bagian. Sosoknya sangat hidup. Ia kesal, sabar, bertanggung jawab, dan kadang terlihat ingin menguntungkan dirinya sendiri. Ia sosok yang kompleks, tidak hitam-putih dan sederhana. Ia pahlawan, tetapi juga bukan tanpa cacat. Aryo begitu jeli memperlihatkan perkembangan watak dan tingkah-polah geuchik dengan kameranya, merekam bagaimana si tokoh bertarung dengan dirinya sendiri dalam menjalankan perannya sebagai geuchik yang harus memperhatikan kepentingan warga serta kepentingan pribadinya, atau bermain-main di antara kedua hal tersebut. Pertarungan internal dalam diri geuchik bisa kita anggap sebagai pertarungan dua " gajah " dan pelanduknya tak lain dari metafor tentang kemampuannya mengelola kedua kepentingan tersebut dengan cerdik. Warga akhirnya memperoleh tambahan uang pembangunan sejumlah Rp 2,1 juta, sedang geuchik punya rumah besar berdapur luas berkat hubungan baiknya dengan penyalur bahan bangunan. Film berdurasi 89 menit ini sama sekali tidak terjerembab sebagai film propaganda program perumahan, meski ia merekam kegiatan lembaga bantuan tertentu dalam melibatkan masyarakat mendirikan rumah mereka, tahap demi tahap. Kadangkala ia begitu puitis, juga dramatis. Selain adegan-adegan yang menampilkan dinamika di lapangan, Aryo juga menghadirkan gambar-gambar secara semiotik yang berfungsi sebagai jeda sekaligus membubuhkan estetika pada filmnya. Beberapa kali muncul pemandangan pantai dan perahu di sela-sela adegan lain. Semula tak ada gerak, tak ada aktivitas apa pun, kecuali lanskap. Namun, perlahan-lahan Aryo menampilkan kehidupan di sana. Anak-anak memancing ikan dekat pantai, lalu suatu ketika orang-orang mendorong perahu ke laut dengan disemangati seruan, " Dalam hati sama rasa, hayooo.. ! " Proses interaksi Film Aryo dengan cerdas mengajak penonton menyaksikan dua proses interaksi. Pertama adalah hubungan manusia dengan alam yang terus-menerus (dalam hal ini manusia dengan laut), rutin, dan bermanfaat (dalam hubungan nelayan dan ikan-ikan), yang kemudian dirusak kekuatan alam lainnya (bencana atau tsunami) dan bagaimana manusia bertahan hidup dengan memulihkan lagi kepercayaan mereka terhadap alam sekaligus memulihkan kembali mata pencaharian atau kehidupan mereka.

This article is my retrospective account on the making of one of my testimonial documentaries, "Kameng Gampoeng Nyang Keunong Geulawa" (The Village Goat that Takes the Beating, 1999) which was commissioned by a human rights-defender NGO based in Jakarta. The aim was to offer critical views on the Aceh conflict to the Indonesian public. By using chronotopes (Bakhtin, 1981) as the analytical tool, I delineate the way the Indonesian state and its military constituted a dominant view of Aceh as the Other by applying a semiotic model of authoritarian nationalism that circulated in the public sphere. As the counter-politics, I developed particular testimony chronotopes as a strategy to capture victims' points of view as embodied experience. In my reflection, I argue that instead of producing a complex visuality of the Aceh actors as human beings, my portrayal of the victims had taken on a sustained oppressor-victim binary opposition view which framed victims as the articulation of singular experience. This study contributes to the emerging interest in media anthropology and the study of non-mainstream film genres and independent cinema works.

This paper describes a figure called Farid Husain who actively involves in the effort towards the peace of Aceh. This figure is believed to be very successful in playing his role upon searching for peace in Aceh, that he
could bring peace in Aceh in August 2005. The reason why Farid Husain needs to be raised in this paper is because he is a very active man in searching for prospective figures of peace in Aceh. He is the one behind the scene who finds all Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) leaders through informant approach to engage in peace talks. Therefore, it is important to understand the role played by Farid Husain until the peace of Aceh can successfully be achieved with the Helsinki agreement on August 15th, 2005 in Finland.

