Sensation and Perception

This paper examines the history and philosophy of a little-known psychological experience: depersonalization. It explores it as a phenomenal experience and as a disorder. It examines nosological debates over the condition, both past and present. It presents speculative hypotheses about phenomenal consciousness, the self and sensation.

Religions are deeply, stubbornly physical and sensual. This course aims to re-imagine our understanding of religion by grounding traditions in physical encounters between human bodies and sensual objects.

Playing drums, telling stories, touching stones, creating wildly colorful altars, dancing, eating and drinking special substances are all basic religious activities. Examples will range across Native American, Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, Christian, and Jewish rituals and symbols, and materials will traverse fields from art history to anthropology, philosophy to poetry, science to religious studies. We will toggle between broad theories of religions and specific case studies.

BACKGROUND Alzheimer disease (AD) primarily affects cognition. A variety of visual disorders was established in AD. Fechner illusory colors are produced by a rotating disk with a black and white pattern. The purpose of our research was to explore the perception of illusory colors in AD. MATERIAL AND METHODS W recruited 40 AD patients (MMSE ≥14) and 40 normal controls (CG group) matched by age, education, gender in this prospective, cross-sectional, case-control study. An achromatic Benham's disk attached to a device to control the speed and direction of rotation was used to produce illusory colors. Primary, secondary, and tertiary RGB system colors were used for matching of illusory and physical colors. RESULTS Subjects in the AD group perceived less illusory colors in 5 arcs (p<0.05) of the 8 arcs assessed. The biggest difference was found between AD and CG groups for pure blue (χ²=26.87, p<0.001 clockwise, χ²=22.75, p<0.001 counter-clockwise). Groups did not differ in...

The dance form contact improvisation (CI) emphasizes attention to sensation as a first step in sourcing physical movement. As a study of physics and materiality that is conducted expressly through the body as instrument and indicator, this proposition immediately alters a practitioner’s relationship with both his or her sensory system and the immediate environment, and demonstrates how touch, and sensation, might be seen as ‘a creative rather than purely functional interaction with one’s environment’ (Dey and Sarco-Thomas 2014).  Nita Little has discussed the ways in which the attentional practice of contact improvisation serves to challenge notions of identity and also illuminates emerging concepts in theoretical physics, noting how CI as touch-based movement training offers a means by which to bring ‘attention to attention’ (2014: 120), acknowledging intra-action (Barad 2012) in a way that challenges clear divisions between my body and yours when dancing.  Taking Little’s investigation further, CI practice that values ‘sensational facts’ (Paxton in Novack 1990: 82) can similarly be applied in observation practices that attend beyond other bodies to non-human forms. Drawing on Steve Paxton’s emphasis on momentum and gravity as common anchors for sensation in CI, this paper maps out some initial territory for using CI practice as a way of extending sensation through both attention and imagination to matter in many forms.  Drawing on additional examples from Body Weather practices of Min Tanaka, and the solo performance score of Twig Dances, this thesis also proposes ways in which CI’s work with sensation might be used to rethink human interactions with the nonhuman and so critique “the materializing effects of boundary making practices by which the ‘human’ and the ‘nonhuman’ are differentially constituted” (Barad 2012: 31-32). I propose that the imaginative and sensate nature of these performance practices and the affects they produce, offer new directions for how interdisciplinarity in performance might be theorized.

Finire dentro un vortice e farsene risucchiare, ci sembra una disgrazia, come inciampare su un sasso o ricevere una tegola in testa. Invece è un evento molto quotidiano, non facciamo che incontrare vortici, anche noi siamo vortici. Il vortice allaccia momentaneamente l'uno all'altro flussi che fino a quel momento si ignoravano. Dentro un vortice i flussi si rincorrono, si stringono, si sciolgono. La teoria della complessità ha scoperto nel vortice uno dei comportamenti fondamentali della materia fisica ma il vortice è una struttura energetica che riconosciamo anche nella società e nella vita dello spirito. Per studiare l'articolazione vorticosa dell'esperienza diventa utile ripercorrere con un nuovo sguardo alcune tappe filosofiche, letterarie e artistiche: il binomio volumen-rivoluzione di Sade, la sensazione in Merleau-Ponty, la visione mescalinica di Henri Michaux, gli ideogrammi poetici di Ezra Pound, il cinema zenoniano dei fratelli Safdie. Una corrente fatta di mulinelli attraversa i corpi e le idee, le azioni e le esitazioni, gli slanci e le ricadute, è capace di formare e distruggere mondi, stringere e sciogliere i nodi di cui è fatta l'esperienza, ogni esperienza.

