Books by Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki
This is a collection of papers on various issues of metaphilosophy of law. .
The file contains the Table of Content and Preface of the volume edited by M. Araszkiewicz, P. Ba... more The file contains the Table of Content and Preface of the volume edited by M. Araszkiewicz, P. Banaś, T. Gizbert-Studnicki and K. Płeszka, published by Springer as volume 111 of Law and Philosophy Library
Papers by Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki
Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, 2021
Edward Elgar Publishing eBooks, Dec 13, 2022
Social Science Research Network, 2017
Legal theories define their task and discovery of necessary and/or essential features of law. It ... more Legal theories define their task and discovery of necessary and/or essential features of law. It is unclear what "necessary" and "essential" mean in this context. This paper focuses on the problem of necessity, claiming that what is meant is metaphysical necessity. The clue to metaphysical necessity is the ideal secondary conceivability. The basis for such conceivability is the folk theory of law. As it is contingent which folk theory is actually adopted legal theories apply a very weak understanding of necessity. Theoretical claim that a certain feature of law is necessary has the function of explaining beliefs, forming the folk theory of law. Various legal theories define their task in different ways. I focus on the theories that define their task as the discovery and explanation of the nature of law. Such theories are quite numerous. Let me give a few examples. Joseph Raz (2009, 92) writes: "[I]n as much as the general theory of law is about the nature of law, it strives to elucidate law's essential features, i.e. those features which are possessed by every legal system just in virtue of its being legal, by every legislative institution in virtue of its being legislative, by every practice of legal reasoning by virtue of its being a practice of legal reasoning , and so on. A claim to necessity is the nature of this enterprise." Julie Dickson (2001, 17) endorses Raz's view by stating: "[...] analytical jurisprudence is concerned with explaining the nature of law by attempting to isolate and explain those features of law which make law into what it is. A successful theory of law of this type is a theory which consists of propositions about the law which (1) are necessarily true, and (2) adequately explain the nature of law." Scott Shapiro (2011, 9) expresses a similar view, as follows: "[...] to answer the question "What is law" on this interpretation is to discover what makes all and only instances of law instances of law and not something else. [...] [T]o discover the law's nature, in this second sense, would be in part to discover its necessary properties, that is, those properties that law could not fail to have." Interestingly enough, a similar view on the task of legal theory is shared by Robert Alexy (2004, 162), a leading representative of the non-positivistic camp. "The possibility of defining the concept of nature as it appears in sentences of the form "What is the nature of p, namely by means of the concept of necessity, allows for the substitution of the question "What is the nature of law?" by the question "What are the necessary properties
Jurisprudence, Apr 4, 2022
Ujmując na potrzeby tego opracowania interpretację jako dyskurs, nie mam na myśli tego, że proces... more Ujmując na potrzeby tego opracowania interpretację jako dyskurs, nie mam na myśli tego, że proces interpretacji de facto przebiega z udziałem więcej niż jednego uczestnika. Sądzę, że w wielu przypadkach mamy raczej do czynienia brought to you by CORE View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
Przegląd Konstytucyjny, 2017
Language and Legal Interpretation in International Law
International commercial arbitration is a cross-cultural enterprise. This chapter explores basic ... more International commercial arbitration is a cross-cultural enterprise. This chapter explores basic legal concepts that are not specific to any legal system but are used by all developed legal systems, such as ‘ownership’, ‘contract’, and ‘negligence’ (substantive multicultural concepts [SMCs]). Such concepts derive their meaning from the applicable law of a particular jurisdiction. However, lawyers from different jurisdictions are usually successful in communicating through the use of such concepts. How can this be explained? Four hypotheses are proposed which constitute a partial explanation. First, some of the SMCs are governed by supranational standards. Second, certain SMCs have ‘travelled’ from national legislation to lex mercatoria. Third, certain SMCs are relatively isolated in the sense that grasping their meaning does not require the determination of relationships between them and many other legal concepts. Such isolated SMCs tend to travel better. Fourth, different conceptua...
Tekkst jest odpiwiedzią na artykuł M. Stambulskiego "Kojot i ironia" opublikowany w nr 5/2022 Pań... more Tekkst jest odpiwiedzią na artykuł M. Stambulskiego "Kojot i ironia" opublikowany w nr 5/2022 Państwa i Prawa
Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 2021
The purpose of legal philosophy is frequently defined as the discovery or exploration of the natu... more The purpose of legal philosophy is frequently defined as the discovery or exploration of the nature of law. The nature of law is usually understood as a set of necessary properties of law. Such an identification of the purpose of legal philosophy raises some doubts. Irrespective of those doubts, I claim that that focusing exclusively on the nature of law may be detrimental to legal philosophy as a whole, as it may be an obstacle to the investigation of certain issues that seem important. Or, at least, not all fundamental problems of legal philosophy may be perceived as pertaining to the nature of the law. Two such problems are briefly discussed: (i) legal pluralism and (ii) certain new categories of non-human legal subjects, such as autonomous machines, environmental legal persons and animals. I argue that focusing on the nature of law does not help the exploration of those important topics.
Etyka, 1981
The article contains a critical analysis of two conceptions of “the nature of things”, as found i... more The article contains a critical analysis of two conceptions of “the nature of things”, as found in publications of West German philosophers of law: G. Radbruch and W. Maihoffer. In the first stage of the evolution of his thought Radbruch spoke of the “influence of the matter on the legal idea”. The function of “the nature of things” is identified by Radbruch with resistance by social reality to the implantation of the legal idea. In the next stage of his views Radbruch conceives of the nature of things as an objective sense of a certain social relationship, perceived from the point of view of a certain value. Now the nature of things serves as a bridge between the real world and the world of values. The nature of things has a minor role according to Radbruch, in legal thought. He emphatically opposes recognizing it as a source of law.
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Books by Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki
Papers by Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki