Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky
Macquarie University, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- Monash University, Department of History and Philosophy, Graduate StudentNew York University Shanghai, Philosophy, Post-DocUniversity of Melbourne, Philosophy, Graduate Studentadd
- Social Epistemology, Philosophy Of Language, Social Justice, Pragmatics, Feminist Theory, Animal Ethics, and 17 moreCritical Theory, Metaphysics, Philosophical Logic, Artificial Intelligence, Epistemology, Philosophy Of Religion, Human Rights Theory, Ethics, Conceptual Engineering, Mixed Race Identity, Critical Mixed Race Studies, Race and Racism, Critical Race Theory, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Critical Race Studies, Critical Mixed-Race/Multiracial Studies, and Ideologiesedit
- Lecturer in Philosophy, Macquarie University. I am a Filipinx philosopher working on topics in conceptual engineeri... moreLecturer in Philosophy, Macquarie University.
I am a Filipinx philosopher working on topics in conceptual engineering, metalinguistic disagreement, and the critical philosophy of race and gender.
www.paulpodosky.comedit
Co-authored with: Thomas Corbin; Jean-Philippe Deranty; Jennifer Duke-Yonge; Gene Flenady; Alexander Gillett; Richard Menary Generative AI (GenAI) grading and tutoring systems are rapidly entering higher education, promising increased... more
Co-authored with: Thomas Corbin; Jean-Philippe Deranty; Jennifer Duke-Yonge; Gene Flenady; Alexander Gillett; Richard Menary
Generative AI (GenAI) grading and tutoring systems are rapidly entering higher education, promising increased efficiency and personalized learning experiences. However, particularly in the case of philosophy, we believe this technology should be viewed with caution. In this article, we first outline the nature and purported benefits of these systems. Next, we examine the economic motivations driving their adoption within institutions, for instance by reducing labor costs. Finally, we argue that these motivations, while compelling to administrators, may fail to consider potential negative consequences. We present six pedagogical reasons to be critical of the widespread implementation of GenAI in education: (1) limitations on teacher efficacy; (2) increased student alienation; (3) the undermining of educators' duty of care; (4) the outsourcing of core teaching tasks; (5) questions regarding the accuracy and utility of GenAI graders; and (6) the risk of implementing GenAI as a misguided solution to real problems in education.
Generative AI (GenAI) grading and tutoring systems are rapidly entering higher education, promising increased efficiency and personalized learning experiences. However, particularly in the case of philosophy, we believe this technology should be viewed with caution. In this article, we first outline the nature and purported benefits of these systems. Next, we examine the economic motivations driving their adoption within institutions, for instance by reducing labor costs. Finally, we argue that these motivations, while compelling to administrators, may fail to consider potential negative consequences. We present six pedagogical reasons to be critical of the widespread implementation of GenAI in education: (1) limitations on teacher efficacy; (2) increased student alienation; (3) the undermining of educators' duty of care; (4) the outsourcing of core teaching tasks; (5) questions regarding the accuracy and utility of GenAI graders; and (6) the risk of implementing GenAI as a misguided solution to real problems in education.
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Conceptual engineering has strong political roots. But if conceptual engineering is to be a useful tool for promoting social justice, there must be a means by which the concepts we design can take root and propagate in dominant contexts.... more
Conceptual engineering has strong political roots. But if conceptual engineering is to be a useful tool for promoting social justice, there must be a means by which the concepts we design can take root and propagate in dominant contexts. This is known as the implementation challenge. In this paper, I caution against movements toward a particular methodological perspective on the challenge called dialogical individualism. This perspective centres the role of speakers in speech-situations to persuade hearers to change their minds about currently held concepts. This individualism has a distorting effect: it warps our perception of the size of the challenge. In particular, dialogical individualism ignores the social environmental factors that make conversation an unfriendly site for conceptual change. Moreover, it is not sufficiently attentive to the history of conceptual change in communities of practice. In the end, I argue for a methodological perspective shift: discursive strategies, such as speaker persuasion, should be decentralized in our overall thinking about the best solutions to the implementation challenge. Our attention is better focused on tailoring strategies to deal with the social environment in which concept-users are embedded.