Table of contents:

Remerciements
Avant-propos
Introduction. Réfléchir (sur) la sensation (Lucie Lagardère, Anne-Laure de Meyer, Marina Poisson)
PREMIÈRE PARTIE : PHILOSOPHIE ET ART
Chapitre 1.
La couleur : de la sensation à la création. Turner et Locke. (Maxime Chapuis)
Chapitre 2.
Regards croisés entre Hume et Bramante : la sensation humienne face au Christ à la colonne. (Florence D'Aupias d'Alcochète)
DEUXIÈME PARTIE : HISTOIRE ET REPRÉSENTATION
Chapitre 3.
La sensation comme outil politique : les représentations anglaises de l'exécution de Charles Ier au XVIIe siècle (Anne-Laure de Meyer)
TROISIÈME PARTIE : LITTÉRATURE ET CRÉATION
Chapitre 4.
Feeling et construction imaginative chez S.T. Coleridge. (Lucie Lagardère)
Chapitre 5.
La sensation dans The Scarlet Letter : de l'oppression du sujet à la création libératrice. (Marina Poisson)
Chapitre 6.
Le dérèglement des sens dans Naked Lunch de William S. Burroughs. (Edouard Marsoin)

In this essay, I argue that a proper understanding of the Cartesian proof of the external world sheds light on some vexatious questions concerning his theory of sense perception. Three main points emerge from the discussion: a picture of the mind, conceived as the power of understanding, as essentially related to the physical world; an extension of rationality such that it includes a set of necessities that neither can be deduced from the principles furnished by pure understanding alone nor are to be found among the particular items of sense experience; and a conception of human sense perception as a composite power that includes sensory awareness as well as understanding, and so that establishes a sharp distinction between human and animal sensory awareness. As far as agency is a constitutive ingredient of human sense perception, Descartes’ doctrine is in line with some current versions of a virtue epistemology.

I propose that the ego functions and functional attitudes each possess different relationships to time. Each function-attitude pair has its own way of experiencing or analyzing time, depending on whether it is a perceiving or judging function. This essay explores the idea of different ways of experiencing time -- being past-oriented, present-oriented, or future-oriented -- as well as whether one is more focused towards external reality or psychic inner space.

Visual perception is most often studied as a "passive" process in which an observer fixates steadily at point in space so that stimuli can be delivered to the system with spatial precision. Analysis of neuronal signals related to vision is generally keyed to stimulus onset, stimulus movement, etc.; i.e., events external to the observer. In natural "active" vision, however, information is systematically acquired by using eye movements including rapid (saccadic) eye movements, as well as smooth ocular pursuit of moving objects and slower drifts. Here we consider the use of alternating saccades and fixations to gather information from a visual scene. The underlying motor sampling plan contains highly reliable information regarding "where" and "when" the eyes will land, this information can be used predictively to modify firing properties of neurons precisely at the time when this "contextual" information is most useful-when a volley of retinal input enters the system at the onset of each fixation. Analyses focusing on neural events leading to and resulting from shifts in fixation, as well as visual events external to the observer, can provide a more complete and mechanistic understanding of visual information processing. Studies thus far suggest that active vision may be a fundamentally different from that process we usually study with more traditional passive viewing paradigms. In this Perspective we note that active saccadic sampling behavior imposes robust temporal patterning on the activity of neuron ensembles and large-scale neural dynamics throughout the brain's visual pathways whose mechanistic effects on information processing are not yet fully understood. The spatio-temporal sequence of eye movements elicits a succession of temporally predictable quasi-rhythmic sensory inputs, whose encoding is enhanced by entrainment of low frequency oscillations to the rate of eye movements. Review of the pertinent findings underscores the fact that temporal coordination between motor and visual cortices is critical for understanding neural dynamics of active vision and posits that phase entrainment of neuronal oscillations plays a mechanistic role in this process.

