Matthew Mendham

"...Hypocrisy and the Philosophical Intentions of Rousseau is a remarkable achievement.  Mendham does for Rousseau what Rousseau could not do for himself: he humanizes him.  Mendham cuts through three autobiographies and personal letters that protest too much and provides a compelling portrait of an imperfect and wounded man trying, at least for a period of his life, to live up to moral ideals of which is is not capable.... [Mendham's] contribution to our understanding of the enigmatic Genevan is considerable.  This book merits scholarly attention."

Of the two leading philosophical paradigms interpreting Rousseau’s corpus as a whole, only one defends him as a moralistic and constructive author.  We offer the first comprehensive and critical introduction to this paradigm, which was first articulated by Ernst Cassirer, but extends far beyond Kantians.  We question its firm distinction between a lofty normative philosophy and claims amounting to merely personal deviations.  First, we find Rousseau’s theory of natural goodness to be in some ways subversive of his theories of virtue and community, especially regarding foresight, the status of politics, and the commitment to domestic virtue.  Second, the autobiographies develop the idea of natural goodness in philosophically substantive ways, and in depicting Jean-Jacques as preeminent in goodness, this two-tiered system of judgment grounds a broad range of self-exculpation.  Despite this paradigm’s illumination of what is most elevating in Rousseau, it has not done full justice to his philosophy as a whole.

Normally limiting himself to general principles, there was a unique ‘activist moment’ in Rousseau’s career when he engaged in sustained criticisms of the Genevan regime (ca. July 1762–February 1765).  This article provides the first comprehensive discussion of his civic behavior and self-understanding during this period.  It counters the main narrative of the Confessions, as well as the leading recent scholarly account, which depict him as prioritizing civic peace.  We emphasize a later quietist turn in his behavior and teaching (1766–1768).  Finally, reconsidering his earlier political thought, we challenge the prevailing scholarly view that he definitively opposed revolution.

Rousseau was profoundly opposed to the dominant tendencies of his times. We focus on two “Enlightenment establishments”—the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie. Both groups were leading forces behind the Enlightenment, and both were roundly condemned by Rousseau. He castigates the indulgent idleness characteristic of the aristocrat, and with comparable force, the misguided frenzy characteristic of the bourgeois. Surprisingly, however, in his own positive alternatives, he seems to readmit certain aspects of their ways of life. His first model—simple republican citizens—practice (seemingly bourgeois) economic diligence, yet in lacking ambition and vanity, they are able to find delight and leisure in their work itself. His second model is more aristocratic, yet it is far more involved in manual labour, and content with far simpler material attainments, than most of this rank. The second model was also influential in illustrating the natural and relational delights of times of pure repose.

Summary Although Rousseau's treatment of his children has provoked much controversy, sustained and scholarly discussions are rare. This study is the first to present the evidence comprehensively and systematically. It engages each of Rousseau's contentions about his children in order to carefully discern the significance of this episode for his life and work. It offers an analytical table of each rationale—nineteen different ones, of five major types. It discusses documents of 1751 and 1778 which strongly defend the actions, the ambiguous arguments in the Second Part of the Confessions (1769–1770), the oscillations in the period surrounding the Confessions (1764–1770), and finally the development of unqualified remorse in the middle period of Emile (1757–1762). It concludes by advancing a middle position between those who ultimately see his behaviour and associated excuses as demonstrating his unchecked individualism and subjectivism, and those who ultimately absolve this episode in order to find him a moralist in good standing.

... 1 Emory University, 327 Tarbutton Hall, 1555 Dickey Drive, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA. Email: matthew. mendham@emory.edu 2 For their helpful comments, I thank Vittorio Hösle, Michael Zuckert, Jennifer Herdt, Mary Keys, Iain Hampsher-Monk, and two anonymous reviewers. ...

... 9 While not entirely neglecting Shklar's idea of “man”—that is, the domestic and virtuous life ofEmile and Julie—such readings would generally agree with Melzer in seeing this romanticization of domestic virtue and attachments as mere popularizations of Rousseau's genuine ...