Charles Travis
King's College London, Philosophy, Emeritus
- I changed into philosophy (from mathematics) in the middle of my junior year at Berkeley. I then had no idea what phi... moreI changed into philosophy (from mathematics) in the middle of my junior year at Berkeley. I then had no idea what philosophy was. But I got lucky. I was engrossed by it, and that stuck. It has only become more and more of a pleasure. In those first years, my main (living) influences were William Craig, Hans Herzberger and Thompson Clarke at Berkeley, and Montgomery Furth at UCLA. When I graduated, in 1963, I went south to UCLA, where I did a dissertation mostly under Keith Gunderson, but also partly under Robert Yost. In 1966 I took up my first position at UNC Chapel Hill. In 1967 I met Hilary Putnam. We had a close friendship up to his death this year (2016). He also had a very profound effect on me philosophically. I think he was the only great philosopher I ever knew, and suspect he might be the only one I would ever want to.I left UNC after three years and moved to Canada. No, I was not eligible for the draft. But I didn’t like what was going on in the US (and especially in North Carolina) in 1968. Also, I left for Canada to be in the same department as my friend, Zeno Vendler. I stayed in Calgary for 11 years, but was then invited to take up a position at what is now Tilburg University, was then the Katholieke Hogeschool Tilburg. (I won’t tell the joke.) To be brief, I couldn’t resist. That was my first tour in Europe, to be followed by two more. The reason for the back and forth is always the same: In general, universities in North America are closer to the academic ideals I have always held. On my first tour I was not willing to accept the distance from those ideals that I found in Europe. On the other hand, I found life in Europe more decently human and agreeable. As I write this from my home in Portugal, I still so find. In the end, I always opted for life, though my last tour, in London was prompted, too, by George Bush’s 2004 electoral victory. Some might see such ambivalence as vacillating. In any case it led to positions at Illinois State University, the University of Stirling, Northwestern University, then King’s College London (and visiting positions at the University of Michigan and Harvard).When I left for Chapel Hill I saw myself as in both philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. But I was meant to be their philosopher of language. I did my best to oblige. One upshot, influenced by Austin, was my first work on what I now call occasion-sensitivity. At first, though, not quite conceived aright, as became clear on further reflection. I was not yet attuned to the importance of the idea of both theory-receptive and theory-resistant phenomena (though I should have been, influenced as I then was by Chomsky). When I saw the shortcomings of my early work, I naturally turned to Wittgenstein who, I think, has better ideas on these matters. But equally Austin and Putnam, all of whom, I find, coincide on issues I find the most importantSo that is one turning point in my philosophical makeup. The other occurred later, in my years at Northwestern (around 2001-2002), when I read Cora Diamond’s wonderful essays on Frege (and on Wittgenstein). I know I was very late doing this. I am not, I suppose, an avid reader. But it did change my life. Up to that point I viewed Frege as more or less a foil for Wittgenstein and a target. When I actually paid attention to what he wrote I got an entirely different impression. Though I do think that he occasionally takes a misstep, I also think that in his writings there is a powerful picture of the relation of thought to world, so, too, of truth. This picture, in my view, is largely lost in the oral tradition. It is lost, too, because of a certain logocentrism which permeates our times, even in those trying to work against itedit
- Keith Gunderson, Robert Yostedit
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This essay outlines a certain 20th century Oxonian tradition in epistemology, contrasting it with another line of thought set out by Michael Ayers. The tradition begins with Cook Wilson and the idea that knowing is never having evidence,... more
This essay outlines a certain 20th century Oxonian tradition in epistemology, contrasting it with another line of thought set out by Michael Ayers. The tradition begins with Cook Wilson and the idea that knowing is never having evidence, no matter how strong. It takes a turn in J.L. Austin, introducing two ideas into philosophy: disjunctivism and occasion-sensitivity. The last section considers whether either can really live without the other. The first part of the essay is a general consideration of the relation between two forms of awareness: perceptual, and ‘propositional’ (awareness-that), and of how the first may furnish proof of the second. The second part considers Ayers’ view of the relation, particularly as expressed in his idea of primary and secondary knowledge, and its relation to disjunctivism about knowledge.