Dans cet article nous allons traiter des impressions de déplacement que ressent l'utilisateur alors qu'il interagit avec les fonctionnalités de l'environnement virtuel (illusion de déplacements). Plus précisément nous sommes intéressés au phénomène de la spatialité de l'image dans l'acte de représentation de l'utilisateur. Afin d'élaborer  un cadre théorique qui se rapproche à l'expérience des phénomènes de la perception et de la sensation nous avons privilégié une approche basée sur la conscience. En effet, nous supposons que les chercheurs qui ont tenté d'appréhender la problématique de la spatialité de l'image à partir d'approches ayant comme base la matérialité du phénomène perçu, l'inconscient, la neurologie où encore la passivité de la conscience n'ont pas pu comprendre comment l'activité de conscience est active sur le corps de l'utilisateur qui interagit avec les fonctionnalités de l'environnement virtuel. Par exemple, comment l'utilisateur peut-il élaborer des actions possibles à partir d'une stimulation provenant d'une surface plate? (écran tactile, ou écran d'un ordinateur) Or nous présupposons que les mécanismes de la conscience permettent le déploiement d'activités de grande rapidité et d'une grande complexité grâce au phénomène de la spatialité de l'image interne (image mentale). Pour décrire le phénomène de la spatialité de l'image et les impressions que ressent l'utilisateur alors qu'il interagit avec les fonctionnalités de l'environnement virtuel nous allons nous baser sur l'approche phénoménologique et psychologique développée par Silo dans les ouvrages : Contribution à la pensée1 et Notes de psychologie2. Cette approche présuppose qu'il doit y avoir une spatialité interne qui permet de mobiliser l'action du corps dans le monde. Tout ce processus est d'une très grande vélocité. En fait, nous disons que les sensations et les perceptions sont structurées à partir de l'appareil de perception, l'appareil de la mémoire et l'appareil de la conscience et transformées en impulsions.

Combining psychology, art theory and cross-cultural studies, this book explores ways in which our minds construct meaning from visual information. It discusses how the mind attributes meaning to things and events, the structure and functioning of eye and brain, how we perceive color, space, depth and distance, motion, the development and mechanics of photography and how the camera affects our definition of reality and the way we think about the world, the incursion of electronic and mass-communication media, and finally, making and looking at works of art with greater awareness.

First edition published in 1976: NY: Van Nostrand Reinhold / Prentice Hall, 1976-86 (six printings).  Translation of first edition published in 1987 by Beijing University Press as Shijue Yuanli视觉原理，Zhang Gongqian 张功 钱, translator, author name transliterated as Kaluolin M Bulumo 卡鲁琳 M 布鲁墨 (print run: 28,500).

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Richard Sorabji and Myles Burnyeat have developed and defended rival interpretations of Aristotle’s account of sensation. Both agree in accepting the common terms of Aristotle’s account (alteration, transition from potentiality to actuality, reception of form without matter, etc.), but they disagree about how these terms are to be understood. In this paper I consider these rival interpretations, examining the best arguments for each and raising new objections to both. I argue that each contemporary interpretation, in its own way, faces the same problem: the inability to accommodate everything that Aristotle says in his account of sensation. In the search for an alternative interpretation I suggest turning to the medieval tradition, and particularly to the interpretation developed by Aquinas in his commentary on Aristotle’s De anima. I argue that Aquinas’s interpretation deserves more attention because it retains the best features of its two contemporary rivals while avoiding the problems facing each.

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A great American psychologist summarizes one of the most difficult of subjects--the nature of dreaming--after decades of lifting matters out of the morass of Freudianism. The result nonetheless is a thin gruel that misses the main thing about dreams: their unworldly imaginative power. But he is not the only one. Who defends the psyche in modern science? Who knows what it is, where it resides, and how it controls the brain? The true theory of dreaming will emerge only by facing and answering these questions, which can be said to have baffled ancient, medieval, and modern investigators alike. At present materialism stands confused, pathetically benighted in its own shadow.

