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- Philosophy, Law, Epistemology, Jurisprudence, Legal Theory, Legal Ethics, and 19 morePolitical Philosophy, Normativity, Argumentation Theory, Legal interpretation, Legal positivism, H.L.A. Hart, Filosofía del Derecho, Legal Reasoning, Theories of Justice, Norberto Bobbio, Law and Language, Political Theory, Epistemology of the Social Sciences, Legal argumentation, Human Rights Theory, Critical Legal Theory, Ronald Dworkin, Clinical Legal Education, and Legal Realismedit
- - Full professor of Legal Philosophy at the University of Palermo. - Ph.D in “Analytical philosophy and general theor... more- Full professor of Legal Philosophy at the University of Palermo. - Ph.D in “Analytical philosophy and general theory of law” (University of Milan, 1997). LL.M in Legal Theory (from “European Academy of Legal Theory”, Bruxelles, 1993).- Co-director of Diritto & Questioni pubbliche.edit
In Interpretivism and the Limits of Law, two perspectives on legal philosophy are brought into comparison, outlining two models: the communicative model and the interpretive model. This essay deals with three arguments levelled against... more
In Interpretivism and the Limits of Law, two perspectives on legal philosophy are brought into comparison, outlining two models: the communicative model and the interpretive model. This essay deals with three arguments levelled against legal interpretivism and proposes an attempt to defend this model of law
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Come osserva Norberto Bobbio – che non a caso ha coniato la suggestiva espressione “età dei diritti in relazione al costituzionalismo contemporaneo – c’è un nesso stringente tra pace, democrazia e diritti. «[S]enza diritti dell’uomo... more
Come osserva Norberto Bobbio – che non a caso ha coniato la suggestiva espressione “età dei diritti in relazione al costituzionalismo contemporaneo – c’è un nesso stringente tra pace, democrazia e diritti. «[S]enza diritti dell’uomo riconosciuti ed effettivamente protetti», scrive Bobbio, «non c’è democrazia; senza democrazia non ci sono le condizioni minime per la soluzione pacifica dei conflitti che sorgono tra individui, tra gruppi e tra quelle grandi collettività tradizionalmente indocili e tendenzialmente autocratiche che sono gli Stati, anche se sono democratiche coi propri cittadini».Non è dunque possibile, oggi, affrontare la questione dell’Europa senza dire qualcosa sui diritti
umani e la democrazia.
umani e la democrazia.
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The prefix 'post' in 'post-law' indicates that something has ended, but it is not clear what has begun; it warns us that we are in a moment of transition and that the moment demands that we reconfigure the map of problems and solutions.... more
The prefix 'post' in 'post-law' indicates that something has ended, but it is not clear what has begun; it warns us that we are in a moment of transition and that the moment demands that we reconfigure the map of problems and solutions. According to Giuseppe Zaccaria, post-law is characterized by the theoretical pair of deconstruction/pluralism, and it is from this pair that this essay critically reconstructs Zaccaria's legal-philosophical perspective. The aspect that is taken into more significant consideration is the possibility of reserving a space for the objectivity and correctness of legal decisions under pluralism and multiculturalism.
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Bruno Celano was an immensely gifted, prolific and profound philosopher. It is not possible to encapsulate his contribution in a few pages. In this article, we limit ourselves to presenting, in brief, some crucial aspects of his thought.... more
Bruno Celano was an immensely gifted, prolific and profound philosopher.
It is not possible to encapsulate his contribution in a few pages. In this article, we
limit ourselves to presenting, in brief, some crucial aspects of his thought. These are,
in particular, the original way in which he conceived the relationship between law
and morality, the peculiar form of legal positivism he endorsed, how he developed
the idea of the rule of law, and his recent turn towards a form of naturalized jurisprudence
that he called “psychodeontics”.
It is not possible to encapsulate his contribution in a few pages. In this article, we
limit ourselves to presenting, in brief, some crucial aspects of his thought. These are,
in particular, the original way in which he conceived the relationship between law
and morality, the peculiar form of legal positivism he endorsed, how he developed
the idea of the rule of law, and his recent turn towards a form of naturalized jurisprudence
that he called “psychodeontics”.
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Alessio Lo Giudice’s Il dramma del giudizio is certainly a book worth reading. It is fluent, at times compelling, and enriched by literary references. There are two visual angles from which to look at this book. The first is to explore... more
Alessio Lo Giudice’s Il dramma del giudizio is certainly a book worth reading. It is fluent, at times compelling, and enriched by literary references. There are two visual angles from which to look at this book. The first is to explore the idea that judgment embodies the essential aspect of law. The second angle of view consists in deepening the dramatic dimension of judgment. Judgment, like drama, is an expression of conflicting human actions. Not only does it presuppose a conflict between human beings, but it is conflictual.
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A dieci anni dall’uscita di The Concept of Law, Alfonso Catania pubblica, sulla prestigiosa Rivista internazionale di filosofia del diritto, un saggio critico dal titolo: L’accettazione nel pensiero di Herbert L. A. Hart. Si tratta di un... more
A dieci anni dall’uscita di The Concept of Law, Alfonso Catania pubblica, sulla prestigiosa Rivista internazionale di filosofia del diritto, un saggio critico dal titolo: L’accettazione nel pensiero di Herbert L. A. Hart. Si tratta di un saggio meritatamente celebre, di cui è difficile esagerare l’impatto oggettivo e anche soggettivo. In questo saggioproporrò una ricostruzione delle tesi salienti del saggio di Catania del 1971 e, a partire da questa ricostruzione, metterò finalmente in bella forma alcune delle mie “osservazioni a margine” che si sono sedimentate nel corso degli anni sulla mia fotocopia, ormai lisa, de L’accettazione del diritto nel pensiero di Herbert L. A. Hart.
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Is the culture of rights in crisis? If by this label we mean to refer only to a legal discourse marked by the language of rights and a certain arrangement between powers that enhances the judiciary at the expense of the legislative and... more
Is the culture of rights in crisis? If by this label we mean to refer only to a legal discourse marked by the language of rights and a certain arrangement between powers that enhances the judiciary at the expense of the legislative and executive branches, then one can only answer in the negative. If, on the other hand, we consider as an integral part of the age of rights the Copernican revolution that reverses the perspective from which to view the relationship between Rulers and Ruled, as well as the belief that there is a hard core (hopefully expanding) of universally shared moral values on which to build a future of peace and prosperity for humanity, then it is difficult to deny the crisis of constitutionalism.