This chapter analyses the neo-Sufi challenge by Abuya Shaykh
Amran Waly and the Majelis Pengkajian Tauhid Tasawuf (MPTT), which I call
the Tauhid Tasawuf movement, to official shariatisation by the state and
shariatism in general. Amran Waly and the MPTT try to synthesise the
wujudiyya Sufi doctrine with orthodoxy, a concern which has led to
them being charged with heterodoxy. However, the fact that the MPTT
survives to this day and is even spread widely not only in Aceh but also
elsewhere in Indonesia and Southeast Asia deserves further analysis.
Amran Waly’s views on Sharia, ‘tauhid tasawuf ’ and wahdat al-wujud,
and the way Sharia ulama have reacted will get special attention here.
I will argue that the long struggle between Sharia and Sufi ulama should
be understood in the context of the local politics of Aceh and that the
dissemination of Sufi views and ways of life reflects their resistance
against the overwhelming official Sharia implementation and shariatism
in Aceh today.

The end of the civil war in Aceh brought peace, but it has been of a predatory nature. As a moment of rupture, the peace revealed interests, powers and dynamics, and it offered an opportunity for their reconfiguration. When unrest ceased, old agrarian conflicts between smallholders and planters resumed. Peace held promise of land reform. Yet old patterns of smallholder dispossession were entrenched as the former insurgency leadership aligned with the old elite of plantation companies. Oil palm contract- farming schemes effectively alienated smallholders from their land, and violence precluded their organization. As a result, large-scale plantation production expanded. Through the creation of a violent frontier, smallholders were denied recognition of independent rights and property. In essence, smallholders were dispossessed by a combination of violence, political power and duplicitous paperwork. The study is based on fieldwork in areas where current land conflicts are played out, as well as on secondary sources.

Abstract

Pat ujeun nyang hana pirang, pat prang nyang hana reuda (no rain that would not stop, no war that would not cease). “Aceh’s Proverb”

Those words above explain the hope of Acehnese for sustainable peace after being overwritten by long period of conflict since 1976. The signs of memorandum of understanding between Indonesian Government and Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM (Free Aceh Movement) on 25 August 2005 in Helsinki, Finland, led the beginning of new chapter for Aceh. Moreover, the Tsunami that hit Aceh on 26 December 2004, attracted international concern for establishing peace environment and the support from outside would come to Aceh smoothly. Thus, in the meantime, the peace transformation was slowly implemented and the degree of violence has been reduces drastically. Also, the economy and social condition of the society hopefully might increase along with the stabilization of security in Aceh. The peace development in Aceh was unique case compare to another peace process in other parts of the world. The positive development of peace in Aceh was thanked for large supports from various forms of civil society, such as student movements, NGOs, ulemmas, intellectuals, journalists, humanitarian workers and other groups and individuals interested in peace and non-violence. The mediation of peace agreement by global civil society such as, Henry Dunant Center and Crisis Management Initiative and the contribution of other civil society groups and individuals proved the important roles of civil society in peace development in Aceh. Based on this fact, therefore, this study would like to analyze the roles and functions of civil society in contributing the process of peace development in Aceh. Basically, civil society is the ‘non-formal’ sector of society and involves groups and individuals concerned with particular causes or issues within the community. In the case of Aceh, the members of civil society are most likely victims as well, and this sustainable peace is also become the most important objective for them. Therefore, the civil society itself became the most important actors for peace-building which are concerned with the building of foundation for peace, and act themselves as important voice and actor for change in the peace development in Aceh. Several civil society groups that works in Aceh in the conflict and after conflict such as, Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Aceh (Aceh Legal Aid Institute) and Kontras (The Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence). Finally, this study would use hypothesis of the relations of civil society and the condition of Aceh during and after conflict by using proper analytical framework.

Keywords: Aceh post-Conflict, Peacebuilding, Civil Society, Sustainable Peace.