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In 1929 Wittgenstein saw the Tractatus collapse before his eyes. In the ensuing years (through 1931) he had two things much on his mind. One was what the collapse of the Tractatus showed. With what might its picture of representation (of... more
In 1929 Wittgenstein saw the Tractatus collapse before his eyes. In the ensuing years (through 1931) he had two things much on his mind. One was what the collapse of the Tractatus showed. With what might its picture of representation (of thought) be replaced? The other was philosophy of mathematics. Here Wittgenstein was particularly interested in formalism of various forms. Which naturally led him back to Frege and, in particular, volume 2 of Grundgesetze. There, I suggest, he found a clue to the question ‘Whence hence from the Tractatus?’. In particular, there Frege floats an idea that for there to be a thought is for there to be its applications (and vice-versa). Such, I will suggest, is inspiration to the Investigations notion of a language game, and for the role that notion is to play in the story the Investigations have to tell. This essay elaborates the story just sketched.
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This is the successor to something (still uploaded) called 'Sense and Sensitivity'. I hope it is much clearer. It discusses the relation between language and logic, placing language firmly on the psychological side of... more
This is the successor to something (still uploaded) called 'Sense and Sensitivity'. I hope it is much clearer. It discusses the relation between language and logic, placing language firmly on the psychological side of Frege's distinction between the logical and the psychological: language's business is achieving thought expression (thus entrance into the business of being true), not that of being true. Some consequences are drawn.
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A simple idea: Perception is of what is in view (before the eyes), or making noise, or the noises made, or emitting odours, or the thus emitted (etc.). What we see is, say, a pig, or its perambulations, or its rooting beneath that oak.... more
A simple idea: Perception is of what is in view (before the eyes), or making noise, or the noises made, or emitting odours, or the thus emitted (etc.). What we see is, say, a pig, or its perambulations, or its rooting beneath that oak. Sight offers us a certain form of awareness of this, characterized in one way by its objects. It thus offers us occasion for another sort: we may recognize what we are aware of as, for example, a case of a pig rooting, or of an interminable drum machine. We take up the offer in exercising capacities for recognition such as they are. John McDowell has argued that this cannot be quite right (or anyway complete). For it needs to posit rational relations where there can be none. What follows argues that McDowell cannot be quite right: if he were, thought would cease to exist.
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What is an object? A prior question: What is objecthood? Au fond, and to logic’s eye, object is a role to be played with respect to a thought (on a decomposition). It is to be a countable which that thought represent as being some way for... more
What is an object? A prior question: What is objecthood? Au fond, and to logic’s eye, object is a role to be played with respect to a thought (on a decomposition). It is to be a countable which that thought represent as being some way for such a countable to be; what restores the business of truth-of to that of truth outright. What plays that role for some given thought is then an object with respect to that thought. Given this, there are corresponding absolute notions, to be fit for this role, and to be fit only for this role. So the fundamental task here is identifying the conditions on playing this role at all. All this is a contribution, however limited, to a topic called ‘ontology’. This last word also occurs in the plural in several contexts. The end of this essay considers how these notions (non-countable, and the several countables) might relate, and what assumptions underlie what some have seen them to.
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This article presents the results of a collaborative ethnographic inquiry in contemporary Sofia and Caracas. Combining historical research and ethnography, we compare the ways in which a former and a current left-wing regime treat urban... more
This article presents the results of a collaborative ethnographic inquiry in contemporary Sofia and Caracas. Combining historical research and ethnography, we compare the ways in which a former and a current left-wing regime treat urban squatting. In both cities, squatters tend to be poor families escaping homelessness. In Sofia, “squatters”—usually of Roma origin—inhabit unregulated spaces deemed illegal after 1989. In Caracas, homeless families have been officially encouraged to squat but not declared legal occupants. A historical comparison shows both socialist governments turn a blind eye to extralegal housing practices. Benign, informal housing arrangements function to display solidarity with marginalized groups as a form of popular legitimacy. Yet, without formalized state protection, such arrangements produced a “surplus” population, vulnerable vis-à-vis global processes of capitalist reorganization.
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Soulevant le probleme des descriptions multiples d'un meme phenomene, l'A. etudie la these de la dependance de l'esprit chez Putnam, et substitue au point de vue divin une diversite de perspectives humaines. Dans sa reponse a... more
Soulevant le probleme des descriptions multiples d'un meme phenomene, l'A. etudie la these de la dependance de l'esprit chez Putnam, et substitue au point de vue divin une diversite de perspectives humaines. Dans sa reponse a l'A., Putnam anticipe les objections qui pourraient lui etre opposees concernant le caractere raisonnable des interpretations de proprietes.
Research Interests: Philosophy, Metaphysics, Property, Interpretation, Perspective, and 5 moreMind, Dependency, Multiple, Description, and Phenomena
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Travis Charles. Les objets de croyance. In: Communications, 40, 1984. Grammaire generative et semantique, sous la direction de Pierre Jacob. pp. 229-257.