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Sensational claims portray AI as an entity beyond human control. We argue that while AI may exhibit characteristics that appear "beyond control," this does not necessarily arise from its status as an independent entity. The panic... more
Sensational claims portray AI as an entity beyond human control. We argue that while AI may exhibit characteristics that appear "beyond control," this does not necessarily arise from its status as an independent entity. The panic “out-of-control” AI narrative is getting in the way of reflecting on how we can meaningfully control AI. To shed light upon this, the first part of the paper introduces a theoretical framework based on two variables: controllable/non-controllable AI and value-free/value-laden AI. This framework yields four distinct perspectives on the ontology of AI, including Value-Free Instrumentalism, Determinism, Value-Laden Critical Theory, and Substantialism. Our argument contends that AI's perceived lack of control is not rooted in its value-free mind-independence, but in its value-laden sociocultural power dynamics. The second part expands on Critical Theory Critical to elucidate that AI remains subject to control, despite prevalent perceptions suggesting otherwise. While AI may present legitimate existential concerns, these apprehensions do not stem from an inherent state of "out-of-control." Rather, they arise due to the exertion of control by entities whose motives do not entirely align with the public interest.
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Debate over the normativity of virtual phenomena is now widespread in the philosophical literature, taking place in roughly two distinct but related camps. The first considers the relevant problems to be within the scope of applied... more
Debate over the normativity of virtual phenomena is now widespread in the philosophical literature, taking place in roughly two distinct but related camps. The first considers the relevant problems to be within the scope of applied ethics, where the general methodological program is to square the intuitive (im)permissibility of virtual wrongdoings with moral accounts that justify their (im)permissibility. The second camp approaches the normativity of virtual wrongdoings as a metaphysical debate. This is done by disambiguating the ‘virtual’ character of ‘virtual wrongdoings’. Doing so is supposed to provide illuminating ontological distinctions that inform ethical aspects of the debate. We argue that each approach faces its own set of issues, and as a result, motivates consideration of an alternative. The alternative we suggest turns inquiry concerning the normativity of virtual wrongdoings into a distinctively conceptual question. Rather than asking whether some action is right or wrong, or whether some virtual phenomenon counts as a particular action at all, we argue that research into the normativity of virtual wrongdoings may be guided by reflecting on whether a concept that originated and developed within a non-virtual context should be exported into a foreign virtual domain. We consider this approach and several objections.
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The phenomena of call-outs and call-ins are fiercely debated. Are they mere instances of virtue signalling? Or can they actually perform social justice work? This paper gains purchase on these questions by focusing on how we negotiate... more
The phenomena of call-outs and call-ins are fiercely debated. Are they mere instances of virtue signalling? Or can they actually perform social justice work? This paper gains purchase on these questions by focusing on how we negotiate norms in speech. We contend that norm-enacting speech not only makes a norm salient in a context but also straightway creates conversational conditions that motivate adherence to it. Recognizing this allows us to define call-outs and call-ins: the act of calling-out brings with it the presupposition that its target's behaviour is norm-violating, whereas the act of calling-in simply presupposes its target's willingness to revise their belief. With these definitions at hand, we evaluate whether call-outs and call-ins are suitable tools for combating social injustice.
Kate Manne claims that her account of gaslighting rectifies regrettable deficiencies in existing theories. However, Manne hasn't done enough to demonstrate the novelty of her view given that she fails to seriously engage with a... more
Kate Manne claims that her account of gaslighting rectifies regrettable deficiencies in existing theories. However, Manne hasn't done enough to demonstrate the novelty of her view given that she fails to seriously engage with a significant portion of the gaslighting literature. This is an issue in the politics of methodology. Many theorists working on gaslighting exist within the margins, attempting to centre their perspectives over dominant points of view. We must listen to marginalised folk when aiming to understand a phenomenon that disproportionately affects them. If Manne had listened, she would have come to see difficulties with some of her suggestions, such as the possibility of unintentional gaslighting.
