By resorting to the principles of good faith, fairness and due process, the WTO Panels and the Appellate Body have rebalanced inequities in the procedural law of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). The principles of procedural... more
By resorting to the principles of good faith, fairness and due process, the WTO Panels and the Appellate Body have rebalanced inequities in the procedural law of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). The principles of procedural justice roll back the use of flexibilities within the DSU as a litigation technique in trade remedy cases. Thus, the WTO Panels have introduced nothing less than a constitutional component to the WTO legal system, to check against abusing those very flexibilities, which were introduced to maintain fairness, promptness and effectiveness of dispute resolution. This paper explores how the WTO Panels have fostered a relationship between the WTO treaty provisions and general principles of law — particularly in relation to the development of a procedural fairness standard in WTO dispute settlement — which is one that the Appellate Body has often confirmed, but more often rejected.
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Andrew Mitchell’s book (“Legal Principles in WTO Disputes”) offers an account of the interplay of WTO with wider public international law viewed through the prism of principles. One part legal theory, one part case study, the book first... more
Andrew Mitchell’s book (“Legal Principles in WTO Disputes”) offers an account of the interplay of WTO with wider public international law viewed through the prism of principles. One part legal theory, one part case study, the book first develops a doctrinal framework for principles, which it then applies to four principles - good faith, due process, proportionality, and special and differential treatment (SDT) - that figure prominently in WTO panel and Appellate Body reports. Like other scholarly contributions in the field, Mitchell also discusses the circumstances for when principles may become law applicable in a WTO dispute. In his view, principles must dispose of a concrete legal basis in established rules of international law, be sufficiently clear and coherent and not contradict the plain meaning of a WTO agreement. If too vaguely defined, the WTO tribunals are encouraged to defer use of that principle until state practice has more reliably concretized its meaning. Yet, if fou...
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... www.brill.nl/nord NORDIC JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Fairness, Promptness and Effectiveness: How the Openness of Good Faith Limits the Flexibility of the DSU Marion Panizzon Senior Research Fellow, World Trade Institute, University... more
... www.brill.nl/nord NORDIC JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Fairness, Promptness and Effectiveness: How the Openness of Good Faith Limits the Flexibility of the DSU Marion Panizzon Senior Research Fellow, World Trade Institute, University of Bern, Switzerland ...
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One of Europe's longest-standing conceptualizations of the migration-and-development-nexus, France's co-development program associates the French government to a migrant diaspora's transnational engagements in view to reduce... more
One of Europe's longest-standing conceptualizations of the migration-and-development-nexus, France's co-development program associates the French government to a migrant diaspora's transnational engagements in view to reduce migratory pressure. According to this partnership paradigm, France co-funds remittances, skills and knowledge transfers in view to stimulate source country development. This article explains the multi-level structure of co-development policy and traces its complex trajectory over time and space from a financial to a fiscal instrument. Facing diaspora criticism, co-development's migration control and security policy rationales were replaced by strategies to help source countries adjust to a globalizing economy. This article focuses on how France invests into de-fiscalizing migrants' revenue and what effects this shift from financial to fiscal measures may have on migratory flows. We identify five benefits of the tax break: non-discriminatory a...
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International economic migration is steered by the vertical interplay of migration-related agreements at three levels: the multilateral opening of labour markets in GATS mode 4, its regional replicas of preferential trade agreements and... more
International economic migration is steered by the vertical interplay of migration-related agreements at three levels: the multilateral opening of labour markets in GATS mode 4, its regional replicas of preferential trade agreements and bilateral migration schemes. We observe a horizontal fragmentation, whereby bilateral migration agreements “correct” the high-skill bias of national immigration laws, while trade agreements liberalize the temporary movement of natural persons in highly skilled services occupations. Combining elements of both are economic partnership agreements (EPAs). The GATS Article II (MFN) brings about coherence, as it lifts the pressure from the classic corridors of migration, which bilateral migration agreements have tended to cement. Presented at the SIEL 2010 Conference in Barcelona.
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ABSTRACT This paper examines the extent to which the Treaty of Lisbon’s new express European Union (EU) competence over readmissions under Article 79(3), may affirm the Union’s exclusivity over return policy. We first trace the trajectory... more
ABSTRACT This paper examines the extent to which the Treaty of Lisbon’s new express European Union (EU) competence over readmissions under Article 79(3), may affirm the Union’s exclusivity over return policy. We first trace the trajectory of Union competences over readmissions from implicit to shared. We then provide a brief overview of EU readmission agreements (EURAs), covering the target countries, as well as their scope and content in relation to human rights guarantees and the third-country nationals clause. Based on a case-study of the French agreements on joint management of immigration flows and partnership development (AJMs) we test if despite a weak human rights record, these agreements are better placed to deal with readmission of third country nationals than those of the EU. We find that the AJMs do not compare to EURAs, notably because of the broader issue linkages they propose and the conditionality between labor market access and readmission they establish. On that basis alone, there cannot be an exclusive Union competence over readmission. However, European Union mobility partnerships (EU MPs), which establish a link of conditionality to EURAs, may strengthen arguments in favor of exclusivity, based on the principles of parallelism and subsidiarity.
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Fairness as an equity of outcomes has been introduced into the WTO relatively late with the proclaimed goal of the Doha Development Agenda to achieve equitable trading conditions for developing countries. Fairness as process legitimacy... more
Fairness as an equity of outcomes has been introduced into the WTO relatively late with the proclaimed goal of the Doha Development Agenda to achieve equitable trading conditions for developing countries. Fairness as process legitimacy stands for increasing the participation of smaller size economies in WTO decision-making and predates Doha. It ensures that every Member's voice is heard in rule-making but also relates to dispute settlement, where participation of developing countries has been low. Procedural justice has been used by the WTO judiciary since the beginnings of GATT/WTO jurisprudence. However, this third prong of fairness in the WTO, has so far received little attention. Standards of procedural fairness unite distributive justice considerations and process legitimacy. Due process ensures equality of opportunity in the dispute settlement process, while good faith pro-tection and prohibition of abus de droit stand for equitable outcomes. By resorting to the principles...
