Abhijit Sengupta

This paper addresses the gap in the knowledge transfer literature around how universities choose specific organizational models for their knowledge transfer offices (KTOs). Organization theory points towards strong interlinkages between strategy, structure and processes in organizations. This motivates an exploration of similar links within the organizational setup of KTOs. In doing so, the paper provides a unified theoretical framework around a university's choice of structure, business model and strategic preferences for their KTOs linked to university-specific contextual factors. A qualitative approach is used wherein four very distinct British universities are examined as individual case studies. The authors find that strategic aims of the university around practitioner engagement, the quantity of applied research and research specialization are key factors in determining the organizational characteristics of the KTO. The theoretical framework derived from the cases makes two key contributions to the university knowledge transfer literature. First, it links the university-level contextual factors to the local model of knowledge transfer. Second, it allows us to develop a set of generic models of knowledge transfer, which can potentially guide universities to develop their own specific models.

This paper models the coalition formation process among primates as a sequential game. The population consists of individuals having distinct social ranks which is determined by the individual’s resource holding potential. Each member of the population is interested in gaining access to a food resource, either individually or
via a coalition. At any given stage of the game, a player can either propose a specific
coalition or he can be proposed to in order to join one. Hence, the strategy of a player consists of a sequence of decisions regarding who to propose to for the formation of a coalition and which proposals to accept or reject. We derive the preferences of the players over the various coalition structures under the assumption that the probability of a coalition to obtain the resource is given by a logistic distribution as a function of relative strengths of the players. We show that, given the primates’ strategic behavior, a variety of different coalition structures can emerge in equilibrium.

Brand competition is modelled using an agent based approach in order to examine the long run dynamics of market structure and brand characteristics. A repeated game is designed where myopic firms choose strategies based on beliefs about their rivals and consumers. Consumers are heterogeneous and can observe neighbor behaviour through social networks. Although firms do not observe them, the social networks have a significant impact on the emerging market structure. Presence of networks tends to polarize market share and leads to higher volatility in brands. Yet convergence in brand characteristics usually happens whenever the market reaches a steady state. Scale-free networks accentuate the polarization and volatility more than small world or random networks. Unilateral innovations are less frequent under social networks.

We consider a Cournot oligopoly market of firms possessing increasing returns to scale technologies (which may not be identical). It is shown that an external regulating agency can increase total social welfare without running a deficit by offering to subsidize one firm an amount which depends on the
output level of that firm and the market price. The firms bid for this contract, the regulator collects the highest bid upfront and subsidizes the highest bidding firm. It is shown that there exists a subsidy schedule such that (i) the regulator breaks even, (ii) the subsidized firm obtains zero net profit and charges a price
equal to its average cost, (iii) every other firm willingly exit the market and (iv) market price decreases, consumers are better off and total welfare improves.

Results from two studies on longitudinal friendship networks are presented, exploring the impact of a gratitude intervention on positive and negative affect dynamics in a social network. The gratitude intervention had been previously shown to increase positive affect and decrease negative affect in an individual but dynamic group effects have not been considered. In the first study, the intervention was administered to the whole network. In the second study, two social networks are considered and in each only a subset of individuals, initially low/high in negative affect respectively received the intervention as “agents of change”. Data was analyzed using stochastic actor-based modeling techniques to identify resulting network changes, impact on positive and negative affect and potential contagion of mood within the group. The first study found a group level increase in positive and a decrease in negative affect. Homophily was detected with
regard to positive and negative affect but no evidence of contagion was found. The network itself became more volatile along with a fall in rate of change of negative affect. Centrality measures indicated that the best broadcasters were the individuals with the least negative affect levels at the beginning of the study. In the second study, the positive and negative affect levels for the whole group depended on the initial levels of negative affect of the intervention recipients. There was evidence of positive affect contagion in the group where intervention recipients had low initial level of negative affect and contagion in negative affect for the group where recipients had initially high level of negative affect.