Readers are now advised that a new approach to the true theory of dreaming, as well as the first mechanistic explanation of Night Terrors in scientific history, is contained in the reviewer's illustrated essay on this page called 'The Last Day.' Both this late 2017 review and the new 2020 essay concern the same foundational ideas within idealism and can be said to blend smoothly together to produce an increasingly coherent view of the phenomenology as well as the fundamental nature of dreaming, the achievement of which depends on isolating and identifying the cosmic generator of dreams.

See also 'Sartre on Dreaming' (2022) and 'On the Materialization of Being' (2022) for deeper insights into the nature of dreaming according to idealism and in the context of the embodiment of the psyche, which reaches far deeper inwardly than the farthest galaxies are from the Solar System.

Önceki bölümde gelişimsel psikolojinin tarihini, temel kavramlarını, ilkelerini ve araştırma tekniklerini öğrendiniz. Şimdiki bölümde ise gelişimsel olguların köklerine inip onları birbirleriyle ilişkilendirerek bütünleştireceğiz. Gelişimsel olguları anlamak için gerekli olan temel biyoloji, psikoloji ve antropoloji kavramlarını tarihsel bir akış içinde hatırlayacağız. Ardından gelişimin kaynaklarını tartışan iki ana paradigmayı tanıyacağız.

This is an advance copy. Please contact me if you are unable to access the final version of the paper.

This essay argues that medieval bestiaries are dependent on and best understood through a process of rhetorical hermeneutics indebted to Augustine’s theory of interpretation. The essay suggests that texts such as the Aberdeen Bestiary leverage the instability of allegorical and the clarity of tropological representation to blur the line between human and nonhuman,encouraging the reader to reflect on predatory human-animal relationships and act to reduce actions that impact the natural world.

Vibration is a part of everyday life, whether we are aware of it or not. Everyone experiences vibration in a variety of different ways: intentionally with music and speech, environmentally by cars, computers, phones, etc., and unconsciously, because there are many vibrational frequencies that are not audible to the human ear. Previous studies have focused on whether vibrational exposure impacts mood or impacts mindfulness, but the aim of the current study was to examine whether exposure to vibration of high and low frequencies has any impact on state mood and mindfulness levels together. Participants (n = 28) were assigned to listen to either high frequencies (20,000Hz and above) or low frequencies (50Hz or below). Regardless of intervention, participants completed the State Mindfulness Survey (SMS) and the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) questionnaires before and after their retrospective intervention. A repeated measures MANOVA was conducted to examine group differences on mood and affect. There was no significant time by condition interactions for any of the dependent variables. There were various limitations in this study that may have led to no significant results, such as insufficient sample size combined with low amplitude levels and short frequency exposure times during intervention.
Keywords: Mood, mindfulness, environmental sound, sound, vibration

Catalogue of the Musée de la danse exhibition dedicated to the "Gestures of Contact Improvisation" revisting the history and practice of a danceform born in the US in 1972. The exibition showcased drawings, photographs, and videos by Contact Improvisation historical dancers such as Nancy Stark Smith, Steve Paxton, and Lisa Nelson, and offerred parallels with key figures of the contemporary American movement and artistic culture (such as works from musician John Cage, choreographer Yvonne Rainer, and anthropologist Ray Birdwhisttel).
The catalogue documents the visit through the museum in seven gestures: not-doing, weighing/lifting, falling, playing, speaking, watching and touching as windows through the inner sensations of Contact Improvisation practionners.