Corporate public diplomacy is a business approach to collaborate, solve problems, and build longterm relationships with people living in foreign communities where transnational corporations invest. It is a supplement to other forms of corporate diplomacy, such as those with governments, international organizations, NGOs, and other businesses. Corporate diplomacy is an umbrella concept that draws on literature from many fields, including political CSR and international relations. 
The thesis takes seriously the current anger expressed by people who do not belong to the welleducated elite and insist on being taken seriously. States invented diplomacy, partly to avoid costly wars, and in a global world, where the largest transnational corporations are as powerful in terms of economic resources and as influential as most states, this thesis argues that corporations can learn from state diplomacy when they strive to create reliable working environments and avoid costly (violent) conflicts with local host communities. The idea is discussed in the light of two cases: Exxon-Mobile in Aceh and China Power Investment Corporation in Kachin. 
Corporate public diplomacy is an alternative approach to firms dealing with local host communities. The more traditional methods are to use hard power and the legal system to enforce corporate rights and/or to apply pity-based CSR. 
The thesis contributes to current research with the idea of corporate public diplomacy and how it differs from state public diplomacy. Using an international relations framework as an organizing tool, it points to two approaches to state public diplomacy and three approaches to corporate public diplomacy. There are many legitimacy issues related to corporate diplomacy, and some of them are discussed in one of the five published articles included.
Three other articles relate to trust research. The thesis contributes with a suggestion as to how state public diplomacy can be linked to international trust; how trust relates to norms and crisis; how forms of trust develop over time during a conflict, and how some people – including leaders – may seek advice from an inner knowing that I have termed spiritual trust. 
Finally, for the scholars wanting to engage in corporate public diplomacy research, a list of ideas is included as inspiration.

Anthropological analyses of post conflict narratives reveal how strategic interests mobilize to resolve or perpetuate conflict. Three years after the 2005 Helsinki peace agreement between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) that ended GAM’s thirty-year separatist rebellion, the author led a post conflict programming evaluation. Drawing upon qualitative interviews of rural informants for this study and using an anthropological approach to narrative analysis, this article argues that recovery narratives can be understood in terms of official and counter-official discourses, each utilizing strategic resources to amplify their interpretation of an unfolding peace process. Subaltern narratives heard most clearly are empowered because they adhere to narrative conventions proscribed by the peace agreement and other powerful discourses such as GAM’s separatist ideology. Other unrecognized voices are left out; their stories of recovery resist easy interpretation and sidestep clichéd narratives of peace.

KEYWORDS: Aceh, Indonesia, narrative, post conflict, recovery, separatism,

This working paper critically examines the concept of ‘build back better’, and seeks to understand the aspirations, implications and resulting impact of the term on recovery and reconstruction in three disaster responses - the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in Aceh, Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008, and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. It asks the questions:  What does ‘better’ look like? Better for whom, where, how? Is it ethical in humanitarian terms to exploit people’s vulnerability after a disaster to drive social change? And to what extent can questions of inequality, deeply rooted in politics and history, be addressed by humanitarian actors at all?

Since Indonesia’s return to multiparty democracy in 1999, national law makers have introduced regulations that effectively ban ethnic or regionally based political parties. A major exception to the rule can be found in the province of Aceh where ethnic separatists were granted the right to form their own political party to contest local elections in return for giving up their armed struggle for
independence. In legislative elections held in 2009 the party of the former rebels – the Aceh Party – won a landslide victory. Drawing on in-depth interviews with national party leaders and parliamentarians, this article examines the implications
of the rise of the Aceh Party for Indonesia’s political party system and the potential for ethnic-based parties to resolve ethnic conflict and secessionism in other parts of Indonesia, including in Papua where the failure of special autonomy arrangements has led to increased militancy among indigenous Papuans.

This paper, which is based upon the author’s experiences in Aceh from 2006 to 2010, illustrates the dangers inherent in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) policies that allow for the transfer of reintegration assets through ex-insurgent command structures. The manipulation of such transfers in Aceh, Indonesia, led to the creation of a new insurgent group, the Pasukan Peudeung, from the ‘splintering’ corpus of the Free Aceh Movement. The author argues that Aceh’s DDR process, while widely heralded as a success, was inherently flawed in its execution and contained within it numerous discrete, and violent, failures; the emergence of the Pasukan Peudeung was emblematic of this. GAM’s conflict-era economic activities, encompassing illegal forms of extraction and other rent-seeking behaviours, did not end with the conflict: they simply evolved, as did Pasukan Peudeung. Further, GAM was and remains in its current iterations a criminal network; its members constantly reinterpret their ideologies to suit their actions and interests, usually in reaction to crimes committed by members.

