- Department of Philosophy
University of Fribourg
Avenue de l'Europe 20
CH-1700 Fribourg
Switzerland - +41263009565
Fabian Dorsch
University of Fribourg, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- http://perso.unifr.ch/fabian.dorsch — I am currently Associate Research Professor at the Philosophy Department of... morehttp://perso.unifr.ch/fabian.dorsch
— I am currently Associate Research Professor at the Philosophy Department of the University of Fribourg.
The research project The Normative Mind connected to this post is funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation.
For more information, please visit my academic homepage (see the link above).edit
Please send me an email (fabian.dorsch@unifr.ch) if you wish to receive the draft of the first half of the book.
Please send me an email (fabian.dorsch@unifr.ch) if you wish to receive a copy of the book. — 'In this highly ambitious, wide ranging, immensely impressive and ground-breaking work Fabian Dorsch surveys just about every account of the... more
Please send me an email (fabian.dorsch@unifr.ch) if you wish to receive a copy of the book. — 'In this highly ambitious, wide ranging, immensely impressive and ground-breaking work Fabian Dorsch surveys just about every account of the imagination that has ever been proposed. He identifies five central types of imagining that any unifying theory must accommodate and sets himself the task of determining whether any theory of what imagining consists in covers these five paradigms. Focussing on what he takes to be the three main theories, and giving them each equal consideration, he faults the first two and embraces the third. The scholarship is immaculate, the writing crystal clear and the argumentation always powerful.' (Malcolm Budd)
This dissertation provides a theory of the nature of aesthetic experiences on the basis of a theory of aesthetic values. It results in the formulation of the following necessary conditions for an experience to be aesthetic:(i) it must... more
This dissertation provides a theory of the nature of aesthetic experiences on the basis of a theory of aesthetic values. It results in the formulation of the following necessary conditions for an experience to be aesthetic:(i) it must consist of a (complex) representation of an object and an accompanying feeling;(ii) the representation must instantiate an intrinsic value; and (iii) the feeling must be the recognition of that value and bestow it on the object.
In recent years, it has become popular again to endorse relationalism about perception. According to this view, perceptions are essentially relational experiences and thus differ in nature from non-relational hallucinations. In this... more
In recent years, it has become popular again to endorse relationalism about perception. According to this view, perceptions are essentially relational experiences and thus differ in nature from non-relational hallucinations. In this article, I assume that relationalism is true. The issue that I am generally interested in is rather which version of relationalism we should endorse, given that perceptions are relational. The standard answer to this question is Acquaintance Relationalism, the view that perceptions are relational in so far as they acquaint us with objects in our environment. But my contention is that this view cannot account for two important aspects of perfect hallucinations, namely their property of being introspectively indistinguishable from perceptions and their property of having the same motivational force as veridical perceptions. Which alternative form of relationism should be endorsed instead (if any) is then an issue to be discussed at another ocassion.
Research Interests:
The recent debate on cognitive phenomenology has largely focused on phenomenal aspects connected to the content of thoughts. By contrasts, aspects pertaining to their attitude have often been neglected, despite the fact that they are... more
The recent debate on cognitive phenomenology has largely focused on phenomenal aspects connected to the content of thoughts. By contrasts, aspects pertaining to their attitude have often been neglected, despite the fact that they are distinctive of the mental kind of thought concerned and, moreover, also present in experiences and thus less contentious than purely cognitive aspects. My main goal is to identify two central and closely related aspects of attitude that are phenomenologically salient and shared by thoughts with experiences, namely the rational role that they play in our mental lives and their determination by factors external to them, such as external objects or reasons. In particular, I aim to defend Phenomenal Rationalism about judgemental thoughts and perceptual experiences: the view that their phenomenal character reflects their rational role, that is, their capacity to provide and/or respond to reasons. I conclude with some remarks about how this view may be extended to other kinds of thought and experience; and about how the phenomenological salience of the specific rational role of individual judgemental thoughts may in fact be used to formulate also an argument for the phenomenological salience of their particular propositional contents.