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La libertà di espressione è tra i valori più cari al costituzionalismo liberale moderno e contemporaneo. Limitare la libertà di ciascuno di dire ciò che vuole è, da questa prospettiva, sempre guardato con sospetto.Giorgio Maniaci nel suo... more
La libertà di espressione è tra i valori più cari al costituzionalismo liberale moderno e contemporaneo. Limitare la libertà di ciascuno di dire ciò che vuole è, da questa prospettiva, sempre guardato con sospetto.Giorgio Maniaci nel suo saggio si scaglia apertamente contro questa prospettiva.L’idea di Maniaci è che la menzogna sia pericolosissima e vada dunque estirpata dai discorsi pubblici. Questo perché la libertà di espressione non è un valore in sé ma è uno strumento a sostegno della democrazia e della possibilità dei cittadini di formarsi un’opinione libera e scientificamente corretta. Le credenze falsificate dalla scienza non hanno diritto di cittadinanza nel discorso pubblico. In questo saggio si propone una difesa di Mill.
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This entry is devoted to a survey of the main analytical conceptions of legal science. The focus will be in particular on (1) Alf Ross’s legal realism and his neo-positivistic approach to legal science; (2) Norberto Bobbio and the Italian... more
This entry is devoted to a survey of the main analytical conceptions of legal science. The focus will be in particular on (1) Alf Ross’s legal realism and his neo-positivistic approach to legal science; (2) Norberto Bobbio and the Italian analytical legal philosophical school, which firmly tie legal science to language analysis; (3) Herbert Hart and the analytical philosophy of ordinary language, and, eventually, (4) Ronald Dworkin and the interpretative turn.
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Is constitutionalism in crisis? If by ‘constitutionalism’ we only refer to a legal discourse grounded on the language of rights and to a division of powers that favors judicial power at the expense of legislative and executive ones, in... more
Is constitutionalism in crisis? If by ‘constitutionalism’ we only refer to a legal discourse grounded on the language of rights and to a division of powers that favors judicial power at the expense of legislative and executive ones, in that case, the answer is ‘not’. If, instead, we consider as an integral part of constitutionalism the Enlightenment’s individualism and the belief in some universal moral values on which to ground a future of peace and prosperity for humanity, then denying the crisis of constitutionalism becomes difficult.
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Fabio Ciaramelli’s book L’ordine simbolico della legge e il problema del metodo proposes a convincing methodological perspective for legal knowledge in contemporary constitutional democracies. The central claim is that a middle path... more
Fabio Ciaramelli’s book L’ordine simbolico della legge e il problema del metodo proposes a convincing methodological perspective for legal knowledge in contemporary constitutional democracies. The central claim is that a middle path between strong objectivism and absolute discretion exists. Ciaramelli thinks that the key concept for legal methodology is that of “symbolic order”. In this paper I deal with this notion and try to emphasize some features of it from a perspective slightly different from Ciaramelli’s one.
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Indeterminacy is one of the main characteristics of the law in contemporary constitutional States. It challenges the objectualist conceptions of law reduce reduce law to a system of norms or a set of facts and confirms those conceptions... more
Indeterminacy is one of the main characteristics of the law in contemporary constitutional States. It challenges the objectualist conceptions of law reduce reduce law to a system of norms or a set of facts and confirms those conceptions that regard the law as an interpretative social practice. Legal systems’ constitutionalization increases legal flexibility at the expense of legal certainty; it imposes to legislators, judges and individuals the responsibility and the associated risks of individuating the law. The ways in which the legislator, at different levels, faces the Covid-19 current pandemic offer an interesting perspective to analyze the positive and negative effects produced by the indeterminacy of contemporary law.
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The author critically discusses some main points of Tommaso Greco’s book La legge della fiducia. Greco distinguishes two models of law – the fiduciary model and the anti-fiduciary one – and supports the first model with good arguments.... more
The author critically discusses some main points of Tommaso Greco’s book La legge della fiducia. Greco distinguishes two models of law – the fiduciary model and the anti-fiduciary one – and supports the first model with good arguments. This review, while endorsing Greco’s conclusions, emphasizes some reason for perplexity and claims that the anti-fiduciary model of law helps to maintain a critical attitude towards the law.
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Rispetto alle visioni del diritto a tinte fosche una teoria del ragionamento giuridico come quella di Terranova ha almeno il merito di “ripulire” il diritto dalle manifestazioni più brutali della forza. Parafrasando Jon Elster, si... more
Rispetto alle visioni del diritto a tinte fosche una teoria del ragionamento giuridico come quella di Terranova ha almeno il merito di “ripulire” il diritto dalle manifestazioni più brutali della forza. Parafrasando Jon Elster, si potrebbe attribuire all’argomentazione una forza civilizzatrice; che non è cosa da poco. Pretendere dalla ragione applicata al diritto qualcosa di più significa peccare di ottimismo. Ma è pur vero che solo un atteggiamento improntato all’ottimismo riesce a far sì che le cose si approssimino a come vorremmo che fossero. E più sono i giuristi ottimisti e devoti alla razionalità e alla ragionevolezza – alla “ricerca della verità”, per dirla col bel titolo del libro di Willard V. Quine – maggiori saranno le probabilità che il diritto di domani sia migliore di quello attuale.
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La costituzionalizzazione degli ordinamenti giuridici accresce la flessibilità del diritto a detrimento della certezza e impone a tutti – legislatori, giudici e individui soggetti al diritto – di assumersi le proprie responsabilità e i... more
La costituzionalizzazione degli ordinamenti giuridici accresce la flessibilità del diritto a detrimento della certezza e impone a tutti – legislatori, giudici e individui soggetti al diritto – di assumersi le proprie responsabilità e i rischi che ne conseguono. Il modo in cui il legislatore, a diversi livelli, fronteggia l’attuale pandemia da Covid-19 costituisce un interessante angolo visuale per riflettere sugli effetti – alcuni positivi, altri negativi – prodotti dall’indeterminatezza del diritto contemporaneo.
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Nello stato costituzionale la distinzione tra “il diritto qual è” e il diritto “quale dovrebbe essere” perde gran parte della sua rilevanza. L’idea che il diritto sia una pratica sociale, caratterizzata principalmente da esercizi di... more
Nello stato costituzionale la distinzione tra “il diritto qual è” e il diritto “quale dovrebbe essere” perde gran parte della sua rilevanza. L’idea che il diritto sia una pratica sociale, caratterizzata principalmente da esercizi di interpretazione di disposizioni indeterminate alla luce dei principi e dei valori morali incorporati nel diritto, impedisce di ritenere che la domanda “qual è il diritto (in relazione a una fattispecie)?” possa ammettere una risposta che consista in una mera acquiescenza passiva rispetto a un dato preesistente; rispondere a tale domanda richiede un impegno personale alla costruzione dell’ordinamento giuridico migliore possibile alla luce della migliore interpretazione dei suoi principi fondamentali. E tale impresa non può prescindere, per le ragioni viste in precedenze, dal ruolo propulsivo e intrinsecamente creativo dell’avvocato.