Book chapter in Ikrar Nusa Bhakti (ed). (2008). Beranda Perdamaian Aceh Tiga Tahun Pasca MoU Helsinki (Verandah of Peace: 3rd Anniversary of Aceh Peace Post Helsinki MoU),  Jakarta & Yogyakarta: P2P-LIPI and Pustaka Pelajar. pp 135-174.  This article is only available in Bahasa Indonesia

In this article we propose a new typology for insurgent groups to explain why in such remarkably similar conflicts—Sri Lanka and Aceh—the impact of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami was so different. We argue that two principal factors shape all rebel
groups by defining their incentive structures: the efficiency of the return on investment of the primary source(s) of support and the group’s territorial objectives. The former factor is especially strong in explaining the different choices made by the LTTE and
GAM. In Sri Lanka, the availability of lucrative resources outside the country has made the LTTE leadership inimical to compromise, threatened by relief aid, and less reliant
on the local population. Lacking access to such high-return funding sources, GAM on the other hand was more closely linked to the needs of the local population and found
greater value in both outside aid and a comprehensive settlement.

Al-Attas adalah seorang cendikiawan muslim kontemporer telah banyak menulis buku dan monograf dalam bahasa Inggris maupun melayu, dan banyak yang telah diterjemahkan ke dalam lain seperti Bahasa Arab, Persia, Turki, Urdu, Prancis, Jerman, Rusia, Jepang dan lain sebagainya. Terjemahan dalam bahasa Indonesia dapat kita baca seperti Islam dan Sekulerisme, Islam dan Filsafat Sains, konsep Pendidikan Islam, dan lain sebagainya. yang terakhir ini ditulis oleh temannya, Wan Mohd Nor Wan Daud (1998) yang sudah diterjemahkan  dalam bahasa Indonesia filsafat dan praktek pendidikan Islam Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas (2003), bisa dikatakan buku pengantar penting mengenal lebih detail sosok Al-Attas juga sumbangan-sumbangan pemikirannya terhadap umat Islam secara umum, khusus rakyat Melayu-Indonesia.

The local Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have a great role in shaping peacebuilding in Aceh, particularly in their relations with the Government (Local & National). Therefore, the aim of this study is to explore the strategies that have been carried out by the CSOs in dealing with the Government in the dynamics of Aceh's peacebuilding. The study used the exploratory means by focusing on qualitative method. The library research and intensive interviews with several CSOs members have been conducted to expand the study. However, the results show that, there are three (3) kinds of strategies which commonly being practiced by the CSOs in dealing with the Government in Aceh's peacebuilding: (1) Oppose/against the Government. This strategy has been in common during conflict period – as the Government was considered as main enemy of society – until the tsunami (1980s – 2004). Yet, some of local CSOs also engaged with the Government to secure their safety; (2) engage/cooperate with the Government (2004 – 2010). This strategy was started being popular since the tsunami was devastating Aceh in the late 2004. Most of local CSOs were shifting their struggle for peace towards helping the people in needs after tsunami. The CSOs became the agent to ensure service delivery of aids could reach the people. Therefore, the cooperation with the Government was necessary. However, this condition transformed most of local CSOs (including its professionals) minds to be more capitalistic; and (3) reclaim/seize the Governmental position. Moreover, as the foreign donors began to leave Aceh since 2008, most of local CSOs professionals were shifting their strategy to reclaim the governmental position with the aim to expand the opportunities to determine the public policies according to the expectation of society. As the programs from foreign donors have finished entirely, this strategy has become more popular among local CSOs professionals (2010 – now). Of course, in positive side, this strategy could be effectively to facilitate the civilian voices in determine the public policies. But in negative side, this might led the local CSOs professionals merely to be political tools of the elites.