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In this article, I defend the view that we can acquire factual knowledge – that is, contingent propositional knowledge about certain (perceivable) aspects of reality – on the basis of imaginative experience. More specifically, I argue... more
In this article, I defend the view that we can acquire factual knowledge – that is, contingent propositional knowledge about certain (perceivable) aspects of reality – on the basis of imaginative experience. More specifically, I argue that, under suitable circumstances, imaginative experiences can rationally determine the propositional content of knowledge-constituting beliefs – though not their attitude of belief – in roughly the same way as perceptual experiences do in the case of perceptual knowledge. I also highlight some philosophical consequences of this conclusion, especially for the issue of whether imagination can help us to learn something from fictions.
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In this paper, I describe and discuss two mental phenomena which are somewhat neglected in the philosophy of mind: focused daydreaming and mind-wandering. My aim is to show that their natures are rather distinct, despite the fact that we... more
In this paper, I describe and discuss two mental phenomena which are somewhat neglected in the philosophy of mind: focused daydreaming and mind-wandering. My aim is to show that their natures are rather distinct, despite the fact that we tend to classify both as instances of daydreaming. The first difference between the two, I argue, is that, while focused daydreaming is an instance of imaginative mental agency (i.e. mental agency with the purpose to voluntarily produce certain mental representations), mind-wandering is not – though this does not mean that mind-wandering cannot involve mental agency at all. This personal-level difference in agency and purposiveness has, furthermore, the consequence that instances of mind-wandering do not constitute unified and self-contained segments of the stream of consciousness – in stark contrast to focused daydreams. Besides, the two kinds of mental phenomena differ in whether they possess a narrative structure, and in how we may make sense of the succession of mental episodes involved.
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In this article, I present two objections against the view that aesthetic judgements – that is, judgemental ascriptions of aesthetic qualities like elegance or harmony – are justified non-inferentially. The first is that this view cannot... more
In this article, I present two objections against the view that aesthetic judgements – that is, judgemental ascriptions of aesthetic qualities like elegance or harmony – are justified non-inferentially. The first is that this view cannot make sense of our practice to support our aesthetic judgements by reference to lower-level features of the objects concerned. The second objection maintains that non-inferentialism about the justification of aesthetic judgements cannot explain why our aesthetic interest in artworks and other objects is limited to only some of their lower-level features that realise their higher-level aesthetic qualities. Although my concern with the view that aesthetic judgements are subject to non-inferential justification is very general, my discussion is primarily structured around Sibley’s well-developed and influential version of this view.
Research Interests:
Page 1. Emotional Imagining and Our Responses to Fiction Fabian Dorsch (fabian.dorsch@ uclmail.net) May 3, 2010 Discussions about imagining normally concentrate on the imaginative counterparts of per-ception and judgemental thought (or... more
Page 1. Emotional Imagining and Our Responses to Fiction Fabian Dorsch (fabian.dorsch@ uclmail.net) May 3, 2010 Discussions about imagining normally concentrate on the imaginative counterparts of per-ception and judgemental thought (or occurrent belief). ...
My primary aim in this article is to provide a philosophical account of the unity of hallucinations, which can capture both perceptual hallucinations (which are subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions) and non-perceptual... more
My primary aim in this article is to provide a philosophical account of the unity of hallucinations, which can capture both perceptual hallucinations (which are subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions) and non-perceptual hallucinations (all others). Besides, I also mean to clarify further the division of labour and the nature of the collaboration between philosophy and the cognitive sciences. Assuming that the epistemic conception of hallucinations put forward by M. G. F. Martin and others is largely on the right track, I will focus on two main tasks: (a) to provide a satisfactory phenomenology of the subjective character of perceptions and perceptual hallucinations and (b) to redress the philosophers’ neglect of non-perceptual hallucinations. More specifically, I intend to apply one of the central tenets of the epistemic conception—that hallucinations can and should be positively characterised in terms of their phenomenological connections to perceptions—to non-perceptual hallucinations as well. That is, I will try to show that we can positively specify the class of non-perceptual hallucinations by reference to the distinctive ways in which we first-personally experience them and perceptions in consciousness. The task of saying more about their underlying third-personal nature may then be left to the cognitive sciences.
Research Interests:
During the last ten years or so, there has been a noticeable surge of interest in disjunctivism, accompanied by the emergence of many different promising disjunctivist positions on a large variety of philosophical issues. However, this... more
During the last ten years or so, there has been a noticeable surge of interest in disjunctivism, accompanied by the emergence of many different promising disjunctivist positions on a large variety of philosophical issues. However, this positive development has yet to lead to a change in the general attitude towards disjunctivism, which is often one of prevailing scepticism or even disregard. It is still not rare to dismiss disjunctivism right from the start as too implausible or abstruse to be considered as a serious alternative to other views.
