Behnam Zolghadr

This paper is a comparative study between Brower's solution to the problem of divine simplicity and that of Abū Hāšim al-Ǧubbāī (d. 933). First, I argue that the theory of aḥwāl is a semantic theory rather than a metaphysical one. Then, I present a reconstruction of Abū Hāšim al-Ǧubbāī's theory of aḥwāl, based on Brower's truthmaker theory of predication. Then, I show how Abū Hāšim would reply to some of the objections that Saenz raised against Brower's truthmaker theory of divine simplicity. Later on, I discuss Abū Hāšim's explanation of the similarities between the properties that God and creatures share.

This paper is about two challenges concerning the gluons of complex objects. One is Marmodoro's argument, according to which, from the non-objecthood of gluons, it follows that gluons do not unify objects. I demonstrate that Marmodoro's argument fails. The second challenge is about the unity of gluons themselves. I show how gluon theory can reply to this challenge.

Similar to Meinong, Abū Hāšim al-Ğubbāī (d.933) held the view that some objects do not exist. This paper is a comparative study between Meinong’s object theory and Abū Hāšim’s theory of nonexistent objects. Our comparative study is mostly done through three topics: the characterization principle, objecthood, and the ontological status of existence. Moreover, Abū Hāšim’s theory of nonexistent objects is based on his theory of states, according to which some things, namely states, which among other things include existence, are neither existent nor nonexistent. In this paper, we have also discussed two arguments on behalf of this claim and then we have examined them from a Meinongian perspective.

This article is about Avicenna’s account of syllogisms comprising opposite premises. We examine the applications and the truth conditions of these syllogisms. Finally, we discuss the relation between these syllogisms and the principle of non-contradiction.

Graham Priest’s Theory of Gluons concerns the problem of unity, i.e. what makes an object into a unity? Based on his theory of Gluons, Priest gives his accounts of being and nothingness. In this paper, I will explore the relationship between nothingness and the being of the totality of every object, and then, I will try to demonstrate that, according to Gluon Theory, these two have the same properties, or in other words, nothingness is the being of the totality of every object.

Aristotle gave seven arguments for the law of non-contradiction. The first one is against a special case of dialetheism, the view that only some contradictions are true, and other six arguments are mostly against trivialism, the view that everything and consequently every contraction is true. Aristotle never argued that dialetheism entails trivialism. Unlike Aristotle, Avicenna, in his defense of LNC, not only considers trivialism and argues against it but also argues that dialetheism entails trivialism. The argument that dialetheism entails trivialism is called explosion. It is usually known that the first argument for explosion is given by the twelfth century logician William of Soissons. In this paper, we will meet Avicenna’s different argument for explosion and then I will demonstrate that this argument is a non-sequitur.