Josh Law

1] Edward Yang (in Chinese 楊德昌, 1947-2007) is one of the most renowned Taiwanese directors, whose works raise criticisms of modernity. Since the New Culture Movement in the 1910s and 1920s, Chinese literati have queried the place of traditional Chinese culture, especially Confucianism, on the road to modernization. This paper gives an account of Yang’s understanding of modernization and the Confucian tradition as illustrated in his work, A Confucian Confusion (1994). We argue that, though he despised politically endorsed Confucianism as ideology, without sufficient justification Yang nonetheless reserves the possibility of taking Confucianism as a supplement to modernity.

Edward Yang (in Chinese 楊德昌, 1947-2007) is one of the most renowned Taiwanese directors, whose works raise criticisms of modernity. Since the New Culture Movement in the 1910s and 1920s, Chinese literati have queried the place of traditional Chinese culture, especially Confucianism, on the road to modernization. This paper gives an account of Yang’s understanding of modernization and the Confucian tradition as illustrated in his work, A Confucian Confusion (1994). We argue that, though he despised politically endorsed Confucianism as ideology, without sufficient justification Yang nonetheless reserves the possibility of taking Confucianism as a supplement to modernity.

封底簡介：
漫畫不止消閒，也可成為哲學入門
的「教科書」！《漫畫與哲學》由
多位從事哲學教育、研究的專家所
著，藉着分析《鋼之鍊金術師》、
《P l u t o 》、《無限之住人》、
《龍》、《天使禁獵區》等經典漫
畫作品，連結現實中的哲學概念，
帶你重新思考一些以前未必深思過
的問題。當中涉及語意學、情緒哲
學、生命價值以至烏托邦等討論，
各章亦附「哲學教室」，讓讀者可
進一步精讀哲學概念。無論是康德
的人性公式，還是霍布斯的契約論
等經典學說，漫畫迷都能「宅」在
家裏掌握一二，走入不再神秘的哲
學結界。