This article argues that paintings of Aesthetic Movement artist Albert Moore (1841-1893) from the mid-1870s onwards are works about consciousness and sensate experience, as defined by Victorian physiological psychologists. First, Moore’s depiction of female figures in these works is considered alongside Luce Irigaray’s theories about sensuous experience. The experiences Moore paints are holistic, private, and self-constituting: in them, self-touch is a mediation between inside and outside, self and world. Sensuous experience is envisioned as multiplicitous, involving the whole body. Next, the logic of Moore’s aesthetic system is compared to that of the nineteenth-century ‘graphic method’, whereby instruments tracked and transcribed inner physiological phenomena (such as the circulation of blood). Moore’s paintings are shown to register rhythms analogous to those of the viscera, unfolding in time. Finally, George Henry Lewes’ (1817-1878) theories of physiological psychology are considered alongside Moore’s use of pattern. Lewes’ holistic and corporeal model of psychological experience is similar to that represented by Moore. Both explore (i) the idea of sensation and sentience as experienced and organised by the whole body, and (ii) differing levels of consciousness. Moore’s forms and working method are multi-layered; his paintings are like corporeal weaves, analogues to the sensate body.

Ce que Michaux écrivait des drogues, je pourrais le dire du Contact Improvisation. Ce ne sont pas ses paradis qui nous intéressent mais ce qu'il nous offre de savoirs. Je chercherai ici, à propos de cette pratique, à déployer une des formes par lesquelles s'incarne une revendication forte et insistante dans le champ des pratiques somatiques : leur dimension expérimentale. Parmi les sujets mis à l'étude dans la pratique du contact improvisation, celle-ci : comment appareillons-nous nos schèmes sensori-moteurs ? Nous accordons-nous sur le fait que nous sommes en train de danser, de le faire ensemble et d'être un minimum accordés sur ce que nous faisons ? Comment nous rencontrons-nous ? L'article propose un motif pour enquêter sur ces questions : l'intersubjectivité

SUMMARY: Apart from the common use of " sensation " to refer to bodily feelings, the word has been adopted by philosophers and scientists to talk about specific feelings arising from stimulation of the sensory organs. Sensations are often ascribed particular properties: of being conscious and inner, of being more immediate than perception, and of being atomic. In epistemology sensation have been taken as infallible foundations of knowledge, in psychology as elementary constituents of perceptual experience. Critics have argued that, given the nature of knowledge and of perceptual experience, sensations are unfit to play these roles. Some philosophers have ascribed mistaken theorizing about sensation to the tendency to conceive of sensations as inner objects of experience. As an alternative the adverbial theory of sensations has been proposed. According to it sensations are ways of experiencing, rather than objects of experience. Representationalism proposes to conceive of sensations as representations. Yet another way of thinking about sensations is to characterize them as embodied reactions of organisms to specific stimuli. An important issue that needs to be addressed by all general accounts of sensations is whether it is legitimate to treat theoretical posits such as colour sensations on a par with bodily sensations such as pain.

Phenomenology is the study of things as they appear in the world. While this concept seems simple enough, the ways in which phenomenology manifests itself, particularly in the study of gender and cinema, become more complex. Phenomenology is often identified as an alternative to philosophy—but this is confusing, because many of the individuals associated with the emergence of phenomenology were themselves European philosophers of the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries. As is so often the case, this list reads in the masculine: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger are all associated with the emergence of phenomenology as a philosophical field. But perhaps it is not helpful to begin with the philosophical origins of phenomenology, particularly because phenomenology itself is not interested in origins or roots. It is interested in the now: what we see, how we perceive, and how those perceptions shape or become the world that is constitutive both of our environment and us.

In this chapter, I am not just seeking to connect feminism with phenomenology, or phenomenology with film, but gender, film and phenomenology. I am also interrogating terms of varying familiarity to film studies—spectatorship, embodiment, and sensation. This is no doubt a difficult task. But it is important to identify those aspects of thinking about film that destabilize film as a detached object of cool observation, an object that can be decoded or ‘read’ as a text. If studies of spectatorship acknowledge that the screen is not the only site where meaning is made for a film, then studies of embodied spectatorship go one step further: they attempt to talk about the ways that film relates to and affects a film viewer’s entire bodily experience: her breathing, her sensation, her memory and her emotion.

