We specify the conscious character of vision by appeal to the way things look to the subject. An ... more We specify the conscious character of vision by appeal to the way things look to the subject. An experience in which there looks to be an F before her is also a source of knowledge of what it is to be F. I argue that these commitments are incompatible with Resemblance and Representational accounts and motivate a Relational account of the nature of visual experience.
Asks how exactly perceptual experiences do provide reasons for empirical beliefs. My answer is th... more Asks how exactly perceptual experiences do provide reasons for empirical beliefs. My answer is that they furnish the subject with certain essentially experiential demonstrative contents—‘that is thus’ (fully conceptual, as they must be)—his grasp of which provides him with a reason to endorse them in belief. For a person's grasp of such contents, as referring to the mind‐independent objects that they do, and predicating the mind‐independent properties that they do, essentially involves his appreciation of them as the joint upshot of the way things are anyway, in the mind‐independent world around him, and his current point of view upon them and other relevant circumstances of perception. That is to say, he necessarily understands that his current apprehension that things are thus is in part due to the very fact that they are. He therefore recognizes the relevant content ashis apprehension of the facts, his epistemic opennessto the way things mind‐independently are out there.
... Inside JANE HEAL Self-knowledge: the Wittgensteinian Legacy CRISPIN WRIGHT ]oint Attention an... more ... Inside JANE HEAL Self-knowledge: the Wittgensteinian Legacy CRISPIN WRIGHT ]oint Attention and the First Person JOHN CAMPBELL Consciousness as ... Freedom CHRISTOPHER PEACOCKE Dualism in Action JENNIFER HORNSBY Index "I U1 L») l\J \l C») DJ @| DJ U3 [Q ...
5 Realism and Explanation in Perception Bill Brewer* Suppose that we identify physical objects, i... more 5 Realism and Explanation in Perception Bill Brewer* Suppose that we identify physical objects, in the first instance, by extension, as things like stones, tables, trees, people, and other animals: the persisting macroscopic constituents of the world in which we live. Of course, ...
... Stirling Naomi Eilan, University ofWarwick Christoph Hoerl, University of Warwick Hemdat Lerm... more ... Stirling Naomi Eilan, University ofWarwick Christoph Hoerl, University of Warwick Hemdat Lerman, University of Warwick Andrew N. Meltzoff ... of Warwick Johannes Roessler, University of Warwick Paul Snowdon, University College London Matthew Soteriou, University ofWarwick ...
The standard paradigm for mental causation is a person’s acting for a reason. Something happens- ... more The standard paradigm for mental causation is a person’s acting for a reason. Something happens- she intentionally φ’s- the occurrence of which we explain by
We believe that the ordinary physical objects that we perceive continue to exist unperceived; and... more We believe that the ordinary physical objects that we perceive continue to exist unperceived; and this is intuitively an aspect of any authentic characterization of how the world appears to us in perception. But how can experience present its objects as continuing to exist beyond that very experience of them? Here I aim to explain this phenomenon. I start with an insight from Evans (1985). Familiar attempts to implement this insight fail, in my opinion. Here I introduce, motivate, defend, and elaborate an alternative approach to its implementation that, I claim, succeeds. Its key is to recognize the role of Evans’s insight in the metaphysics of perceptual experience itself.
Commonsense appears committed to enduring macroscopic material objects that exclude each other fr... more Commonsense appears committed to enduring macroscopic material objects that exclude each other from their precise location at all times. I elaborate a specific version of the commonsense commitment and consider its merits in connection with an important line of objection concerning the relation between material objects and their parts. The central thesis is that amongst persisting macroscopic material objects there are Natural Continuants, NCs, whose unity at a time and over time is entirely independent of our concepts, which occupy their precise spatial location Exclusively at all times, and which ground Artificial Continuants, ACs, by partition, collection, and approximation. I call the position the Natural Continuants View (NCV). Section “The Natural Continuants View” offers a provisional characterization. Section “Spatial Partition” considers a familiar puzzle concerning the idea that material objects may survive the loss of a part in order to provide intuitive motivation for (N...