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One prominent ambition of theories of colour is to pay full justice to how colours are subjectively given to us; and another to reconcile this first-personal perspective on colours with the third-personal one of the natural sciences. The... more
One prominent ambition of theories of colour is to pay full justice to how colours are subjectively given to us; and another to reconcile this first-personal perspective on colours with the third-personal one of the natural sciences. The goal of this article is to question whether we can satisfy ...
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Research Interests: Philosophy and Dialectica
Hegel's Theory of Imagination. By jennifer ann bates. State University of New York Press. 2004. pp. xlv + 202. $50. In this book, Jennifer Ann Bates engages in a very detailed and well-supported exegesis of Hegel's various... more
Hegel's Theory of Imagination. By jennifer ann bates. State University of New York Press. 2004. pp. xlv + 202. $50. In this book, Jennifer Ann Bates engages in a very detailed and well-supported exegesis of Hegel's various discussions of the imagination. Although ...
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This is the original, longer draft for my entry on 'Hume' in the 'The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination' (Amy Kind (ed.), London: Routledge, 2016). — Please always cite the Routledge version, unless there are passages... more
This is the original, longer draft for my entry on 'Hume' in the 'The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination' (Amy Kind (ed.), London: Routledge, 2016). — Please always cite the Routledge version, unless there are passages concerned that did not make it into the Handbook for reasons of length. — This chapter overviews Hume’s thoughts on the nature and the role of imagining, with an almost exclusive focus on the first book of his Treatise of Human Nature. Over the course of this text, Hume draws and discusses three important distinctions among our conscious mental episodes (or what he calls ‘perceptions’): (i) between impressions (including perceptual experiences) and ideas (including recollections, imaginings and occurrent beliefs); (ii) between ideas of the memory and ideas of the imagination; and (iii), among the ideas of the imagination, between ideas of the judgement (i.e. occurrent beliefs) and ideas of the fancy (i.e. imaginings). I discuss each distinction in turn, also in connection to contemporary views on imagining. In addition, I briefly consider Hume’s views on the imagination as a faculty aimed at the production of ideas, as well as on the role that imagining plays in the wider context of our mental lives, notably in the acquisition of modal knowledge and in the comprehension of, and resistance to, stories and opinions that we take to be false or fictional.
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Research Interests:
Research Interests:
One central fact about hallucinations is that they may be subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions. Indeed, it has been argued that the hallucinatory experiences con-cerned cannot and need not be characterised in any more... more
One central fact about hallucinations is that they may be subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions. Indeed, it has been argued that the hallucinatory experiences con-cerned cannot and need not be characterised in any more positive general terms. This epistemic ...
Research Interests:
3 Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency Fabian Dorsch 1. SOME DIVISIONS IN THE MIND Try to conjure up a visual image of a sunny forest, or to suppose that Goethe once visited Stoos in the centre of Switzerland. Presumably, you will be... more
3 Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency Fabian Dorsch 1. SOME DIVISIONS IN THE MIND Try to conjure up a visual image of a sunny forest, or to suppose that Goethe once visited Stoos in the centre of Switzerland. Presumably, you will be able to comply immediately and ...
One influential focus in the recent debates on the non-sensory phenomenal aspects of our mental episodes has been on the intellectual elements of phenomenal character. More specifically, it has been on what it is subjectively like to... more
One influential focus in the recent debates on the non-sensory phenomenal aspects of our mental episodes has been on the intellectual elements of phenomenal character. More specifically, it has been on what it is subjectively like to think a proposition (in opposition to experiencing objects and their features), as well as on the extent to which how our thoughts and judgements are phenomenally given to us depends on how they present the world as being.
The claim that consciousness is propositional has be widely debated in the past. For instance, it has been discussed whether consciousness is always propositional, whether all propositional consciousness is linguistic, whether... more
The claim that consciousness is propositional has be widely debated in the past. For instance, it has been discussed whether consciousness is always propositional, whether all propositional consciousness is linguistic, whether propositional consciousness is always articulated, or whether there can be non-articulated propositions. In contrast, the question of whether propositions are conscious has not very often been the focus of attention.