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In this commentary to the M.N. v. Belgium case the authors criticize the three fundamental arguments on which the decision of the European Court of Human Rights is founded: the approach based on ‘originalism’, the approach based on the... more
In this commentary to the M.N. v. Belgium case the authors criticize the three fundamental arguments on which the decision of the European Court of Human Rights is founded: the approach based on ‘originalism’, the approach based on the Courts’ precedents, and the approach based on consequentialism. As far as consequentialism is concerned, the authors do not disapprove the use of non-strictly legal arguments in the Court’s reasoning, convinced as they are that human rights’ courts, more than any other judge, are not la bouche de la loi, but actually hold a political power. What is criticized is the choice of the Court to give space to only one of the (possible) political consequences of its decision, completely disregarding all the others, regardless of their importance for human rights.
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In his latest book Massimo La Torre makes a number of criticisms to legal positivism. Most of them are convincing. In this essay I try to reply to the few I disagree with. In particular, I deal with La Torre's objections against Hart's... more
In his latest book Massimo La Torre makes a number of criticisms to legal positivism. Most of them are convincing. In this essay I try to reply to the few I disagree with. In particular, I deal with La Torre's objections against Hart's theories on legal interpretation and the internal point of view and against Raz's theory of legitimate authority. In the last paragraph I outline some ideological reasons for not considering legal positivism entirely dead.
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Legal education solicits the search for a preliminary answer to the question "what is the law?". As this latter question allows different answers depending on times, places and personal ideology, in the same way there is no unique model... more
Legal education solicits the search for a preliminary answer to the question "what is the law?". As this latter question allows different answers depending on times, places and personal ideology, in the same way there is no unique model or an ideal-type of legal education. Jurists change-and they must change-depending on the legal practice and legal culture in which they operate. As a consequence, legal education cannot ignore the context, it must adapt to it.
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Indeterminacy is one of law’s main characteristics in contemporary constitutional States. It challenges the objectualist conceptions of law which reduce law to a system of norms or a set of facts and confirms those conceptions which... more
Indeterminacy is one of law’s main characteristics in contemporary constitutional States. It challenges the objectualist conceptions of law which reduce law to a system of norms or a set of facts and confirms those conceptions which regard law as an interpretative social practice. Legal systems’ constitutionalization increases legal flexibility at the expense of legal certainty; it imposes to legislators, judges and individuals the responsibility and the associated risks of individuating law. The ways in which the legislator, at different levels, faces the Covid-19 current pandemic offer an interesting perspective to analyze the positive and negative effects produced by the indeterminacy of contemporary law.
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The interpretative turn that characterized the legal philosophical debate in the last decades offers a privileged viewpoint to observe the dispute between legal analytical philosophy and legal hermeneutics. On one hand it is certainly... more
The interpretative turn that characterized the legal philosophical debate in the last decades offers a privileged viewpoint to observe the dispute between legal analytical philosophy and legal hermeneutics. On one hand it is certainly true that the two traditions of thought have actually been converging for many years; on the other, it is worth noting that legal analytical philosophers are struggling to accept the interpretative turn and, as a consequence, to abandon the neutrality thesis peculiar of methodological legal positivism. Looking at the hermeneutics instead, its next step should be that of rejecting the one right answer thesis, with the awareness that it does not necessarily lead to surrender to arbitrary decisionism.
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The paper deals with the structural vagueness of the legal measures enacted by the Italian legislator to manage the Covid-19 pandemic. Can we demand more certain norms? Is personal liberty taken in due account by the legislator? Starting... more
The paper deals with the structural vagueness of the legal measures enacted by the Italian legislator to manage the Covid-19 pandemic. Can we demand more certain norms? Is personal liberty taken in due account by the legislator? Starting from these and similar questions, the paper proposes a reconstruction of the law and of the underlying legal ideology of contemporary constitutional States. Unlike the modern State, which was characterized by the authority principle and the value of legal certainty, the contemporary constitutional State seems to be willing to sacrifice authority and certainty on the altar of more justice and flexibility.
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The paper deals with the structural vagueness of the legal measures enacted by the Italian legislator to manage the Covid-19 pandemic. Can we demand more certain norms? Is personal liberty taken in due account by the legislator? Starting... more
The paper deals with the structural vagueness of the legal measures enacted by the Italian legislator to manage the Covid-19 pandemic. Can we demand more certain norms? Is personal liberty taken in due account by the legislator? Starting from these and similar questions, the paper proposes a reconstruction of the law and of the underlying legal ideology of contemporary constitutional States.
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This paper proposes a critical analysis of Bruno Celano’s normative legal positivism. The main objections focuses on four crucial points of Celano’s theory: 1) the distinction between descriptive and normative jurisprudence, which is not... more
This paper proposes a critical analysis of Bruno Celano’s normative legal positivism. The main objections focuses on four crucial points of Celano’s theory: 1) the distinction between descriptive and normative jurisprudence, which is not taken in due account; 2) the underestimation of the role of interpretation in the legal domain; 3) the acritical acceptance of the source thesis; 4) the attempt of reconciling a procedural ideal of the Rule of Law with the substantial values of the contemporary constitutional States.
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This paper proposes a critical presentation of the analytical approach to legal science. After an introductory paragraph in which a definition of the notions involved (i.e.: «legal science» and «analytical approach») will be offered and... more
This paper proposes a critical presentation of the analytical approach to legal science. After an introductory paragraph in which a definition of the notions involved (i.e.: «legal science» and «analytical approach») will be offered and some ambiguities affecting the discourses on legal knowldege will be disentangled, the next paragraphs will be devoted to a survey of the main analytical conceptions of legal science. The focus will be in particular on: (1) Alf Ross’s legal realism and his neo-positivistic approach to legal science; (2) Norberto Bobbio and the Italian analytical legal philosophical school, which firmly tie legal science to language analysis; (3) Herbert Hart and the analytical philosophy of ordinary language, and, eventually, (4) Ronald Dworkin and the interpretative turn. In the last paragraph I draw a general conclusion: legal science’s ambition to be pure and detached by its object (the law) is bound to be frustrated.
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Does a clinical legal approach tell us something interesting about the nature and the concept of law? This is the main question that this focus will try to answer in affirmative terms. This is a question of legal epistemology that seems... more
Does a clinical legal approach tell us something interesting about the nature and the concept of law? This is the main question that this focus will try to answer in affirmative terms.
