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Duopoly firms engaged in a standard two-stage game of R&D and Cournot competition are caught in a prisoner's dilemma for their R&D decisions whenever spillover effects are low. This effect works to the advantage of consumers and society.... more
Duopoly firms engaged in a standard two-stage game of R&D and Cournot competition are caught in a prisoner's dilemma for their R&D decisions whenever spillover effects are low. This effect works to the advantage of consumers and society. This result provides an interesting perspective on the well-known wedge between private and social incentives for R&D. The prisoner's dilemma is the key effect behind this wedge under low spillovers. The latter take over when sufficiently high, as is widely recognized. This mutually exclusive nature of the prisoner's dilemma and significant spillovers also serves to explain the incentives to form R&D cartels.
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We report data from controlled laboratory experiments on two-sided matching markets in which participants interact in a decentralized way, without having to refer to a central clearinghouse. Our treatments have been designed to evaluate... more
We report data from controlled laboratory experiments on two-sided matching markets in which participants interact in a decentralized way, without having to refer to a central clearinghouse. Our treatments have been designed to evaluate the effect of information, search costs, and binding agreements on the final outcome and also on the individual strategies that lead to it. We find that these features affect the level and pace of market activity as well as the identity of those who receive proposals.
Page 1. Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment Exhaustible Resources Joana Vaz Pais . Page 2. 2E Sustainable Energy Systems Joana Vaz Pais jpais@iseg.utl.pt Off. 212 www.joanapais.com Page 3. 3E Sustainable Energy Systems •... more
Page 1. Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment Exhaustible Resources Joana Vaz Pais . Page 2. 2E Sustainable Energy Systems Joana Vaz Pais jpais@iseg.utl.pt Off. 212 www.joanapais.com Page 3. 3E Sustainable Energy Systems • Program • References • Lecture 1 Page 4. 4E Sustainable Energy Systems Program I. Introduction 1. Definitions 2. Historical perspective 3. Main questions II. Hotelling's Rules 1. Perfect competition 2. Costs of extraction 3. Monopoly 4.
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ABSTRACT This paper models the location of two vertically related firms in a low labor cost country and in a country with a large market. The upstream industry is more labor intensive than the downstream industry. We find that spatial... more
ABSTRACT This paper models the location of two vertically related firms in a low labor cost country and in a country with a large market. The upstream industry is more labor intensive than the downstream industry. We find that spatial fragmentation occurs for low values of the input-output coefficient and intermediate values of the transport rate, particularly if the countries are very asymmetric in size. Otherwise, we obtain agglomeration either in the low cost country (when the transport rate is low) or in the large market (when the transport rate ...