目錄：
P / i i
序．羅雅駿
目
第一部分
第二部分
P / 0 2 1 1. 弗洛姆《愛的藝術》
P / 0 2 3 2. 「愛四要素說」的鍊成
P / 0 2 7 3. 不吝付出更勝「等價交換」
P / 0 2 9 4. 不止於成熟之愛
P / 0 3 1 哲學教室
P / 0 3 5
《死亡筆記》中的
依愛之情
—黃沐恩—
P / 0 3 6 1. 什麼是依愛（AMAE）？
P / 0 3 9 2. 日本文化與依愛的形成
P / 0 4 2 3. 日本少年問題與依愛喪失
P / 0 4 4 4. 從依愛看《死亡筆記》
P / 0 4 6 5. 結語
P / 0 4 8 哲學教室
P / 0 0 2
一拳超人 VS 悟空：
漫畫人物的存在悖論
—貝剛毅—
P / 0 0 3 1. 誰是史上最強動漫英雄
P / 0 0 3 2. 存在又不存在
P / 0 0 5 3. 麥農的不存在物論
P / 0 0 7 4. 想像遊戲論
P / 0 1 1 5. 抽象人造物論
P / 0 1 3 6. 尚未解決的問題
P / 0 1 4 哲學教室
P / 0 5 6
《Pluto》：
阿童木的理性與感情
—羅雅駿—
P / 0 5 7 1. 高志的復仇計劃
P / 0 5 8 2. 冰冷的理性能作出最好的決策？
P / 0 6 0 3. 糾纏着肉身的大腦
P / 0 6 2 4. 身體與情緒的關係
P / 0 6 5 5. 情緒的世界
P / 0 7 0 6. 憤怒的破壞力
P / 0 7 2 7. 阿童木的憤怒與「策略」
P / 0 7 4 8. 理性中的情緒‧ 情緒中的理性
P / 0 7 5 哲學教室
P / 0 8 2
不死是一件好事嗎？
從《無限之住人》看長生不老
—陳學嵐—
P / 0 8 3 1. 《無限之住人》裏的不死身
P / 0 8 5 2. 不死是一件壞事
P / 0 8 7 3. 欲望與生死的關係
P / 0 9 0 4. 沒有絕對的結論
P / 0 9 2 哲學教室
P / 1 1 2
《寄生獸》：
什麼決定生命的輕重？
—楊家頌—
P / 1 1 4 1. 人是萬物之靈，還是惡魔？
P / 1 1 6 2. 智力決定道德地位？
P / 1 2 0 3. 什麼才是真正的正義？
P / 1 2 2 哲學教室
P / 0 9 6
「國土鍊成陣計劃」的道德思考：
犧牲人類實現目的不行嗎？
—蔡子俊—
P / 0 9 7 1. 「國土鍊成陣計劃」錯在哪裏？
P / 1 0 1 2. 譴責沒有道德感的人造人可以嗎？
P / 1 0 4 3. 道德信念背後對人的理解
P / 1 0 5 哲學教室
P / 1 3 0
愛與自由：
《天使禁獵區》的宗教觀
—趙偉偉—
P / 1 3 1 1. 宗教與權力：從天界看極權
P / 1 3 4 2. 宗教與自由：外在限制與自我的失落
P / 1 3 7 3. 宗教與道德：對人性的思考
P / 1 4 0 4. 對終極價值的持續追尋
P / 1 4 1 哲學教室
P / 1 4 7
《龍》的烏托邦思想
—趙子明—
P / 1 4 8 1. 烏托邦的理想和現實
P / 1 4 9 2. 夢想中的理想國
P / 1 5 2 3. 借助權力建立的理想國
P / 1 5 4 4. 民族意識與烏托邦
P / 1 5 8 5. 赫爾德對「純粹理性」的質疑
P / 1 6 1 6. 主角與說故事者眼中的烏托邦
P / 1 6 5 7. 肯定傳統文化的影響
P / 1 6 8 8. 於作品中統一的對立
P / 1 7 1 哲學教室

本書透過解讀經典電影，深入淺出探討人生與哲學。全書按照文章討論重點分為「自我」「自由」「道德」「信念」「情感」「幸福」六章，合共17篇，討論話題涵蓋了人的一生中最重要的方面。各篇通過品論一部經典的電影，介紹影片中折射出的議題，理論結合生活地討論與讀者息息相關的重要哲理。將生命中的永恆話題，一一剖析解構成哲學思考議題，結合哲學理論，分析疏導這些難解的生命話題。