This is a question of legal epistemology that seems not to be so interesting for clinical jurists. Indeed, clinical jurists above all emphasize the importance of legal clinics from the viewpoint of education and social justice, but neglect the contribution that a clinical legal method can offer with respect to the knowledge of law. The papers included in this focus face, from a legal philosophical perspective, each in its own way, the phenomenon of legal clinic approach, which it is spreading in Italy since a decade.
This is a question of legal epistemology that seems not to be so interesting for clinical jurists. Indeed, clinical jurists above all emphasize the importance of legal clinics from the viewpoint of education and social justice, but neglect the contribution that a clinical legal method can offer with respect to the knowledge of law. The papers included in this focus face, from a legal philosophical perspective, each in its own way, the phenomenon of legal clinic approach, which it is spreading in Italy since a decade.
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Quella tra Alf Ross ed Herbert Hart è la storia di un amore non corrisposto. Il primo non si lascia sfuggire alcuna occasione per rimarcare quanto la sua concezione del diritto sia, in definitiva, sovrapponibile a quella del secondo il... more
Quella tra Alf Ross ed Herbert Hart è la storia di un amore non corrisposto. Il primo non si lascia sfuggire alcuna occasione per rimarcare quanto la sua concezione del diritto sia, in definitiva, sovrapponibile a quella del secondo il quale, al contrario, giudica con grande severità, unita ad una punta di sarcasmo, la prospettiva giusfilosofica del primo. Gli amori non corrisposti sono senz’altro più interessanti di quelli corrisposti, i quali rischiano di apparire noiosi. In questo saggio cerco dunque di analizzare le ragioni e i fraintendimenti di questa storia d’amore senza lieto fine. Anticipo subito che, sebbene vi siano stati dei fraintendimenti (soprattutto da parte di Hart),vi sono anche ragioni robuste e profonde che spiegano perché questi due autori non potevano allearsi.In questa sede approfondisco alcune importanti divergenze tra la filosofia del diritto di Ross e quella di Hart. Tali divergenze riguardano: 1) il modo di intendere la scienza giuridica; 2) il collegamento tra la validità del diritto e i sentimenti e, infine, 3) i rapporti tra diritto e potere.
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Does a clinical legal approach tell us something interesting about the nature and the concept of law? Is it possible to rethink the relationship between law and morals starting from the legal clinics experience? Is the juxtaposition... more
Does a clinical legal approach tell us something interesting about the nature and the concept of law? Is it possible to rethink the relationship between law and morals starting from the legal clinics experience? Is the juxtaposition between doctors and jurists convincing? These are the main questions that will be addressed here. They are questions concerning legal epistemology and legal philosophy in the strict sense that seems not to be so interesting for clinical jurists. Indeed, clinical jurists above all emphasize the importance of legal clinics from the viewpoint of education and social justice, but neglect the contribution that a clinical legal method can offer with respect to the knowledge of law. Nevertheless, dealing with this latter question could be useful to strengthen contemporary legal clinical movement.
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From a legal philosophical point of view, the most interesting theses of so-called neo-constitutionalism are those that challenge methodological legal positivism. As an approach to law, legal positivism presupposes the possibility of... more
From a legal philosophical point of view, the most interesting theses of so-called neo-constitutionalism are those that challenge methodological legal positivism. As an approach to law, legal positivism presupposes the possibility of distinguishing between “law as it is” and “law as it should be”, between ideal law and real law, and, on the basis of this distinction, it identifies the object of legal science in positive law. The attack of neo-constitutionalism on this way of seeing legal knowledge revolves around three arguments: a) the argument of the correctness claim b) the argument relating to the impossibility of clearly distinguishing the observer from the participant, and c) the argument of the interpretive turn in legal science. My goal here is to show that methodological legal positivism is unable to reply convincingly to a critique based on these arguments. Another issue, which I do not deal with directly, is to determine whether, from these criticisms, it is possible to configure a legal philosophical perspective that is an alternative to both natural law doctrine and legal positivism. On the one hand, I feel that this is a futile issue, which is likely to run aground in sterile disputes whose outcome is predetermined by the starting stipulative definitions. On the other hand, I think it is possible and appropriate, at a conceptual level, to reconstruct legal positivism and natural law as mutually exclusive perspectives. In this case, the so-called neo-constitutionalist authors can be linked to the one or the other conception of law, depending on whether criticisms of methodological legal positivism are accompanied by an objectivist and cognitivist meta-ethical perspective or, conversely, by a subjectivist and non-cognitivist one. In the first case, we would be looking at anti-positive-law ideas of law (and, therefore, at natural law ones); in the second, at post-positivist conceptions of law that, despite foregoing the purity of legal science, remain faithful to the maxim auctoritas non veritas facit legem. In this way we would also recover the intuition of legal positivists like Hans Kelsen and Alf Ross, who consider ethical non-cognitivism an essential element of legal positivism.
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Shapiro elabora una versión del positivismo jurídico tomando como punto de partida la teoría del derecho como práctica social de Hart. Algunos de los límites de la teoría de Hart se refieren a su concepción de la obligación jurídica y de... more
Shapiro elabora una versión del positivismo jurídico tomando
como punto de partida la teoría del derecho como práctica social
de Hart. Algunos de los límites de la teoría de Hart se refieren a su
concepción de la obligación jurídica y de la normatividad del Derecho.
En este escrito analizaré los límites de la concepción de Hart de
la normatividad del derecho y evaluaré si la teoría del derecho como
plan indica el camino correcto para evitar estos límites. Anticipando la
conclusión, intentaré demostrar cómo Shapiro reproduce los errores de
Hart sobre estas cuestiones. En los siguientes párrafos se presenta una
reconstrucción crítica de la concepción de la normatividad de Hart en
parte distinta a la propuesta por Shapiro en Legalidad. El último párrafo
se dedica a la realización de un análisis crítico de las concepciones de
la obligación jurídica y de la autoridad del derecho asociadas a la teoría
del derecho como plan.
como punto de partida la teoría del derecho como práctica social
de Hart. Algunos de los límites de la teoría de Hart se refieren a su
concepción de la obligación jurídica y de la normatividad del Derecho.
En este escrito analizaré los límites de la concepción de Hart de
la normatividad del derecho y evaluaré si la teoría del derecho como
plan indica el camino correcto para evitar estos límites. Anticipando la
conclusión, intentaré demostrar cómo Shapiro reproduce los errores de
Hart sobre estas cuestiones. En los siguientes párrafos se presenta una
reconstrucción crítica de la concepción de la normatividad de Hart en
parte distinta a la propuesta por Shapiro en Legalidad. El último párrafo
se dedica a la realización de un análisis crítico de las concepciones de
la obligación jurídica y de la autoridad del derecho asociadas a la teoría
del derecho como plan.