Research Interests:
Engaging in philosophical aesthetics means, to a considerable extent, also engaging in other and, in some sense, more fundamental disciplines of philosophy, such as metaphysics, epistemology or the philosophy of mind. 1 Which ontological... more
Engaging in philosophical aesthetics means, to a considerable extent, also engaging in other and, in some sense, more fundamental disciplines of philosophy, such as metaphysics, epistemology or the philosophy of mind. 1 Which ontological category paintings, novels or performances of music belong to should be influenced by considerations about their status as artworks and about our aesthetic experiences of them.
Abstract In this paper, I would like to put forward the claim that, at least in some central cases, visualising consists literally in imagining seeing. The first section of my paper is concerned with a defence of the specific argument for... more
Abstract In this paper, I would like to put forward the claim that, at least in some central cases, visualising consists literally in imagining seeing. The first section of my paper is concerned with a defence of the specific argument for this claim that MGF Martin presents in his paper'The Transparency of Experience'(Martin 2002). This argument has been often misunderstood (or ignored), and it is worthwhile to discuss it in detail and to illustrate what its precise nature is and why I take it to be sound.
One important issue in the philosophy of perception is the question of which features of objects are perceivable. 1 Perhaps the only fairly uncontroversial claim in this debate is that we can perceive the traditional examples of what have... more
One important issue in the philosophy of perception is the question of which features of objects are perceivable. 1 Perhaps the only fairly uncontroversial claim in this debate is that we can perceive the traditional examples of what have been called 'secondary qualities'—such as colours, smells, or tastes.
Most philosophers writing on the imagination have insisted that we cannot gain knowledge by relying on imagining–in contrast, say, to perception or inference–as our source of knowledge. Their doubts have not concerned the widely... more
Most philosophers writing on the imagination have insisted that we cannot gain knowledge by relying on imagining–in contrast, say, to perception or inference–as our source of knowledge. Their doubts have not concerned the widely acknowledged fact that imagining a situation may help or enable us to acquire certain pieces of knowledge–for instance, when we visualise geometrical figures or patterns of numbers to come to know mathematical facts (cf.
Abstract Empirical findings may be relevant for aesthetic evaluation in at least two ways. First—within criticism—they may help us to identify the aesthetic value of objects. Second—whithin philosophy—they may help us to decide which... more
Abstract Empirical findings may be relevant for aesthetic evaluation in at least two ways. First—within criticism—they may help us to identify the aesthetic value of objects. Second—whithin philosophy—they may help us to decide which theory of aesthetic value and evaluation to prefer. In this paper, I address both kinds of relevance.
One influential focus in the recent debates on the non-sensory aspects of the phenomenal character of our mental episodes has been on their intellectual elements. More specifically, it has been on what it is like to think or judge... more
One influential focus in the recent debates on the non-sensory aspects of the phenomenal character of our mental episodes has been on their intellectual elements. More specifically, it has been on what it is like to think or judge something (in opposition to seeing or imagining it), as well as on the extent to which how we subjectively experience our thoughts and judgements depends on how they present the world as being.
One of the central questions of the ontology of art is which ontological categories the different types of artworks–such as paintings, novels, pieces of musics, or etchings–belong to. The best answer to this question may then reveal... more
One of the central questions of the ontology of art is which ontological categories the different types of artworks–such as paintings, novels, pieces of musics, or etchings–belong to. The best answer to this question may then reveal whether all types of artworks belong to the same ontological category; and perhaps also how this fact may be related to their significance in our lives.
One of the key ideas in Kant's argument for the transcendental ideality of space is that the objects of outer experience are distinct from us–and open to be experienced by us–by taking up a different part of space than us (cf. Kant (1990,... more
One of the key ideas in Kant's argument for the transcendental ideality of space is that the objects of outer experience are distinct from us–and open to be experienced by us–by taking up a different part of space than us (cf. Kant (1990, B 38); Strawson (1959); Evans (1996)). One need not accept Kant's conclusion about the non-empirical priority of our intuition of space and concept of objecthood, however, in order to acknowledge that (human) objectual experience does not occur without spatial experience.