目錄
一　自我
《搏擊會》的真我觀：怎樣才能認識自己? / 羅進昌
《惡人》的自我解釋 / 黃慧萍
《末路狂花》：公路電影與自我理解 / 尹德成

二　自由
《雙面嬌娃》：迷情慾愛 / 林澤榮
《七宗罪》︰內在自由的可能 / 溫帶維

三　道德
《歡情太暫》：為甚麼要道德? / 梁光耀
《寡佬飛行日記》：輕渺的人生 / 羅雅駿
《竊聽風雲 2》：情境詮釋與道德價值 / 尹德成

四　信念
《真人 Show》：信念與懷疑 / 林澤榮
《廿二世紀殺人網絡》：往信心的跳躍 / 溫帶維
《永遠的一天》：神話、哲學、電影 / 羅雅駿

五　情感
《真的戀愛了》：慾愛與聖愛 / 林澤榮
《杯酒留痕》：啤酒泡沫裏的友情 / 羅雅駿
《回魂夜》：克服恐懼 / 羅進昌

六　幸福
《魂離情外天》：快樂與幸福 / 溫帶維
《留芳頌》：幸福與意義 / 尹德成
《作死不離 3 兄弟》：生存作為一種美學! / 駱頴佳

從哲學看電影：《海上傳奇》(代跋) / 陶國璋

Prof. Paisley Nathan Livingston is the former Head and Chair Professor of the Philosophy Department at Lingnan University. He has spent over a decade at the University and made significant contributions to both the University and the local community during his stay in Hong Kong. He has always been energetic in class and passionate about what he is teaching. Furthermore, if you knew how much administrative works he was also burdened with, you would truly be awed by his excellent teaching performance and impressive amount of research output. One of his most notable works over the years in Hong Kong is Cinema, Philosophy, Bergman: On Film as Philosophy in which he rebuts some of the exaggerated claims of "film as philosophy" and provides an alternative moderate account to the thesis. The work has made important contribution to aesthetics, philosophy of film, film studies and the studies of the Swedish film director, Ingmar Bergman. To acknowledge his retirement from Lingnan, I decided to interview him before his departure to rejoin his family in Scandinavia. The interview questions range from his background to academic interests, issues in aesthetics and problems regarding the current tertiary education.

The central pillar for Edmund Husserl's philosophy is the doctrine that "consciousness is always a consciousness of something." That is to say; our consciousness is an experience of an object. Accordingly, Edmund Husserl’s aim in the Logical Investigations (1901. Hereafter, LU) is to provide an account to answer “what it means to be conscious.”  There are naturally many types of experiences; among them, there are perception, imagination, remembrance, etc. In Husserl’s theory of intentionality, perception is directed at perceived objects; imagination is an imagining of something, and memory is the remembering of a past event. The kind of aboutness or directedness towards something is considered by Husserl to be the essential structure of consciousness. He terms consciousness’ directedness towards something, “intentionality.” When Husserl asks the question regarding intentionality, ultimately, Husserl is attempting to uncover the essential structures of our experience. However, Husserl also recognizes in the LU, that there is a kind of experience in which it appears not possessing any directedness or intentionality. We can find in Section 15 of the "Fifth Investigation" that Husserl tries to investigate this group of non-intentional feelings. Among this group of experiences, it seems that some feelings are of or for something, while some feelings are not. The former kind of feeling includes our fear of a fearful dog, our love for someone or something and our hatred towards something, etc., which are intentional experiences; whereas, the latter kind of feeling encompasses, notably, sensory-pain (sinnliche Schmerz) and sensory-pleasure (sinnliche Lüste), which are considered as non-intentional experiences. The latter group of feelings is usually labelled as sensory feelings. Husserl, in his LU, adopts the terminology of feeling-sensations (Gefühlsempfindungen)
from Carl Stumpf to refer to this particular group of sensory feeling. As oppose to feeling-sensations, there are feeling-acts (Gefühlsakte) referring to the group of intentional feelings, which is a term coined by Franz Brentano. Interestingly, if Husserl recognises that there are non-intentional feeling-sensations, this recognition poses a threat to the doctrine that consciousness is essentially intentional. In other words, the sensory feelings as non-intentional feelings would undermine the central pillar of his philosophy. The problem is then; how is it possible for Husserl to hold a view that there is non-intentional experience while upholding his central tenet of consciousness is always a consciousness of something? The question also leads to other related issues, such as what does Husserl means by intentionality? What is the essential structure of an intentional experience? What is the nature of sensory-pain or sensory-pleasure
as feeling-sensations? If feeling-sensations are non-intentional, do they have any role in our intentional experience? What are the objects of these experiences if they are to be intentional at all? I argue in this paper that Husserl gives an account of feeling-sensations that would provide answers to these questions in Part (b) in Section 15 of the "Fifth Investigation."
Accordingly, then, the overarching goal of the present paper is to investigate Husserl’s resolution to his recognition of feeling-sensations as non-intentional feelings in the LU. To do so, I will provide an exegetical reading and interpretation of Part (b) of Section 15 of the “Fifth Investigations” in which Husserl provides an explication of the nature and the role of sensory feelings or feeling-sensations, which should be seen as an attempt to resolve the problem.