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This paper offers a diachronic reconstruction of MacCormick’s theory of law and legal argumentation: In particular，two related points will be highlighted in which the difference between the perspective upheld in Legal Reasoning and Legal... more
This paper offers a diachronic reconstruction of MacCormick’s theory of law and legal
argumentation: In particular，two related points will be highlighted in which the difference between the perspective
upheld in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory and the later writings is particularly marked． The ? rst point concerns
MacCormick’s gradual break with legal positivism，and more speci? cally the thesis that the implicit pretension to
justice of law proves legal positivism false in all its different versions． The second point concerns MacCormick’s
acceptance of the one－right－answer thesis and the consequent thinning of the differences between MacCormick’s
theory of legal reasoning and that of Ronald Dworkin and of Robert Alexy． The intent，however，is not only to
describe this change in MacCormick’s thought，but also to attempt a defence of the original view that we ? nd in
Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory．
argumentation: In particular，two related points will be highlighted in which the difference between the perspective
upheld in Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory and the later writings is particularly marked． The ? rst point concerns
MacCormick’s gradual break with legal positivism，and more speci? cally the thesis that the implicit pretension to
justice of law proves legal positivism false in all its different versions． The second point concerns MacCormick’s
acceptance of the one－right－answer thesis and the consequent thinning of the differences between MacCormick’s
theory of legal reasoning and that of Ronald Dworkin and of Robert Alexy． The intent，however，is not only to
describe this change in MacCormick’s thought，but also to attempt a defence of the original view that we ? nd in
Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory．
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Demokrati, magt og ret is a collection of articles published by Danish newspapers in a period of just under twenty years, from 1957 to 1974. In all these articles Ross’ “scientific philosophy” is clearly traceable. In this paper I focus... more
Demokrati, magt og ret is a collection of articles published by Danish newspapers in a period of just under twenty years, from 1957 to 1974. In all these articles Ross’ “scientific philosophy” is clearly traceable. In this paper I focus on some relevant philosophical and legal-philosophical questions recurring in the articles collected in Demokrati, magt og. I deepen in particular 1) the rejection of metaphysics; 2) the importance of linguistic clarity; 3) the relation between law and power and, finally, 4) the distinction between internal and external aspect of norms.
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Law and its double: in search of the border between legal knowledge and its object. Some legal scholars draw a clear line between law and legal knowledge. Following Norberto Bobbio, we can call them " law's guardians ". Conversely, others... more
Law and its double: in search of the border between legal knowledge and its object. Some legal scholars draw a clear line between law and legal knowledge. Following Norberto Bobbio, we can call them " law's guardians ". Conversely, others – Bobbio calls them " law's creators " – almost neglect the relevance of the border which separates law and legal knowledge. The distinction between " guardians " and " creators " captures something relevant about jurists' style in different historical periods and contexts. Nevertheless, it would be a clear mistake to treat this distinction as a conceptual or a substantive one. Even the " guardians model " of legal knowledge is grounded on ideological assumptions; as a consequence, the scholars which refer themselves to this model cannot avoid to be the law's creators.
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Until the middle of the last century all the most prominent legal positivists share the idea of a necessary connection between legal positivism and a subjectivist and non-cognitivist meta-ethics. At a certain point this close link was... more
Until the middle of the last century all the most prominent legal positivists share the idea of a necessary connection between legal positivism and a subjectivist and non-cognitivist meta-ethics. At a certain point this close link was severed. Outstanding legal positivists start to question that legal positivism implies a certain meta-ethical perspective. In this paper I raise three objections to legal positivism to which it can at least partly reply only adopting a subjectivist and non-cognitivist meta-ethical perspective.
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Da una prospettiva giusfilosofica, le tesi più interessanti del c.d. neocostituzionalismo sono quelle che sfidano il positivismo giuridico metodologico. Come approach al diritto, il positivismo giuridico presuppone la possibilità di... more
Da una prospettiva giusfilosofica, le tesi più interessanti del c.d. neocostituzionalismo sono quelle che sfidano il positivismo giuridico metodologico. Come approach al diritto, il positivismo giuridico presuppone la possibilità di distinguere tra il diritto qual è ed il diritto quale dovrebbe essere, tra diritto ideale e diritto reale, e, sulla base di tale distinzione, individua l'oggetto della scienza giuridica nel diritto positivo. L'attacco del neocostituzionalismo a questo modo di intendere la conoscenza del diritto ruota intorno a tre argomenti: a) l'argomento della pretesa di correttezza b) l'argomento legato alla impossibilità di distinguere nettamente l'osservatore dal partecipante e c) l'argomento della svolta interpretativa della scienza giuridica. Il mio obiettivo in questa sede è quello di mostrare che il giuspositivismo metodologico non è in grado di replicare in modo convincente ad una critica fondata su questi argomenti. Altra questione, che non affronto direttamente, è quella di stabilire se, a partire da queste critiche, sia possibile configurare una prospettiva giusfilosofica alternativa tanto al giusnaturalismo quanto al giuspositivismo. Per un verso, ritengo che si tratti di una questione leziosa, che rischia di arenarsi in dispute sterili il cui esito è pre-determinato dalle definizioni stipulative di partenza. Per altro verso, ritengo possibile e opportuno ricostruire, a livello concettuale, giupositivismo e giusnaturalismo come prospettive mutuamente esclusive. In questo caso, gli autori c.d. neocostituzionalisti potranno essere ricondotti ora all'una ora all'altra concezione del diritto, a seconda che le critiche al giuspositivismo metodologico siano accompagnate da una prospettiva meta-etica oggettivista e cognitivista o, viceversa, soggettivista e non-cognitivista. Nel primo caso, ci troveremmo di fronte a concezioni del diritto anti-giuspositiviste (e, dunque, giusnaturaliste); nel secondo, di fronte a concezioni post-positiviste del diritto che, pur rinunciando alla purezza della scienza giuridica, mantengono fede alla massima auctoritas non veritas facit legem. In questo modo, si recupererebbe anche l'intuizione di giuspositivisti come Hans Kelsen ed Alf Ross che considerano il non-cognitivismo etico un elemento essenziale del positivismo giuridico.