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This paper explores the implications of Zeynep Tufekci’s capacities approach to social movements, which explains the strength of social movements in terms of their capacities. Tufekci emphasises that the capacities of contemporary social... more
This paper explores the implications of Zeynep Tufekci’s capacities approach to social movements, which explains the strength of social movements in terms of their capacities. Tufekci emphasises that the capacities of contemporary social movements largely depend upon their uses of new digital technologies, and of social media in particular. We show that Tufekci’s approach has important implications for the structure of social movements, whether and what obligations they can have, and for how these obligations distribute to their members. In exploring these implications, we develop a tripartite taxonomy of social movements. Each type of social movement in the taxonomy corresponds to a different type of group: social campaigns, social struggles, and social agitations. We show that all three types of social movement can bear obligations in virtue of their capacities. Finally, we argue that a surprising upshot of the obligations of social movements is that members of oppressed groups can have obligations to resist their own oppression in virtue of being members of social movements.
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This chapter explores a case study in contemporary fanaticism. We adopt Katsafanas's conceptualization of fanaticism to make possible an in-depth discussion of and evaluation of a diffuse but important social movement-the anglophone... more
This chapter explores a case study in contemporary fanaticism. We adopt Katsafanas's conceptualization of fanaticism to make possible an in-depth discussion of and evaluation of a diffuse but important social movement-the anglophone manosphere. According to Katsafanas, fanatics are fruitfully understood as members of a group that adopts sacred values which they hold unconditionally to preserve their own psychic unity, and who feel that those values are threatened by those who do not accept them. The manosphere includes several social movements, including incels, men's rights activists, and men-going-their-own-way. We show that many members of these groups are well-characterized by Katsafanas's theory of fanaticism, and that they have forged their fanatical group identity using tools that philosophers have tended to associate with more benign social movements and the task of "conceptual engineering." Indeed, we think that manosphere groups have in many cases been more successful than more palatable liberationist movements, and that this case study in the dark side of conceptual engineering may be both sobering and informative.
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This paper explores the question: What would conceptual engineering have to be in order to promote social justice? Specifically, it argues that to promote social justice, conceptual engineering must deliver the following: (i) it needs to... more
This paper explores the question: What would conceptual engineering have to be in order to promote social justice? Specifically, it argues that to promote social justice, conceptual engineering must deliver the following: (i) it needs to be possible to deliberately implement a conceptual engineering proposal in large communities; (ii) it needs to be possible for a conceptual engineering proposal to bring about change to extant social categories; (iii) it needs to be possible to bring a population to adopt a conceptual engineering proposal for the right reasons; and (iv) it needs to be possible to do (i)-(iii) without producing harmful consequences. I show that, of the three dominant approaches to conceptual engineering in the literature, only one of them seems amenable to the idea that it is possible and legitimate to promote social justice in accordance with (i)-(iv).
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This paper continues a debate on the normative limits of conceptual engineering. In particular, it responds to Manuel Gustavo Isaac’s (2021) claim, in response to Simion (2018a) and Podosky (2018), but in particular Podosky, that... more
This paper continues a debate on the normative limits of conceptual engineering. In particular, it responds to Manuel Gustavo Isaac’s (2021) claim, in response to Simion (2018a) and Podosky (2018), but in particular Podosky, that cognitive efficacy, rather than truth and knowledge, should be the normative standard by which we assess the legitimacy of a conceptual engineering project – at least for ideological concepts. I argue Isaac has not done enough to show us that truth and knowledge are insignificant for the conceptual engineering of ideological concepts.
In this paper, I explain the kinematics of non-ideal metalinguistic disagreement. This occurs when one speaker has greater control in the joint activity of pairing contents with words in a context. I argue that some forms of non-ideal... more
In this paper, I explain the kinematics of non-ideal metalinguistic disagreement. This occurs when one speaker has greater control in the joint activity of pairing contents with words in a context. I argue that some forms of non-ideal metalinguistic disagreement are deeply worrying. When we pay attention to certain power imbalances in such exchanges, we are able to locate a distinctive wrong. This occurs when a speaker possesses illegitimate control in metalinguistic disagreement owing to the operation of identity prejudice. I call this metalinguistic injustice. The wrong involves restricting a speaker from participating in the processes that determine the epistemic/linguistic resources of a conversation, and/or undermining a speaker's ability to affect metalinguistic outcomes.