According to historical perspective, the violence of conflict in Aceh killed more 15,000 and more than 50,000 had victimized by the situation of violence and conflict in Aceh, moreover, the devastation of tsunami put a great trauma for the people of Aceh. So, the birth of the permanent peace agreement is really necessary to build the safe and conducive environment for the people of Aceh.The main emphasis of this paper is to explore the roles of third parties in Aceh peace process that include the roles of Henry Dunant Center and Martti Ahtisaari - Crisis Management Initiative. Thus it seems that one should not take a categorical position on the role of different types of actors in conflict and peace processes. It is not important who does something, but what is being done. When compromises are encouraged, when violent action is discouraged, then peace is served. Next exploring the other factors behind the involvement of third parties in Aceh that include issues of human rights, increase of democracy, demand of referendum in Aceh, Autonomy status for Aceh, also state leaderships that led to the peace process of Aceh. This research also focuses to the theory of  moment of ripeness to explain the timing of mediation involvements in Aceh peace process.

This topic will focus on how the religion could influence the post-conflict development in Aceh, Northern Indonesia. It will discuss the position and potency of religion in the conflict resolution with analysis how successful religion could stop the Aceh Conflict and bring peace to Acehnese people. This paper also will measure how important religion toward peacebuilding in Aceh. Moreover, this paper will explain the problem behind the Acehnese implementation sharia law and clash between societies that stimulated by the sharia law. This article uses secondary data that acquired from books and scholarly journals. This article also implements case study in which will analyzes the case of data that acquired from the research.

After more than 20 years of sporadic separatist insurgency, the Free Aceh Movement and the Indonesian government signed an internationally brokered peace agreement in August 2005, just eight months after the Indian Ocean tsunami devastated Aceh’s coastal communities. This article presents a medical hu-manitarian case study based on ethnographic data I collected while working for a large aid agency in post-conflict Aceh from 2005 to 2007. In December 2005, the agency faced the first test of its medical and negotiation capacities to provide psychiatric care to a recently amnestied political prisoner whose erratic behavior upon returning home led to his re-arrest and detention at a district police station. I juxtapose two methodological approachesdan ethnographic content analysis of the agency’s email archive and field-based participant-observationdto recount contrasting narrative versions of the event. I use this contrast to illustrate and critique the immediacy of the humanitarian imperative that characterizes the industry. Immediacy is explored as both an urgent moral impulse to assist in a crisis and a form of mediation that seemingly projects neutral and transparent transmission of content. I argue that the sense of immediacy afforded by email enacts and amplifies the humanitarian imperative at the cost of abstracting elite humanitarian actors out of local and moral context. As a result, the management and mediation of this psychiatric case by email produced a bureaucratic model of care that failed to account for complex conditions of chronic political and medical instability on the ground.

In this article, I address whether activities meant to improve land tenure security may have
supported or undermined peace-building during the postwar stabilization and transition
period of 2005–2008. In 2005, the population of Aceh began recovery from both a 29-year
separatist war and the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Property and tenure systems were
severely damaged by both the war and tsunami. The primary project designed to support
land tenure security during this period was an internationally funded and state-administered
project called the Reconstruction of Aceh Land Administration System (RALAS). RALAS
successfully registered land in several areas of Aceh and rebuilt much of the technical
capacity of the state land administration system. Yet, the linkage of RALAS primarily to
post-disaster activities meant that connections between land tenure security and postwar
dynamics were often missed. As a result, actors involved in RALAS did not clearly identify
or take advantage of opportunities to link land tenure security to peace-building. In addition,
a lack of understanding of fundamental legal problems typical of postwar scenarios caused
several problems for the implementation of RALAS. This article concludes with lessons
learned regarding the timing, location, institutional capacities, and methods of implementing
land reform for peace building

The authors researched the successes, failures, and overall sustainability of projects utilizing community- based approaches and Community-Driven Development methodologies in select areas of Aceh Utara and Bener Meriah, especially with regard to the durability of such externally imposed structures past the project cycle. The authors visited a sampling of governance, livelihoods, and small-scale infrastructure projects a minimum of two years after the projects ended and found that, while infrastructure and skills transfer impacts to individuals were positive, cooperative livelihood projects tended to fail. As for governance and planning processes, positive impacts past the project cycle were realized but the overall sustainability of such approaches remains exposed to future failure due to a lack of codification of such processes in local law. Impacts on women were intended but were not sustainable past the project cycle with the exception of select individual skills transfers. Case studies were developed through individual interviews and focus group discussions with past participants in these projects.

