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ISBN: 978-980-6810-66-2 This document was prepared by CAF at the request of the Ibero-American General Secretariat (ESGIB, in Spanish) to be presented in the XXI Ibero-American Summit of Chiefs of State and Government held in Asunción,... more
ISBN: 978-980-6810-66-2 This document was prepared by CAF at the request of the Ibero-American General Secretariat (ESGIB, in Spanish) to be presented in the XXI Ibero-American Summit of Chiefs of State and Government held in Asunción, Paraguay.
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From 1992 to 2002, major expansions of the Argentine electricity transmission sector depended on users proposing, voting and paying for such expansions, which were then put out to competitive tender. Commentators hold this novel policy to... more
From 1992 to 2002, major expansions of the Argentine electricity transmission sector depended on users proposing, voting and paying for such expansions, which were then put out to competitive tender. Commentators hold this novel policy to have been unsuccessful, mainly on the ground that it substantially delayed investment in a muchneeded “Fourth Line ” to Buenos Aires. Part One of this paper challenges this interpretation. The policy was chosen because the conventional regulatory framework could not be trusted to deliver more efficient transmission investment decisions. The delay to the Fourth Line was short. Most importantly, the Fourth Line was not economic. Hence the delay was beneficial both in deferring and in reducing costs. It indicated a need to reappraise transmission investment policy because the availability of gas had made it more economic to generate electricity near Buenos Aires than to transmit it a long
The innovative transmission expansion policy introduced in Argentina in 1992 has been refined and modified since then. Refinements include provision for transmission companies and others to propose quality and substation expansions. There... more
The innovative transmission expansion policy introduced in Argentina in 1992 has been refined and modified since then. Refinements include provision for transmission companies and others to propose quality and substation expansions. There have been several such expansions, and no lack of investment in quality and reliability of supply. A ‘second round of reforms ’ in 1998 introduced transmission rights and a method of ‘riskbearing expansions’. These and other reforms were rescinded before they became effective. In 1999 a Federal Transmission Plan was introduced, to build lines designated by the federal and provincial governments. This reflected a decision to give greater weight to political rather than economic considerations, rather than a failure to meet the original economic aims of reform. The original reform led to less investment in major transmission lines but used existing lines more intensively, which was more efficient. Competition to construct expansions developed, and le...
From 1992 to 2002, major expansions of the Argentine electricity transmission sector depended on users proposing, voting and paying for such expansions, which were then put out to competitive tender. Commentators hold this novel policy to... more
From 1992 to 2002, major expansions of the Argentine electricity transmission sector depended on users proposing, voting and paying for such expansions, which were then put out to competitive tender. Commentators hold this novel policy to have been unsuccessful, mainly on the ground that it substantially delayed investment in a much needed “Fourth Line” to Buenos Aire. This paper challenges this interpretation. The policy was chosen because the conventional regulatory framework could not be trusted to deliver more efficient transmission investment decisions. The delay to the Fourth Line was short. Most importantly, the Fourth Line was not economic. Hence the delay was beneficial both in deferring and in reducing costs. It indicated a need to reappraise transmission investment policy because the availability of gas had made it more economic to generate electricity near Buenos Aires than to transmit it a long distance.
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Argentina’s 1992 transmission expansion policy was subsequently modified by, for example, including provision for transmission companies and proposing quality and substation expansions. There have been several such expansions, and no lack... more
Argentina’s 1992 transmission expansion policy was subsequently modified by, for example, including provision for transmission companies and proposing quality and substation expansions. There have been several such expansions, and no lack of investment in quality and reliability of supply. In 1999, reflecting a decision to give greater weight to political considerations, a Federal Transmission Plan was introduced to build lines designated by the federal and provincial governments. The original reform led to less investment in major transmission lines but more intensive use of existing lines. Competition to construct expansions developed, leading to lower construction costs. Thus the Argentine transmission expansion mechanism was a considerable success in terms of meeting the requirements of users efficiently. This experience suggests that involving users in the regulation of monopoly networks is feasible, and the scope for it may be greater than generally appreciated. However, the r...
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From 1992 to 2002, major expansions of the Argentine electricity transmission sector depended on users proposing, voting and paying for such expansions, which were then put out to competitive tender. Commentators hold this novel policy to... more
From 1992 to 2002, major expansions of the Argentine electricity transmission sector depended on users proposing, voting and paying for such expansions, which were then put out to competitive tender. Commentators hold this novel policy to have been unsuccessful, mainly on the ground that it substantially delayed investment in a muchneeded “Fourth Line ” to Buenos Aires. Part One of this paper challenges this interpretation. The policy was chosen because the conventional regulatory framework could not be trusted to deliver more efficient transmission investment decisions. The delay to the Fourth Line was short. Most importantly, the Fourth Line was not economic. Hence the delay was beneficial both in deferring and in reducing costs. It indicated a need to reappraise transmission investment policy because the availability of gas had made it more economic to generate electricity near Buenos Aires than to transmit it a long