Abstract
What is cinematic poetry? This is the fundamental question that this master’s thesis will attempt to answer by analyzing the works of American film-director Terrence Malick. By positing this question in different ways within the realities of his films, one will inevitably reach the following conclusions: cinematic poetry occurs where the forms of representation are opened by a modality of expression; cinematic poetry occurs when the sentient is no longer a sign of the intelligible, but of the matter and of the mode of its production over time, that is, in its evolution. Describing this poetry will only be possible by describing one’s experience of the sensation-cluster of images and of figures proper to Malick’s films. This involves making the world come into existence by doing justice to the core of meanings buried in the visible, a justice rendered by the sharing of a description of the sentient. It will be argued that, in Malick, this poetry manifests itself through a phenomenology of light and gravitation. Also shown, the importance of sound in the emergence of the sentient world, which, through open voices, through materialization of noises, and through music, develops into a total musical score consisting of metamorphoses and destinies. Furthermore, this poetry resembles the sensibility of early German romantics who, through their resistance to language and to absolute reason, destroy the hierarchy of the world in order to redefine it. The constituents of Malick’s cinema of poetry, namely the expression of light and movement, the invisible inhabiting the visible (like an elsewhere that exceeds it), the reinvention of language, the chaotic system linking mankind and nature, as well as the dual world (from darkness to light and from light to darkness) will thus be defined. This master’s thesis therefore suggests an approach of Malick’s cinema inspired by phenomenology, which presents it as being “always underway”, in an immediacy seeking to think within, through, but also beyond cinema.

Résumé
Qu’est-ce que la poésie cinématographique? Telle est la question primordiale de ce mémoire de maitrise, qui tentera d’y répondre en analysant les œuvres du cinéaste américain Terrence Malick. Inscrivant par divers moyens cette question dans les réalités de son cinéma, nous déboucherons forcément sur la réponse suivante : il y a poésie cinématographique chaque fois que les formes de la représentation sont ouvertes par une modalité de l’expression ; il y a poésie cinématographique chaque fois que le sensible n’est plus manifestation de l’intelligible, mais la matière et le mode de sa production dans le temps ou plutôt dans le devenir. Décrire cette poésie, ce ne sera possible qu’en décrivant l’expérience que nous avons du régime de sensations des images et des figures propres au cinéma de Malick. Il s’agit de faire venir le monde en présence en rendant justice aux noyaux de sens enfouis dans le visible, justice rendue par le partage d’une description du sensible. Nous verrons alors que, chez Malick, cette poésie se manifeste par une phénoménologie de la lumière et de la gravitation. Nous verrons également l’importance du sonore dans l’apparaitre de ce monde sensible qui, à travers les voix ouvertes, la matérialisation des bruits et la musique, forme une partition musicale totale faite de métamorphoses et de devenirs. Encore, cette poésie s’approche de la sensibilité des premiers romantiques allemands qui, par leur résistance au langage et à la raison absolue, déhiérarchisent le monde pour le redéfinir. Seront ainsi définis les éléments constitutifs du cinéma de poésie de Malick, soit la manifestation de la lumière et du mouvement, l’invisible habitant le visible (comme un ailleurs qui l’excède), la réinvention du langage, le système chaotique liant l’homme et la nature, ainsi que le monde duel (de l’ombre à la lumière et de la lumière à l’ombre). Ce mémoire propose donc une approche d’inspiration phénoménologique du cinéma de Malick, qui le présente comme « toujours en train de se faire », dans une immédiateté cherchant à penser dans, à travers, mais aussi au-delà du cinéma.

Consciousness is a virtual-reality display, created by an internal executive agent, which human beings experience as the self. This display serves to monitor and manage the state of the organism in relation to the world. Conscious experience serves a different function than unconscious processing. It is therefore not superfluous but has limited causal powers within the organism: the causality of agency, rather than the passive (efficient) causality of physics.

We are trying here to object to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to reduce qualia to structural predicates, which is the way we understand his ontology of the “flesh”, as he seems to us to develop it already in his first works on “expression”. We are more generally objecting through him to any kind of “structural” theory concerning sensation, meaning by this any theory which claims that one cannot attribute a relation to a sensorial content without intrinsically altering it. Our task is complicated by the great number of empirical facts that Merleau-Ponty calls for to prove his structural theory. He notably finds great help in the structural interpretation Kurt Koffka had already laid down for these facts as a Gestalt psychologist. Consequently, we begin with the examination of this theory and of the facts that support it, showing that they cannot seem to corroborate a structural theory unless one confuses “abstraction” and “real separation” of a quale from its context. We then call for William James to support these conclusions, reminding that he had already showed the illegitimacy of the claim by the neo-Hegelian writers of his time to find empirical proof for their own structural theories in similar psychological data. He had also suggested a “knowledge by acquaintance” theory against those writers that we are trying to use in defense for introspection pure and simple.