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Seeing is, or affords, a certain sort of awareness – visual – of one's surroundings. The obvious strategy for saying what one sees, or what would count as seeing something would be to ask what sort of sensitivity to one's... more
Seeing is, or affords, a certain sort of awareness – visual – of one's surroundings. The obvious strategy for saying what one sees, or what would count as seeing something would be to ask what sort of sensitivity to one's surroundings – e.g. the pig before me – would so qualify. Alas, for more than three centuries – at least from Descartes to VE day – it was not so. Philosophers were moved by arguments, rarely stated which concluded that one could not, or never did, see what was before his eyes. So much for the obvious strategy. It occurred to almost no one to object that this could not be right. Frege did, but no one noticed. Austin, finally, did away with that conception of good faith in philosophy which had allowed such a thing to pass, and then with those arguments themselves. Until then, philosophy was deformed. Robbed of the obvious approach, a Drang set in to gaze inward, hoping to find what it really is to see in what enabled sensitivity to pigs, or in its byproducts...
‘Hostility to psychologism’, John McDowell writes, 'is not hostility to the psychological. ‘Psychologism’ is an accusation. But it may be either of several.The psychologism McDowell is master of detecting is, as he sometimes puts... more
‘Hostility to psychologism’, John McDowell writes, 'is not hostility to the psychological. ‘Psychologism’ is an accusation. But it may be either of several.The psychologism McDowell is master of detecting is, as he sometimes puts it, a form of scientism. It is a priori psychology where, at best, only substantive empirical psychology would do. It often represents itself as describing the way any thinker (or any empirical, or language-using one) must be; as describing requirements on being a thinker at all. But it misses viable alternatives. It is just speculation as to how we are.
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What is insensitive semantics (also semantic minimalism, henceforth SM)? That will need to emerge, if at all, from the authors' (henceforth C&L) objections to what they see as their opponents. They signal two main opponents:... more
What is insensitive semantics (also semantic minimalism, henceforth SM)? That will need to emerge, if at all, from the authors' (henceforth C&L) objections to what they see as their opponents. They signal two main opponents: moderate contextualists (henceforth MCs); ...
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3 The Face of Perception CHARLES TRAVIS Near the end of his Dewey lectures, Hilary Putnam remarked: Part of what I have been trying to show in these lectures is that what we recognize as the face of meaning is, in a number of... more
3 The Face of Perception CHARLES TRAVIS Near the end of his Dewey lectures, Hilary Putnam remarked: Part of what I have been trying to show in these lectures is that what we recognize as the face of meaning is, in a number of fundamentally important cases, also the face of ...
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A critical discussion of Susana Siegel's book, The Content of Visual Experience
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Dummett appears to have a certain conception of what vagueness would be like. On it, first, it is (eg English) predicates which are either vague or not, and second, for a predicate to be vague is for there to be (possibly) some range of... more
Dummett appears to have a certain conception of what vagueness would be like. On it, first, it is (eg English) predicates which are either vague or not, and second, for a predicate to be vague is for there to be (possibly) some range of items such that nothing about what the ...
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... 140 Charles Travis ... Once we realise the kinds of messes intentions, meaning and the rest may be, and once we take on board a point stressed by Wittgenstein—that, however messes are correctly put in order, no one can have sole... more
... 140 Charles Travis ... Once we realise the kinds of messes intentions, meaning and the rest may be, and once we take on board a point stressed by Wittgenstein—that, however messes are correctly put in order, no one can have sole responsibility for, or authority over, his own ...
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As With other topics about which philosophers theorize, there are two approaches to semantics. One might begin by stipulating what the content of a semantic theory of a language is to be, that is, what the theory is to say in describing... more
As With other topics about which philosophers theorize, there are two approaches to semantics. One might begin by stipulating what the content of a semantic theory of a language is to be, that is, what the theory is to say in describing what each expression in the language means. Alternatively, one can begin by trying to formulate semantic theories with adequate descriptive apparatus – vocabulary and description forming rules – for marking the differences between one thing and another that an expression of some language(s) may mean, and then, with theories in hand, see what content or significance can plausibly be assigned to the vocabulary and descriptions which the theories yield. Adherents of the second approach are apt to regard the first approach, with suspicion, as a piece of a priori theorizing about what it comes to for an expression to mean what it does, hence about what properties speakers of the relevant language are prepared to recognize in it. But there is little doubt ...
Research Interests: Philosophy and Dialogue
Disjunctivism about perception and disjunctivism about knowledge oppose a common form of target. The target posits an ingredient in seeing, say, a lemon, or knowing there to be one, which could also be present in some range of cases where... more
Disjunctivism about perception and disjunctivism about knowledge oppose a common form of target. The target posits an ingredient in seeing, say, a lemon, or knowing there to be one, which could also be present in some range of cases where there was no such thing to see, or to ...