This  chapter  examines  some  overlooked  connections  between  property administration and violent conflict. Specifically, it examines how policy narratives concerning property and tenure security affected the design and success of the
state-administered  program  for  land  registration  and  title  issuance  in Aceh.  It argues that activities meant to improve land tenure security in Aceh came from politicized post-disaster narratives that marginalized post-conflict aspects of property administration. The resulting lack of consideration of post-conflict land- and property-administration  issues  may  have  not  only  limited  RALAS’s  ability  to issue titles and support tenure security but also undermined existing, secure tenure relations. The failure to frame tenure security as a post-conflict issue as well as
a post-disaster one ultimately affected how tenure security was defined, how land tenure  programs  were  designed  to  meet  perceived  challenges,  and  how  these programs did or did not link to peacebuilding. The lessons learned in the case of Aceh  pose  broader  questions  about  what  difference  the  symbolic  values  of natural resources might make in post-conflict natural resource management, and specifically what difference a lack of attention to these symbolic values makes when land and property are linked to peacebuilding.

This article asseses security progress in Aceh (2005-2015) after the signing of the Helsinki MoU between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in 2005. In examining the progress, this paper employs security-development nexus approach and peace building theory. This is a book chapter and published in German version only. See Basilisa Dengen and Alex Flor (eds). Peace building in Aceh: Zwischen Scharia und Tsunami. Berlin: Regiospectra, 2017. Pp 45-80.

In this paper, the possibilities for creating a peaceful society amidst an ongoing conflict between the state and ethno-based secessionist movement are explored. The cases of the Philippines and Indonesia, specifically the Moros and Acehnese respectively, are discussed and analyzed against the backdrop of identity politics, modalities of peace building and conflict resolution, and nation-state building. Towards the end of the paper, lessons from the peace process engaged by both the state and secessionist movement are derived on the wish that they may serve as guideposts in future peace and conflict mitigation endeavors.

This is english translated version of my Book chapter 'Transformasi Gerakan Aceh Merdeka' in Ikrar Nusa Bhakti (ed). (2008). Beranda Perdamaian Aceh Tiga Tahun Pasca MoU Helsinki (Verandah of Peace: 3rd Anniversary of Aceh Peace Post Helsinki MoU),  Jakarta & Yogyakarta: P2P-LIPI and Pustaka Pelajar. pp 135-174.

Although Indonesia is not an Islamic state, it uniquely granted the province of Aceh permission to officially implement sharia law in 2001. This was an effort to win over the Aceh people, who are known to be deeply religious Muslims, against the Aceh Liberation Movement (which had no sharia agenda). Since then sharia has become the “master signifier” which defines all other aspects of life in the region. All other legal sources—customary laws, national laws, and international conventions—are interpreted according to, and should not contradict, sharia. The Quran and prophetic traditions are the major sources of legal authority and take precedence over the state constitution and national laws in all local qanuns (bylaws). The thing is, although Muslims are a majority (98.19% according to the 2010 census), non-Muslims live in Aceh too, albeit a small minority. They are citizens, just like their Muslim counterparts, and should technically have equal rights. How, then, do local Islamic establishment politics and illiberal citizenship affect interreligious relations, sources of authority, and how individuals define their identity, especially in Aceh’s ethnically and religiously mixed border areas?

This report examines factions within the former rebel movement GAM and its political party, Partai Aceh. It notes how the old diaspora elite is losing influence, with control over resources and institutions mattering more than closeness to the GAM founders.