At a key location within the Comitium of Rome’s Forum Romanum lies a collection of stone monuments of significant antiquity. Known as the Lapis Niger, they have become, to use a phrase of recent vogue, a synecdoche. The black stone pavement from which the grouping takes its name has acquired a role as a collective term for the monuments which it covers, just as they, in turn, are often referred to as Lapis Niger. the part standing for the whole. The history of twentieth-century scholarship of these parts has though been characterised, indeed overshadowed, by one aspect of one element of the group – the archaic inscription on one of the stone monuments, the cippus. This paper contends that this monolithic approach has precluded a full appreciation of the significance of both the cippus and the assemblage as a whole, and instead proposes a new approach based on phenomenology, landscape archaeology and the object’s own materiality.

Do not talk about or use the misleading,‭ ‬umbrella-word like mind and consciousness,‭ ‬or mental processes and phenomena.‭ ‬Even Hume realized this and emphasized the need for accurate definitions of those words and processes we wish to investigate.‭ ‬Talk about and investigate specific processes or‭ ‬‘notions and activities‭’‬ like thinking,‭ ‬reasoning,‭ ‬sensing and experience/ing,‭ ‬arguments and argumentation,‭ ‬etc‭ ‬.I intend to explore the notions of thought‭ (‬thinking‭)‬,‭ ‬sensation,‭ ‬feeling,‭ ‬understanding and insight,‭ ‬reason/ing and argumentation,‭ ‬emotion and experience,‭ ‬as features of so-called‭ '‬consciousness‭'‬.
Information about these things are collected as data collection,‭ ‬brain dumping or storming or one of the first or preliminary steps or stages of the process/‭ ‬es of theorizing.‭ ‬But each section itself is also a mini theorizing concerning the ideas‭ ‬dealt with in it.The aim of this writing is on the one hand dealing with these notions to show that they are not mental processes or indications of the existence of‭ ‬‘the mind‭’‬,‭ ‬but that they can be located in the brain.‭ ‬On the other hand each section and the entire piece are features of the doing of philosophy as steps or stages in the process/es of theorizing.

Philosophy‭ (‬philos Sophos,‭ ‬love for Sophia/wisdom‭) ‬begins with‭ (‬a passion,‭ ‬a desire and need for‭) ‬wisdom‭ (‬alone‭)
And ends with‭ (‬a life filled,‭ ‬realized,‭ ‬experienced and lived for and by‭) ‬wisdom alone

04/04/2017‭  ‬U

This essay consists of two parts. First is an in-depth introduction to Autonomous Sensory Meridian Response (ASMR), a condition where people experience pleasurable sensations from specific visual and aural materials on the Internet. Second is an analysis of various theories on material culture that may help us to understand and contextualize this hitherto unexplainable but burgeoning phenomenon.

The incorporeality of the soul is a central subject in Augustine's thought and plays a primordial role in De quantitate animae, which discusses the question of the soul's relation to the body. The analysis of the philosophical sources of the various theses presented by Evodius and Augustine in this dialogue reveals Augustine's thorough familiarity with the debate between Stoics and Neo-Platonists on this subject. In addition, this study allows us to see how Augustine rethinks Neoplatonic concepts in order to affirm the non-corporeal nature of the soul, which paves the way for a new conception of the human subject.

Luke, D. (2015, July). Psychedelic synaesthesia: New light on an old phenomenon. Paper presented at Breaking Convention: The 3rd International Conference on Psychedelic Consciousness, University of  Greenwich, London, 10-12th July.