We specify the conscious character of vision by appeal to the way things look to the subject. An ... more We specify the conscious character of vision by appeal to the way things look to the subject. An experience in which there looks to be an F before her is also a source of knowledge of what it is to be F. I argue that these commitments are incompatible with Resemblance and Representational accounts and motivate a Relational account of the nature of visual experience.
Asks how exactly perceptual experiences do provide reasons for empirical beliefs. My answer is th... more Asks how exactly perceptual experiences do provide reasons for empirical beliefs. My answer is that they furnish the subject with certain essentially experiential demonstrative contents—‘that is thus’ (fully conceptual, as they must be)—his grasp of which provides him with a reason to endorse them in belief. For a person's grasp of such contents, as referring to the mind‐independent objects that they do, and predicating the mind‐independent properties that they do, essentially involves his appreciation of them as the joint upshot of the way things are anyway, in the mind‐independent world around him, and his current point of view upon them and other relevant circumstances of perception. That is to say, he necessarily understands that his current apprehension that things are thus is in part due to the very fact that they are. He therefore recognizes the relevant content ashis apprehension of the facts, his epistemic opennessto the way things mind‐independently are out there.
... Inside JANE HEAL Self-knowledge: the Wittgensteinian Legacy CRISPIN WRIGHT ]oint Attention an... more ... Inside JANE HEAL Self-knowledge: the Wittgensteinian Legacy CRISPIN WRIGHT ]oint Attention and the First Person JOHN CAMPBELL Consciousness as ... Freedom CHRISTOPHER PEACOCKE Dualism in Action JENNIFER HORNSBY Index "I U1 L») l\J \l C») DJ @| DJ U3 [Q ...
5 Realism and Explanation in Perception Bill Brewer* Suppose that we identify physical objects, i... more 5 Realism and Explanation in Perception Bill Brewer* Suppose that we identify physical objects, in the first instance, by extension, as things like stones, tables, trees, people, and other animals: the persisting macroscopic constituents of the world in which we live. Of course, ...
... Stirling Naomi Eilan, University ofWarwick Christoph Hoerl, University of Warwick Hemdat Lerm... more ... Stirling Naomi Eilan, University ofWarwick Christoph Hoerl, University of Warwick Hemdat Lerman, University of Warwick Andrew N. Meltzoff ... of Warwick Johannes Roessler, University of Warwick Paul Snowdon, University College London Matthew Soteriou, University ofWarwick ...
The standard paradigm for mental causation is a person’s acting for a reason. Something happens- ... more The standard paradigm for mental causation is a person’s acting for a reason. Something happens- she intentionally φ’s- the occurrence of which we explain by
We believe that the ordinary physical objects that we perceive continue to exist unperceived; and... more We believe that the ordinary physical objects that we perceive continue to exist unperceived; and this is intuitively an aspect of any authentic characterization of how the world appears to us in perception. But how can experience present its objects as continuing to exist beyond that very experience of them? Here I aim to explain this phenomenon. I start with an insight from Evans (1985). Familiar attempts to implement this insight fail, in my opinion. Here I introduce, motivate, defend, and elaborate an alternative approach to its implementation that, I claim, succeeds. Its key is to recognize the role of Evans’s insight in the metaphysics of perceptual experience itself.
Commonsense appears committed to enduring macroscopic material objects that exclude each other fr... more Commonsense appears committed to enduring macroscopic material objects that exclude each other from their precise location at all times. I elaborate a specific version of the commonsense commitment and consider its merits in connection with an important line of objection concerning the relation between material objects and their parts. The central thesis is that amongst persisting macroscopic material objects there are Natural Continuants, NCs, whose unity at a time and over time is entirely independent of our concepts, which occupy their precise spatial location Exclusively at all times, and which ground Artificial Continuants, ACs, by partition, collection, and approximation. I call the position the Natural Continuants View (NCV). Section “The Natural Continuants View” offers a provisional characterization. Section “Spatial Partition” considers a familiar puzzle concerning the idea that material objects may survive the loss of a part in order to provide intuitive motivation for (N...
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