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Of the two leading philosophical paradigms interpreting Rousseau’s corpus as a whole, only one defends him as a moralistic and constructive author. We offer the first comprehensive and critical introduction to this paradigm, which was... more
Of the two leading philosophical paradigms interpreting Rousseau’s corpus as a whole, only one defends him as a moralistic and constructive author.  We offer the first comprehensive and critical introduction to this paradigm, which was first articulated by Ernst Cassirer, but extends far beyond Kantians.  We question its firm distinction between a lofty normative philosophy and claims amounting to merely personal deviations.  First, we find Rousseau’s theory of natural goodness to be in some ways subversive of his theories of virtue and community, especially regarding foresight, the status of politics, and the commitment to domestic virtue.  Second, the autobiographies develop the idea of natural goodness in philosophically substantive ways, and in depicting Jean-Jacques as preeminent in goodness, this two-tiered system of judgment grounds a broad range of self-exculpation.  Despite this paradigm’s illumination of what is most elevating in Rousseau, it has not done full justice to his philosophy as a whole.
Normally limiting himself to general principles, there was a unique ‘activist moment’ in Rousseau’s career when he engaged in sustained criticisms of the Genevan regime (ca. July 1762–February 1765). This article provides the first... more
Normally limiting himself to general principles, there was a unique ‘activist moment’ in Rousseau’s career when he engaged in sustained criticisms of the Genevan regime (ca. July 1762–February 1765).  This article provides the first comprehensive discussion of his civic behavior and self-understanding during this period.  It counters the main narrative of the Confessions, as well as the leading recent scholarly account, which depict him as prioritizing civic peace.  We emphasize a later quietist turn in his behavior and teaching (1766–1768).  Finally, reconsidering his earlier political thought, we challenge the prevailing scholarly view that he definitively opposed revolution.
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