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Emmalon Davis (2018) has offered an insightful analysis of an under-theorized form of epistemic oppression called epistemic appropriation. This occurs when an epistemic resource developed within marginalized situatedness gains... more
Emmalon Davis (2018) has offered an insightful analysis of an under-theorized form of epistemic oppression called epistemic appropriation. This occurs when an epistemic resource developed within marginalized situatedness gains inter-communal uptake, but the author of the epistemic resource is unacknowledged. In this paper, I argue that Davis’s definition of epistemic appropriation is not exhaustive. In particular, she misses out on explaining cases of epistemic appropriation in which an intra-communal epistemic resource is obscured through inter-communal uptake. Being attentive to this form of epistemic appropriation allows us to identify unique forms of epistemic oppression that emerge as a result of socially maintained active ignorance.
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In what sense does one doubt their understanding of reality when subject to gaslighting? I suggest that an answer to this question depends on the linguistic order at which a gaslighting exchange takes place. This marks a distinction... more
In what sense does one doubt their understanding of reality when subject to gaslighting? I suggest that an answer to this question depends on the linguistic order at which a gaslighting exchange takes place. This marks a distinction between first order and second order gaslighting. The former occurs when there is disagreement over whether a shared concept applies to some aspect of the world, and where the use of words by a speaker is apt to cause a hearer to doubt her interpretive abilities without doubting the accuracy of her concept. The latter occurs when there is disagreement over which concept should be used in a context, and where the use of words by a speaker is apt to cause a hearer to doubt her interpretive abilities in virtue of doubting the accuracy of her concept. Many cases of second order gaslighting are unintentional: its occurrence often depends on contingent environmental facts. I end the paper by focusing on the distinctive epistemic injustices of second order gaslighting: (1) metalinguistic deprivation, (2) conceptual obscuration, and (3) perspectival subversion. I show how each reliably have sequelae in terms of psychological and practical control.
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Recently there has been much philosophical interest in the analysis of concepts to determine whether they should be removed, revised, or replaced. Enquiry of this kind is referred to as conceptual engineering or conceptual ethics. We will... more
Recently there has been much philosophical interest in the analysis of concepts to determine whether they should be removed, revised, or replaced. Enquiry of this kind is referred to as conceptual engineering or conceptual ethics. We will call it revisionary conceptual analysis (RCA). It standardly involves describing the meaning of a concept, evaluating whether it serves its purposes, and prescribing what it should mean. However, this stands in tension with prescriptivism, a metasemantic view which holds that all meaning claims are prescriptions. If prescriptivism is correct, then one is faced with two options: either (1) give up on the possibility of RCA, or (2) come up with a version of RCA that is consistent with the idea that all meaning claims are prescriptive. In this paper, we offer an argument for (2).
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Assuming that there is an obligation to combat structural injustice, what does it look like? I suggest that discerning what this obligation is, and on whom it falls, first requires being sensitive to facts about social structure.... more
Assuming that there is an obligation to combat structural injustice, what does it look like? I suggest that discerning what this obligation is, and on whom it falls, first requires being sensitive to facts about social structure. Importantly, we need to know how social structure is constituted, and the ways in which it can be disrupted. I argue that since social structure is constituted, in part, by concepts that undergird social practices, then our critical attention should be focused on those concepts that undergird oppressive social practices. In the end, I suggest that the obligation to combat structural injustice falls on privileged social groups to significantly aid in the processes that give rise to conceptual change.