From a legal philosophical point of view, the most interesting theses of so-called neo-constitutionalism are those that challenge methodological legal positivism. As an approach to law, legal positivism presupposes the possibility of distinguishing between " law as it is " and " law as it should be " , between ideal law and real law, and, on the basis of this distinction, it identifies the object of legal science in positive law. The attack of neo-constitutionalism on this way of seeing legal knowledge revolves around three arguments: a) the argument of the correctness claim b) the argument relating to the impossibility of clearly distinguishing the observer from the participant, and c) the argument of the interpretive turn in legal science. My goal here is to show that methodological legal positivism is unable to reply convincingly to a critique based on these arguments. Another issue, which I do not deal with directly, is to determine whether, from these criticisms, it is possible to configure a legal philosophical perspective that is an alternative to both natural law doctrine and legal positivism. On the one hand, I feel that this is a futile issue, which is likely to run aground in sterile disputes whose outcome is predetermined by the starting stipulative definitions. On the other hand, I think it is possible and appropriate, at a conceptual level, to reconstruct legal positivism and natural law as mutually exclusive perspectives. In this case, the so-called neo-constitutionalist authors can be linked to the one or the other conception of law, depending on whether criticisms of methodological legal positivism are accompanied by an objectivist and cognitivist meta-ethical perspective or, conversely, by a subjectivist and non-cognitivist one. In the first case, we would be looking at anti-positive-law ideas of law (and, therefore, at natural law ones); in the second, at post-positivist conceptions of law that, despite foregoing the purity of legal science, remain faithful to the maxim auctoritas non veritas facit legem. In this way we would also recover the intuition of legal positivists like Hans Kelsen and Alf Ross, who consider ethical non-cognitivism an essential element of legal positivism.
KEYWORDS Neocostituzionalismo, positivismo giuridico, giusnaturalismo, diritto e morale, epistemologia giuridica
Neo-constitutionalism, legal positivism, natural law doctrine, law and morals, legal epistemology
From a legal philosophical point of view, the most interesting theses of so-called neo-constitutionalism are those that challenge methodological legal positivism. As an approach to law, legal positivism presupposes the possibility of distinguishing between " law as it is " and " law as it should be " , between ideal law and real law, and, on the basis of this distinction, it identifies the object of legal science in positive law. The attack of neo-constitutionalism on this way of seeing legal knowledge revolves around three arguments: a) the argument of the correctness claim b) the argument relating to the impossibility of clearly distinguishing the observer from the participant, and c) the argument of the interpretive turn in legal science. My goal here is to show that methodological legal positivism is unable to reply convincingly to a critique based on these arguments. Another issue, which I do not deal with directly, is to determine whether, from these criticisms, it is possible to configure a legal philosophical perspective that is an alternative to both natural law doctrine and legal positivism. On the one hand, I feel that this is a futile issue, which is likely to run aground in sterile disputes whose outcome is predetermined by the starting stipulative definitions. On the other hand, I think it is possible and appropriate, at a conceptual level, to reconstruct legal positivism and natural law as mutually exclusive perspectives. In this case, the so-called neo-constitutionalist authors can be linked to the one or the other conception of law, depending on whether criticisms of methodological legal positivism are accompanied by an objectivist and cognitivist meta-ethical perspective or, conversely, by a subjectivist and non-cognitivist one. In the first case, we would be looking at anti-positive-law ideas of law (and, therefore, at natural law ones); in the second, at post-positivist conceptions of law that, despite foregoing the purity of legal science, remain faithful to the maxim auctoritas non veritas facit legem. In this way we would also recover the intuition of legal positivists like Hans Kelsen and Alf Ross, who consider ethical non-cognitivism an essential element of legal positivism.
KEYWORDS Neocostituzionalismo, positivismo giuridico, giusnaturalismo, diritto e morale, epistemologia giuridica
Neo-constitutionalism, legal positivism, natural law doctrine, law and morals, legal epistemology
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L’obiettivo di questo saggio è analizzare criticamente la celebre distinzione proposta da Ronald Dworkin tra tre modelli di comunità, che egli chiama comunità de facto, del “libro delle regole” e di principio; gli ultimi due modelli... more
L’obiettivo di questo saggio è analizzare criticamente la celebre distinzione proposta da Ronald Dworkin tra tre modelli di comunità, che egli chiama comunità de facto, del “libro delle regole” e di principio; gli ultimi due modelli possiamo considerarli come due versioni dei modelli generali di RoL che ho brevemente introdotto in questo paragrafo. Per quanto la preferenza di Dworkin vada incontrovertibilmente per la comunità di principio, mi propongo di avanzare alcuni argomenti a difesa della comunità del “libro delle regole”. Più precisamente, l’obiettivo è quello di mostrare alcuni difetti nella ricostruzione dworkiniana della comunità di principio. In breve, e anticipando le conclusioni, la mia obiezione a Dworkin è la seguente: egli ritiene che in una comunità politica di principio sia possibile evitare le negoziazioni ed i compromessi tra le preferenze personali, anche valoriali, tra i membri della comunità. Tale convinzione tuttavia è falsa e l’unica differenza tra questa comunità e la comunità del libro delle regole è che, in quest’ultimo caso, i compromessi e le negoziazioni sono presentati per quello che sono, mentre nel primo caso sono travestiti da disaccordi genuini sul modo corretto di intendere i valori della comunità su cui si assume vi sia un accordo generalizzato e “spesso” (thick).
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La ciencia jurídica de matriz iuspositivista establece un ligamen preciso entre el derecho y el lenguaje. Según esta perspectiva, el derecho es el discurso del legislador y la ciencia jurídica no es otra cosa que un discurso sobre un... more
La ciencia jurídica de matriz iuspositivista establece un ligamen preciso entre el derecho y el lenguaje. Según esta perspectiva, el derecho es el discurso del legislador y la ciencia jurídica no es otra cosa que un discurso sobre un discurso: un meta lenguaje descriptivo del lenguaje prescriptivo del legislador. Esta concepción del derecho y este modelo de ciencia jurídica están en crisis desde hace algunas décadas. En mi artículo presento cuatro argumentos dirigidos a señalar los límites de esta aproximación al derecho: el argumento epistemológico, el argumento del pluralismo epistemológico, el argumento del giro interpretativo y, finalmente, el argumento funcionalista. Estos argumentos no están todos al mismo nivel y no tienen todos la misma fuerza. Algunos proporcionan sólo una explicación del porqué la ortodoxia iusanalítica sobre la ciencia jurídica esté siendo atacada. Otros tienen la pretensión de identificar algunos límites estructurales y conceptuales de este modelo.
Legal positivism’s conception of legal knowledge sets up a tight bond between law and language. According to this perspective, law is the discourse of the legislator and legal science is nothing but a discourse on a discourse: a meta-language descriptive of the prescriptive language of the legislator. This conception of law and this model of legal science have been in crisis for some decades. In my paper I present four arguments serving to underline the limits of this approach to law: the epistemological argument, the argument of epistemological pluralism, the argument of the interpretative turn, and lastly the functionalist argument. These arguments are not all on the same plane and do not all have the same strength. Some only furnish an explanation of why analytical law orthodoxy on legal science is under attack. Others claim to identify some structural and conceptual limits of this model.
