Charles Travis

I changed into philosophy (from mathematics) in the middle of my junior year at Berkeley. I then had no idea what philosophy was. But I got lucky. I was engrossed by it, and that stuck. It has only become more and more of a pleasure. In those first years, my main (living) influences were William Craig, Hans Herzberger and Thompson Clarke at Berkeley, and Montgomery Furth at UCLA. When I graduated, in 1963, I went south to UCLA, where I did a dissertation mostly under Keith Gunderson, but also partly under Robert Yost. In 1966 I took up my first position at UNC Chapel Hill. In 1967 I met Hilary Putnam. We had a close friendship up to his death this year (2016). He also had a very profound effect on me philosophically. I think he was the only great philosopher I ever knew, and suspect he might be the only one I would ever want to.I left UNC after three years and moved to Canada. No, I was not eligible for the draft. But I didn’t like what was going on in the US (and especially in North Carolina) in 1968. Also, I left for Canada to be in the same department as my friend, Zeno Vendler. I stayed in Calgary for 11 years, but was then invited to take up a position at what is now Tilburg University, was then the Katholieke Hogeschool Tilburg. (I won’t tell the joke.) To be brief, I couldn’t resist. That was my first tour in Europe, to be followed by two more. The reason for the back and forth is always the same: In general, universities in North America are closer to the academic ideals I have always held. On my first tour I was not willing to accept the distance from those ideals that I found in Europe. On the other hand, I found life in Europe more decently human and agreeable. As I write this from my home in Portugal, I still so find. In the end, I always opted for life, though my last tour, in London was prompted, too, by George Bush’s 2004 electoral victory. Some might see such ambivalence as vacillating. In any case it led to positions at Illinois State University, the University of Stirling, Northwestern University, then King’s College London (and visiting positions at the University of Michigan and Harvard).When I left for Chapel Hill I saw myself as in both philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. But I was meant to be their philosopher of language. I did my best to oblige. One upshot, influenced by Austin, was my first work on what I now call occasion-sensitivity. At first, though, not quite conceived aright, as became clear on further reflection. I was not yet attuned to the importance of the idea of both theory-receptive and theory-resistant phenomena (though I should have been, influenced as I then was by Chomsky). When I saw the shortcomings of my early work, I naturally turned to Wittgenstein who, I think, has better ideas on these matters. But equally Austin and Putnam, all of whom, I find, coincide on issues I find the most importantSo that is one turning point in my philosophical makeup. The other occurred later, in my years at Northwestern (around 2001-2002), when I read Cora Diamond’s wonderful essays on Frege (and on Wittgenstein). I know I was very late doing this. I am not, I suppose, an avid reader. But it did change my life. Up to that point I viewed Frege as more or less a foil for Wittgenstein and a target. When I actually paid attention to what he wrote I got an entirely different impression. Though I do think that he occasionally takes a misstep, I also think that in his writings there is a powerful picture of the relation of thought to world, so, too, of truth. This picture, in my view, is largely lost in the oral tradition. It is lost, too, because of a certain logocentrism which permeates our times, even in those trying to work against it
Supervisors: Keith Gunderson, Robert Yost