Bruce Friedrich

The chicken industry is harming animals, befouling our environment, exploiting farmers and workers, and harming human health. In this article, we discuss the harms and some of the solutions. In Part I, we discuss animal welfare, both on the farm and at slaughter. In Part II, we discuss the environment, both local and global. In Part III, we discuss human rights, with a focus on chicken growers, slaughterhouse workers, and the global poor. In Part IV, we discuss the effect of chicken consumption on human health. In each of our first four sections, we offer a few examples of actions that creative lawyers are taking in an effort to mitigate some of the discussed harm. Finally, in Part V, we discuss our belief that the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) is ‘captured’ by the industries it is supposed to regulate, leading to under-regulation. We conclude that while the tireless efforts of lawyers, activists, and organizations to ameliorate industry and agency failures are critical, the best that can be done through litigation and other forms of policy action is to mitigate the harm caused by the poultry industry.

Available on Westlaw or Lexis at 17 Vt. J. Envtl. L. 222 (and linked from the title). Abstract: The Humane Slaughter Act of 1958 (HMSA) includes an exemption for ritual slaughter, which is defined by the Act as “a method of slaughter whereby the animal suffers loss of consciousness by anemia of the brain caused by the simultaneous and instantaneous severance of the carotid arteries with a sharp instrument.” In their execution of the law, the United States Department of Agriculture has created a “ritual bubble,” during which it says that its own inspectors have no authority at all to ensure that animals are humanely treated. USDA’s refusal to regulate ritual slaughter in that bubble cannot be reconciled with the humane intention of the federal slaughter law, and it also cannot be reconciled with the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. In part one of this paper, I explain the statutory and regulatory scheme that applies to ritual slaughter, examine the science behind the ritual exemption to the humane slaughter requirement, and consider a real-life controversy over cruelty at a U.S. kosher slaughterhouse revealed by an undercover investigation. In part two, I argue that the ritual slaughter exemption as interpreted by USDA violates the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. In part three, I suggest that the best way forward on ritual slaughter is for USDA to promulgate regulations to require that it is conducted as humanely as possible. This solution would preserve the ritual slaughter exemption, thus not inhibiting religious freedom, while removing most of the Establishment Clause problems that are presented by USDA’s current interpretation of the law.

The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) regulates meat labeling under the statutory authority of the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA). The FMIA’s labeling preemption clause prohibits labeling requirements beyond federal requirements, and would thus preclude state causes of action on the basis of deceptive labels that were properly approved under federal law. Through the eyes of Kat, a hypothetical consumer concerned with the origins of the meat she purchases for her family, this Article argues that consumers should be able to pursue state law claims based on fraudulent animal welfare labels on packages of meat. This is true for two reasons: first, the FMIA’s labeling preemption only covers the USDA’s statutory scope of authority, which does not include on-farm treatment of animals; and second, both FMIA and a state cause of action would require the same thing—a non-fraudulent label. However, even if a court did find that a state cause of action based on a fraudulent label was preempted, consumer plaintiffs would have other avenues through which to pursue their claims.

In this article, I do two things: First, I argue that a belief in animal liberation constitutes religion under constitutional jurisprudence interpreting the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Thus, every time a prison warden, teacher or school administrator, or government employer refuses to accommodate the ethical belief of an animal liberationist, they are infringing on that person’s religious freedom, and they should have to satisfy the same constitutional or statutory requirements that would adhere were the asserted interest based on more traditional religious exercise. Second, I suggest that one possible solution to the problem of widespread violation of the first amendment rights of animal liberationists would be the incorporation of a “Church of Animal Liberation” under the Internal Revenue Code, which would help to protect the free exercise rights of those who believe in animal rights, because it would give them a religious organization to reference (with articles of incorporation that align with the jurisprudential definition of religion) in making their requests for religious accommodation.

The Humane Methods of Livestock Slaughter Act (HMSA) declares that it is “the policy of the United States that the slaughtering of livestock and the handling of livestock in connection with slaughter shall be carried out only by humane methods.” Unfortunately, the HMSA is pervasively under-enforced, because the agency charged with administering it does an almost unfathomably inadequate job of doing so. This article: 1) briefly explains the factual and legal background of humane slaughter in the United States; 2) reviews government reports and undercover investigations that prove that USDA is not enforcing the law; 3) considers common theories that are deployed as explanations for an agency that is failing in its statutory mandate, and suggests a new one; and 4) explores some possible ways forward on the issue of humane slaughter.

Chickens and turkeys represent more than 98 percent of slaughtered land animals in the United States, and yet they have no legal protection from inhumane slaughter. This paper argues that the USDA must use its statutory authority to protect poultry from inhumane slaughter under both the Human Methods of Slaughter Act of 1958 (HMSA) and the Federal Meat Inspection Act of 1907 (FMIA). After an introduction to the central themes in this area of law, Part II discusses the treatment of poultry in slaughterhouses and the need for reform. Part III describes the current state of humane slaughter laws and regulations in the United States. Part IV offers a detailed analysis of Levine v. Vilsack, in which animal protection and workers’ rights organizations tried to force the USDA to regulate poultry under the HMSA. Finally, Part V suggests a new path to federal legal protection for poultry at slaughter, building on an understanding of the legal and factual arguments adduced by both sides in Levine.