Legal positivism’s conception of legal knowledge sets up a tight bond between law and language. According to this perspective, law is the discourse of the legislator and legal science is nothing but a discourse on a discourse: a meta-language descriptive of the prescriptive language of the legislator. This conception of law and this model of legal science have been in crisis for some decades. In my paper I present four arguments serving to underline the limits of this approach to law: the epistemological argument, the argument of epistemological pluralism, the argument of the interpretative turn, and lastly the functionalist argument. These arguments are not all on the same plane and do not all have the same strength. Some only furnish an explanation of why analytical law orthodoxy on legal science is under attack. Others claim to identify some structural and conceptual limits of this model.
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La scienza giuridica di matrice giuspositivista che, in Italia, si rifà al pensiero di Norberto Bobbio, istituisce un legame stringente tra diritto e linguaggio. Secondo questa prospettiva, il diritto è il discorso del legislatore e la... more
La scienza giuridica di matrice giuspositivista che, in Italia, si rifà al pensiero di Norberto Bobbio, istituisce un legame stringente tra diritto e linguaggio. Secondo questa prospettiva, il diritto è il discorso del legislatore e la scienza giuridica non è altro che un discorso sopra un discorso: un meta-linguaggio descrittivo del linguaggio prescrittivo del legislatore. Questa concezione del diritto e questo modello di scienza giuridica sono in crisi da alcuni decenni. Dalla pubblicazione, nel 1950, del saggio di Bobbio Scienza del diritto e analisi del linguaggio, un vero e proprio “manifesto programmatico” del nuovo corso giusfilosofico molte cose sono cambiate: la globalizzazione ha prodotto la crisi del modello giuridico incentrato sulla sovranità degli Stati nazionali; il neoempirismo non rappresenta più il mainstream in ambito epistemologico e anche il dibattito giusfilosofico contemporaneo ha percorso direzioni divergenti rispetto a quelle intraprese dalla scuola analitica. Nella mia relazione presento quattro argomenti volti a evidenziare i limiti di questo approccio al diritto: l’argomento funzionalista, l’argomento epistemologico, l’argomento del pluralismo epistemologico e, infine, l’argomento della svolta interpretativa. Questi argomenti non stanno tutti sullo stesso piano e non hanno tutti la stessa forza. Alcuni forniscono soltanto una spiegazione del perché l’ortodossia giusanalitica sulla scienza giuridica sia sotto attacco. Altri hanno la pretesa di individuare alcuni limiti strutturali e concettuali di questo modello.
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The controversy between Dworkin and legal positivism has lasted more than forty years. After Dworkin’s death, a reflection on this debate is needed. This paper faces some of the most important and popular arguments Dworkin advanced... more
The controversy between Dworkin and legal positivism has lasted more than forty years. After Dworkin’s death, a reflection on this debate is needed. This paper faces some of the most important and popular arguments Dworkin advanced against legal positivism. More precisely, the article is divided in two main parts. The first is devoted to a critical presentation of three arguments developed by Dworkin in his early essays against Hart’s practice theory of norms. In particular, these arguments challenge a) the idea that law is a system of rules; b) the autonomy of legal obligation from moral one and c) the idea that judges exercise (strong) discretion in hard cases. The second part analyses two important aspects of Dworkin’s non-positivistic conception of law: the claim that law should be regarded as a community of principle and the thesis that ‘law’ is an interpretive concept
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The paper deals with the “conventionalist turn” in legal positivism in relation to the matter of the duty to obey the law and legal normativity. In this respect, conventionalist legal positivism is worth considering a) because it offers... more
The paper deals with the “conventionalist turn” in legal positivism in relation to the matter of the duty to obey the law and legal normativity. In this respect, conventionalist legal positivism is worth considering a) because it offers an explanation of legal normativity partly different vis-à-vis previous ones and b) because it tries to preserve the autonomy of legal obligation from moral obligation and coercion, respectively. Here I will only focus on legal conventionalism as sketched out by Hart in the Postscript. Indeed, Hart’s conventionalism comes up against problems which to some extent also affect other distinguished versions of legal conventionalism like, for example, those worked out by Jules Coleman, Andrei Marmor and Scott Shapiro. Other “stronger” versions of legal conventionalism like, for example, those advanced by Chaim Gans and Gerald Postema, succeed in avoiding some of the traps into which the previous ones fall but, paraphrasing Hart, the outcome is distortion as the price of internal coherence. To sum up, legal conventionalism follows two pathways, both of them in the end unsatisfactory. The first pathway – opened up by Hart – leads to a “weak” version of conventionalism. This approach fails insofar as it does not succeed in preserving the autonomy of legal obligation from moral. The second pathway – followed in different ways by Gans and Postema – does not soften conventionalism and so it achieves the outcome of designing a coherent conventionalist model of legal normativity but at the price of distorting reality.
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The paper deals with legal positivism “conventionalist turn” in relation to the matter of the duty to obey the law and legal normativity. In this respect, conventionalist legal positivism is worth considering a) for it offers an... more
The paper deals with legal positivism “conventionalist turn” in relation to the matter of the duty to obey the law and legal normativity. In this respect, conventionalist legal positivism is worth considering a) for it offers an explanation of legal normativity partly different vis-à-vis previous ones and b) for it tries to preserve the autonomy of legal obligation from moral obligation and coercion, respectively. Here I will only focus on legal conventionalism sketched out by Hart in the Postscript. Indeed, Hart’s conventionalism faces troubles which in some way affects also other distinguished versions of legal conventionalism like, for example, those worked out by Jules Coleman, Andrei Marmor and Scott Shapiro. Other “stronger” versions of legal conventionalism like, for example, those advanced by Chaim Gans and Gerald Postema, succeed in avoiding some of the traps in which fall the previous ones but, paraphrasing Hart, the outcome is distortion as the price of internal coherence.
To sum up, legal conventionalism follows two pathways, both of them in the end unsatisfactory. The first pathway – opened by Hart – leads to a “weak” version of conventionalism. This approach fails in so far as it does not succeed in preserving the autonomy of legal obligation from moral one. The second pathway – followed in different ways by Gans and Postema – does not soften conventionalism and so it achieves the outcome to design a coherent conventionalist model of legal normativity but at the price of distorting reality.
To sum up, legal conventionalism follows two pathways, both of them in the end unsatisfactory. The first pathway – opened by Hart – leads to a “weak” version of conventionalism. This approach fails in so far as it does not succeed in preserving the autonomy of legal obligation from moral one. The second pathway – followed in different ways by Gans and Postema – does not soften conventionalism and so it achieves the outcome to design a coherent conventionalist model of legal normativity but at the price of distorting reality.