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With Prof Gabriele Mras, co-editor (Routledge, 2016). Richard Wollheim famously tried to found a theory of pictorial representation on the notion of seeing-in, or earlier, seeing-as (which we call both indifferently aspect-perception).... more
With Prof Gabriele Mras, co-editor (Routledge, 2016). Richard Wollheim famously tried to found a theory of pictorial representation on the notion of seeing-in, or earlier, seeing-as (which we call both indifferently aspect-perception). The notion or cluster of notions captured Wittgenstein's attention throughout his philosophical life, especially towards its end. What exactly is the role and status of aspect-perception? Is it unusual, or is it in some sense present in all seeing? Can Wittgenstein's ruminations illuminate Wollheim's approach, or do they show what is wrong with it? If the latter, can the substance of Wollheim's ideas be saved? In the book, these questions and related ones are addressed in papers by: Avner Baz, Charles Travis, Richard Heinrich, Hanjo Glock,Garry Hagberg, Joachim Schulte, Fabian Dorsch, David Hills, Volker Munz, Michael Levine, Gabriele Mras. and myself.
Table of Contents:
Introduction and Acknowledgements
Part I Wittgenstein and Seeing-as
1. The Room in a View
Charles Travis
Part II Difficulties with Wollheim’s Borrowing from Wittgenstein
2. Seeing Aspects and Telling Stories about It
Joachim Schulte
3. Aspects of Perception
Avner Baz
4. Aspect-perception, Perception and Animals: Wittgenstein and Beyond
Hans-Johann Glock
5. Wittgenstein’s Seeing as: A Survey of Various Contexts
Volker A. Munz
Part III Benefits from Wollheim’s Borrowing from Wittgenstein
6. Leonardo’s Challenge: Wittgenstein and Wollheim at the Intersection of Perception and Projection Garry L. Hagberg
7. ‘Surface’ as an Expression of an Intention – On Richard Wollheim’s Conception of Art as a Form of Life
Gabriele M. Mras
8. Richard Wollheim on Seeing-In: From Representational Seeing to Imagination
Richard Heinrich
Part IV Rescuing Wollheim’s Account without the Support of Wittgenstein
9. A measure of Kant seen in Wollheim
Gary Kemp
10. Seeing-In as Aspect Perception
Fabian Dorsch
Part V Imagination and Emotion in Wollheim’s Account of Pictorial Experience
11. Wollheim: Emotion and its relation to art
Michael Levine
12. Visions: Wollheim and Walton on the Nature of Pictures
David Hills
Table of Contents:
Introduction and Acknowledgements
Part I Wittgenstein and Seeing-as
1. The Room in a View
Charles Travis
Part II Difficulties with Wollheim’s Borrowing from Wittgenstein
2. Seeing Aspects and Telling Stories about It
Joachim Schulte
3. Aspects of Perception
Avner Baz
4. Aspect-perception, Perception and Animals: Wittgenstein and Beyond
Hans-Johann Glock
5. Wittgenstein’s Seeing as: A Survey of Various Contexts
Volker A. Munz
Part III Benefits from Wollheim’s Borrowing from Wittgenstein
6. Leonardo’s Challenge: Wittgenstein and Wollheim at the Intersection of Perception and Projection Garry L. Hagberg
7. ‘Surface’ as an Expression of an Intention – On Richard Wollheim’s Conception of Art as a Form of Life
Gabriele M. Mras
8. Richard Wollheim on Seeing-In: From Representational Seeing to Imagination
Richard Heinrich
Part IV Rescuing Wollheim’s Account without the Support of Wittgenstein
9. A measure of Kant seen in Wollheim
Gary Kemp
10. Seeing-In as Aspect Perception
Fabian Dorsch
Part V Imagination and Emotion in Wollheim’s Account of Pictorial Experience
11. Wollheim: Emotion and its relation to art
Michael Levine
12. Visions: Wollheim and Walton on the Nature of Pictures
David Hills
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Are the laws of being true really 'immovable boundary stones? Is there absolutely no such thing as things being otherwise that for them to hold? In this paper I do not quite answer that question. But I think I do something to deflate it.... more
Are the laws of being true really 'immovable boundary stones? Is there absolutely no such thing as things being otherwise that for them to hold? In this paper I do not quite answer that question. But I think I do something to deflate it. I do so by going into some detail as to what logic really is about.
When someone acknowledges something as true, he thus judges. … Where there is judging one can always separate out the thought acknowledged as true, and the judging does not belong to this.