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Research Interests: Law and European Law
Set in the context of growing interdisciplinarity in legal research, The Political Economy of International Law: A European Perspective provides a much-needed systematic and coherent review of the interactions between political economy... more
Set in the context of growing interdisciplinarity in legal research, The Political Economy of International Law: A European Perspective provides a much-needed systematic and coherent review of the interactions between political economy and international law.
The contributors reflect the need felt by international lawyers to open their traditional frontiers to insights from other disciplines - and political economy in particular. The methodological approach of the book is to take the traditional list of topics for a general treatise of international law, and to systematically incorporate insights from political economy to each.
Students and scholars of political economy and international law will find the topics discussed to be of great interest to their work. This book will also provide valuable insights for economists, lawyers, and policy-makers.
CONTENTS:
Introduction
Alberta Fabbricotti
PART I FRAMEWORK ISSUES
1. Political Economy of International Law: Towards a Holistic Model of State Behavior
Anne Van Aaken and Joel P. Trachtman
PART II POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
2. The Political Economy of Customary International Law
Niels Petersen
3. Can Political Economy Help Solve The Riddle of Customary International Law?
Alessandra Gianelli
4. The Political Economy of Jus Cogens
Paul B. Stephan
5. The Political Economy of International Treaties
Panos Merkouris
6. Political Economy and the Decisions of International Organizations: Choosing Governance Arrangements Through Informality
Ramses A. Wessel and Evisa Kica
PART III POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
7. Political Economy of International Law: A Convenient Alliance for the Study of Compliance?
Barbara Delcourt
8. International Political Economy and the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Compliance with International Law
Meredith Kolsky Lewis
9. The Political Economy of Judicial Production of International Law
Paul B. Stephan
10. The Political Economy of The (Non-)Enforcement of International Human Rights Pronouncements by States
Andreas Von Staden
11. The Political Economy of International Lawmaking by National Courts
Eyal Benvenisti
12. Political Economy and the Responsibility of States: The Problem of Many Hands in International Law
André Nollkaemper
PART IV POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SUBSTANTIVE FIELDS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
13. The Political Economy of Regional Trade Agreements
Alberta Fabbricotti
14. Political Economy and International Investment Law: The Conclusion of IIAs by Developing Countries during the Twentieth Century
Tobias A. Lehmann
15. Political Economy and International Water Law: Political Economy Induced Changes to the Uptake of Benefit Sharing in International Water Law
Laurence Boisson De Chazournes and Christina Leb
16. Political Economy and the Protection of Human Rights: Political Economy and Compliance with Human Rights Treaties
Ulyana Kohut
17. Political Economy and International Migration Law
Daniela Vitiello and Marion Panizzon
PART V CONCLUSIONS
18. Political Economy and International Law: Paradoxes and Potential
Eyal Benvenisti and Jan Wouters
Index
The contributors reflect the need felt by international lawyers to open their traditional frontiers to insights from other disciplines - and political economy in particular. The methodological approach of the book is to take the traditional list of topics for a general treatise of international law, and to systematically incorporate insights from political economy to each.
Students and scholars of political economy and international law will find the topics discussed to be of great interest to their work. This book will also provide valuable insights for economists, lawyers, and policy-makers.
CONTENTS:
Introduction
Alberta Fabbricotti
PART I FRAMEWORK ISSUES
1. Political Economy of International Law: Towards a Holistic Model of State Behavior
Anne Van Aaken and Joel P. Trachtman
PART II POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
2. The Political Economy of Customary International Law
Niels Petersen
3. Can Political Economy Help Solve The Riddle of Customary International Law?
Alessandra Gianelli
4. The Political Economy of Jus Cogens
Paul B. Stephan
5. The Political Economy of International Treaties
Panos Merkouris
6. Political Economy and the Decisions of International Organizations: Choosing Governance Arrangements Through Informality
Ramses A. Wessel and Evisa Kica
PART III POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
7. Political Economy of International Law: A Convenient Alliance for the Study of Compliance?
Barbara Delcourt
8. International Political Economy and the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Compliance with International Law
Meredith Kolsky Lewis
9. The Political Economy of Judicial Production of International Law
Paul B. Stephan
10. The Political Economy of The (Non-)Enforcement of International Human Rights Pronouncements by States
Andreas Von Staden
11. The Political Economy of International Lawmaking by National Courts
Eyal Benvenisti
12. Political Economy and the Responsibility of States: The Problem of Many Hands in International Law
André Nollkaemper
PART IV POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SUBSTANTIVE FIELDS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
13. The Political Economy of Regional Trade Agreements
Alberta Fabbricotti
14. Political Economy and International Investment Law: The Conclusion of IIAs by Developing Countries during the Twentieth Century
Tobias A. Lehmann
15. Political Economy and International Water Law: Political Economy Induced Changes to the Uptake of Benefit Sharing in International Water Law
Laurence Boisson De Chazournes and Christina Leb
16. Political Economy and the Protection of Human Rights: Political Economy and Compliance with Human Rights Treaties
Ulyana Kohut
17. Political Economy and International Migration Law
Daniela Vitiello and Marion Panizzon
PART V CONCLUSIONS
18. Political Economy and International Law: Paradoxes and Potential
Eyal Benvenisti and Jan Wouters
Index