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Norberto Bobbio’s introduced the expression “age of rights” to indicate the idea of an universal consensus on some values which can be interpreted as a signum prognosticum – in kantian terms – of mankind’s moral progress. The symbolic... more
Norberto Bobbio’s introduced the expression “age of rights” to indicate the idea of an universal consensus on some values which can be interpreted as a signum prognosticum – in kantian terms – of mankind’s moral progress. The symbolic starting point of this age is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed in 1948. In this paper the expression “the end of the age of rights” is value free and it is used to sign the replacement of the model of social organization imagined by Bobbio and many others after the second world-war in favour of a different model according to which human rights become a sort of lingua franca. As a consequence, it is not paradoxically at all to decree the end of the age of rights in presence of a public discourse crowded with rights.
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The way of conceiving knowledge of law varies over time and is influenced by many factors. Following Norberto Bobbio, it is possible to distinguish two ideal-typical models of the jurist: the 'custodian' of a pre-existing law and the... more
The way of conceiving knowledge of law varies over time and is influenced by many factors. Following Norberto Bobbio, it is possible to distinguish two ideal-typical models of the jurist: the 'custodian' of a pre-existing law and the 'creator' of a law perpetually in fieri and indeterminate. This alternative is, however, only apparent; even when legal science postulates the existence of a "law-object" waiting to be known, it in fact does no more than presuppose an ideologically characterized image of law. Consequently, the legal scholar is never a neutral observer. Thus even the law-object 'guarded' by modern legal science is nothing but the product of a certain ideology, and the detachment advocated by modern jurists is a mere appearance that serves to conceal the underlying ideology. The thesis that the jurist cannot but also be the creator of his object follows a series of implications, the main ones of which are discussed in this essay.
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L’età dei diritti è l’esito della rivoluzione copernicana che ha messo al centro della riflessione politica l’individuo, il quale non è più considerato come la parte del tutto rappresentato dalla società e dallo stato. Da un punto di... more
L’età dei diritti è l’esito della rivoluzione copernicana che ha messo al centro della riflessione politica l’individuo, il quale non è più considerato come la parte del tutto rappresentato dalla società e dallo stato. Da un punto di vista storico, l’età dei diritti designa il periodo che va dalla fine della Seconda guerra mondiale ai giorni nostri. Essa intende marcare una radicale rottura rispetto ai totalitarismi ed alle atrocità che hanno caratterizzato il periodo antecedente ed è espressione della fiducia dell’umanità nella possibilità di un reale progresso morale universale, che presuppone la condivisione di alcuni valori, il rispetto degli individui e dei loro diritti, il rifiuto della guerra come mezzo di risoluzione delle controversie. La fiducia e la scommessa in un futuro migliore sono, senza dubbio, la cifra dell’età dei diritti. L’esigenza di ripensare l’età dei diritti potrebbe apparire paradossale in un momento in cui il linguaggio dei diritti si è imposto come la lingua franca del discorso pubblico globale. Eppure c’è un senso in cui non è esagerato decretare addirittura la fine dell’età dei diritti. Il punto cruciale concerne il modo in cui si è evoluto il linguaggio dei diritti e le aspettative che ciascuno ripone nei diritti. L’impressione è che sia ormai molto diffusa la consapevolezza che il linguaggio dei diritti è l’idioletto attraverso il quale avanzare pretese e rivendicazioni nell’arena pubblica se si desidera che le une e le altre abbiano delle chance di essere accolte. Si può addirittura sostenere che l’uso retorico e spregiudicato del linguaggio dei diritti al fine di incrementare la forza delle proprie rivendicazioni politiche sia uno degli esiti pressoché inevitabili della costituzionalizzazione degli ordinamenti giuridici. Non c’è in definitiva alcunché di paradossale né di roboante o di retorico nel decretare la fine dell’età dei diritti in presenza di un discorso pubblico tutto incentrato sui diritti e sulla loro tutela.
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Research Interests: Bioethics and Euthanasia
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Il funzionamento, buono o cattivo, di una pratica sociale dipende in non piccola misura dalla moralità dei partecipanti. Se questi ultimi fanno degnamente la propria parte siamo già nella giusta direzione
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Recensione de: Giovanni Fiandaca, Prima lezione di diritto penale, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2017.
Il Foglio, 1 marzo 2018
Il Foglio, 1 marzo 2018
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https://revistas.uns.edu.ar/disc/issue/view/210 El presente número resulta especial en múltiples sentidos. En primer lugar, supone retomar –de manera excepcional y por esta vez– lo que fue el formato inicial de esta revista. En efecto,... more
https://revistas.uns.edu.ar/disc/issue/view/210 El presente número resulta especial en múltiples sentidos. En primer
lugar, supone retomar –de manera excepcional y por esta vez– lo que
fue el formato inicial de esta revista. En efecto, el número se centra solo
en la discusión de un texto pero no incluye las secciones Cortes, Balance
y Libros. Sin embargo, comenta de modo crítico todo un libro, como
suele suceder en nuestra sección Libros. Se acerca a una mezcla entre
nuestra clásica sección principal, pero esta vez sobre un libro completo.
Por último, es el fruto de una discusión académica organizada en otras
latitudes, con un espíritu idéntico al que inspira el tipo de discusiones
que se dan en esta revista. El Comité Editorial consideró que dada la
relevancia del libro, el tipo de discusión y las conexiones con el formato
de nuestra revista, ese encuentro de pensadores merecía ser publicado
en este número especial. Los números siguientes, actualmente en edición, regresarán a nuestro formato habitual. Esperamos que las lectoras y lectores puedan considerar este número no solo especial, sino
también valioso.
lugar, supone retomar –de manera excepcional y por esta vez– lo que
fue el formato inicial de esta revista. En efecto, el número se centra solo
en la discusión de un texto pero no incluye las secciones Cortes, Balance
y Libros. Sin embargo, comenta de modo crítico todo un libro, como
suele suceder en nuestra sección Libros. Se acerca a una mezcla entre
nuestra clásica sección principal, pero esta vez sobre un libro completo.
Por último, es el fruto de una discusión académica organizada en otras
latitudes, con un espíritu idéntico al que inspira el tipo de discusiones
que se dan en esta revista. El Comité Editorial consideró que dada la
relevancia del libro, el tipo de discusión y las conexiones con el formato
de nuestra revista, ese encuentro de pensadores merecía ser publicado
en este número especial. Los números siguientes, actualmente en edición, regresarán a nuestro formato habitual. Esperamos que las lectoras y lectores puedan considerar este número no solo especial, sino
también valioso.
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Accessible at:
https://www.openstarts.units.it/handle/10077/29492
https://www.openstarts.units.it/handle/10077/29492