Where do the boundaries of the ‘should’ in conceptual engineering lie? Mona Simion (2017) suggests that the right kind of reason for an ameliorative project is epistemic: revising a concept should not come at the cost of epistemic loss.... more
Where do the boundaries of the ‘should’ in conceptual engineering lie? Mona Simion (2017) suggests that the right kind of reason for an ameliorative project is epistemic: revising a concept should not come at the cost of epistemic loss. In this paper I argue that Simion’s epistemic constraint on conceptual engineering fails to make sense of important ameliorative projects. In virtue of the interdependence of thought and reality, sometimes conceptual engineering aims at epistemic loss. Given this, I offer an amendment of Simion’s epistemic constraint: epistemic loss is permissible in cases where the ameliorated concept has the capacity to causally influence the world, and can therefore make itself representationally accurate. I call this the Epistemic Limiting Procedure+ (ELP+). At the end of the paper, I suggest that we should examine a further question about the normative boundaries of ameliorative projects: What are the feasibility constraints on conceptual engineering?
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In recent social philosophical investigation, many theorists have relied on the idea that our social and epistemic dispositions depend on collective access to a shared set of concepts, or what I call a conceptual resource. What is not... more
In recent social philosophical investigation, many theorists have relied on the idea that our social and epistemic dispositions depend on collective access to a shared set of concepts, or what I call a conceptual resource. What is not said in this literature is how such conceptual resources are individuated. To address this, I propose and provide an answer to The Resource Question: What is the relationship that must hold in order for a set of concepts to be the conceptual resource of a group of people? This suggests that a conceptual resource is not defined simply by the concepts that constitute it, nor solely by the group that it is attributed to. Instead, it is defined by a relationship between groups of people and sets of concepts. After surveying some possible answers, I settle on Communication: social agents must be able to use concepts in patterned interactions of communication. This answer controverts the intuitive position that social groups are bearers of conceptual resources. I argue that conceptual resources are only indirectly related to social groups.
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It’s been 10 years since the publication of Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice (2007). New and novel forms of epistemic injustice continue to be identified and theorised; some more novel than others. A recent form offered by Daniel... more
It’s been 10 years since the publication of Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice (2007). New and novel forms of epistemic injustice continue to be identified and theorised; some more novel than others. A recent form offered by Daniel Egan Anderson is termed conceptual competence injustice; “a form of epistemic injustice that occurs when a marginalized epistemic agent makes a conceptual claim and is illegitimately regarded as having failed to grasp one or more of the concepts expressed in her testimony” (2017, p. 210). In this paper, we provide reasons to doubt that conceptual competence injustice is a novel form of epistemic injustice. We argue for this on three grounds. First, we suggest that there isn’t anything more to be learned by thinking about conceptual competence injustice that isn’t captured by testimonial injustice. Second, we show that the grounds on which Anderson attempts to distinguish conceptual competence injustice from hermeneutical injustice and contributory injustice are ultimately unsuccessful. Third, we query Manuel Padilla Cruz’s (2017) suggestion that conceptual competence injustice is useful in helping us to grasp how epistemic injustice manifests in the field of relevance theory and its application to linguistic pragmatics.
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I examine how the use of moral language is tactically employed by the meat-eating industry to exploit and manipulate the moral community. In particular, I discuss the treatment of the word " humane " in the context of factory farming. I... more
I examine how the use of moral language is tactically employed by the meat-eating industry to exploit and manipulate the moral community. In particular, I discuss the treatment of the word " humane " in the context of factory farming. I argue that when the meat-eating industry employs phrases such as " killing humanely " , it deceitfully directs the attention of the moral community by inviting us to make judgements about the method of killing farmed animals, while ignoring judgements about the whether or not such killing ought to happen. This difference is between killing humanely and a humane killing.
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Miranda Fricker (2007) explains that hermeneutical injustice occurs when an area of one's social experience is obscured from the collective understanding. However, Fricker focuses only on the injustice suffered by those who cannot render... more
Miranda Fricker (2007) explains that hermeneutical injustice occurs when an area of one's social experience is obscured from the collective understanding. However, Fricker focuses only on the injustice suffered by those who cannot render intelligible their own oppression. I argue that there is another side to hermeneutical injustice that is other-oriented; an injustice that occurs when one cannot understand, to a basic extent, the oppression of others. Specifically, I discuss the hermeneutical injustice suffered by non-human animals made possible by objectifying concepts available in the hermeneutical resource.