The passing of Law No. 18 of 2001 on ‘Special Autonomy for the Province of Aceh Special Region as the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam’ signified a major development in the Indonesian government’s strategy to resolve Aceh’s protracted conflict. Ratified by President Megawati Sukarnoputri on 9 August 2001, the ‘NAD law’ conferred unprecedented authority to Aceh over its internal affairs. This paper evaluates the challenges that have been involved in implementing the three main tenets of the legislation — aspects of Syari’ah (Islamic law), the return of Aceh’s natural resource revenue and a provision to hold direct local elections. The paper argues that the Megawati administration’s failure to redress Acehnese grievances through special autonomy largely stems from its suspicion of the NAD law itself, its greater reliance on militaristic measures than on political policies in Aceh, and pre-existing systemic factors such as Aceh’s dysfunctional state infrastructure, corrupt political culture and war economy.

The Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, hereafter GAM) fought the Government of Indonesia (hereafter GoI), in numerous discrete phases of conflict and retreat, from 1976 until the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the GoI and GAM in Helsinki on August 15, 2005.) However, tensions resulting from territorial and economic competition remain between the demobilized remnants of that insurgency and the anti-separatist militias created by the Indonesian military as a counterbalance to GAM in Aceh’s Central Highlands. This paper describes a series of violent criminal incidents that occurred in the Highlands in February / March 2008, and the connections of those incidents to Indonesian gangs/ militias and political / economic interests from the local through to the provincial and on to the national levels. It examines the motivations of all involved; the way in which these motives change from the micro-level to the macro-level as one moves further away from the event; and the inherent contradictions in group discourses versus group activities. It also elaborates upon the economic and political motivations underlying the actions and stances of certain peripheral elites (involved in the criminal incidents described) who back a decentralization bid that would split Aceh into three provinces, in violation of Aceh’s territorial integrity as recognized by the 2005 Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding which brought the 30-year conflict in Aceh to a close. This paper also evaluates the way in which various international actors viewed both the crime and the separatist movement, and their reactions to the event based upon those prisms. The paper concludes with a discussion of the viability of new separatist aspirations and their relation to Indonesian politics.

Panarchy theory has been utilized to first conceptualize the entrenched conflict that lasted for nearly 30 years between Aceh and Indonesia and second, the development of peace prior to and shortly following the tsunami of 2004. The purpose of this paper is to show how panarchy or complex adaptive systems theory can be used to explain the previous
state of the Aceh-Indonesia conflict as a sustained maladaptive system and how it was eventually changed into an adaptive system harboring the potential for peaceful sustainability. There are four main questions that this thesis answers. First, how can the Aceh-Indonesia conflict be explained as a rigidity trap? Second, what were the main elements or inputs from cyclical systems below or above the Aceh-Indonesia conflict
scale that led to the collapse of the rigidity trap and the generation of a healthy or complex adaptive system? Third, what role, if any, did the tsunami of December 2004 play in achieving the peace of the new complex adaptive system and fourth, what elements or inputs into the new healthy system may or may not lead to the systems peaceful sustainability? The conflict and the peace achieved between the two former antagonists appears to be an example of a maladapted cyclical socio-economic and political rigidity trap that was acted upon by new inputs from cyclical scales above the Aceh-Indonesia conflict scale. It is thought that this is the first time panarchy theory has been applied to an aspect of conflict transformation modeling. It is hoped that this initial 4 attempt will encourage others to test panarchy theory; maladaptive and adaptive system models, in the field of conflict transformation.

Much international development assistance has been delivered in the form of
statebuilding interventions over the past 20 years, especially in post-conflict or fragile
states. The apparent failure of many international statebuilding interventions has
prompted a ‘political economy’ turn in development studies. This article critically
assesses the key approaches that have emerged to address the interrelations between
interveners and recipients, and advances an approach that places the politics of scale
at the core of the conflicts shaping the outcomes of international intervention.
Different scales privilege different interests, unevenly allocating power, resources and
political opportunity structures. Interveners and recipients thus pursue scalar
strategies and establish socio-political alliances that reinforce their power and
marginalise rivals. This approach is harnessed towards examining the uneven results
of the Aceh Government Transformation Programme, financed by the World Bankmanaged
Multi Donor Trust Fund following the 2005 peace agreement and
implemented by the UNDP and the Aceh provincial government.