Video here: https://vimeo.com/141751685

The neurobiology of synaesthesia is receiving growing attention in the search for insights into consciousness, such as the binding problem. The cognitive processes and phenomenology of congenital synaesthesia have been much explored, yet virtually nothing exists concerning the phenomenological topography of psychedelically-induced experiences, despite the recent renaissance in psychedelic research. Results are presented of an online survey into the prevalence, type and frequency of psychedelic synaesthesia experiences along with accounts of three people reporting permanent psychedelically-induced synaesthesia – a phenomenon as yet unreported in the literature but which may have important implications for our neuroscientific understanding of the congenital condition.

This study is in two main parts.  The first part examines how Thomas Aquinas uses the Proclean notion of "complete return to one's essence" (which he derives from the Arabic philosophical treatise "Liber de causis," prop. 15) in connection with the intellect's reflexivity and incorporeality.  The second part examines the implications for his theory of sense-consciousness, since in two texts in De veritate only, he modifies the doctrine to extend to the senses, which (being corporeal), return only "incompletely" to themselves, by grasping their own acts, though not themselves properly speaking.  I argue that this modification shows him grappling with the problem of sense-consciousness, and I document how his views on sense-consciousness develop subsequently.

This paper aims to establish some of the taxonomical groundwork required for developing a robust philosophy of perception on the basis of the Thomistic doctrine of the cogitative power (vis cogitativa). The formal object of the cogitative power will be divided into aspectual, actional, and affectional percepts. Accordingly, the paper contends that there is an internal sense power capable of a non-conceptual and pre-linguistic perceptual estimation of what some particular is, what could be done with respect to it, and what is to be done with respect to it. The argument begins with a synopsis of Thomas Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology. It then presents an extensive taxonomical analysis of three different kinds of cogitative percepts. This analysis is followed by a short exegetical defense of the threefold division of percepts. Finally, the essay concludes with a comparison of the Thomistic doctrine of the cogitative power with recent work in the philosophy of perception.


De Haan, “Perception and the Vis Cogitativa: A Thomistic Analysis of Aspectual, Actional, and Affectional Percepts” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 88, 3 (2014): 397–
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Resumen
El diseño arquitectónico evoluciona constantemente en los procesos de enseñanza – aprendizaje, explora los límites del espacio que circunda y crea un nuevo dominio entre sinestesia y percepción; una arquitectura emo – sensorial que representa el espacio antrópico perfeccionando el dominio de los sentidos aristotélicos que están en detrimento o pierden interacciones entre ellos. La vista tiene una importancia primordial desde la Grecia clásica en el proceso de conocimiento porque se consideraba que está más cerca del intelecto. Las modernas tecnologías digitales fundamentan su relación con el hombre sobre todo a través de la vista y el oído, pero dicha realidad está desprovista de algunas señales que procesa el cerebro, razón por la cual la información debe ser procesada mediante un proceso de propiocepción que favorezca el desarrollo del espacio arquitectónico antrópico, de este modo la arquitectura se basa en una integración compleja de todos los sentidos.
Abstract
The architectural design constantly evolves in the processes of teaching - learning, explores the limits of the space that surrounds and creates a new domain between synesthesia and perception; an emo - sensorial architecture that represents the anthropic space perfecting the domain of the Aristotelian senses that are in detriment or lose interactions between them. The sight is of prime importance from classical Greece in the process of knowledge because it was considered to be closer to the intellect. The modern digital technologies base their relationship with the man mainly through the sight and the hearing, but this reality is devoid of some signals that processes the brain, reason for which the information must be processed through a process of proprioception that favors the development of anthropic architectural space, in this way the architecture is based on a complex integration of all the senses.

What is the relationship between cinema and the baroque? How might it be figured and felt?

In Cinema’s Baroque Flesh, Saige Walton draws on the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty to argue for a distinct aesthetic category of film and a unique cinema of the senses: baroque cinema. Combining media archaeological work with art history, phenomenology, and film studies, the book offers close analyses of a range of historic baroque artworks and films, including Caché, Strange Days, the films of Buster Keaton, and many more. Walton pursues previously unexplored connections between film, the baroque, and the body, opening up new avenues of embodied film theory that can make room for structure, signification, and thought, as well as the aesthetics of sensation.