Sema Hande Ogutcu-Fu

How does state intervention during civil conflict affect the variation in post-agreement outcomes? While intervention in civil conflict is a widely studied topic, the conflict resolution literature generally ignores how state intervention during conflict affects the durability of the peace agreement that follows. In this paper, I argue that state interveners continue to influence the decisions and actions of their war-time ally in the post-agreement period. Self-interested state interveners can use the leverage they possess over their ally to break down or nurture the fragile order the peace agreement provides depending on how satisfied they are with the policy outcomes of the peace agreement. Therefore, I contend that the durability of a peace agreement depends on a) the satisfaction level of state interveners with the post-agreement status quo, and in instances of multiple interventions, b) whether state interveners converge or diverge in their level of satisfaction. I trace state interveners' level of satisfaction with the post-agreement status quo in the economic and political signals they send in the post-agreement period. I examine the durability of intra-state peace agreements signed between 1985 and 2004 and find that a) improving economic and political interactions between state interveners and the post-agreement state increase the durability of the peace agreement and b) the divergence between each state intervener's economic and political interactions with the post-agreement state decreases the durability of the peace agreement. Findings indicate that intervener states' satisfaction with the post-agreement status quo is a primary determinant of durable peace.

How does the intervention of the state during civil conflicts affect the variation of the results after the signing of an agreement? Although intervention in civil conflicts is a well-studied topic, the literature related to conflict resolution ignores how state intervention in a conflict affects the durability of the peace agreement that is signed afterwards. In this paper, I argue that state auditors continue to influence the decisions and actions of their war ally during the period after the agreement is signed. Interveners of the state who only focus on their own interests can use the influence they have over their ally to destroy or cultivate the fragile order provided by the peace agreement. This depends on how satisfied they are with the results of the policies set out in that agreement. Therefore, I argue that the durability of the peace agreement depends on a) the level of satisfaction that state auditors have with the status quo after the agreement is signed and, in the event of multiple stakeholders, it will also influence b) if their satisfaction levels are similar or different. In addition, I track the level of satisfaction of state auditors with the post-agreement status quo, taking into account the economic and political signals that they demonstrate during that period. In addition, I examine the durability of the peace accords that were signed between 1985 and 2004 and I conclude that a) improving economic and political interactions between state and state interveners after signing the agreement will increase its durability. In addition, b) the difference between the economic and political interactions of each controller with the state, after signing the peace agreement, decreases its durability. Findings indicate that state auditors' satisfaction with the post-agreement status quo is the main determinant of lasting peace.

How does the presence of multiple combatants affect rebel groups’ ideological and demand positioning? Although violent forms of inter-group conflict have been widely studied in the civil war literature, rebel groups’ strategic use of ideology and demands has received scarce scholarly attention. We argue that the pressure of competition forces rebel groups to differentiate themselves ideologically and demand-wise from their rivals to maximize their chances of survival and success. Rebel groups strive to set themselves apart by offering unique products to their supporters and recruits. Thus, we contend that rebel groups are more likely to modify their ideologies and demands from the government in the face of competition from rival groups. We test this theory using novel data collected from rebel group manifestos and public statements. Our findings suggest that groups are more likely to shift their ideology and modify their demands as the number of rival groups increases.

Coauthors: Seden Akcinaroglu, Efe Tokdemir, Evgeny Sedashov, Carlos Moreno Leon, Jeremy Berkowitz

How does unilateral third-party intervention in civil conflict affect the variation in post-settlement outcomes? Unilateral third-party interveners continue to influence their ally in the post-settlement period. Using this influence, third-party interveners can make reneging on the peace agreement appealing by increasing the benefits of defection for their ally or they can induce compliance by increasing the benefits of commitment to the agreement. I argue that by identifying the satisfaction level of interveners with the policy outcomes of settlement, it is possible to locate a trend of when interveners’ willingness to spoil or implement is most likely. I trace this level of contentment with the economic, political, and multi-dimensional cooperative-hostile signals that interveners send to the intervened. I examine durability of peace agreements signed between 1980 and 2004 and find that improving relations between interveners and the intervened increase the durability of the agreement whereas declining relations between them decrease it.

Published in Political Research Quarterly, 2016, 69(3): 403–417.  http://prq.sagepub.com/content/69/3/403.abstract

What influences warring parties’ ability to reach a negotiated settlement to end civil war? In this chapter, I answer this question by examining the environment government and rebel group leadership internally encounter while seeking to unite on a consensual decision to negotiate. I disaggregate in-group dynamics of governments and rebels into their respective political elements that either grant autonomy or create constraints for resolution, namely, their constituencies and elites. Introducing original negotiations data for internal conflict-dyad-years between 1980 and 2005, this paper reveals that successful settlements cannot be thought autonomously from the wider pool of all (successful and failed) negotiations that were initiated. Moreover, autonomy from constituent and elite obstruction seem to be two important factors for conflicts to be settled successfully.
This paper is the recipient of 2013 NPSA Annual Meeting's Best Paper by a Female Political Scientist Award.

Link: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418681