1 Summary The main aim of my research project is to investigate the conscious and normative aspects of the mind and their complex relationships to each other. More concretely, the guiding theme of my research is to develop and defend... more
1 Summary The main aim of my research project is to investigate the conscious and normative aspects of the mind and their complex relationships to each other. More concretely, the guiding theme of my research is to develop and defend Experiential Rationalism-the claim that our mental episodes are given to us as responses to and/or providers of reasons and, therefore, involve an experience of their rational nature.
With Prof Gabriele Mras, co-editor (Routledge, 2016). Richard Wollheim famously tried to found a theory of pictorial representation on the notion of seeing-in, or earlier, seeing-as (which we call both indifferently aspect-perception).... more
With Prof Gabriele Mras, co-editor (Routledge, 2016). Richard Wollheim famously tried to found a theory of pictorial representation on the notion of seeing-in, or earlier, seeing-as (which we call both indifferently aspect-perception). The notion or cluster of notions captured Wittgenstein's attention throughout his philosophical life, especially towards its end. What exactly is the role and status of aspect-perception? Is it unusual, or is it in some sense present in all seeing? Can Wittgenstein's ruminations illuminate Wollheim's approach, or do they show what is wrong with it? If the latter, can the substance of Wollheim's ideas be saved? In the book, these questions and related ones are addressed in papers by: Avner Baz, Charles Travis, Richard Heinrich, Hanjo Glock,Garry Hagberg, Joachim Schulte, Fabian Dorsch, David Hills, Volker Munz, Michael Levine, Gabriele Mras. and myself.
Table of Contents:
Introduction and Acknowledgements
Part I Wittgenstein and Seeing-as
1. The Room in a View
Charles Travis
Part II Difficulties with Wollheim’s Borrowing from Wittgenstein
2. Seeing Aspects and Telling Stories about It
Joachim Schulte
3. Aspects of Perception
Avner Baz
4. Aspect-perception, Perception and Animals: Wittgenstein and Beyond
Hans-Johann Glock
5. Wittgenstein’s Seeing as: A Survey of Various Contexts
Volker A. Munz
Part III Benefits from Wollheim’s Borrowing from Wittgenstein
6. Leonardo’s Challenge: Wittgenstein and Wollheim at the Intersection of Perception and Projection Garry L. Hagberg
7. ‘Surface’ as an Expression of an Intention – On Richard Wollheim’s Conception of Art as a Form of Life
Gabriele M. Mras
8. Richard Wollheim on Seeing-In: From Representational Seeing to Imagination
Richard Heinrich
Part IV Rescuing Wollheim’s Account without the Support of Wittgenstein
9. A measure of Kant seen in Wollheim
Gary Kemp
10. Seeing-In as Aspect Perception
Fabian Dorsch
Part V Imagination and Emotion in Wollheim’s Account of Pictorial Experience
11. Wollheim: Emotion and its relation to art
Michael Levine
12. Visions: Wollheim and Walton on the Nature of Pictures
David Hills
Table of Contents:
Introduction and Acknowledgements
Part I Wittgenstein and Seeing-as
1. The Room in a View
Charles Travis
Part II Difficulties with Wollheim’s Borrowing from Wittgenstein
2. Seeing Aspects and Telling Stories about It
Joachim Schulte
3. Aspects of Perception
Avner Baz
4. Aspect-perception, Perception and Animals: Wittgenstein and Beyond
Hans-Johann Glock
5. Wittgenstein’s Seeing as: A Survey of Various Contexts
Volker A. Munz
Part III Benefits from Wollheim’s Borrowing from Wittgenstein
6. Leonardo’s Challenge: Wittgenstein and Wollheim at the Intersection of Perception and Projection Garry L. Hagberg
7. ‘Surface’ as an Expression of an Intention – On Richard Wollheim’s Conception of Art as a Form of Life
Gabriele M. Mras
8. Richard Wollheim on Seeing-In: From Representational Seeing to Imagination
Richard Heinrich
Part IV Rescuing Wollheim’s Account without the Support of Wittgenstein
9. A measure of Kant seen in Wollheim
Gary Kemp
10. Seeing-In as Aspect Perception
Fabian Dorsch
Part V Imagination and Emotion in Wollheim’s Account of Pictorial Experience
11. Wollheim: Emotion and its relation to art
Michael Levine
12. Visions: Wollheim and Walton on the Nature of Pictures
David Hills